Why does God permit evil????

@Zetherin,

Zetherin;102980 wrote:

(and, at this point, I think kennethamy has explained what he meant with Leibniz - take a look at post #238). I, personally, agree that premise 7 (your premise 7, that is) need not be essential to theism. In fact, the majority of the premises are muddy to me, as I've noted earlier. I say all of this to make sure you don't believe this is my argument, or my 'calling out' of a contradiction. It isn't at all; I responded to help clarify others' viewpoints (which, obviously I was unsuccessful at doing). For the record, I get very nauseous when I even look at one of these metaphysical properties, and I wrastled (yes, wrastled, not wrestled) with kennethamy earlier regarding what most of this even meant.

I just want to mention again (as I have before) that although Leibniz gives an account which if true would reconcile the power and goodness of God with the existence of evil, the "if" is important. There is no evidence given that the Theodicy Leibniz presents is, in fact, true (and I am not talking about the existence of God) And there is a considerable amount of evidence against it. There is a big gap between, "this is how it could be" and, "this is how it is". In fact, that gap exists in the case of all Theodicies. That is why I said that at best, Leibniz's Theodicy solves the logical problem of evil. It shows (at best) that it is logically possible that evil is compatible with a good and all-powerful God. It does not show that evil actually is compatible with such a God. This must always be kept in mind. (By the way, the term, "theodicy" comes from the Greek, and means, "God's justice").

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@Zetherin,

Zetherin;102980 wrote:

Here's another way to look at it:

God exists

God is omnipotent, omniscient, and perfectly good

A perfectly good being would want to prevent all evils.

An omniscient being knows every way in which evils can come into existence.

An omnipotent being who knows every way in which an evil can come into existence has the power to prevent that evil from coming into existence.

A being who knows every way in which an evil can come into existence, who is able to prevent that evil from coming into existence, and who wants to do so, would prevent the existence of that evil.

If there exists an omnipotent, omniscient, and perfectly good being, then no evil exists.

Evil exists (logical contradiction).*

On first glance this proof works because God would both exist and not exist. But I see no reason why the theist needs to be committed to 6, 7, 5, 3, or even 8. Also, let's not presume that the above argument is identical to the one I took issue to.

1 Reply

@Michel,

Michel;102999 wrote:

On first glance this proof works because God would both exist and not exist. But I see no reason why the theist needs to be committed to 6, 7, 5, 3, or even 8. Also, let's not presume that the above argument is identical to the one I took issue to.

I was misunderstanding you, because this is the argument I was referring to the entire time; it is the argument we were speaking about 10+ pages ago. There are further stipulations in this one I just showed you, that I found out about (and which I still don't really understand) later in the thread. I'm sorry for all the confusion, though.

A theist need not be committed to any of these stipulations or premises, Michel. But that's not the point. The point is that, looking at the problem of evil from a formal logic point of view, there is an apparent logical contradiction. Theists need not be bound by logic, though, nor do they have to accept any stipulations or premises that they are not comfortable with.

kennethamy wrote:

I just want to mention again (as I have before) that although Leibniz gives an account which if true would reconcile the power and goodness of God with the existence of evil, the "if" is important. There is no evidence given that the Theodicy Leibniz presents is, in fact, true (and I am not talking about the existence of God) And there is a considerable amount of evidence against it. There is a big gap between, "this is how it could be" and, "this is how it is". In fact, that gap exists in the case of all Theodicies. That is why I said that at best, Leibniz's Theodicy solves the logical problem of evil. It shows (at best) that it is logically possible that evil is compatible with a good and all-powerful God. It does not show that evil actually is compatible with such a God. This must always be kept in mind. (By the way, the term, "theodicy" comes from the Greek, and means, "God's justice").

I understand. The logicality of the problem is what is focused on.

1 Reply

@Alan McDougall,

I am still looking for an adequate response to
The grieving parent
The dying child
The tortured prisoner and the OT "Why does god permit evil???"

Even if one accepts that Leibniz offers a formal (though not very plausible, very believable or very comforting) response to the classic logical problem of evil, his explanation offers little comfort to the afflicted.

