General Staff to Give Briefing on Iraq Issue
TURKEY, October 12, 2003 - Turkey's General Staff is planning a press conference for tomorrow to inform the public about the deployment of Turkish soldiers to Iraq.
It is expected that the press conference will outline the latest development in talks with the US, details on where Turkish soldiers will serve, how they will get there, and a preliminary schedule of operations.
There are significant disagreements between the US and Turkish side on these issues. The Americans oppose the presence of Turkish forces Northern Iraq, fearing conflict with the Kurdish population.
Thus, general public opinion reflects a certain amount of confusion as to what Turkish soldiers are supposed to do.
Meanwhile, the 28th Mechanized Infantry Brigade, already engaged in many other international missions, has been called up for service in Iraq.
Based in Ankara-Mamak and also known as the 'Peacekeeping Brigade', the 28th Mechanized Infantry Brigade has hastened their preparations after parliament's approval of the troop deployment motion.
aa / / TURKEY
US soldiers bulldoze farmers' crops
Americans accused of brutal 'punishment' tactics against villagers, while British are condemned as too soft
By Patrick Cockburn in Dhuluaya
12 October 2003
US soldiers driving bulldozers, with jazz blaring from loudspeakers, have uprooted ancient groves of date palms as well as orange and lemon trees in central Iraq as part of a new policy of collective punishment of farmers who do not give information about guerrillas attacking US troops.
The stumps of palm trees, some 70 years old, protrude from the brown earth scoured by the bulldozers beside the road at Dhuluaya, a small town 50 miles north of Baghdad. Local women were yesterday busily bundling together the branches of the uprooted orange and lemon trees and carrying then back to their homes for firewood.
Nusayef Jassim, one of 32 farmers who saw their fruit trees destroyed, said: "They told us that the resistance fighters hide in our farms, but this is not true. They didn't capture anything. They didn't find any weapons."
Other farmers said that US troops had told them, over a loudspeaker in Arabic, that the fruit groves were being bulldozed to punish the farmers for not informing on the resistance which is very active in this Sunni Muslim district.
"They made a sort of joke against us by playing jazz music while they were cutting down the trees," said one man. Ambushes of US troops have taken place around Dhuluaya. But Sheikh Hussein Ali Saleh al-Jabouri, a member of a delegation that went to the nearby US base to ask for compensation for the loss of the fruit trees, said American officers described what had happened as "a punishment of local people because 'you know who is in the resistance and do not tell us'." What the Israelis had done by way of collective punishment of Palestinians was now happening in Iraq, Sheikh Hussein added.
The destruction of the fruit trees took place in the second half of last month but, like much which happens in rural Iraq, word of what occurred has only slowly filtered out. The destruction of crops took place along a kilometre-long stretch of road just after it passes over a bridge.
Farmers say that 50 families lost their livelihoods, but a petition addressed to the coalition forces in Dhuluaya pleading in erratic English for compensation, lists only 32 people. The petition says: "Tens of poor families depend completely on earning their life on these orchards and now they became very poor and have nothing and waiting for hunger and death."
The children of one woman who owned some fruit trees lay down in front of a bulldozer but were dragged away, according to eyewitnesses who did not want to give their names. They said that one American soldier broke down and cried during the operation. When a reporter from the newspaper Iraq Today attempted to take a photograph of the bulldozers at work a soldier grabbed his camera and tried to smash it. The same paper quotes Lt Col Springman, a US commander in the region, as saying: "We asked the farmers several times to stop the attacks, or to tell us who was responsible, but the farmers didn't tell us."
Informing US troops about the identity of their attackers would be extremely dangerous in Iraqi villages, where most people are related and everyone knows each other. The farmers who lost their fruit trees all belong to the Khazraji tribe and are unlikely to give information about fellow tribesmen if they are, in fact, attacking US troops.
Asked how much his lost orchard was worth, Nusayef Jassim said in a distraught voice: "It is as if someone cut off my hands and you asked me how much my hands were worth."
Although weblogs are often used as an opportunity for writers to post interesting links and opinions, many regard the Bush-Cheney weblog as a series of tacked-together press releases made to look like a weblog.
