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The working class uprising in East-Germany/Berlin June 1953

 
 
Reply Sat 7 Jun, 2003 03:19 pm
These days, we are celebrating the 60th anniversary of the uprising in Berlin (and other towns and cities in East Germany) in 1953.

The 1953 East Berlin popular uprising showed that the opportunities for such resistance were limited. On June 16, 1953, in a direct challenge to East German authority, workers in East Berlin rose to protest government demands to increase productivity. Although the Soviets quickly suppressed the revolt, the uprising was an unprecedented episode in the cold war--it was the first time the people had openly opposed communism in Eastern Europe.

Quote:
"Stalin's death in March 1953 raised expectations everywhere that the new Soviet leadership would relax its grip on Eastern Europe. As the first actions of the new leadership proved these hopes to be false, popular revolts broke out in East Germany, Poland, and Hungary. All were swiftly and brutally put down, either by the indigenous Communist regime or by Soviet bloc troops brought in for the purpose.

The Berlin uprising of 16-17 June 1953 was the first of these protests. It began with an orderly march in protest of newly increased work quotas involving an estimated 5,000 workers at noon on the sixteenth. This ended about three hours later, but protests resumed early the next day with some 17,000 people in the streets, a figure that may eventually have risen to anywhere from 30,000 to 50,000 to several hundred thousand by noon. Traffic came to a halt and the demonstration turned violent; thousands of people swarmed through the Potsdammer Platz to the Lustgarten Platz, tearing down Communist flags and overturning kiosks. But East German and Soviet troops with tanks and armored cars had quietly moved into East Berlin the previous night. Early on the afternoon of the seventeenth they drove into the crowds, firing automatic weapons and small arms. At 2:20 PM the East German government declared a state of emergency; the revolt was quickly crushed. Like after-shocks following a major earthquake, strikes, demonstrations and isolated "incidents" continued to occur throughout the DDR over the next few weeks, but with the crackdown on the seventeenth the Communist regime demonstrated that, even if it had little popular support, it was nevertheless firmly in control.

The Berlin uprising was a spontaneous action that took American intelligence officers by surprise. Although the United States had waged an active propaganda campaign that encouraged dissatisfaction with the Communist regime, it had not worked directly to foster open rebellion and had no mechanism in place to exploit the situation when it arose. US authorities in Berlin thus had no alternative but to adopt an attitude of strict neutrality. Many East Germans nonetheless expected the United States to intervene. These expectations persisted, unintentionally fueled by a US-sponsored food-distribution program that began on 1 July and lasted until the East Berlin government put an end to it in August.

The Berlin uprising effectively ended the limited political plurality hitherto tolerated by the East German regime. More than 6,000 people were arrested. A statewide purge eliminated dissidents both in the official party, the SED (Sozialistische Einheits Partei Deutschland), and in the state-tolerated "opposition" parties. Ironically, the principal effect of the uprising was to further consolidate the existing power structure in the DDR: East Germany's President Walter Ulbricht used the revolt as an excuse to eliminate rival factions within the SED, while measures were taken to ensure that the security apparatus would not be caught napping again." from:
June 1953


Some links to (English) websites with more information:

German Uprising of 1953


The Working Class Uprising In East-Germany June 1953


Uprising in East Berlin, 1953


Five Year Plan for Peaceful Reconstruction, 1951 - 1955

GDR-caricatures from 1953


The Importance of Alertness: an article giving advice to agitators on how to deal with the 17 June 1953 uprising
17. Juni 1953 - Project Site

Since these sites, with many, many sources, are in German only, I'll copy and paste some English sources in the following responses.
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Walter Hinteler
 
  1  
Reply Sat 7 Jun, 2003 03:20 pm
Quote:
Radio Telegram from Vladimir Semyonov Providing Situation Report to Vyacheslav Molotov and Nikolai Bulganin, 17 June 1953, as of 2:00 p.m. CET Telephonogram by VCh

From Berlin



To Comrade V.M. Molotov

To Comrade N.A. Bulganin



17 June 1953

We report on the situation in Berlin and the GDR at 2 p.m. Berlin time.

The office building of the GDR government [House of Ministries], which was attacked by demonstrators, has been liberated after the arrival of tanks. The demonstrators were also repulsed from the SED Central Committee building and the Police Presidium building. The German police and our troops opened fire on the demonstrators at the Police Presidium building. We do not have information on dead and wounded.

In the districts of Alexanderplatz and Pankow, demonstrators built barriers and roadblocks. The provocateurs organized a pogrom of the bookstore "The International Book". In some government buildings and shops, windows were smashed.

Until our troops took active measures to settle the unrest, the demonstrators succeeded in overcoming resistance by the German People's Police and the Garrisoned People's Police, who in general did not hold them off. With the start of active intervention by our troops, the situation in Berlin began to normalize. Demonstrators dispersed after the appearance of Soviet tanks.

At 12:00 p.m., U-Bahn and S-Bahn traffic stopped as per our instruction in order to impede the arrival of provocateurs from West Berlin.

At 1:00 p.m., martial law was declared in Berlin.

In the past hours one can see in Berlin a certain decline in disturbances. Various worker groups have left the demonstrations and gone back to work or home.