The OT was about responses to the plaintive cry "why does God permit evil???" and was not confined to a logical assessment of the formal problem of evil and Leibniz's response.

To claim that this is the best of all logically possible actual worlds will be met with justifiable scorn and derision by those actually suffering in it. This is "gods will" or this is "gods plan" or "it is all for the greater good" fail the test (maybe not the formal logical test but the human religious test) of the crematories at Auschwitz.

It is time to reconsider our conception of the divine in the face of both moral evil of the magnitude of the twentieth century and the natural cataclysmic evil of mass extinctions in the history of life on earth. The classical omnipotence, omniscience, divine tyrant of medieval scholastic religion is not a tenable conception of the divine in the modern world.

To the suffering soul, I would offer "this is not god's will, this is not gods plan, and god is not standing by with the power to relieve your suffering but declining to intervene for the greater good". God is suffering with you. God is your fellow traveler who struggles and suffers to bring meaning and value into the world against the void and the forces of chaos. God is the reason why there is anything of meaning and value in the world not the reason why there is evil and suffering. God struggles and suffers for the sake of creative advance.
In short God is all good and all loving but not all powerful and all knowing.
The contradictions and logical hoops one has to jump through to maintain the omnipotence and omniscience of the concept of God are just too much for me.

1 Reply

@Zetherin,

Zetherin;103001 wrote:

I was misunderstanding you, because this is the argument I was referring to the entire time; it is the argument we were speaking about 10+ pages ago. There are further stipulations in this one I just showed you, that I found out about (and which I still don't really understand) later in the thread. I'm sorry for all the confusion, though.

No problem.

Again, I only took issue to Ken's sloppy formation of the problem. Even if we grant that he only meant to convey an appearance of a contradiction, he fell way off the mark.

Quote:

A theist need not be committed to any of these stipulations or premises, Michel. But that's not the point. The point is that, looking at the problem of evil from a formal logic point of view, there is an apparent logical contradiction.

The argument that we are now talking about is more than an apparent contradiction; it is a contradiction. And of course it matters whether the premises are essential to theism. A skeptic cannot just pull premises out of his bum and think that they pose a serious problem for the theist--he needs to show that the theist is committed to these positions. Or at least that the premises are more plausible than their negations. If not, then this is just an exercise in making logically valid arguments.

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@Alan McDougall,

Michel wrote:

A skeptic cannot just pull premises out of his bum and think that they pose a serious problem for the theist--he needs to show that the theist is committed to these positions.

Firstly, this is not simply a battle between theism and skepticism and/or non-believers. From the information I've gathered, this is a very controversial topic within many branches of theological practice. The "problem" itself could have been conjured by a non-believer who wanted to trick theists into losing faith (I don't know the exact origin), but the fact that it is studied and contemplated decades later by many theologists and holy men, says something. Many theists do accept the premises, and many do find it to be a problem.

In my opinion, it is just an exercise in making logically valid arguments, just as all arguments are which involve "God" or any number of these metaphysical properties (which, usually, can only be defined by other metaphysical notions). A theist need not accept, nor limit themselves, to this type of evaluation (trickery, really). I'd hope a theist who chooses to believe in God, whatever that God is, at least contemplate their beliefs and not immediately be influenced by some contrived "problem".

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@prothero,

prothero;103027 wrote:

I am still looking for an adequate response to
The grieving parent
The dying child
The tortured prisoner and the OT "Why does god permit evil???"

[/COLOR]

What's an adequate response?

[QUOTE]Even if one accepts that Leibniz offers a formal (though not very plausible, very believable or very comforting) response to the classic logical problem of evil, his explanation offers little comfort to the afflicted. [/QUOTE]

Are theodicies and defenses expected to offer comfort?

[QUOTE]To claim that this is the best of all logically possible actual worlds will be met with justifiable scorn and derision by those actually suffering in it. [/QUOTE]

Why?

