Why does God permit evil????

@Michel,

Michel;102679 wrote:

Perhaps because it is impossible to morally grow in a world without pain, suffering (or some analogue). It baffles me how a world devoid of evil, or on your terms, a world without pain and suffering, can be conducive of moral growth.

Everything that is is caused by God.

Suffering and pain are not goods.

God is all-good.

What inference allows you to infer a contradiction?

1. I did not say anything about a world without pain. I merely asked a question.

2. I did not draw a contradiction from statements 1,2,3. In fact, I drew not contradiction at all. I listed the following statements:

1. God is all powerful
2. God is all good
3. Evil exists

And I pointed out that there is an apparent inconsistency among those statements. The question is whether this apparent inconsistency is a real inconsistency. And, then, I pointed to a possible solution by the philosopher Leibniz.

1 Reply

@kennethamy,

kennethamy;102765 wrote:

1. I did not say anything about a world without pain. I merely asked a question.

Alright. Well, my best guess is that pain and suffering are essentially involved in moral and spiritual growth.

Quote:

2. I did not draw a contradiction from statements 1,2,3. In fact, I drew not contradiction at all. I listed the following statements:

1. God is all powerful
2. God is all good
3. Evil exists

You said:

Quote:

Clearly, if everything is caused by God, and suffering and pain are not good, and God is all-good, then there seems to be a contradiction.

That's a typical conditional. I'll grant you the antecedents. Where a a contradiction seem (whatever that means) to arise? If you meant something else or would like to add something into the mix, then I'm happy to assess that.

Quote:

And I pointed out that there is an apparent inconsistency among those statements.

You did not say that there is an inconsistency; you said that there "seems to be a contradiction". Contradictions and inconsistencies are not equivalent.

I'm not even sure what the word apparent affords you-why use it? I see no reason for a theist to concern himself with whether his beliefs seem contradictory or inconsistent. I mean, how is he to reply to that? I'd rather concern myself with the allegations that such beliefs are contradictory or inconsistent. But to each his own.

0 Replies

@Alan McDougall,

Michel wrote:

I'm not even sure what the word apparent affords you-why use it?

Because some things can look like contradictions, but not be contradictions at all.

Kennethamy was speaking about Leibniz, who, presumably, reconciled that contradiction (he showed that those three aforementioned premises do not actually contradict eachother). He's saying it was an apparant contradiction after the fact, because he's aware of Leibniz's reconciliation.

1 Reply

@Zetherin,

Quote:

Kennethamy was speaking about Leibniz, who, presumably, reconciled that contradiction

What contradiction? You cannot on the one hand grant that Ken is limited to an appearance of a contradiction and then on the other hand say that Ken was referencing that contradiction presumably solved by Leibniz.

Quote:

He's saying it was an apparant contradiction after the fact, because he's aware of Leibniz's reconciliation.

I'd like to know more about this apparent contradiction. Ken states that his conditional is clearly true. I'd like to hear why.

0 Replies

@Alan McDougall,

Michel wrote:

What contradiction?

I'm sorry, but have you been following the thread at all? The contradiction was argued and spoken about in great length throughout the thread. The apparent contradiction spawns from these three premises:

1. God is all powerful
2. God is all good
3. Evil exists

Quote:

You cannot on the one hand grant that Ken is limited to an appearance of a contradiction and then on the other hand say that Ken was referencing that contradiction presumably solved by Leibniz.

I don't know what this means at all, I'm sorry. I don't know what being "limited to an appearance" means.

What I did say, however, was that what kennethamy meant by "apparent contradiction" was that it looked as though there was a contradiction, but just because something looks as though it is a contradiction, it doesn't follow that it is.

Quote:

I'd like to know where is the apparent contradiction?

The apparent contradiction is located within those three aforementioned premises. If you'd like clarification as to why they are part of an apparent contradiction, all you need do is view the pages of this thread.

1 Reply

@Zetherin,

Zetherin;102837 wrote:

I'm sorry, but have you been following the thread at all? The contradiction was argued and spoken about in great length throughout the thread. The apparent contradiction spawns from these three premises:

1. God is all powerful
2. God is all good
3. Evil exists

You speak of both the contradiction and the apparent contradiction, and then act as if the two shouldn't lead to confusion. These terms are not at all clearly equivalent.

