I note that all arguments concerning the legality of the NSA spying program seem to have ceased...
Cycloptichorn
McGentrix wrote:Having one person on the line that has relations with terrorists or terrorist organization is probable cause.
It that's truly the case, then Bush would have no problem obtaining FISA court approval to conduct electronic surveillance.
Some have pointed to the provision in FISA that allows for so-called "emergency authorizations" of surveillance for 72 hours without a court order. There's a serious misconception about these emergency authorizations. People should know that we do not approve emergency authorizations without knowing that we will receive court approval within 72 hours. FISA requires the Attorney General to determine IN ADVANCE that a FISA application for that particular intercept will be fully supported and will be approved by the court before an emergency authorization may be granted. That review process can take precious time.
Thus, to initiate surveillance under a FISA emergency authorization, it is not enough to rely on the best judgment of our intelligence officers alone. Those intelligence officers would have to get the sign-off of lawyers at the NSA that all provisions of FISA have been satisfied, then lawyers in the Department of Justice would have to be similarly satisfied, and finally as Attorney General, I would have to be satisfied that the search meets the requirements of FISA. And we would have to be prepared to follow up with a full FISA application within the 72 hours.
A typical FISA application involves a substantial process in its own right: The work of several lawyers; the preparation of a legal brief and supporting declarations; the approval of a Cabinet-level officer; a certification from the National Security Adviser, the Director of the FBI, or another designated Senate-confirmed officer; and, finally, of course, the approval of an Article III judge.
We all agree that there should be appropriate checks and balances on our branches of government. The FISA process makes perfect sense in almost all cases of foreign intelligence monitoring in the United States. Although technology has changed dramatically since FISA was enacted, FISA remains a vital tool in the War on Terror, and one that we are using to its fullest and will continue to use against al Qaeda and other foreign threats. But as the President has explained, the terrorist surveillance program operated by the NSA requires the maximum in speed and agility, since even a very short delay may make the difference between success and failure in preventing the next attack. And we cannot afford to fail.
From the foregoing analysis, it appears unlikely that a court would hold that Congress has expressly or impliedly authorized the NSA electronic surveillance operations here under discussion, and it would likewise appear that, to the extent that those surveillances fall within the definition of "electronic surveillance" within the meaning of FISA or any activity regulated under Title III, Congress intended to cover the entire field with these statutes. To the extent that the NSA activity is not permitted by some reading of Title III or FISA, it may represent an exercise of presidential power at its lowest ebb, in which case exclusive presidential control is sustainable only by "disabling Congress from acting upon the subject."141 While courts have generally accepted that the President has the power to conduct domestic electronic surveillance within the United States inside the constraints of the Fourth Amendment, no court has held squarely that the Constitution disables the Congress from endeavoring to set limits on that power. To the contrary, the Supreme Court has stated that Congress does indeed have power to regulate domestic surveillance,142 and has not ruled on the extent to which Congress can act with respect to electronic surveillance to collect foreign intelligence information. Given such uncertainty, the Administration's legal justification, as presented in the summary analysis from the Office of Legislative Affairs, does not seem to be as well-grounded as the tenor of that letter suggests.
When every President since Roosevelt conducted warrantless searches for purposes of foreign intelligence prior to FISA, did they do so pursuant to authority? If so, what authority?
To make all laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into execution the foregoing powers, and all other powers vested by this Constitution in the government of the United States, or in any department or officer thereof.
This Constitution, and the laws of the United States which shall be made in pursuance thereof; and all treaties made, or which shall be made, under the authority of the United States, shall be the supreme law of the land. . . .
(The president) shall from time to time give to the Congress information of the state of the union, and recommend to their consideration such measures as he shall judge necessary and expedient; he may, on extraordinary occasions, convene both Houses, or either of them, and in case of disagreement between them, with respect to the time of adjournment, he may adjourn them to such time as he shall think proper; he shall receive ambassadors and other public ministers; he shall take care that the laws be faithfully executed, and shall commission all the officers of the United States.