Unclassified Report to Congress
on the Acquisition of Technology
Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction
and Advanced Conventional Munitions,
1 January Through 30 June 2002
Iraq
During the reporting period, Baghdad continued to deny UN inspectors entry into Iraq as required by Security Council Resolution 687 and subsequent Council resolutions, and no UN inspections took place during the first half of 2002. Moreover, the automated video monitoring systems installed by the UN at known and suspect WMD facilities in Iraq were not operating during this period. Furthermore, Iraq has engaged in extensive concealment efforts and has used the period since it refused inspections to attempt to reconstitute prohibited programs.
Nuclear. More than ten years of sanctions and the loss of much of Iraq's physical nuclear infrastructure under IAEA oversight have not diminished Saddam's interest in acquiring or developing nuclear weapons. Iraq's efforts to procure tens of thousands of proscribed high-strength aluminum tubes are of significant concern. All intelligence experts agree that Iraq is seeking nuclear weapons and that these tubes could be used in a centrifuge enrichment program. Most intelligence specialists assess this to be the intended use, but some believe that these tubes are probably intended for conventional weapons programs.
Iraq had an advanced nuclear weapons development program before the Gulf war that focused on building an implosion-type weapon using highly enriched uranium. Baghdad was attempting a variety of uranium enrichment techniques, the most successful of which were the electromagnetic isotope separation (EMIS) and gas centrifuge programs. After its invasion of Kuwait, Iraq initiated a crash program to divert IAEA-safeguarded, highly enriched uranium from its Soviet- and French-supplied reactors, but the onset of hostilities ended this effort. Iraqi declarations and the UNSCOM/IAEA inspection process revealed much of Iraq's nuclear weapons efforts.
Baghdad, however, still has not provided complete information on all aspects of its nuclear weapons program. Iraq has withheld significant details relevant to its nuclear program, including procurement logs, technical documents, experimental data, accounting of materials, and foreign assistance. Baghdad also continues to withhold other data about enrichment techniques, foreign procurement, weapons design, and the role of Iraqi security services in concealing its nuclear facilities and activities. In recent years, Baghdad has diverted goods contracted under the Oil-for-Food Program for military purposes and has increased solicitations and dual-use procurements?-outside the Oil-for-Food process?-some of which almost certainly are going to prohibited WMD and other weapons programs. Baghdad probably uses some of the money it gains through its illicit oil sales to support its WMD efforts.
Before its departure from Iraq, the IAEA made significant strides toward dismantling Iraq's nuclear weapons program and unearthing the nature and scope of Iraq's past nuclear activities. In the absence of inspections, however, most analysts assess that Iraq is working to reconstitute its nuclear program?-unraveling the IAEA's hard-earned accomplishments.
Iraq retained its cadre of nuclear scientists and technicians, its program documentation, and sufficient dual-use manufacturing capabilities to support a reconstituted nuclear weapons program. Iraqi media have reported numerous meetings between Saddam and nuclear scientists over the past two years, signaling Baghdad's continuing interest in reviving a nuclear program.
Iraq's expanding international trade provided growing access to nuclear-related technology and materials and potential access to foreign nuclear expertise. An increase in dual-use procurement activity in recent years may be supporting a reconstituted nuclear weapons program. The acquisition of sufficient fissile material is Iraq's principal hurdle in developing a nuclear weapon. Iraq is unlikely to produce indigenously enough weapons-grade material for a deliverable nuclear device until the last half of this decade. Baghdad could produce a nuclear weapon within a year if it were able to procure weapons-grade fissile material abroad.
Missile. Iraq has developed a ballistic missile capability that exceeds the 150 kilometer range limitation established under UNSCR 687. During the 1980s, Iraq purchased 819 Scud B missiles from the USSR. Hundreds of these 300 km range missiles were used to attack Iranian cities during the Iran-Iraq War. Beginning in 1987, Iraq converted many of these Soviet Scuds into extended-range variants, some of which were fired at Tehran; some were launched during the Gulf war, and others remained in Iraq's inventory at war's end. Iraq admitted filling at least 75 of its Scud warheads with chemical or biological agents and deployed these weapons for use against Coalition forces and regional opponents, including Israel in 1991.