The situation in the GDR is gradually becoming normal once again.

The most serious situation is in the city of Görlitz on the German-Polish border where a mob of 30,000 destroyed SED offices, the prison, and the buildings of the security service and district committee. A reinforced armor battalion with tanks was deployed to Görlitz.

In Magdeburg, provocateurs set the SED Municipal Committee building and the prison on fire and had a shoot-out with GDR State Security troops. Soviet troops were deployed to the city. Disturbances reached a significant scale in Halle. Some 1,000 workers from the Leuna and Buna factories, most of whom were intoxicated, overwhelmed the police protection in the factories.

In Berlin some 70 people were arrested.

Soviet troops operating in the GDR and troops of the People's Police and Garrisoned Police detachments were given the order to use their weapons if necessary to arrest and punish the instigators of the unrest.

We will report on further development.



Semyonov





[Source: AVP RF; f. 06,op. 12a, pap. 51, d. 300. Übersetzung : Benjamin Aldrich-Moodie, dok. in: Christian F. Ostermann (Hg.), Uprising in East Germany. The Cold War, the German Question and the First Major Upheaval Behind the Iron Curtain. National Security Archive Cold War Readers, New York: CEU Press 2001, Dokument Nr. 28, S. 186/87.]
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Walter Hinteler
 
  1  
Reply Sat 7 Jun, 2003 03:21 pm
Situation report from Andrei Grechko and A. Tarasov to Nikolai Bulganin, 17 June 1953, received 6:30 p.m. Moscow Time (4:30 p.m. CET)
Quote:

OPERATIONS DIVISION, MAIN OPERATIONS ADMINISTRATION GENERAL STAFF OF THE SOVIET ARMY

TOP SECRET
Copy #6

>To Comrade Bulganin, N.A.



The situation in Berlin is improving. The principal government and civil service buildings, such as [the ones occupied by] the Council of Ministers, the SED Central Committee, and the Police headquarters, are secured and guarded by our forces. The primary districts of the Soviet sector of Berlin are under the control of our forces.

According to preliminary data, forty-six active instigators were arrested. The situation at the buildings occupied by the SED Central Committee and the government is peaceful.

All the roads on the way to these buildings are blocked by our troops, tanks, and artillery. The tanks and armored personnel carriers are finishing dispersing the demonstrators. Some demonstrators are leaving the columns and hiding along the side streets. Some three thousand demonstrators are gathering at Friedrichstrasse in the American sector of Berlin. Demonstrators shouted anti-government slogans, demanded the immediate resignation of the present government of the German Democratic Republic, and a decrease in prices by 40 percent, the defense of the strikers, the abolition of the [East] German armed forces and the People's Police, and the return of the territories of Germany that were given to Poland, as well as other anti-Soviet slogans.

Martial law was introduced in the Soviet sector of Berlin at 1:00 p.m. on 17 June, local time.

To restore order, the 2nd Mechanized [Soviet] Army, consisting of the 1st and the 14th mechanized divisions and the 12th tank division, was brought into Berlin and given the task of restoring complete order in the city by 9:00 p.m. on 17 June.

The units of the above divisions will be reaching the outskirts of the city by 4.00 - 6.00 p.m. The members of the GDR government have been evacuated from the dangerous areas and are with comrade Semyonov.

With the intention to restore public order and terminate the anti-government demonstrations which have occurred, martial law has been declared in Magdeburg, Leipzig, Dresden, Halle, Görlitz, and Brandenburg.

Today, at 2.00 p.m., local time, a declaration was issued by the government of the German Democratic Republic to the German people which explained the nature of events that have taken place and called for the unity and opposition to the fascist and reactionary elements.

Grechko

Tarasov



Received on telephone by Lieutenant-Colonel N. Pavlovsky

17 June 1953, 6.30 p.m.

(Signature)


[Source: AGSh, f. 16, op. 3139, d. 155, II. 8-9. Übersetzung: Victor Gobarev. Zuerst veröffentlicht in: Cold War International History Project Bulletin, No. 10 (March 1998), pp. 87-88. - Auch dok. in: Christian F. Ostermann (Hg.), Uprising in East Germany. The Cold War, the German Question and the First Major Upheaval Behind the Iron Curtain. National Security Archive Cold War Readers, New York: CEU Press 2001, Dokument Nr. 30, S. 190/91


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Walter Hinteler
 
  1  
Reply Sat 7 Jun, 2003 03:25 pm
Quote:
Cable from Cecil Lyon to U.S. Department of State Relaying Minutes of the First Meeting of the Western Military Commandants in Berlin, 17 June 1953, 6:00 p.m. CET

INCOMING TELEGRAM

Department of State
ACTION COPY

Control: 6114
Rec'd: June 17, 1953 2:37 p.m.
From: BERLIN
To: Secretary of State

No: 1670, June 17, 6 p.m.



French chairman Commandant called meeting this morning at 11 to consider situation arising from disturbances in East Berlin.