Quote:

What I did say, however, was that what kennethamy meant by "apparent contradiction" was that it looked as though there was a contradiction, but just because something looks as though it is a contradiction, it doesn't follow that it is.

Sure. Alright. But you switched your language: You went from talking about the apparent contradiction to that contradiction in an unqualified sense. Reread your post-I'm sure you can see where my confusion is.

Quote:

The apparent contradiction is located within those three aforementioned premises. If you'd like clarification as to why they are part of an apparent contradiction, all you need do is view the pages of this thread.

And I have. All I have seen are posters adding additional premises to the above 3 premises. But how does that prove their point? You cannot show that there is an apparent contradiction in those 3 premises by adding a fourth or a fifth premise.

0 Replies

@Alan McDougall,

Michel wrote:

You speak of both the contradiction and the apparent contradiction, and then act as if the two shouldn't lead to confusion. These terms are not at all clearly equivalent.

I speak in this way because I'm not sure that everyone accepts Liebniz's reconcilliation. For those who do not accept, this would still be a contradiction. For those who do, this would be an apparent contradiction. The point was that there are some things which appear to be a contradiction but which aren't contradictions at all, but then there are also things which appear to be a contradiction and which are in fact contradictions. I think kennethamy was pointing out that this appears to be a contradiction (whether it is or not is an entirely different story). I get this impression when he says this:

kennethamy wrote:

And I pointed out that there is an apparent inconsistency among those statements. The question is whether this apparent inconsistency is a real inconsistency. And, then, I pointed to a possible solution by the philosopher Leibniz.

Quote:

Sure. Alright. But you switched your language: You went from talking about the apparent contradiction to that contradiction in an unqualified sense. Reread your post-I'm sure you can see where my confusion is.

Sorry about this.

Quote:

And I have. All I have seen are posters adding additional premises to the above 3 premises. But how does that prove their point? You cannot show that there is an apparent contradiction in those 3 premises by adding a fourth or a fifth.

Not everyone added premises. Most people that I conversed with, or read from, were simply analyzing the three premises.

1 Reply

@Zetherin,

Zetherin;102842 wrote:

I speak in this way because I'm not sure that everyone accepts Liebniz's reconcilliation. For those who do not accept, this would still be a contradiction. For those who do, this would be an apparent contradiction. The point was that there are some things which appear to be a contradiction but which aren't contradictions at all, but then there are also things which appear to be a contradiction and which are in fact contradictions. I think kennethamy was pointing out that this appears to be a contradiction (whether it is or not is an entirely different story), but perhaps I am wrong in regards to what he meant.

Sorry about this.

Not everyone added premises. Most people that I conversed with, or read from, were simply analyzing the three premises.

Offer me an example. I bet that I can find your example offering additional definitions or entailments of all-goodness or evil, or modal intuitions. These offerings all work as supplementary premises to the argument. They are not just there doing nothing-they have a function.

1 Reply

@Michel,

Michel;102845 wrote:

Offer me an example. I bet I can find that example offering definitions or entailments of all-goodness or evil, or modal intuitions. These all work as supplementary premises to the argument.

Offer you an example of what?

I think you're misunderstanding me here. All I've tried to explain is what kennethamy meant when he said that there was an apparent inconsistency among those three premises. I'm sorry if I did not make myself clear.

0 Replies

@Alan McDougall,

I still do not understand. This is a two thousand year old problem. It is clear that there is a contradiction and that no adequate solution has been found. If one wishes to resolve the contradiction one must question the premises. Liebniz's offering only "solves" the contradiction by declaring that which is perceived to be evil as being necessary for the greater good. It is not a solution at all.

To the suffering child and the grieving parent "it is for the greater good" or "it is part of gods necessary plan" do not suffice. It is not an adequate or acceptable explanation. Better to offer "it is not gods will" or "not gods plan" the "god is your fellow traveler and sufferer". The only way to solve the traditional problem of evil is to question the premises or redefine divine power, divine goodness or the concept of evil in such a way as to make them worthless as a practical or religious concept.