Most of the approximately 90 Scud-type missiles Saddam fired at Israel, Saudi Arabia, and Bahrain during the Gulf war were al-Husayn variants that the Iraqis modified by lengthening the airframe and increasing fuel capacity, extending the range to 650 km.
Baghdad was developing other longer-range missiles based on Scud technology, including the 900km al-Abbas. Iraq was designing follow-on multi-stage and clustered medium range ballistic missile (MRBM) concepts with intended ranges up to 3,000km. Iraq also had a program to develop a two-stage missile, called the Badr-2000, using solid-propellants with an estimated range of 750 to 1,000 km. Iraq never fully accounted for its existing missile programs. Discrepancies in Baghdad's declarations suggest that Iraq retains a small force of extended-range Scud-type missiles and an undetermined number of launchers and warheads. Further, Iraq never explained the disposition of advanced missile components, such as guidance and control systems, that it could not produce on its own and that would be critical to developmental programs.
Iraq has continued to work on UN-authorized short-range ballistic missiles (SRBMs)?-those with a range no greater than 150 km?-that help develop the expertise and infrastructure needed to produce longer-range missile systems. The al-Samoud-II liquid propellant SRBM and the al-Fat'h (Ababil-100) solid propellant SRBM, however, have both flown beyond the allowed 150 km range. Both missiles have been tested aggressively and are in early deployment. Other evidence strongly suggests that Iraq is modifying missile testing and production facilities to produce even longer-range missiles.
The Al-Rafah-North Liquid Propellant Engine Research, Development, Testing, and Evaluation (RDT&E) Facility is Iraq's principal site for the static testing of liquid propellant missile engines. Baghdad has been building a new test stand there that is larger than the test stand associated with al-Samoud engine testing and the defunct Scud engine test stand. The only plausible explanation for this test facility is that Iraq intends to test engines for longer-range missiles prohibited under UNSCR 687.
The Al-Mutasim Solid Rocket Motor and Test Facility, previously associated with Iraq's Badr-2000 solid-propellant missile program, has been rebuilt and expanded in recent years. The Al-Mutasim site supports solid-propellant motor assembly, rework, and testing for the UN-authorized Ababil-100, but the size of certain facilities there, particularly those newly constructed between the assembly rework and static test areas, suggests that Baghdad is preparing to develop systems that are prohibited by the UN.
At the Al-Mamoun Solid Rocket Motor Production Plant and RDT&E Facility, the Iraqis, since the December 1998 departure of inspectors, have rebuilt structures damaged during the Gulf war and dismantled by UNSCOM that originally were built to manufacture solid-propellant motors for the Badr-2000 program. They also have built a new building and are reconstructing other buildings originally designed to fill large Badr-2000 casings with solid propellant. Also at Al-Mamoun, the Iraqis have rebuilt two structures used to "mix" solid propellant for the Badr-2000 missile. The new buildings?-about as large as the original ones?-are ideally suited to house large, UN-prohibited mixers. In fact, the only logical explanation for the size and configuration of these buildings is that Iraq intends to develop longer-range, prohibited missiles.
Iraq has managed to rebuild and expand its missile development infrastructure under sanctions. Iraqi intermediaries have sought production technology, machine tools, and raw materials in violation of the arms embargo. The Iraqis have completed a new ammonium perchlorate production plant at Al-Mamoun that supports Iraq's solid propellant missile program. Ammonium perchlorate is a common oxidizer used in solid-propellant missile motors. Baghdad would not have been able to complete this facility without help from abroad. In August 1995, Iraq was caught trying to acquire sensitive ballistic missile guidance components, including gyroscopes originally used in Russian strategic nuclear submarine-launched ballistic missiles, demonstrating that Baghdad has been pursuing proscribed, advanced, long-range missile technology for some time. Iraqi officials admitted that, despite international prohibitions, they had received a similar shipment earlier that year.