French Commandant reported that some thousand Germans have entered French sector from East Zone with intent [to] cross into East sector of Berlin to demonstrate. French officers, having noted that sector border was guarded by VOPOS and Soviet soldiers carrying automatic weapons, warned demonstrators against proceeding into Soviet sector. West Berlin police had been asked to assist in this matter, but their hearts not (repeat not) obviously in work. Commandants agreed that as their mission Berlin was to maintain law and order West Berliners and Soviet Zone residents transiting the West sectors should if possible be dissuaded from mixing in East Berlin demonstrations where serious possibility of bloodshed existed.

Commandants also agreed situs near sector border of West Berlin sympathy demonstration scheduled for this afternoon appeared undesirable.

Commandants then called in Acting Mayor [Walter] Conrad and Police President [Johannes] Stumm and French chairman informed them as follows:

1. Commandants consider their primary duty to maintain law and order in their sectors in Berlin. They appreciate sympathy of West Berliners for their fellow citizens in the East.

2. Commandants will not (repeat not) oppose orderly meeting or demonstrations of sympathy. However, they feel it their duty to warn West Berliners of grave consequences which might result were West Berliners to participate in manifestations in East sector. In this they are expecting the usual full cooperation of West Berlin police.

3. Commandants understand that West Berlin meeting is scheduled to take place at six this evening at Oranien Platz (SPD-sponsored sympathy rally). Commandants have no (repeat no) objection to such a meeting taking place, but feel that place chosen is too close to sector border and consequently might result in serious consequences. They, therefore, request that another meeting place be selected more removed from the sector borders.

4. Commandants scarcely feel it necessary to remind [West Berlin] Senat that status of Berlin is Allied responsibility and expect Senat to take no (repeat no) initiative to change it without consulting Allied Kommandatura.

Dr. Conrad speaking in name of Senat said that the Senat had no (repeat no) objection to Commandants' proposals. He pointed out that both yesterday and today he had been purposefully reticent so as not to give Soviets or GDR excuse to say that Western authorities behind movement. Conrad said this point of view was shared by the three parties, with the leaders of which he had just met and by his colleagues in the Senat. He indicated that they understood that West Berliners could not (repeat not) adopt callous attitude but that they must be very careful in every act they take and particularly in expressions which might be made at meeting planned for this afternoon. He reported that the street cars, buses ,S-bahn, and U-bahn in East ceased functioning; also that East sector was controlled by Soviet tanks and that very few VOPOS were in evidence; most of latter reportedly deployed to sector zonal borders to prevent influx of masses from East Zone into East Berlin. Conrad indicated that deputation from East Zone was at this movement awaiting him at the Rathaus.

Police President Stumm confirmed reports on transportation situation. He said reports indicated that large crowd had assembled in Leipzigerstrasse near GDR Government headquarters, which was cordoned off and protected by Soviet troops. Crowds had been dispersed there with hoses. He also said HO Building Potsdamer Platz had been stoned. He confirmed there had been no (repeat no) demonstrations hostile to West Berlin. Situations here calm and police were fully alerted. Conrad then indicated he had emphasized when questioned by foreign journalists today and yesterday that situation in the East was in his opinion entirely spontaneous and not (repeat not) as he had been suggested (a) inspired by American instigators (b) inspired by Soviet military in attempt to rid themselves of SED leaders.

Conrad also requested Allied assistance in air passage for Reuter to return to Vienna tomorrow.

Conrad asked that House Representatives Council of Elders be permitted to decide where this afternoon's meeting of sympathy be held, emphasizing that city officials' views re danger of meeting too close to sector borders coincided with those of Commandants. Conrad also suggested that if there was much bloodshed in East, Commandants consider visiting Soviet officials and urging restraint.



Lyon



TT: HMR/14

Note: Advance copy to GER 5:25 p.m. 6/17/53 CWO-JRL.





[Source: NARA, RG 59, 762A.0221/6-1755, dok. in: Christian F. Ostermann (Hg.), Uprising in East Germany. The Cold War, the German Question and the First Major Upheaval Behind the Iron Curtain. National Security Archive Cold War Readers, New York: CEU Press 2001, Dokument Nr. 32, S. 1194/95.]
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Walter Hinteler
 
  1  
Reply Sat 7 Jun, 2003 03:26 pm
Quote:
Situation Report from Andrei Grechko and A. Tarasov to Nikolai Bulganin, 17 June 1953, as of 11:00 p.m. Moscow Time (9:00 p.m. CET)

OPERATION DIVISION, MAIN OPERATIONS ADMINISTRATION
GENERAL STAFF OF THE SOVIET ARMY

TOP SECRET
Copy #6

To Comrade Bulganin, N.A.

I am reporting on the situation in the GDR and Berlin as of 11 p.m., 17 June 1953 (Moscow time).

1. The Soviet forces, namely the 1st mechanized infantry division, the 14th mechanized infantry division, and the 12th tank division (altogether 600 tanks), have for the most part restored order in the Soviet sector of Berlin. The provocative plan of the reactionary and fascist elements has collapsed.

There have been only minor groups around the Alexanderplatz and Stalinallee area downtown in the evening, which are being dispersed and arrested by our troops.

[We] can surmise that a special organization based in West Berlin has directed the strikes in East Berlin.