To say that the "holocaust" was not evil because it was necessary for the greater good is to distort the religious notion of evil. In fact it was events like the holocaust which redefined the religous philosophical conception of the divine in the twentieth century. The contradiction in the problem of evil was made too real and too clear. The concept of God had to be redefined or abandoned in the wake of the holocaust. The medieval scholastic version of god does not explain and does not suffice.

2 Replies

@Alan McDougall,

How about this!

1) God allows evil so we can know and savour goodness
2) God has nothing to do with good or evil, we do what we like
3) God sets a standard whereby you must qualify, namely be good in his hypothetical eyes
4) God is playing a game with us, seeing how we cope etc
5) God is good! only humans are bad because they misuse their fee will
6) We exist in a dark universe full of evil God is trying to bring light and goodness to us
7) We exist in a universe that "was perfect and full of goodness" but now some evil agent maybe Satan is trying to undo all his work and lead us astray

1 Reply

@Alan McDougall,

An alternative perspective:

Here is a question - what would the world be like if there were NO suffering, 'evil', or anything of the kind? I mean it is crowded enough as it is, isn't it? Be tough if we had to share the place with all the species that have become extinct (i.e. about 99.9% of species) or all the beings that have died (i.e. about 99.99999999% of beings).

Or would you say, let's just reduce suffering by X%? If so, what percentage? What if there were only 10% of all the suffering in the world left? There would still be suffering? What if a smaller percentage died, or got sick, or became extinct? Would it be any better?

Is there, or could there be, a world where there is no suffering, nobody goes without, nobody dies or gets sick? It sounds very much like the traditional depiction of another realm to me. Nothing like 'the world' that we know.

I don't think it is conceivable to have material existence, the kind of existence that we find ourselves in, without evil and suffering of various kinds. It is up to human beings to try and ameliorate it as best as possible, through medicine and political means, and the like. And objectively, medicine has done an enormous amount to relieve suffering over the millenia.

But at the end of it all, if you are a material existent of any kind, then it is inevitable that you will die, loose things, get into accidents, be subject to illness, and so on. it will probably also be inevitable that there are calamities such as natural disasters, and so on. How could it be any different?

The question I think that could be asked is (and this may sound corny, but) 'why are we here'? In the old traditions, there is a view that the world is only one among various realms of existence and our being here is not accidental. Hence 'this realm' as one among others, and one in which suffering is an inevitable part. Hence the ancient idea, Eastern and Western, of 'the world' as 'vale of tears', and so forth, from which the righteous are released according to the various soteriological doctrines of the different faiths. The World, in these doctrines, is not wholly evil, nor entirely good, but humans can discern the two, and hopefully realise the unalloyed good which, as humans, we alone are able to discern.

0 Replies

@prothero,

prothero;102886 wrote:

I still do not understand. This is a two thousand year old problem. It is clear that there is a contradiction...

That's not clear to me.

Quote:

If one wishes to resolve the contradiction one must question the premises.

:brickwall: what contradiction?

Quote:

Liebniz's offering only "solves" the contradiction by declaring that which is perceived to be evil as being necessary for the greater good. It is not a solution at all.

That's not his solution.

Quote:

To say that the "holocaust" was not evil because it was necessary for the greater good is to distort the religious notion of evil.

I have yet to see a theologican or philosopher claim this.

1 Reply

@Alan McDougall,

Michel wrote:

Everything that is is caused by God.
Suffering and pain are not goods.
God is all-good.

What inference allows you to infer a contradiction?

The inference that infers the contradiction, is that suffering and pain are things which God created, but which are not good.

Just in case you don't know what we're dealing with here:

Problem of evil - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

1 Reply

@Zetherin,

Zetherin;102919 wrote:

The inference that infers the contradiction, is that suffering and pain are things which God created, but which are not good.

I'm well aware of what we're dealing with. My stance is well along the lines of Plantinga's critique of Mackie and the rest of the jejune atheology. So, we have:

1.Everything that is is caused by God.
2.Suffering and pain are not good.
3.God is all-good.

Your response is that:

4.Both suffering and pain exist.
5.Thus, suffering and pain are caused by God.
6. Thus, there exists something that is caused by God and is not good.

Where's the contradiction? :whistling: You might have a hard time finding one because there is no contradiction. You'd have a contradiction if it was granted that

7. Whatever God creates is good.

and thus,

8. suffering is good and suffering is not good.