[QUOTE]This is "gods will" or this is "gods plan" or "it is all for the greater good" fail the test (maybe not the formal logical test but the human religious test) of the crematories at Auschwitz. [/QUOTE]

What does this even mean?

1 Reply

@Alan McDougall,

I have difficulties with understanding the kind of God whom one would regard as responsible for 'the dying child, tortured prisoner' and so on. It seems to me that this reduces God to being like 'one of us' - an agent or do-er who is responsible for this or that situation. So the question is 'how can you do this' or 'allow this to happen'.

I personally don't think there is such a being; if that makes me atheist, then so be it. However if God is instead understood as 'the source of all being' or 'that by virtue of which anything whatever can exist' then there is no question of this God being responsible for any particular thing. It is not as if God is an actor on the stage. God is that by virtue of which the stage exists and the actors are able to appear on it. They can either enquire as to what is the source of all of this, and in starting to realise its nature, amend their ways and refrain from evil, or they can throw themselves further and further into the world of their own creation and willfulness. Insofar as they realise the true nature of the situation they will refrain from evil, and whatever evil they encounter will no longer seem as terrifying or as powerful because whatever being it has is only derivative and secondary.

But to try and get God to explain himself: 'why does this or that have to happen? Why do you allow this to occur?' - I cannot understand this attitude. I have had cause to ask this, in my own life; I have seen terrible things happen to those dear to me, but the question has not occurred to me. I neither ask God, nor blame God, for anything. I only seek to understand, and that understanding can only come from meditation, the abandonment of discursive thought, and a distinct sense of one's own limitations.

I am just trying to illustrate the differences between two types of understanding here. It is not as if I say this approach is wrong; it is just that I don't understand it.

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@Michel,

[QUOTE=Michel;103048] What's an adequate response? [/QUOTE] My suggestion of an adequate response was it is not part of God's plan, will or purpose. I am asking for your suggestion of an adequate response.

[QUOTE=Michel;103048] Are theodicies and defenses expected to offer comfort? [/QUOTE]No but religion is expected to comfort the afflicted. The question is ultimately not a sterile exercise in logic and logical problems but a fundamental challenge to belief.

[QUOTE=Michel;103048] Why? What does this even mean?[/QUOTE]As the machines guns mow you down, or they shove you into the gas showers, or you die an agonizing painful death and someone shouts out "It is all part of Gods plan, god's will, or for the greater good in the best of all possible actual worlds" you may begin to understand what I mean.

---------- Post added 11-11-2009 at 07:46 PM ----------

[QUOTE=jeeprs;103052] I have difficulties with understanding the kind of God whom one would regard as responsible for 'the dying child, tortured prisoner' and so on. It seems to me that this reduces God to being like 'one of us' - an agent or do-er who is responsible for this or that situation. So the question is 'how can you do this' or 'allow this to happen'. [/QUOTE] I have difficulties understanding that conception of God as well. I consider such a conception to be unworthy of worship. I also understand god to be "logos" rational agent and attribute the ability of reason to understand the universe in such a deep manner to be confirmation of the "logos" of God. So in that sense man is created in the image of god. Man is part of creation not the purpose of creation but creation is involved in creative advance towards the emanation of spirit or the manifestation of the divine. Either the child's life is valuable to God or God is not worth the worship of man. An indifferent god is of no more value as a religious concept than an indifferent universe (they are morally equivalent).

[QUOTE=jeeprs;103052] I personally don't think there is such a being; if that makes me atheist, then so be it. However if God is instead understood as 'the source of all being' or 'that by virtue of which anything whatever can exist' then there is no question of this God being responsible for any particular thing. It is not as if God is an actor on the stage. God is that by virtue of which the stage exists and the actors are able to appear on it. They can either enquire as to what is the source of all of this, and in starting to realise its nature, amend their ways and refrain from evil, or they can throw themselves further and further into the world of their own creation and willfulness. Insofar as they realise the true nature of the situation they will refrain from evil, and whatever evil they encounter will no longer seem as terrifying or as powerful because whatever being it has is only derivative and secondary. [/QUOTE] We best serve god by serving our fellow man and living in relative harmony with nature. I believe god does act in the world through nature and through natural law to create things of value in the world. My conception of God is not some detached, impassive, indifferent observer but our fellow traveler and sufferer as well as the ground of all being the essence of existence