Analyzing the situation, I have also come to the conclusion that the provocation was prepared in advance, organized and directed from Western sectors of Berlin. The simultaneous actions in the majority of the major cities of the GDR, the same demands of rebels everywhere as well as the same anti-state and ant-Soviet slogans, are proof for this conclusion.

As the result of measures undertaken in the Western sectors of Berlin, there were large gatherings of German residents at the borders between the Soviet sector and the British and American ones by 8:00 p.m.

The border with the Western sectors of Berlin was closed by our troops.

There were no clashes at power stations, gas plants, water supply, and railroads.

About 300 organizers and provocateurs were arrested in Berlin by 8:00 p.m.

2. Order was restored in the majority of the cities of GDR. A normal state of affairs and activity of state institutions were restored toward the end of the day. Order was restored by measures undertaken in Magdeburg. Fifty Germans were killed and wounded, and over 100 instigators and provocateurs have been arrested during the restoration of order.

3. With the purpose of preventing possible further riots, the forces of the Group [of the Soviet Occupation Forces in Germany] were dispatched from the field camps into the following major, important population centers by the morning of 18 June:

The 3rd Army - the 19th mechanized division into Magdeburg; the 136th artillery-technical, tank & self-propelled gun regiment into Burg; the 13th mechanized division into Parchim, Ludwigslust, Perleberg; the 207th infantry division into Gardelegen, Stendal.

The 8th Guards Army - the 20th Guards mechanized division into Weimar, Jena, Zeitz; the 21st Guards mechanized division into Halle, Merseburg; the 57th Guards infantry division into Naumburg, Weissenfels and its one infantry regiment into Eisenach.

The 1st Guards Army - the 11th tank division into Dresden (the main forces) and Meissen, Königsbruk (the minor forces); the 8th Guards mechanized division into Leipzig (the main forces) and Borna, Grimma (the minor forces); the 9th tank division into Piesa, Oschatz, Zeithavn.

The 3rd Guards Mechanized Army - the 6th Guards tank division into Dessau, Wittenberg; the 9th mechanized division into Lubben, Cottbus, Spremberg.

The 4th Guards Mechanized Army - the 6th Guards mechanized division into Bernau, Eberswalde, Bad Freienwalde; the 7th Guards mechanized division into Fürstenwalde, Frankfurt an der Oder.

The motorbike battalion and the howitzer battalion of the 10th tank division into Brandenburg; the 25th tank division (a tank regiment and a mechanized infantry regiment) into Oranienburg.

4. According to preliminary information, the losses of the strikers in the whole territory of the DDR have been: 84 people killed and wounded, 700 men arrested. Our exact losses are being determined.

5. Martial law was declared in the British sector of Berlin. Soldiers are not allowed to leave the barracks. The patrols at the border with the Soviet sector have been reinforced. Troops in the American and French sectors of Berlin are in Barracks.



Grechko

Tarasov



"Correctly": COLONEL-GENERAL MALININ

17 June 1953





[Source: AGSh, f. 16,op. 3139, d. 155, II. 12-14. Übersetzung: Victor Gobarev. Zuerst veröffentlicht in: Cold War International History Project Bulletin, No. 10 (March 1998), S. 89. Auch dok. in: Christian F. Ostermann (Hg.), Uprising in East Germany. The Cold War, the German Question and the First Major Upheaval Behind the Iron Curtain. National Security Archive Cold War Readers, New York: CEU Press 2001, Dokument Nr. 33, S. 196/97.]
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Walter Hinteler
 
  1  
Reply Sat 7 Jun, 2003 03:27 pm
Quote:
Cable from Cecil Lyon to the State Department Reported on Afternoon Meeting of the Western Commandants, 17 June 1953, 9:00 p.m. CET

INCOMING TELEGRAM

Department of State

ACTION COPY

Control:6205
Rec'd: June 17, 1953 6:37 p.m.

From: BERLIN
To: Secretary of State
No: 1676, June 17, 9:00 p.m.

CDT's [Commandants] reconvened again this afternoon to discuss Berlin developments. Following again was taken:



(1) Press release issued, as follows:

"The British, French and US CDTs met with the Berlin municipal authorities this morning. Together they considered all aspects of present situation. The CDTs and the Berlin authorities fully agreed on the need of maintaining public order in the Western Sectors and on the advisability of adopting a completely calm attitude.

They noted certain information according to which demonstrations in Soviet Sector were alleged to have been incited by West Berlin agents. Since such allegation may give rise to serious misunderstandings as to the origin of such demonstrations, the French, British and US CDTs stressed clearly that, neither the Allied authorities nor the West Berlin authorities have, in any manner whatsoever, either directly or indirectly, incited or fostered such demonstrations."

(2) Again discussed West Berlin sympathy rally, since Berlin authorities reported that it was too late to change locale thereof. French and British Generals felt that CDTs should order police to prohibit holding of meetings at Oranien Platz. General Timberman argued that even if order given it would probably be impossible for Police to execute order as crowds already gathering. Finally it was decided to send word to Dr. Suhr, who was addressing meeting, that he should do his best to move crowd away from sector border in order to avoid spilling German blood.

