Tirpitz, the Building of Battleships and WWI

Tirpitz and the Imperial german navy.
Exactly that.

Up to that point Germany, a rapidly developping Great Power, - see the economic growth statistics, it was growing like the US. - had only had a coastal defence force.
It was well equipped technological, but was a coastal defence force.

it was displaced from 9th to 10th by the US. building three battleships, one of which was the famous Maine.

In that year they decided to build a fleet of 16 battleships plus 0ne command ship ( four squadrons plus one), passed the law the next year, then started building the year after that.

At the time we were building a new fleet from 1889 of forty battleships to the "Two-Power Standard" against France and Russia - then held to be the most dangerous powers and the ones with which we had serious differences.

Tirpitz and the Imperial German Navy
"Germany was MORE aggressive than Russia or France from the period of 1890 to 1914 in terms of expanding its navy, military, and chasing colonies."

Incidentally this is untrue and can be proved by reading Niail Furguson's book "The Pity of War". He's an economic historian and proves that France and Russia were spending huge sums from 1910 much more than Germany. Also germany was spending TOO LITTLE on ots army, largely because of the indirect taxation system

I couldn't agree less with your second statement. A thorough review of the Imperial building program can be found in Dreadnought: Britain, Germany and the Coming of the Great War, by Robert Massie. It is a well-written book, as well, and is entertaining to read.

I'm afraid it is clearly laid out in the economic tables, both relatively and absolutely.

Had Imperial Germany wished to be more agressive it could have reformed its tax system to a direct one and got the Reichstag to vote the money, the two basis probems.

I am aware as a Brit how depeply cherished the myth of "aggressive Germany and the wicked Kaiser" is held in Britain - 0therwise it looks bad and the book you mention is an example.

The original German building programme for a navy was modest with 17 pre-dreadnought battleships and about the size as France and Russia regarded as hte principal enemies till 1904-5.

Their subsequent dreadnought and battlecruiser programme was only ever intended to be 60% of Britain's.
A Naval Convention failed on the refusal of the liberal government in 1912 to add the clause britain would remain neutral if another Power 9other than Germany) was the aggressor.

The constituencies established in 1867 and 1871 were never altered to reflect population shifts, giving rural areas a vastly disproportionate share of power as urbanization progressed. In theory the Reichstag's ability to reject any bill seemed to make it an important reservoir of power; in practice, however, the power of the lower house was circumscribed by the government's reliance on indirect taxes and the Reichstag's limited right to approve the military budget once every seven years. All legislative proposals were submitted to the Bundesrat first and to the Reichstag only if they were approved bythe upper house. In addition, the legislative bodies were rarely consulted about foreign policy. Imperial ministers were chosen by and were responsible to the emperor rather than to the legislature. In comparison with the lower houses of the French and British parliamentary systems of the period, the Reichstag was a (relatively) impotent body.

Tirpitz and Imperial navy
Yew, I agree.

This is the point Furguson makes. meanwhile Britain relied on direct taxation essentially, whilst france and Russia - loans in their case - were able to raise adequate funds.

His argiement over an inadequate tax base and voting problems does seem to be supported by the statisical tables.

I am no Brit--an imputation which i find highly offensive, and am not referring to any aggressive Germany and wicked Kaiser stereotype. It is the height of absurdity to ignore the attempts Germany made to corner France and humiliate her on the issue of Morroco. It is equally absurd to ignore the Naval League and Tirpitz' efforts to acheive at the least status as the second fleet of Europe. To refer to the Imperial fleet as coastal defense is either extremely naive or willfully disingenuous. That it was designed to operate in the Baltic or the North Sea, but no further is a reasonable statement. One plays fast and loose with the truth to describe that as coastal defense, a far more benign image that what Tirpitz envisioned. Churchill, initially opposed to a large building program, changed his mind completely when he became First Lord. When it was learned that Tirpitz had devised the trick of stockpiling after-launch fittings such as power plants, gun tubes, turrets, etc., it was obvious that British calculations of build time from the laying of the keel to finally fitting and crew complement were significantly over-long. Tirpitz' little trick meant that once a hull came down the ways, the final fitting could be accomplished in considerably less than half the time which ordinarily would have been required. The alarm was sufficient during the "naval scare" of 1909 to justify an aggressive building program to uphold the "Two plus 10 per cent" doctrine, which was that the British would keep afloat a fleet equivalent in size to the two next largest fleets in Europe, plus 10%. That Imperial Germany did not achieve its aim of being able to effectively challenge the Royal Navy does not mean that they did not try, and Churchill and the Admiralty were not fooled. The two plus 10 per cent was a barely sufficient concept as it was, given that prior to the real dead heat of the German-British fleet building race, the bulk of the British fleet steamed in the Med, and the Royal Navy had commitments in the Carribean, the South Atlantic, the Indian Ocean and on the Asiatic station. In fact, England became sufficiently alarmed that she made a treaty with Japan to take over many of her responsibilities on the Asiatic station, including the coastal defense of Canada's Pacific coast. When war did break out, Japan sent a cruiser to the west coast of Canada, and just about in the nick of time, because what there was of the Royal Canadian Navy could quickly have been sent to the bottom by the German light cruiser which was then headed north along the west coast of the United States.