[QUOTE=jeeprs;103052] But to try and get God to explain himself: 'why does this or that have to happen? Why do you allow this to occur?' - I cannot understand this attitude. I have had cause to ask this, in my own life; I have seen terrible things happen to those dear to me, but the question has not occurred to me. I neither ask God, nor blame God, for anything. I only seek to understand, and that understanding can only come from meditation, the abandonment of discursive thought, and a distinct sense of one's own limitations. [/QUOTE] God never does explain himself to suffering Job. God in the Judeo-Christian-Islamic tradition is understood to be a loving god who concerns himself with the welfare of his creatures. This image of the divine as concerned with us as individuals and with other creatures (each bird in the sky) is a powerful and attractive image in religion. One can anthropomorphize god too much but one can also make god too abstract, too detached from the earthly and material realm to be of much use as a religious concept. I do not expect god to explain himself to me, but I have to find a conception of the divine which is compatible with the suffering and evil in the world. For me this conception must be rational and must entail transcendent aesthetic and ethical value.

[QUOTE=jeeprs;103052] I am just trying to illustrate the differences between two types of understanding here. It is not as if I say this approach is wrong; it is just that I don't understand it. [/QUOTE] Some are perfectly content with an abstract, mystical, transcendent vision of the divine ineffable. Most I think want more tangible forms of worship and conceptualization. Certainly all human conceptions of the divine are partial and incomplete just as all material explanations of reality are but to err is human to forgive is divine. Cheers.

1 Reply

@Alan McDougall,

"Evil" or "Good" are relative "Gravitational" terms within systems in several degrees of Order...There is no Absolute Evil because ultimately Evil would be all about denying "Existence" in anyway, including the so called "evil", itself...(if one thinks on its deepest meaning)

The approach on the subject is all wrong and naive...
(...let me play naive to call you so...it fits !)

What there is in fact, is the need for Value...and for that, one needs a variation between pleasure and displeasure...simple !
...so, in the end, its all good !...(the Spice of Life as I call it)

(Get this in mind once and for all)
Nothing is wrong in Reality...The Absolute is Perfect, and therefore not Free...(but some of you will never get why this is) :nonooo::sarcastic::listening:
( ...Tedium and Boredom x 25... )

...Meta cognition, as someone said before, Meta-cognition...there you go !...

Regards>FILIPE DE ALBUQUERQUE

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@xris,

xris;102972 wrote:

Are you decribing god Alan or some childish fool.

NO God in my opinion is inscrutable

1 Reply

@Alan McDougall,

Alan McDougall;103089 wrote:

NO God in my opinion is inscrutable

Was that
No. God is inscrutable
or
No god is inscrutable?
I think an completely inscrutable god is not much use as an object of religion.

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@prothero,

prothero;103076 wrote:

I am asking for your suggestion of an adequate response.

Well, I am not at all sure that a response is supposed to be wholly adequate since it may be intended that we grapple with the amibiguity of God's existence. We might say that evil justifiably exists within the world because evil is part of a progressive growth of spiritually and morally immature human beings to moral and spiritual excellence. Philosopher John Hick believes that rather than creating humans statically within His image, God created mankind with an epistemic distance from Him so that we can freely come to know Him in spiritual and moral excellence. Had God simply created human beings knowing of His existence, then human beings could not freely come to Him because human beings would be overwhelmed by His grace and goodness. In fact, Hick says that it is logically impossible that human beings come freely into a relationship with God if they were created and virtually thrown into that relationship. Presuming that God justifiably values free relationships over unfree relationships, then it makes good sense that to think that God puts an epistemic distance between Himself and human beings. Thus, on Hick's account, human beings have free will and the ambiguity of God's existence is explicable and expected.