(3) Considered question of having chairman CDT call on Dengin with view to urging restraint on part of Soviets. French CDT indicated that French High Commissioner with whom he had discussed possibility of some such action urged that initiative by Allies on this matter be delayed.

(4) British CDT stated he had received information from British High Commissioner that latter had communicated with Vienna and requested that all possible be done to assist and expedite Reuter's return to Berlin.

(5) CDTs decided refrain from using Allied military personnel in disturbance unless disorders became widespread in all Western Sectors or extremely serious in any one or more Sector. In case of such emergency if time permitted CDTs would meet and discuss question before issuing orders. However, if situation was so pressing then any one of CDTs would make his own decision re using his troops in his own Sector.

(6) Instructed communication officers to ascertain facts on S-Bahn situation since considerable number of S-Bahn trains are at present idle in the Western Sector.

Latest reports indicate SPD meeting at Oranien Platz took place without disturbance in originally announced location. Crowd, which was in neighborhood of 35,000, was quiet and speeches given by [West Berlin union leader Ernst] Scharnowski and [Joachim] Lipschitz were not (repeat not) inflammatory. Both speakers demanded free elections with Scharnowski emphasizing need for free unions in Soviet Zone and Lipschitz stressing necessity Allied action to solve German question. Most surprising feature of speeches was statement by Lipschitz to effect entire disturbances manipulated by Soviets in order get rid of SED Government.

Large restrictive crowd which had gathered both sides Potsdamer Platz disbursed about 8:15 [p.m.] after intermittent shootings and several buildings on East side set fire.

CDTs plan meet again in morning at 9:30 [a.m.] though all three prepared meet any time during night if situation requires.



Lyon



MGG: MEJ/1

Note: Advance copy to Mr. Montenegro 6/17/53, 9:45 p.m. EH.





[Source: NARA, RG 59, 662A.0221/6-1753, dok. in: Christian F. Ostermann (Hg.), Uprising in East Germany. The Cold War, the German Question and the First Major Upheaval Behind the Iron Curtain. National Security Archive Cold War Readers, New York: CEU Press 2001, Dokument Nr. 34, S. 198/99.]
0 Replies
 
Walter Hinteler
 
  1  
Reply Sat 7 Jun, 2003 03:28 pm
Quote:
Telephonogram from Vladimir Semyonov and Marshal Vasilii Sokolovskii to Vyacheslav Molotov and Nikolai Bulganin Reporting on the Situation in East Berlin, 17 June 1953, as of 11:00 p.m. CET

SECRET
Copy #14

TELEPHONOGRAM BY VCH

From Berlin 17
June 1953

To comrade V.M. Molotov
To comrade N.A. Bulganin

We report on the situation in Berlin and the GDR at 11 p.m., 17 June.

The disorders in Berlin have been stopped. The streets are calm. In connection with the implementation of martial law from 9 p.m. to 5 a.m., the movement of transportation and walking on the streets were halted in the Soviet sector of the city. A small number of people were arrested for breaking this order.

Our troops and the German police are in control of all key streets and important installations in the Soviet sector of the city. The most attention has been paid to the defense of the sector border between East and West Berlin, across which a number of large groups of provocateurs and hooligans from West Berlin had broken through into the Soviet sector in the evening. On the streets Brunnenstrasse and Bernauer Strasse, these gangs started a shootout with the German police, which resulted in casualties. According to preliminary information, 79 German policemen were injured and 2 policemen are missing as a result of the disturbances in the Soviet sector. West Berlin radio is reporting that 7 demonstrators were killed and 66 people were injured. As yet, there are no complete reports on the number of casualties.

In its broadcasts, the American radio station RIAS is calling upon the rebels to submit to the orders of the Soviet authorities and avoid clashes with the Soviet troops.

In the majority of cities in the GDR, order has been fully restored. There are reports of continuing disorders only in the two small cities of Apolda and Mühlhausen.

According to incomplete data, 700 instigators of the disorders have been arrested in the Republic, 300 of whom were in Berlin.

Measures are being taken to reestablish normal operation of all enterprises in the Republic, as well as measures to prevent interruptions in the food supply to the inhabitants of Berlin.

The GDR government has called upon the people to swiftly reestablish social order and normal operation of enterprises.



Sokolovskii

Semyonov



Sent by Blatov

Received by Roshchina

18.VI.1953

2 hours, 45 min.





[Source: AVP RF, f. 082, op. 41, port. 93, pap. 280, II. 3-4. Übersetzung: Daniel Rozas; dok. in: Christian F. Ostermann (Hg.), Uprising in East Germany. The Cold War, the German Question and the First Major Upheaval Behind the Iron Curtain. National Security Archive Cold War Readers, New York: CEU Press 2001, Dokument Nr. 35, S. 200/201.]
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Walter Hinteler
 
  1  
Reply Sat 7 Jun, 2003 03:31 pm
The view of someone, who was personally involved:
Personal experiences by a GDR-citizen

This is the official webpage of Mr. Karl-Heinz Pahling, a local leader of the people's uprising of 17th June 1953 in the former GDR (German Democratic Republic).

He was sentenced to 10 years' in prison of Brandenburg-Görden. He could leave the prison in November 1960 after almost 8 years.