§ 5503. Recess appointments
(a) Payment for services may not be made from the Treasury of the United States to an individual appointed during a recess of the Senate to fill a vacancy in an existing office, if the vacancy existed while the Senate was in session and was by law required to be filled by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, until the appointee has been confirmed by the Senate. This subsection does not apply—
(1) if the vacancy arose within 30 days before the end of the session of the Senate;
(2) if, at the end of the session, a nomination for the office, other than the nomination of an individual appointed during the preceding recess of the Senate, was pending before the Senate for its advice and consent; or
(3) if a nomination for the office was rejected by the Senate within 30 days before the end of the session and an individual other than the one whose nomination was rejected thereafter receives a recess appointment.
(b) A nomination to fill a vacancy referred to by paragraph (1), (2), or (3) of subsection (a) of this section shall be submitted to the Senate not later than 40 days after the beginning of the next session of the Senate.
We admit, as all must admit, that the powers of the government are limited, and that its limits are not to be transcended. But we think the sound construction of the constitution must allow to the national legislature that discretion, with respect to the means by which the powers it confers are to be carried into execution, which will enable that body to perform the high duties assigned to it, in the manner most beneficial to the people. Let the end be legitimate, let it be within the scope of the constitution, and all means which are appropriate, which are plainly adapted to that end, which are not prohibited, but consist with the letter and spirit of the constitution, are constitutional. . . .
Should congress, in the execution of its powers, adopt measures which are prohibited by the constitution; or should congress, under the pretext of executing its powers, pass laws for the accomplishment of objects not intrusted to the government; it would become the painful duty of this tribunal, should a case requiring such a decision come before it, to say, that such an act was not the law of the land. But where the law is not prohibited, and is really calculated to effect any of the objects intrusted to the government, to undertake here to inquire into the decree of its necessity, would be to pass the line which circumscribes the judicial department, and to tread on legislative ground. This court disclaims all pretensions to such a power.
As to Tico's argument that the Congress cannot pass laws that regulate executive power, I would reference Article I, section 8 of the US Constitution where Congress is given the power "to make all laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into execution the foregoing powers, and all other powers vested by this Constitution in the government of the United States, or in any department or officer thereof." Once FISA was passed and signed into law by the president, it became law. The president is encroaching on the authority of Congress to make laws by enacting an executive order that is counter to it.
If Congress tried to pass a law restricting the president from making recess appointments, the president would veto it, and if that were overridden, would successfully defeat it in court. However, Congress has the power to pass laws defining how to execute those powers, as it did with FISA.
Debra_Law wrote:McGentrix wrote:Having one person on the line that has relations with terrorists or terrorist organization is probable cause.
It that's truly the case, then Bush would have no problem obtaining FISA court approval to conduct electronic surveillance.
This is what Albert Gonzales had to say on Tuesday concerning that:
Quote:Some have pointed to the provision in FISA that allows for so-called “emergency authorizations” of surveillance for 72 hours without a court order. There’s a serious misconception about these emergency authorizations. People should know that we do not approve emergency authorizations without knowing that we will receive court approval within 72 hours. FISA requires the Attorney General to determine IN ADVANCE that a FISA application for that particular intercept will be fully supported and will be approved by the court before an emergency authorization may be granted. That review process can take precious time.
(f) Emergency orders
Notwithstanding any other provision of this subchapter, when the Attorney General reasonably determines that—
(1) an emergency situation exists with respect to the employment of electronic surveillance to obtain foreign intelligence information before an order authorizing such surveillance can with due diligence be obtained; and
(2) the factual basis for issuance of an order under this subchapter to approve such surveillance exists;
he may authorize the emergency employment of electronic surveillance if a judge having jurisdiction under section 1803 of this title is informed by the Attorney General or his designee at the time of such authorization that the decision has been made to employ emergency electronic surveillance and if an application in accordance with this subchapter is made to that judge as soon as practicable, but not more than 72 hours after the Attorney General authorizes such surveillance.
The concerns within the Justice Department appear to have led, at least in part, to the decision to suspend and revamp the program, officials said. The Justice Department then oversaw a secret audit of the surveillance program. The audit examined a selection of cases to see how the security agency was running the program. Among other things, it looked at how agency officials went about determining that they had probable cause to believe that people in the United States, including American citizens, had sufficient ties to Al Qaeda to justify eavesdropping on their phone calls and e-mail messages without a court warrant. That review is not known to have found any instances of abuses.