Chemical. We believe that, since December 1998, Iraq has increased its capability to pursue chemical warfare (CW) programs. After both the Gulf war and Operation Desert Fox in December 1998, Iraq rebuilt key portions of its chemical production infrastructure for industrial and commercial use, as well as former dual-use CW production facilities and missile production facilities. Iraq has attempted to purchase numerous dual-use items for, or under the guise of, legitimate civilian use. Since the suspension of UN inspections in December 1998, the risk of diversion of such equipment has increased. In addition, Iraq appears to be installing or repairing dual-use equipment at CW-related facilities. Some of these facilities could be converted fairly quickly for production of CW agents.
UNSCOM reported to the Security Council in December 1998 that Iraq also continued to withhold information related to its CW program. For example, Baghdad seized from UNSCOM inspectors an Iraqi Air Force document discovered by UNSCOM that indicated that Iraq had not consumed as many CW munitions during the Iran-Iraq war in the 1980s as had been declared by Baghdad. This discrepancy indicates that Iraq may have hidden an additional 6,000 CW munitions.
Biological. During this reporting period, Baghdad continued to pursue a BW program. Iraq in 1995 admitted to having an offensive BW program, but UNSCOM was unable to verify the full scope and nature of Iraq's efforts. UNSCOM assessed that Iraq was maintaining a knowledge base and industrial infrastructure that could be used to produce quickly a large amount of BW agents at any time. In addition, Iraq has continued dual-use research that could improve BW agent R&D capabilities. In light of Iraq's growing industrial self-sufficiency and the availability of mobile or possible covert facilities, we are concerned that Iraq is again producing BW agents.
Advanced Conventional Weapons. Iraq continued to pursue an unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) program that converted L-29 jet trainer aircraft originally acquired from Eastern Europe. In the past, Iraq conducted flights of the L-29, possibly to test system improvements or to train new pilots. We suspect that these refurbished trainer aircraft have been modified for delivery of chemical or, more likely, biological warfare agents. Iraq is also developing and testing smaller UAVs, some of which are well suited for dispensing chemical and biological agents.Iraq aggressively continues to seek advanced conventional warfare (ACW) equipment and technology. A thriving gray arms market and porous borders have allowed Baghdad to acquire smaller arms and components for larger arms, such as spare parts for aircraft, air defense systems, and armored vehicles. Iraq also acquires some dual-use and production items that have applications in the ACW arena through the Oil For Food program.
Timber how do you feel about what the CIA actually said compared with what they actually found?
The primary objectives of the war have not been achieved. Iraq has not been disarmed of WMD ...
Saddam has not been captured or killed
the security situation is getting worse.
The only way out of this mess imo is to internationalise it
if that means the US has to eat a large helping of humble pie before the UN then so be it.
Iraq no longer has either intention or capabilty of WMD use or proliferation.
The futility and failure of Internationalization is precisely why the resumption of hostillities became necessary.
what Bush said was "We must not allow that threat to become imminent".
The US hostility toward The UN is occasioned wholly upon its having become an opponent of, not a partner with, The US in the prosecution of the interests of global stability, security, and prosperity.
We must assume that our enemies would use these diseases as weapons, and we must act before the dangers are upon us ...
( - Saddam's Iraq - ) will not be permitted to dominate a vital region and threaten the United States ...
Before September the 11th, many in the world believed that Saddam Hussein could be contained. But chemical agents, lethal viruses and shadowy terrorist networks are not easily contained. Imagine those 19 hijackers with other weapons and other plans -- this time armed by Saddam Hussein. It would take one vial, one canister, one crate slipped into this country to bring a day of horror like none we have ever known. We will do everything in our power to make sure that that day never comes.
Some have said we must not act until the threat is imminent. Since when have terrorists and tyrants announced their intentions, politely putting us on notice before they strike? If this threat is permitted to fully and suddenly emerge, all actions, all words, and all recriminations would come too late.
How can America view the UN as being in opposition to its interests when the US itself is a significant member of that body!?
That indeed is what he actually said, Steve.
Intelligence gathered by this and other governments leaves no doubt that the Iraq regime continues to possess and conceal some of the most lethal weapons ever devised.