After his prison sentence he chose to stay in East Germany for private reasons. He married to is wife Karin in 1962. Their son Peer was born in 1963, their daughter Regina was born in 1968.
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Walter Hinteler
 
  1  
Reply Sat 7 Jun, 2003 03:34 pm
The Berlin radio staion RIAS (= Rundfunk Im Amerikanischem Sektor = Radio in the American sector) became very famous especially because of its participation in the events.

From: Unintended Consequences:
RIAS and the Cold War
by Prof. Howard S. Pactor, University of Florida, Gainesville
History of RIAS
Quote:


The RIAS broadcasts, throughout its 46 years, were an irritant for the East German leaders. The GDR chairman, Wilhelm Pieck, once railed that "RIAS is nothing more than poison! Time and time again, it undermines our efforts to direct the thinking of the people into correct political lines. It makes us look ridiculous!" The vilification of RIAS was on-going and East German/Soviet jamming of the RIAS signal was intense. By the end of 1953, the East Germans were operating at least four or five jamming operations to prevent RIAS' signal from reaching its intended audience.
Perhaps the most important single event in RIAS' history, with the world looking on, occurred when workers in East Berlin struck. Early in 1953 the RIAS called for voluntary increase in work norms for all East German workers; RIAS, during this period, provided considerable programming in its broadcast series, "Workday in the Zone" and "Berlin Speaks to the Zone," about the effects of the decision to increase. In June the East German government ordered a ten-percent increase in the already-impossible work norms in the construction projects along Stalinallee, the showcase apartment blocks being built in the eastern sector. The increase in work norms came on top of salary cuts and other speed-ups resulting in severe decreases in purchasing power of the East German mark.
During the evening of June 15, 1953, RIAS reported that three isolated demonstrations against the increase had occurred; no other news agencies carried the story. Workers had had enough and marched on SED (Communist) Party headquarters with a petition demanding revocation of the latest increase of work norms. The party leadership refused the petition. With the work stoppage and march on the 16th, RIAS began carrying reports of the events at 4:30 that afternoon; a visit by a workers delegation to RIAS was reported by the station on its 6:30 p.m. broadcast and at 7:30 the RIAS broadcast the workers' demands. These included free, secret elections, lowering the cost of living and the abolition of norms. Acceptance of the demands was not conditional; if the demands were not met by the morning of the 17th, the workers would strike, which they did. More workers in the eastern sector joined in the protest and the SED leaders first used the state security agency to quell the protests. When this failed, the Red Army was called in and the demonstrations became far more violent with shootings, injuries and deaths. Although RIAS was playing a role in a dangerous situation, the station did not involve itself in directing the strike. Basically, it provided a running report of the events and a forum for the workers to air their demands-something they could not do in the controlled media of the Soviet zone.

In effect, RIAS' broadcasts of the riots served as something of a command post. It passed along information about the locations of the protesters in Berlin, explaining problems and demands, reporting the results of negotiation and, through its information sources in the GDR, acted as a catalyst for protests in other East German cities. Support for the workers' demands and protests were recorded in more than 270 cities and towns in the East Zone. RIAS avoided direct involvement in the riots, but it was perilously close to involvement. "Without RIAS, the zone would not have learned about the strike [in Berlin] for days, and the national insurrection might never have taken place."
Although RIAS was perhaps more deeply involved in the events of June 17th than many observers would have liked, the events in the East did involve, and even threaten the safety and well-being of fellow Germans, the emotional connections were far too great for the station to ignore. In the long term, the broadcasts of the events in June, and the programming both before and after the event, firmly established RIAS in the hearts of Berliners and those who lived in the GDR. Listeners in the East knew there was a free source of news and information, no matter how dangerous it might be to listen to the broadcasts.
0 Replies
 
Walter Hinteler
 
  1  
Reply Fri 13 Jun, 2003 01:04 am
Obviously, a crisis from the past doesn't attract attention - althought, IMHO, it changed the world for at least a couple of decades.
0 Replies
 
nimh
 
  1  
Reply Wed 23 Jul, 2003 01:00 pm
Walter Hinteler wrote:
Obviously, a crisis from the past doesn't attract attention - althought, IMHO, it changed the world for at least a couple of decades.


Hmmm ... isn't the tragedy of the '53 uprising that it didnt change the world?

Just from the top o' my head -
- Budapest '56 led the Hungarian government, first, to clamp down harshly, but then, to develop "gulash communism" - pioneering a pragmatic, relatively consumer-satisfaction brand of communism that can be argued to have prolonged the lifespan of communism as a state system. (As well as, on an aside, saving a place for the ex-communist parties in post-89 democracy in the countries where it was practiced).
- Prague '68, inversely, provoked the Czechoslovak, and to some degree also the Soviet and other EE leaderships, to turn back from any further reform project that might have modernised or imploded communism, and instead turned them introvertly to a culture of political and economic stagnation. That stagnation can be argued to have gradually rotten away any resolve (whether ideological or totalitarian of nature) from inside, so that those regimes fell like houses of cards in 89.
- So both of those revolts were, one could say, the impetus for a distinct turn in the development of east-european communism, which in turn determined how long it was to last, what character it was to have, and how it would end.

