georgeob1 wrote:On this thread, given the majority views of ATK posters, it is hardly sycophancy to defend U.S. foreign policy. Indeed it could better be described as masochistic.
It was actually the lack of what you said. Despite my snide comments I AM interested in hearing more from you. I'm glad you decided to play ball.
I never said your defense of US policy was sycophancy, I said that the desire for Europe not to find fault is. If they are not to find fault when their population is overwhelmingly entrenched in the side that finds fault then what would you have them do? Be silent about it? That is, to my definition, sycophancy.
I have seen you do much better defenses of the war and simply prefer those. I am EAGER to hear defense of the war. Like Timberlandko said: "I personally think that discussion without dissent is meaningless".
I simply wished for something more substantial that the one-liners (that I'll not repeat as I got far more play out of them than I deserved to have gotten).
georgeob1 wrote:
The U.S. government claims that the Security Council in Resolution 1441 and others gave it the authority to act in Iraq. We certainly made it clear to all at the time it passed that we interpreted 1441 in that manner. No nation, to my knowledge has specifically challenged us on this point.
Yes, the US made that clear. And the rest of the world (in their majority) made it clear that they did not see it this way. Hence the difficulty in wrangling the resolution in the first place. Your memory seems to either be selective or you interpret the events far differently (or a mix) but I plainly recall both Russia and France insisting that as they passed that resolution they did not expect it to be a "trigger" for war.
There was specific wording in that resolution that was agonized over to seek to deny that interpretation. Kofi Annan went on the record to say that US action without the second resolution would be a breach of the UN charter. The US seemed to take what it could get and had planned to go to the UN for round two if we could win but spurn the UN if we couldn't. We wrangled all the support we could but it was evident that the second resolution was not likely to pass (and no, not just because of France's veto).
That you interpret the resolution differently is understandable. To say that no nation spoke out with a sharply different interpretation of that resolution is less so (I'm trying to understate it here).
georgeob1 wrote:I doubt very much that a seasoned diplomat such as Kofi Anan would ever say that the United States has violated the UN Charter.
He did not say it after the war. He said it before the war and it is indicative of the severity of the situation in the eyes of the UN that he would put that kind of pressure on the US when he knows full well that the US's intent was to play the irrelevant card if things didn't go our way. I believe his wording was something along the lines of "against the principles of the charter" but am notoriously too lazy to look up articles I remember. I understand that this is unhelpful. Were I to have the patience to dig it up this would be a non-issue.
If you really believe that no nation spoke out against our interpretation of the resolution and that Kofi did not say that I'd think about digging them up but it would not change your opinion so right now it's not worth it. Or to state it a better way, Kofi is the final word for neither of us.
georgeob1 wrote:On what basis do you claim to speak for the majority of nations in the world? Where is your evidence? We had quite a few nations in the so-called coalition and I believe that a clear majority of the nations in NATO supported us - only Belgium, Luxembourg, Germany, and France expressed any opposition. The others were strongly supportive.
I never claimed to speak for the majority of the world.
A) the majority of the
people of the world did not support the US. Even those who were pressured into the coalition were not supported by their populations.
Even Britain, and Australia who came along willingly faced enormous public opposition until the bombs started falling.
B) I still contend that the majority of nations opposed it. If you REALLY contend that the majority supported it (not just the important ones and not after the fact) I will research further.
I did not expect this, which I considered obvious, to be a point of contention.
My caveat: I say that many nations supported the war once it was inevitable simply to avoid diplomatic and possibly economic retaliation, I assume you think many had supported the war since the beginning but were hedging their bets and publicly being less supportive.
This could be a complicating factor and make my research useless. Hence I play the lazy card again. You can always bring me out from my slothfulness by calling me on it and pressing those points.
georgeob1 wrote:You evidently believe the U.S. is somehow "expansionistic" and is upsetting international stability.
That the US is expansionist is obvious. We project our power and seek to do so in economic, military and cultural ways.
I do not consider expansionism to be inherently evil so this is not a big deal for me.
georgeob1 wrote:I believe that the intent of our government is clearly to enhance that stability and that we have no territorial ambitions involved.
Expansionism is clearly not always territorial. Thing is, I know that many supporters of the war seek to achieve stability by their reasoning. I simply think that their reasoning leads them to conclude that expansionist policy (not in terms of territory but in terms of geopolitical influence and power projection) is to the benefit of stability.
georgeob1 wrote:Only the unfolding events of history will prove the point either way
I disagree. I think in the long run people will still disagree on this. Interpretation of History is subjective and full of "what ifs" that can't be answered. The "what if" of whether Saddam posed a threat to the Us will not be answered for example. Neither will the "what if" about whether he could successfully have been contained or replaced.
