CHIRAC, SARKOZY The French Right prepares for presidentials

From the Guardian (so I haven't to translate French)

These maps from today's Le Parisien (page 10) show how the country is divided:





Related the report in the Independent: French electorate splits into two tribes of young and old

Murawiec's view is significantly opposite to the actual voter's anylysis (see e.g. quotes above).

Besides that, he is wrong re Bayou's party, which most clearly isn't becoming a "Christian-democratic" party - that role is already filled by Sarkozy's (and before that de Gaulle's and Girac's) UMP

(Seriously: I totally doubt that the UMP will leave the Christian Democrat International only to support Bayou's new party. Besides that, the name for new party is already known and trademarked.)

Actually, as it seems now, Bayrou's former party, the UDF, will end to exist with the founding of Mouvement démocrate on Thursday.

(The UDF was formed in 1978 by the [Christian-democratic] Democratic and Social Centre, the [conservative-liberal] Republican Party, the [liberal] Radical Party, the [centre-left] Social Democratic Party and the [centrist] Perspectives and Realities Clubs.)

Quite a few of leading members of the UDF already joined Sarkozy's UMP.
(The UMP is a merger of the Gaullist-conservative Rally for the Republic (Rassemblement pour la République, RPR), the conservative-liberal Liberal Democracy (Démocratie Libérale, DL), and a sizeable portion of the centrist Union for French Democracy (Union pour la Démocratie Française, UDF), more precisely many Christian Democrats (such as Philippe Douste-Blazy and Jacques Barrot), the social-liberal Radical Party and the centrist Popular Party for French Democracy (both associate parties to UDF until 2002.)


sources: Wikipedia France, Assemblée nationale, France 1, France 2, EUROPE 1.

Wikipedia isn't the more reliable of sources; in both 1965 and 1974 presidentielles Mitterand was supported by the French Communist Party - whether he was an actual member, ever, is said to be not proven, but the Russian archives, opened since the mid-1990s, indicate he had been at some point,


http://www.election-politique.com/pcf.php#parti

Source: website for French Communist Party (and a more obnoxious lot I've never met, personally - worse even than the old Berlin anarchists)

Speaking of the old Sovs, however, it must be said to Mitterand's credit that, soon after his election in 1981, he came across a whole group of them in France (up to no good, I guess) and he notified the U.S. a.s.a.p.

It's not for nothing he was known as the inscrutable "Florentin" - presumably meaning Machiavelli.

I haven't doubted at all - and you never wrote that, too - wether the Communist Party supported Mitterand or not.

I don't post which extreme right-wing party supported which conservative candidate neither.


Back to Sark de triomphe :wink:

LOL Walter - knowing you, I'd have thought you're staying away from Arc de Triomphe, being all the way across town at Place de la Bastille!

Seems that Mme Royal and M. Hollande (and others in the Socialist party) have some severe discussions ...

Election defeat exposes strategy split of France's 'power couple'

And in today's The Guardian ...





The French seem to have the perfect lifestyle: long lunches, short hours, great food and plenty of ooh-la-la. But their new president is determined to make them work harder, faster, more efficiently - just like the British and Americans. Merde alors, says Stuart Jeffries

Goodbye to la belle France?

Amusing article -- but not much point to it.

The problem was that despite widely available and high quality public services, ranging from public transport to child and medical care, France has become a more unequal society. Worse, the forms of inequality themselves are not readily overcome by intelligence and hard work, too often leaving the most energetic and creative people on the outside, ready to make trouble.

The economics of the system were unsustainable. Public sector productivity is low, despite the generally high quality of the services provided, and marginal tax rates are very high -- not much room there for continued adjustment.

Finally, the French themselves made this choice and did so for their own reasons, about which we can only speculate.

It is not unreasonable to assume, though, is it O'George, that you are pleased with the outcome?

You are indeed a perceptive devil !

I believe that I have been relatively magnanimous in all of this -- not at all overbearing and triumphant. (Except for a couple of pokes in Walter's eye - but he deserves it.)

Unless you were prepared to demonstrate that you had significantly contributed to Sarkozy's victory, there would be nothing for you to feel triumphant about.

I have found this interesting, and in fact began a thread about Royal quite some time ago--but it didn't have "legs." Of course, reasonably speaking, neither you nor i have a big stake in the outcome of this election (at least, i assume you don't--got any major business interests in France, O'George?).

Unfortunately, i continue to subscribe to the notion that the French have the right to make their own choices in such matters. Therefore, when Chirac (who is right-wing) would not support Bush's military adventure in Iraq, i pointed out that Chirac was simply doing the will of the French people. And Sarkozy now has Chirac's old job due to the will of the French people.

I'm doing eyerobics now.

Glad to see Walter noticed. Nothing is worse than an undetected poke in the eye.

I agree Setants, I had nothing to do with Sarkozy's victory and therefore no basis for triumphalism. Thank you for pointing that out.

I agree with you about the very interesting aspects of the contemporary political debate in France. I'm sure that the story is not yet over and that the forthcoming parliamentary elections will add a few new elements to the situation and our interpretations of it. I don't have much confidence in my understanding of the left wing in France and would be interested to know your interpretations.