In comparison, what change did the '53 insurrection spur? One could say the development was of an opposite sequence to that of Hungary after '56 -persuading the regime, at first, to take it a little more slowly with its industrial bully-policies, whereas in the long term it actually helped to push it to a harsher line. After all, one can say that the '53 uprising - especially because it was workers who revolted - brought it home to the communist rulers as glaringly as anything could have done that they had now, de facto, become prison wardens. It must have destroyed most remaining illusions party members might have had about how they were "building a better Germany", focusing their attention instead to a more pragmatic "how are we going to stay in power".

But, if we consider this harsher line to encompass the wholesale closing-off of the GDR, leading up to the building of the wall, then that was hardly the work of '53 by itself. It was the massive, ongoing emigration more than anything else that pushed the GDR to building the wall - and it was that emigration that brought the point above home on a much more continuous, and equally visible, basis. The uprising merely punctuated it.

What do you think were the most important ways in which '53 itself "changed the world"?
0 Replies
 
Walter Hinteler
 
  1  
Reply Wed 23 Jul, 2003 01:47 pm
Well, it changed the world.

This has been the first attempts by people of Eastern Europe to rise up against their Soviet occupiers. Not the last, you showed that above.)
In none of these cases of uprisings in Eastern Europe, the West come to aid of those fighting for their freedom. (Only sending messages etc.).

This showed people in the GDR and in other Soviet "connected" countries, that an uprise was possible.
It showed the West ... the same.

So, you are right, nimh, it didn't change the world.
0 Replies
 
nimh
 
  1  
Reply Wed 23 Jul, 2003 01:49 pm
One important thing about '53 was that it was a workers' revolt. The fact that it was workers who revolted first against the new communist regime - that they protested in first instance exactly those things in which a communist state, theoretically, should have proven itself superior (working conditions, workers' wages, workers' rights) - and that it was these workers who so automatically connected those issues with the demand for free elections etc - totally blew many a communist's case and argument out of his hands, forever.

On the other hand, the fact that it was a workers revolt was a godsend to leftists in the west who were struggling to keep from being associated with their manic communist cousins. It was trade union leaders who in West Berlin were the first and the fiercest to try to support the revolt, after all, and June 17 henceforth provided an important symbol as "the first socialdemocratic revolution against dictatorship and for reunification" for socialdemocrats, and as expression of "the class struggle of east german workers against despotic, "state capitalist" communism" for those further left who wanted to dissociate themselves from the GDR (as an article in Freitag pointed out).

That may, paradoxically, also explain why the insurrection is almost forgotten now, compared to "Budapest" and "Prague", outside of Germany (and why the topic doesnt evoke much enthusiasm for discussion here, perhaps).

I mean, those who at some point in time "fellow-travelled" along with talk of the "good sides" of east-european communism, or who still insist that "the underlying idea was good" or that it just was "perverted over time", wont want to be reminded of Berlin '53. But their more numerous polar opposites, who still see Reagan as having liberated Eastern Europe (or, if not, for it to at least have been some heroic duell between capitalism and communism), wont really know what to do with this indigenous workers' revolt either. It just doesnt fit in with the habitual models of explanation, or something?
0 Replies
 
Walter Hinteler
 
  1  
Reply Wed 23 Jul, 2003 02:05 pm
Hmm.

Personally I think, the 'memorial day' we had on that date until 1990, was deepening the ditch between East and West Germany.

Somehow, it made most of us think, "we can't do anything against it". (And in the SPD, we looked at it like one of the greatest deads of workers in history - but as if it happened centuries back.)



Besides, 'Budapest' and 'Prague' won't get more attraction than this thread, I bet , if presented by one of "us" :wink:
0 Replies
 
nimh
 
  1  
Reply Wed 23 Jul, 2003 02:08 pm
Hey Walter, I'm just rattling on here & I didnt even see you'd already checked in! I hope others will join us, this time, even if its a month late ...

There might have been another reason (than the above) for the lack of reactions, though - simply that you have posted such an overwhelming lot of information here, in such a short time! I think people might have been scared off by that! Cause its impolite to post without having read all you put up here, but its such a lot ... mighta been kinda intimidating! :-D
I must admit I didnt read all of 'em before I reacted, either ...

I did read a rather moving account of the events of '53 in one of those 'memorial' articles last month - in Die Weltwoche, a Swiss weekly. Was called, "Wir wollen freie Menschen sein", in the June 5 issue, by Wolf Schneider, who back in '53 was correspondent for Associated Press. Dunno if its online.