Q Thank you, Mr. President. If you believe that present law needs to be faster, more agile concerning the surveillance of conversations from someone in the United States to someone outside the country --
THE PRESIDENT: Right.
Q -- why, in the four years since 9/11, has your administration not sought to get changes in the law instead of bypassing it, as some of your critics have said?
THE PRESIDENT: I appreciate that. First, I want to make clear to the people listening that this program is limited in nature to those that are known al Qaeda ties and/or affiliates. That's important. So it's a program that's limited, and you brought up something that I want to stress, and that is, is that these calls are not intercepted within the country. They are from outside the country to in the country, or vice versa. So in other words, this is not a -- if you're calling from Houston to L.A., that call is not monitored. And if there was ever any need to monitor, there would be a process to do that.
FreeDuck wrote:
As to Tico's argument that the Congress cannot pass laws that regulate executive power, I would reference Article I, section 8 of the US Constitution where Congress is given the power "to make all laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into execution the foregoing powers, and all other powers vested by this Constitution in the government of the United States, or in any department or officer thereof." Once FISA was passed and signed into law by the president, it became law. The president is encroaching on the authority of Congress to make laws by enacting an executive order that is counter to it.
If Congress tried to pass a law restricting the president from making recess appointments, the president would veto it, and if that were overridden, would successfully defeat it in court. However, Congress has the power to pass laws defining how to execute those powers, as it did with FISA.
EXACTLY. Thank you, FreeDuck, for making that significant point.
What breadth of authority are you claiming is given the Legislature by the "necessary and proper" clause?
Maybe I'd understand the point better if you or FD would point to the particular "foregoing powers" in Article I Section 8 you believe Congress was "carrying into execution" that allows it to "regulate executive power," and particularly this one?
Where does Article I enumerate foreign intelligence collection as one of Congress' powers? It appears you want to read the "necessary and proper" clause to effectively neuter the Executive's CIC powers, and I don't think that's what the Constitution says.
Ticomaya wrote:What breadth of authority are you claiming is given the Legislature by the "necessary and proper" clause?
Maybe I'd understand the point better if you or FD would point to the particular "foregoing powers" in Article I Section 8 you believe Congress was "carrying into execution" that allows it to "regulate executive power," and particularly this one?
Where does Article I enumerate foreign intelligence collection as one of Congress' powers? It appears you want to read the "necessary and proper" clause to effectively neuter the Executive's CIC powers, and I don't think that's what the Constitution says.
I already addressed this matter in my previous post. Although I posted the entire clause and highlighted the relevant portion of the clause, you didn't read it. Congress shall have the power:
To make all laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into execution the foregoing powers, AND all other powers vested by this Constitution in the government of the United States, or in any department or officer thereof.
The necessary and proper clause is not limited to Congress's power to enact laws to carry into execution its own powers enumerated in Article I. Congress has explicit constitutional authority to make laws to carry into execution ALL powers vested by the Constitution in the GOVERNMENT or any department of the GOVERNMENT or any officer of the GOVERNMENT. This includes the power to make laws to carry into execution all powers vested by the Constitution in the executive branch as a department of our government and the president as an officer of the government.
If we assume that the government has power to conduct domestic electronic surveillance of United States persons to gather intelligence information, then Congress has EXPLICIT constitutional authority to establish the means by law under which the government (which includes the executive branch) may conduct electronic surveillence of United States persons within this country. So long as the means are consistent with the limitations placed on the government by the Fourth Amendment, the law is constitutional.
There are indications that the Constitution did not contemplate that the title Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy will constitute him also Commander in Chief of the country, its industries and its inhabitants. ,' whatever they are. While Congress cannot deprive the President of the command of the army and navy, only Congress can provide him an army or navy to command.
The argument that Congress is interfering in CIC powers is pretty weak.
The court dealt with that in Youngstown
Quote:There are indications that the Constitution did not contemplate that the title Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy will constitute him also Commander in Chief of the country, its industries and its inhabitants. ,' whatever they are. While Congress cannot deprive the President of the command of the army and navy, only Congress can provide him an army or navy to command.
Congress can make regulations for the military. The president is not free to ignore those regulations.
Grover Norquist is one of the most influential conservative Republicans in Washington.
"My view on the terrorists is that we should find all of them and kill them," said Norquist. "But we should also protect our civil liberties, which the terrorists are trying to destroy."