But unless premise 1-7 is essential on the theist worldview, then the theist just needs to give up one premise from 1-7. If it were me, I'd drop premise 1 because it's not at all essential on theism if we are to understand God's causation as productive. If we understand 1 to also involve sustaining causes, then I'd deny 7. I see no reason to think that premise 7 is essential on theism.

2 Replies

@Michel,

Michel;102947 wrote:

I'm well aware of what we're dealing with. My stance is well along the lines of Plantinga's critique of Mackie and the rest of the jejune atheology. So, we have:

1.Everything that is is caused by God. ?
2.Suffering and pain are not good. Sometimes they are
3.God is all-good. No God is not

Your response is that:

4.Both suffering and pain exist. ""For a purpose""
5.Thus, suffering and pain are caused by God. ""No allowed by God""
6. Thus, there exists something that is caused by God and is not good. Yes

Where's the contradiction? :whistling: You might have a hard time finding one because there is no contradiction. You'd have a contradiction if it was granted that

7. Whatever God creates is good. "No so"

and thus,

8. suffering is good and suffering is not good. ""IT serves a purpose""

But unless premise 1-7 is essential on the theist worldview, then the theist just needs to give up one premise from 1-7. If it were me, I'd drop premise 1 because it's not at all essential on theism if we are to understand God's causation as productive. If we understand 1 to also involve sustaining causes, then I'd deny 7. I see no reason to think that premise 7 is essential on theism.

My friend you are entangling yourself in an infinite loop of philosophical jargon

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@Michel,

[QUOTE=Michel;102915] That's not clear to me. [/QUOTE] According to Leibnitz:
God can only do that which is logically possible (can not make a square circle say).
This is the best of the logically possible worlds- the one with the least evil and the greatest good. We humans cannot possibly verify that a better world is possible.
Basically Leibniz claims there is no contradiction but that we humans can not possible verify it with our limited minds and limited experience and limited ability to foresee the future fates of all possible worlds. This ability belongs only to God. So there is not necessarily any real contradiction.
[QUOTE=Michel;102915] what contradiction? [/QUOTE] You may be willing to accept that the contradiction between divine power, divine goodness and the extent and degree of evil in the world is solved by Leibniz, but I am not. Perhaps it becomes more of an evidential problem than a logical problem but it is still a problem for believers and skeptics alike and a major source of disbelief.
[QUOTE=Michel;102915] That's not his solution. [/QUOTE] I am listening.
[QUOTE=Michel;102915] I have yet to see a theologian or philosopher claim this [/QUOTE] Lots of modern theologians and religious philosophers are more willing to sacrifice divine omnipotence and divine omniscience than to declare the apparent evil in the world is actually for the "ultimate good" and part of gods will or gods plan or part of the only logically possible best of all actual worlds .
See panentheism, see process theology, see open theism.
See Charles Hartshone "omnipotence and other theological mistakes".
See Candide by Voltaire for that matter, a satirical farce on the notion this is "the best of all possible worlds".

0 Replies

@prothero,

prothero;102886 wrote:

I still do not understand. This is a two thousand year old problem. It is clear that there is a contradiction and that no adequate solution has been found. If one wishes to resolve the contradiction one must question the premises. Liebniz's offering only "solves" the contradiction by declaring that which is perceived to be evil as being necessary for the greater good. It is not a solution at all.

To the suffering child and the grieving parent "it is for the greater good" or "it is part of gods necessary plan" do not suffice. It is not an adequate or acceptable explanation. Better to offer "it is not gods will" or "not gods plan" the "god is your fellow traveler and sufferer". The only way to solve the traditional problem of evil is to question the premises or redefine divine power, divine goodness or the concept of evil in such a way as to make them worthless as a practical or religious concept.

To say that the "holocaust" was not evil because it was necessary for the greater good is to distort the religious notion of evil. In fact it was events like the holocaust which redefined the religous philosophical conception of the divine in the twentieth century. The contradiction in the problem of evil was made too real and too clear. The concept of God had to be redefined or abandoned in the wake of the holocaust. The medieval scholastic version of god does not explain and does not suffice.