Hick also uses human free will to account for moral evil but he adds an interesting justifier for the non-interference of human free will. Hick says that free will cannot be justifiably violated because free will is a logically necessary requirement of moral growth. It might be asked why God did not just create free beings that always choose good actions. After all, it is logical possible to be free and always choose good actions because God is free and always chooses good actions. To this objection Hick responds that the moral virtues attained through the trials and tribulations of life are intrinsically more valuable than ready-made virtues. Thus, it is better that we struggle to be good persons rather than created as wholly good persons.

The existence of non-moral is also explained by Hick. Non-moral evil, like moral evils, are evils just because they cause pain and suffering. All pain and suffering exists because it is necessary for human spiritual and moral growth. This is because human beings cannot grow spiritually or morally unless they are challenged by the world and its environment. That is, in a world devoid of environmental risks and dangers, there is no meaningful growth because there would be nothing to overcome. Moreover, if there were no pain and suffering, then none of our choices would possess moral content because our actions could result in negative consequences. But if none of our actions have moral content, then it seems outlandish to think that there we could have moral growth. After all, nothing we could ever do would be of any moral consequence. Thus, it is because moral growth justifiably exists that pain and suffering justifiably exist.

Of course there are problems with Hick's line of reasoning. For one, it depends on a libertarian account of free will. Secondly, it is not at all clear that some of the necessities spoken of are logical necessities rather than causal necessities. Thirdly, it is not at all clear that it is acceptable to think evolved moral virtues are intrinsically better than ready-made moral virtues. After all, if God has such virtues, then they are ready-made. But surely we wouldn't have virtues with greater intrinsic value than God. Though a way out of this is to think of God as goodness itself rather than just a wholly good person. Lastly, Hick's defense against there being too many evils is hard to accept. While there will always be the most evil thing within a world containing some evil, it does not mean that such evil will be intolerable. But, then again, is our spiritual and moral growth best served is a world with tolerable evil? I don't know.

It's interesting that some doubt for Hick's argument is actually expected under Hick's argument. For as his argument says, we are expected to deal with the epistemic distance of God's existence.

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@Alan McDougall,

Thanks for mentioning John Hick and provided this account of his approach. The idea that humans must 'find their way' is quite an orthodox one, as is the idea of 'God being goodness itself rather than just a wholly good person'.

1 Reply

@jeeprs,

jeeprs;103226 wrote:

Thanks for mentioning John Hick and provided this account of his approach. The idea that humans must 'find their way' is quite an orthodox one, as is the idea of 'God being goodness itself rather than just a wholly good person'.

Two questions:

1. Hick's account might be true. But is it true?
2. Suppose it is true, and suppose moral and non-moral evil are necessary for human spiritual and moral growth (whatever that comes to). Still, is the human and spiritual growth worth the suffering and pain necessary for such growth? And, how is that to be determined? Should it be determined by those who do the suffering, and who have the pain? Or by God?

1 Reply

@Alan McDougall,

I would say that this is a judgement that has to be made by each individual for themselves.

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@Alan McDougall,

I am with Dostoevsky: One can not rationally or logicallyl explain the undeserved suffering of children and any vision of god in which such suffering is "permitted" by a god who had power to prevent is not worthy of worship.

"You see, Alyosha, perhaps it really may happen
that if I live to that moment, or rise again to see it, I, too, perhaps,
may cry aloud with the rest, looking at the mother embracing the
child's torturer, 'Thou art just, O Lord!' but I don't want to cry
aloud then. While there is still time, I hasten to protect myself, and
so I renounce the higher harmony altogether. It's not worth the
tears of that one tortured child who beat itself on the breast with its
little fist and prayed in its stinking outhouse, with its unexpiated
tears to 'dear, kind God'! It's not worth it, because those tears are
unatoned for. They must be atoned for, or there can be no
harmony. But how? How are you going to atone for them? Is it
possible? By their being avenged? But what do I care for avenging
them? What do I care for a hell for oppressors? What good can
hell do, since those children have already been tortured? And what
becomes of harmony, if there is hell? I want to forgive. I want to
embrace. I don't want more suffering. And if the sufferings of
children go to swell the sum of sufferings which was necessary to
pay for truth, then I protest that the truth is not worth such a price."