Already mentioned Freitag, also had a series of articles about '53 in May/June, I think (I just got the one issue, you cant buy it here). Well, all German weeklies did, I assume! Freitag I think was trying to "debunk" some of the aspects of the story, but I dunno whether it really worked. In issue 24 the attempt was just annoying - cause the two articles were in themselves interesting enough, but in their "debunk" effort they'd given them all kinds of "provocative" intros/headlines, like Letter from Halle, 1953 - "Deutschland, Deutschland ueber alles" (evoking an image of nationalist throngs that the eye-witness account doesnt actually put forward at all), and June 17 and the right to laziness; Was there an implicit social contract between the SED leadership and the GDR workers? (answer in article: No). That on an aside. (When I stayed in Berlin in '99 and '00, I always bought & enjoyed Freitag, so I still buy it whenever I'm in Germany, but it seems to just have gotten obscurantist).
0 Replies
 
nimh
 
  1  
Reply Wed 23 Jul, 2003 02:13 pm
Walter Hinteler wrote:
Besides, 'Budapest' and 'Prague' won't get more attraction than this thread, I bet , if presented by one of "us" :wink:


We should try, huh! ;-)
0 Replies
 
Walter Hinteler
 
  1  
Reply Wed 23 Jul, 2003 02:21 pm
I'm sure, there would be an article about me in our local paper, when I bought 'Freitag' here - it isn't sold here, anyway, and our local paper is named "Der Patriot" :wink:

(An aside: I've thought the predecessor papers (Sonntag, Volkszeitung and especially Die Tat) to be obscurantist as well.

You might be right about the mass of information, I gave.



Let's wait until the end of summer holidays for that new thread (could use an anniversary then as well :wink: ).
0 Replies
 
nimh
 
  1  
Reply Wed 23 Jul, 2003 03:13 pm
Walter Hinteler wrote:
In none of these cases of uprisings in Eastern Europe, the West come to aid of those fighting for their freedom. (Only sending messages etc.)


Do you think there would have been room for the West to do more?
Do you think it would have been wise for them to do so?
Do you think it was right for the West to encourage revolt if it wasnt going to be supported?

(Keeping in mind that "the West" could be West-Germany, the US, NATO, also depending on whether we're talking 1953, 1956, or the building of the Berlin Wall.)

Those aren't leading questions - they are questions that really interest me, and I'm totally of two minds about them. I mean, we usually assume that it was right what the West then did, that more couldnt have been done, and that to have tried to do more would have caused WW3. But I'm intrigued by the odd article coming by, after the archives were opened in Moscow and E-Berlin, that suggested that the Soviets were actually surprised by the leeway they got.

For example - no source, just memory of reading material - when the East Germans started building the wall, they were prepared to halt their work and retreat at any moment that the occupation powers in W-Berlin would attempt to intervene - and they were pretty surprised that no such thing happened, and they could finish the job without military confrontation. I read the same kind of story (oh, my professor would hate me if he saw me recklessly claiming far-reaching quotes by heart like this, 5 years on ...) about when Hungary was turned into just one more Soviet satellite, back in '45-'48, step by step, waiting to see how the West would react.

Should the Western powers have been more bold in trying to stop the erection of the Iron Curtain? I know, its easy to say in hindsight: 'wished they'd pushed a little bit further', when at the moment they were dealing with a nuclear-charged situation at the height of the cold war ...

That still leaves the last question though, in any case: was it right for the West to encourage East-Europeans to revolt if it wasnt going to support them if they did, anyway? Question's mostly been asked about Hungary '56, I think, since RFE and the like had really, fervently appealed to the Hungarians to resist, to persist ... Considering the Hungarians did so in the expectation (or hope, in any case) that the West would intervene if it'd go wrong, was that really an ethically just thing to do? But on the other hand, what else should RFE have done, appeal to them not to rise up? That would have been wrong, too ...

For Germany this question was less relevant I think, cause I believe the West-German & occupation authorities and the radio were actually very cautious, very reticent, throughout, am I right?
0 Replies
 
Walter Hinteler
 
  1  
Reply Wed 23 Jul, 2003 03:21 pm
Since it's too late for me to answer re the first 7/8th of your post, nimh, I just want to say that in the 50's RIAS (=Radio In the American Sector) was quite. ehem, well, oh, ... yes, it really was more than just very informative:

RIAS (and others) original recordings
0 Replies
 
nimh
 
  1  
Reply Wed 23 Jul, 2003 03:44 pm
Walter Hinteler wrote:
Since it's too late for me to answer re the first 7/8th of your post, nimh, I just want to say that in the 50's RIAS (=Radio In the American Sector) was quite. ehem, well, oh, ... yes, it really was more than just very informative:


Yes, I also only just now read your post above about the RIAS! Sorry 'bout that. Still, in the Weltwoche piece for example, it struck me how the Western authorities seemed to have gone out of their way to not make RIAS say all too provocative things. For example, after RIAS first reports demonstrators chanting for a "general strike", the station "hat von der amerikanischen Hochkommission in Bonn die Weisung erhalten, nicht mehr von "Generalstreik" zu sprechen" - and later, when West-Berlin trade union leader Scharnowski gets to air his appeal to the East-German workers to demonstrate on RIAS, he is accordingly forbidden to call for a "general strike". And this was after a minister from Bonn appealed to the EastGermans to retain "Ruhe und Besonnenheit". Thats the kind of thing I mean, I think RFE went a lot further in Hungary.

(Then again, the minister from Bonn appealed them to retain Ruhe und Besonnenheit "im Vertrauen auf unseere Solidaritaet", which brings us straight back to our other question, for what worth did that solidarity turn out to have?)
0 Replies
 
 

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