Leibniz asked the question whether, given all the evils there are in the world, how is it possible that this world was created by an all-good, and all-powerful God, since we can all imagine a different world with many fewer evils or even a world with no evil. Therefore, seemingly, God could have created a better world than the one He actually created, and, if this is true, then he was not all-good. On the other hand, if He had to create the world he created, namely this world, he was not all-powerful. So, Leibniz's question was whether this world, the world God actually created, was the best of all logically possible worlds. Leibniz imagines God first deciding to create a world (which is an issue) and then, having decided to create a world, deciding which of an infinite number of possible worlds to create. And the word "possible" is important here. It means, "logically possible". There are logically impossible worlds, for example, a world that contains in it a square-circle. But that is not a world that even God could create. God cannot violate the laws of logic. So, with that restriction, God now chooses among the infinite number of possible worlds. Since God is all-good, He will want to (Leibniz says "inclined to") create the best of all possible worlds. He could, of course, create a world with no evil in it. But, would this be the best of all possible worlds. The answer is, no, because the world without evil would not have as much good in it as would a world which contained evil. As I mentioned earlier, Leibniz (who created the calculus. Newton did at about the same time) sees this a calculus problem called the minimax problem. What world would have in it the maximum amount of good with the minimum amount of evil? And He created this world. Namely, the best of all possible worlds.

0 Replies

@Alan McDougall,

Alan McDougall;102905 wrote:

How about this!

1) God allows evil so we can know and savour goodness
2) God has nothing to do with good or evil, we do what we like
3) God sets a standard whereby you must qualify, namely be good in his hypothetical eyes
4) God is playing a game with us, seeing how we cope etc
5) God is good! only humans are bad because they misuse their fee will
6) We exist in a dark universe full of evil God is trying to bring light and goodness to us
7) We exist in a universe that "was perfect and full of goodness" but now some evil agent maybe Satan is trying to undo all his work and lead us astray

Are you decribing god Alan or some childish fool.

1 Reply

@Michel,

Michel;102947 wrote:

I'm well aware of what we're dealing with. My stance is well along the lines of Plantinga's critique of Mackie and the rest of the jejune atheology. So, we have:

1.Everything that is is caused by God.
2.Suffering and pain are not good.
3.God is all-good.

Your response is that:

4.Both suffering and pain exist.
5.Thus, suffering and pain are caused by God.
6. Thus, there exists something that is caused by God and is not good.

Where's the contradiction? :whistling: You might have a hard time finding one because there is no contradiction. You'd have a contradiction if it was granted that

7. Whatever God creates is good.

and thus,

8. suffering is good and suffering is not good.

But unless premise 1-7 is essential on the theist worldview, then the theist just needs to give up one premise from 1-7. If it were me, I'd drop premise 1 because it's not at all essential on theism if we are to understand God's causation as productive. If we understand 1 to also involve sustaining causes, then I'd deny 7. I see no reason to think that premise 7 is essential on theism.

Here's another way to look at it:

God exists
God is omnipotent, omniscient, and perfectly good
A perfectly good being would want to prevent all evils.
An omniscient being knows every way in which evils can come into existence.
An omnipotent being who knows every way in which an evil can come into existence has the power to prevent that evil from coming into existence.
A being who knows every way in which an evil can come into existence, who is able to prevent that evil from coming into existence, and who wants to do so, would prevent the existence of that evil.
If there exists an omnipotent, omniscient, and perfectly good being, then no evil exists.
Evil exists (logical contradiction).*

*Wiki

Let it be known that the efforts in my postings to you are to describe and elaborate on what others mean when they cite this contradiction, when they bring this "problem" in the spotlight (and, at this point, I think kennethamy has explained what he meant with Leibniz - take a look at post #238). I, personally, agree that premise 7 (your premise 7, that is) need not be essential to theism. In fact, the majority of the premises are muddy to me, as I've noted earlier. I say all of this to make sure you don't believe this is my argument, or my 'calling out' of a contradiction. It isn't at all; I responded to help clarify others' viewpoints (which, obviously I was unsuccessful at doing). For the record, I get very nauseous when I even look at one of these metaphysical properties, and I wrastled (yes, wrastled, not wrestled) with kennethamy earlier regarding what most of this even meant.

2 Replies

Why does God permit evil????

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