From the Brothers Karamazov Chapter 4 Rebellion

1 Reply

@kennethamy,

kennethamy;103229 wrote:

Two questions:1. Hick's account might be true. But is it true?

It is not necessary to argue that it is true. The idea behind it is that the evils of the whole are explicable and expected on theism. Thus, theists use this argument to understand that their worldview is consistent and that such evil is expected given their worldview. Thus, the problem of evil becomes the existential problem of living in a world with such evil and God; it no longer functions to doubt God's existence.

Quote:

Suppose it is true, and suppose moral and non-moral evil are necessary for human spiritual and moral growth (whatever that comes to). Still, is the human and spiritual growth worth the suffering and pain necessary for such growth?

This question is vague. If you mean any degree of suffering and pain at all, then I'd say yes. If you mean the degree of pain and suffering present within the world today, then I'm not so sure. I'm not sure because I have no idea what spiritual and moral excellence is like. But we can supplement Hick's argument with this:

1.If unnecessary evil exists, then God does not exist.
2.If unnecessary evil exists, then evil exists.
3.If evil exists, then God exists.
4. Thus, if unnecessary evil exists, then God exists.
5. Unnecessary evil exists. (Presumption)
6. God exists and God does not exist.
7. Thus, unnecessary evils do not exist.

Premise 1 is something most skeptics and theists will embrace. It's basically granting one of the premises on the problem of evil, and so I won't argue it. Premise 2 is simply analytic. Proposition 4 follows by hypothetical syllogism. Proposition 5 is a presumption for reductio; number 6 is the contradiction; and thus we conclude with 7, the negation of the presumption.

The only seriously controversial premise is 3. This can be argued by using God as the best explanation for the ontological basis of evil. We might talk about how unlikely it is that evil truly exists on atheism; or the poverty of the post plausible atheistic accounts of moral truths, and the benefits of a theistic moral ontology.

Quote:

And, how is that to be determined?

By weighing the end results with the means, I suppose.

Quote:

Should it be determined by those who do the suffering, and who have the pain? Or by God?

God knows all truths. He does not determine the truths as if He we an arbiter nor does He judge what is true. He just knows whatever is true. So, your question is a bit muddled, I think. I'm not even sure how to respond. I mean, if it were the person who judges, then we to understand that they judge as spiritually and morally excellent beings? Or now? Or...?

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@prothero,

prothero;103242 wrote:

One can not rationally or logicallyl explain the undeserved suffering of children and any vision of god in which such suffering is "permitted" by a god who had power to prevent is not worthy of worship.

But I am still having trouble understanding what this means. How could God prevent it? Is God supposed to materially intervene? Or is it a matter of there being something wrong with the nature of the world that these things can happen? There are millions, or billions, of people living in absolute poverty - how is God responsible for that? It seems concommitant with the 'argument from free will' that, in fact, human beings could ameliorate many of these evils, but do not. Human beings were, after all, wholly and solely responsible for the concentration camps. So - what would the 'power to prevent' this suffering consist of? Is it not the case that we have been given the power to prevent a great deal of it, yet we choose not to exercise it?

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@jeeprs,

jeeprs;103247 wrote:

But I am still having trouble understanding what this means. How could God prevent it? Is God supposed to materially intervene? Or is it a matter of there being something wrong with the nature of the world that these things can happen? There are millions, or billions, of people living in absolute poverty - how is God responsible for that? It seems concommitant with the 'argument from free will' that, in fact, human beings could ameliorate many of these evils, but do not. Human beings were, after all, wholly and solely responsible for the concentration camps. So - what would the 'power to prevent' this suffering consist of? Is it not the case that we have been given the power to prevent a great deal of it, yet we choose not to exercise it?

Well, consider just a single case of a child dying painfully of cancer. Presumably God can work miracles, so He can cure the child. Instead, the child dies in agony. God is responsible (maybe not for the cancer) but for not ameliorating it. (The same, by the way, is true of the concentration camps).

1 Reply

Why does God permit evil????

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