But, in fact, a number of prominent Republicans, including Sen. John McCain of Arizona, have criticized Bush and the wiretapping without court warrants as a violation of the law and basic civil liberties. So have other well-known conservatives, including former Rep. Bob Barr of Georgia. Bruce Fein, a lawyer who worked in the Justice Department under President Ronald Reagan, wrote in a commentary in the Washington Times last week that Bush should face "possible impeachment" if the practice is not stopped.
Given these potential distinctions between Title III criminal surveillances and those involving the domestic security, Congress may wish to consider protective standards for the latter which differ from those already prescribed for specified crimes in Title III. Different standards may be compatible with the Fourth Amendment [407 U.S. 297, 323] if they are reasonable both in relation to the legitimate need of Government for intelligence information and the protected rights of our citizens. For the warrant application may vary according to the governmental interest to be enforced and the nature of citizen rights deserving protection. As the Court said in Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 534 -535 (1967):
"In cases in which the Fourth Amendment requires that a warrant to search be obtained, `probable cause' is the standard by which a particular decision to search is tested against the constitutional mandate of reasonableness. . . . In determining whether a particular inspection is reasonable - and thus in determining whether there is probable cause to issue a warrant for that inspection - the need for the inspection must be weighed in terms of these reasonable goals of code enforcement."
It may be that Congress, for example, would judge that the application and affidavit showing probable cause need not follow the exact requirements of 2518 but should allege other circumstances more appropriate to domestic security cases; that the request for prior court authorization could, in sensitive cases, be made to any member of a specially designated court (e. g., the District Court for the District of Columbia or the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit); and that the time and reporting requirements need not be so strict as those in 2518.
FreeDuck wrote:
As to Tico's argument that the Congress cannot pass laws that regulate executive power, I would reference Article I, section 8 of the US Constitution where Congress is given the power "to make all laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into execution the foregoing powers, and all other powers vested by this Constitution in the government of the United States, or in any department or officer thereof." Once FISA was passed and signed into law by the president, it became law. The president is encroaching on the authority of Congress to make laws by enacting an executive order that is counter to it.
If Congress tried to pass a law restricting the president from making recess appointments, the president would veto it, and if that were overridden, would successfully defeat it in court. However, Congress has the power to pass laws defining how to execute those powers, as it did with FISA.
EXACTLY. Thank you, FreeDuck, for making that significant point.
parados wrote:The argument that Congress is interfering in CIC powers is pretty weak.
The court dealt with that in Youngstown
Quote:There are indications that the Constitution did not contemplate that the title Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy will constitute him also Commander in Chief of the country, its industries and its inhabitants. He has no monopoly of ‘war powers,’ whatever they are. While Congress cannot deprive the President of the command of the army and navy, only Congress can provide him an army or navy to command. It is also empowered to make rules for the ‘Government and Regulation of land and naval Forces,’ by which it may to some unknown extent impinge upon even command functions
Congress can make regulations for the military. The president is not free to ignore those regulations.
Youngstown did not deal with warrantless searches for purposes of gathering foreign intelligence for national defense. Every appellate court that has done so has upheld the authority of the President in that regard.
If Congress has the power to make laws which define and restrict any and all powers vested in government by the Constitution, then it has the ultimate power, and what check is there on Congress?
To the extent that powers and authorities are granted by the Constitution to any one of the three branches of government, the means to amend, limit, or control such powers is specifically prescribed by the Constitution. Congress cannot amend the Constitution.
We should not allow ourselves to fall into Rove’s trap and let this become a partisan squabble over national security. If we do, the President and his cronies on Capitol Hill are going to win. This is not fundamentally a debate about wiretapping or national security. It is about whether Presidents must obey the law, one of the bedrock principles of a free nation. As Elizabeth Holtzman recently observed in these pages, “A President, any President, who maintains that he is above the law – and repeatedly violates the law – thereby commits high crimes and misdemeanors.” Bush purposely violated the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, disregarding clear and specific statutory language and the Constitution. If he is not called to account for this grave illegality, the democratic standards to which this and future Presidents are held will have been dramatically lowered, and essential avenues for defending our liberties will have been blocked in precisely the manner that Ben Franklin, James Madison and the other wise Founders feared.