@Zetherin,
Zetherin;128546 wrote:This is what I'm saying makes no sense to me. First, what is this strictly speaking direct sense (again contrasted with how we normally perceive the world)? And second, why does the fact that we experience the world with our senses mean that we are not experiencing the world in a strictly speaking direct sense?
Did you read the R. text I linked to? He explains it in there and I have explained it above. It is always possible to demand more explanations.
We don't normally perceive the world directly. We have certain sensations and then we infer that they are from certain objects that are in the world. Babies seem to have to learn this as they grow up. They learn that things continue to exist even though they may stop causing us sensations for a while (e.g. because they are out of our visual field).
Quote: In other words, this strictly speaking direct sense (which has been called several different things in this thread and elsewhere) seems made up, in order to support these claims that we aren't perceiving the true external world. It is as if these people have conjured some sort of ethereal realm where no observers are present, and in this realm the true properties exist, untainted or manipulated by perspective!
Made up? Hahaha. As a sort of wishful thinking? That's an absurdly improbable claim. What kind of desire could possibly fuel a such wishful thinking? No, it is of course not a case of wishful thinking but philosophical thinking/reasoning.
Since I agree with R. about this and so does Ken, and I do not believe in some ethereal realm (whatever that is), then not everyone that believes in sense-data believes in ethereal realms, whatever that means.
What would it even mean to deny the sense-data thesis? Suppose we deny it, what does it even mean to experience a chair? It does not mean anything. Chairs are not the kind of thing that can be meaningfully said to be experienced (in the strict sense, for surely there are other and more broad uses of the word "experience"), sensations are. Sensations are exactly the sort of thing which we are capable of experiencing, that is, after all, what a sensation is.
And yes it has many names. Kant has a name for the things/objects that cause our sensations, things-in-themselves (ding-an-sich). (Ken please confirm this as I have not read Kant yet.) These things are not directly perceivable. But that does not mean, I think, that we cannot know anything about them.
Consider as an analogy the same thing this thread is about, electrons. They are not directly perceivable (though this is in another sense, in this sense a thing is directly perceivable if it is perceivable by the unaided senses, thus without microscopes and telescopes, radars etc.).
Quote: Maybe he just means what is mind-dependent.
Which means...?
---------- Post added 02-15-2010 at 07:47 PM ----------
Scottydamion;128558 wrote:"No, stop that." lol
I do not end with the doubt however. "the moment we do we've gone mad, religious, or poetic." I see the opposite! Or at least I see doubt as a great cure for the "rationale" of the mad, religious, or poetic (leaving poetic in there just for kicks). I think the pursuit of knowledge starts with doubting all things, not that it ends there.
No one doubts everything, even though they may think they do. Neither did Descartes. It is not humanly possible to doubt everything, we cannot do it.