I also agree that the French - like everyone else - are entitled to their own interpretation and approach to things. However, I can't escape the impression that Chirac - right wing, though he may be - was animated partly by an odd desire to take a path distinct from our own (whatever it may be) - even in the face of objective reasons not to do so. Much of this is popularly associated with DeGaulle, but I believe its roots go back to the period between the World Wars. I don't claim to fully understand it, but I do welcome the prospect that it may now be somewhat reduced.

The politics of the postwar period derived somewhat from the events which took place during the war, but i don't think de Gaulle's attitudes can be ascribed simply to his resentment of his treatment during the war.

Churchill thought he should run the whole show. "Bomber" Harris thought the 8th United States Army Air Force should just be handed over to him to do with as he pleased, and Churchill attempted to pressure Roosevelt into authorizing the hand-over. Generals Marshall and Eaker deserve credit for digging in and refusing to be lackeys of the RAF. The Royal Navy treated the Royal Canadian Navy like a collective red-eared step child, taking their destroyers for their hunter groups, and sneering at the Canadians for their lack of U-boat kills. Credit is due to Admiral King for resisting the pressure to put his resources in the hands of the Royal Navy, and for pointing out that the United States had more than 150 years of deployment and operations in the Atlantic without Royal Navy help, thank you very much.

Charles de Gaulle had as much claim to command the Free French as anyone else did, and Churchill and the Imperial Staff found him distasteful because he was "political." So French troops in Italy were put under the command of Alexander's United Nations Command, and French troops in France fought with the Third Army and with Patch's Seventh Army. At one point, de Gaulle threatened to pull his troops out of the Allied command if Eisenhower did not consent to the liberation of Paris.

But de Gaulle was a canny politician, and i don't think resentments from the war conditioned his behavior when he was President. After all, he did not stand for the office until 1958, more than 13 years after the end of the war. He had to deal with the Secret Army Organization (the OAS) and at the same time appeal to a constituency which resented the notion that as one of the Allies, they would be garrisoned by U.S. forces. The OAS even attempted to assassinate de Gaulle, but he stayed with a middle course. He accepted the need to abandon Algeria, but he still needed to deal with nationalists disillusioned by that "defeat," and the failure of the Suez operation, which had humiliated the French in the eyes of much of the public. Ranting about the Americans and throwing them out of France did no violence to the economy or national defense, and helped him to keep his broad appeal with the population. I think he was more motivated by political considerations that he was by any real antipathy to the Americans. One the lasting appeals of de Gaulle's presidency for the French was that he placed them on the map again as "a great power," which could walk a middle ground between England and the United States on the one hand, and the Soviet Union and China on the other. That may have been illusory, but it worked with the French voter.

In the case of Chirac and Iraq (nice rhyme, there), the sondages had already shown that the French public was not convinced by the American arguments, and would not support French participation in the invasion, before Chirac ever publicly turned his back on Bush. Once again, he was expressing the will of the French public.

Setanta,

Thanks for the very interesting commentary. The British had been in WWII for a couple of years before our entry, and it was, to a degree, understandable that they should wish to see us as an adjunct to their effort. As you noted, we did resist, and did so very successfully.

It may also be noteworthy that, with respect to both the French and the British, our policy towards their colonial empires was - properly - perceived by them as a threat to their traditional self-interest.

I agree with you about DeGaulle, and was very taken by your reference to his need to, "and at the same time appeal to a constituency which resented the notion that as one of the Allies, they would be garrisoned by U.S. forces". We saw the French expulsion of NATO forces as an unconscionable strategic betrayal. Where else could we position defensive forces with which to deter or defend from a Soviet attack? They saw it as equating their status to that of Germany, a former beligerant, and this touched a sensitive nerve for them. I had not considered this aspect of the situation, though it seems obvious now. I also agree about DeGaulle's management of the political forces he faced within France.

I always found the British military forces, particularly at the working level, very good and very easy to deal with. Something seemed to happen to them though when they became promoted above a certain level. Their Captains, Generals and Admirals always managed to poke their fingers in our eyes, and assert that we were relative amateurs who sorely taxed their patience and forbearance. The result was that in combined operations there was always a certain tension in the air.

Oddly the French were easier to take - though we worked with them less often. For almost a year in the Indian Ocean I regularly refuelled my carrier from a very modern and well-operated French supply ship, The "Var". We all used to look forward to helo rides and lunch on Foch or Clemenceau. However it was all very informal -- no defined organization, no press releases, no public association.

You know, that's interesting to me on another level, and that is a consideration of the quiet professionalism of French private soldiers, non-coms and company and field grade officers. During the "Crimean" War, the French and English got along well enough at higher levels (although Lord Raglan habitually referred to the Russian opponent as "the French"). But what strikes me is how well prepared the French were for a prolonged campaign, and the extent to which the English were not. The French had all their ducks in a row, had all the supplies they needed, including attractive vivandieres who sold vin ordinaire and cognac to the troops. Many, many English soldiers and officers commented on the compassion with which the French treated them in that first horrible winter as they slowly starved and froze thanks to the insane mismanagement of their logistical evidence. The French would find reasons to invite their English comrades to dinner in their well-heated bunkers, usually the excuse was the many "USO-like" tour shows which were organized and sent out to keep up the troops morale up. That provided the opportunity to invite the English in for a good meal without touching their pride. Recently, there have been quite a few studies done on the letters and diaries of officers and private soldiers in that war, which had previously been ignored or even buried, because it was humiliating for English historians to acknowledge just how badly the war effort in 1854 was so thoroughly screwed up.