My biggest "what if" is that I do not think the urgency was there. Waiting a few months or a year in my opinion would not have spelled disaster. Again, time, IMO, will not tell.
georgeob1 wrote:I believe we are indeed on a course to deal well with several interlocking and serious threats to the international order. What is my basis for that belief? My experience in relevant matters and in life in general (both are substantial) and my interpretation of the events we both have read about. What is yours?
The same (my experience in relevant matters and life in general which is substantial :-) ). I'm not going to play a silly credential contest. The key word in your above post is your "interpretation". My interpretation is different from yours and my opinions on this matter are derived from the same as everyone else's. The information made available to us and our interpretation of them.
If you seek to question my understanding please select the issues I exhibit factual flaw in and do not seek a blanket "my opinion is more valid than yours", as you tried on setanta. I did not ever do that to you and the same respect for my cognitive ability is only helpful. It will allow us to focus on the issue.
In any case a man like Bush has far more experience in the world of geopolitics than I. Am I to not question his conclusions? Men who have far more experience than either you or I have come out against the war. Are we to take their experiences and accept their conclusions unconditionally?
Obviously not. So let's avoid credential wars.
georgeob1 wrote:I don't believe we should (or could ever) be immune from any criticism. In the case at hand I believe the criticism we got, particularly from France, Germany, and Russia was cynically based on other factors - somewhat different for each country. Indeed both France and Russia have recently violated the very principles they cited in attacking us. So the difference between my views and what appear to be yours is how we interpret that criticism.
Indeed, the thing about the dissent being motivated of financial interest I reject because the populations of said countries were not all individually involved in financial dealings.
I posit that the populations of the world simply did not want the US to be have their way, as they view such a condition as a threat to their security.
Everyone interprets world events differently. I happen to agree that there are many good things that can result of the invasion of Iraq. But I think it is not unfair to allow other nations to be deeply suspicious of "pre-emption". A "pre-emptive" case can be used to justify many things and I think it's imperative to international stability that pre-emption be held to a high standard.
georgeob1 wrote:I can't prove the rightness of my conclusions in the manner you suggest, any more than you can prove yours. Moreover over time I believe you will come to understand that real historical truth requires much more than the superficial legalisms that appear to attract you so much.
I agree that we can not beat our opinions over each others heads. I do take issue with your comment that time will teach me differently. I do not believe that any more so than I believe time will teach you differently. Again, interpretation is subjective.
I do not place undue interest in legality. An earlier example of yours that I missed (I believe you edited it in while I was posting) was about France and their military intervention without UN approval. I do not equate the same because there simply was not an overwhelming amount of dissent to that action. You will note I do not complain of our actions there either.
In Iraq I believe the case to be different. It was a cause sold under several descriptions and poorly managed. Due to the nature of pre-emption I sought as much justification for us as possible. See, Saddam is worse than just about anything that will arise from our actions in my estimation. But I like as much legitimacy in unprovoked military action if possible. After all, is not stability on the international level the absence of unprovoked military action?
We could go on about what provocation means and what the result of inaction would have been, and that leads me to my next point. People differ in these interpretations of statistical probability. Therefore I find the ideal in war to be one that is justified as broadly as possible. Individuals defining morality and what should be done is termed lawlessness. When someone believes that their goals are worth the costs they can be wrong, and dramatically so. It's also not uncommon for them to not see this and still act against the will of the majority.
Hence my liking for multilateral decisions of this nature. If I believed that this was necessary I'd not be as concerned about satisfying these criteria. If our nation's existence was threatened there would not be a need in our mind for us to justify this action.
But most can agree that the threat to our nation was not an obvious one. Therefore I think it was simple consideration for legitimacy of a breach of sovereignty to try the UN route. A collectively sanctioned act is always more desirable in these cases. My criteria for the war has always been simple. Convince the world that this is needed and go for it. I don't think it was needed. The neighbors to Saddam (who was reportedly a "regional threat") did not think it was needed (in most cases).
So my criteria was simply this: convince the world that this is more than expansionism and if they buy it you have legitimized an unprovoked "pre-emptive" violation of another nation's sovereignty.
If that were achieved my qualms would be on a personal level and I would accept the action as legitimate. I also believe that it was not a hard thing to sell, and that selling it to the world was more of a state department thing with certain persons undermining it at every opportunity (calling the inspections a waste of time etc). I believe that certain persons seek to de-legitimize the UN so as to make it easier to render them irrelevant to a domestic audience.
Simply put, if you are gonna do something drastic make it look as legal as possible. If I kill someone I know is a villain I am a murderer, if I convince the court that he needs killin' then I am not.
It's a simple principle and not inordinately tied to legality. It's tied to my interpretation of events and the practicality of the solutions as I see them.