Tirpitz' program had every intention of challenging the Royal Navy, and the Reichstag, despite it's grumbling, approved every Navy Law he proposed. It is as foolish to suggest that there was no effort to produce a first-rate Imperial Navy as it would be to suggest what you refer to as an "aggressive Germany and the wicked Kaiser" paranoia on the part of Britain. Germany was aggressive, and, in July, 1914, willfully deceived England and France about her plans to support Austria's play against Serbia. I don't overrate the threat which Imperial Germany posed to peace in Europe--i don't underrate it either.

I'd didn't suggest you were a Brit neither did I say the Imperial german fleet was a Coastal Defence Force.

France lead by Delcasse and Poincarre was trying to grab Morocco, which Germany opposed because it disturbed the Balance of Power in Europe. Initially Germany had not shown sufficient interest in Morocco and Sir Edward Grey had actually suggested a German coaling port on the Altantic coast to buy them off. The actual events on Morocco are the opposite of what is suggested by British historians.

Germany, with its meteoric economic growth had to expand from a coastal defence force in 1897 to a full navy, and that is fair enough.

However you appear to be entirley influenced by the views of British "Court Historians" of which Robert Massie is one.

The "stockpiling of parts" one is one of the oldest propaganda stories known to have been planted in the press by the War Party as was the "We want 8 and we won't wait" scare. Churchill did become First Lord relatively late, by which time he was challenging Fisher's strategy.
The scares were in fact based on getting the Liberal government to adhere to the original programme of the Fisher-Cawdor Plan and which had lapsed.

Germany did not attempt to build against Britain as can been seen by the times of laying downs and commissionings - they could have built far more quickly had they chose. If these are examined this can be seen.

Much of the trouble lies in the theories of Fisher and the Fisher-Cawdor plan itself of )ctober 1904. It was thought there would be a clear two year lead over any other Power including Germany, and this was a vital part of the plan. Also by building small, using existing yards and components a fleet could rapidly be built.
Iit was thought Germany amongst others would have to built new slipways first.

lastly, Tirttz' plan was of a Risk Fleet - it was intended as a bargaining chip in colonail disputes and division of Colonial territory in which germany was considered to have lost out rather than actually used against Britian in the North Sea.

It was thought Britain would never be able to overcome their differneces with France and Russia, and also Britain would never be able to concentrate its fleet in home waters.

Thus the German fllet there would make germany much more valuable as an ally or as a benevolent neutral in event of war. Thus germany would be able to attain a real maritime policy.

In other wordfs it was intended as a balance on britian's side against France and Russia.

Lord Esher, the chairman of the Committee of Imperial Defence had confirmed this view in 1902 as the first thing they did - we could not defend the Empire and britain as well.

Unfortunately Fisher got the job on the basis of his solving the problem - by concentrating the fleet in Home Waters.

Britain did not enter the Japanese Alliance against Germany but against Imperial Russia. War with Russia was held to be inevitable in 1902 when the alliance was signed as vital british intersts in the Far East and China were threatened by Imperial Russia and the czr had built a pwerful Pacific fleet. The Black Sea fllet was also to be sent out.
This is why there was a mad scramble to sign an alliance with GERMANY in 1902.

In the first place, i wouldn't for a moment deny that France was trying to get all they could in Morrocco, but your statement about it upsetting the balance of power in Europe is an absurdity. Germany was simply trying to muscle the French as had been done since the Franco-Prussian war, one of the most trumped up wars in 19th century Europe. France made it's move in Morrocco based on an understanding with England after the Fashoda incident, during which the Brits offered a hands off policy in Morrocco in return for French recognition of Brit hegemony in Egypt and the Sudan. Neither party was thinking of Germany, which irked the Germans no end. I've been reading history for well over 40 years, and don't need Massie to instruct me about these affairs.



Keep your snide insults to yourself, you don't have a clue about what reading i've done in my lifetime in European history. I would opine that you are entirely influenced by having read one book, with as much justification as you make your suppposition. You will get out of these fora exactly what you put into them.

Any contention about an alliance with Germany is ludicrous. Old Joe Chamberlain hoped for such, but the German people would never have had it, and Tirpitz' propaganda machine, working throught the Naval league and articles written by his staff for publication in regional newspapers needed the image of Britain tramelling the Reich's honor for him to keep up the political influence of his building program. I find it laughable that you propose the stockpiling program was a planted propaganda story, you must read a good deal of loopy revisionist history if you indeed read more than one book (remember, the supposition i make with as much justice as you make yours).

I know well why England made its alliance with Japan, and know that it was in large measure a move to relieve England of the full weight of her repsonsibilities on the Asiatic station. I did not say she made the alliance with Gemany expressly in mind. It was, however, part and parcel of the move to "re-concentrate" from the Med to Gibraltar and the Channel.

We can agree to disagree, or you can continue to try to teach your grandmother to suck eggs. It is immaterial to me, i assure you. You've made enough snide remarks about the extent and depth of my reading for me to have lost any interest in continuing a discussion with you.

I'm pleased to hear it in view of your stream of personal insults.

Insults of exactly the same character as those you initiated . . . as i said, you get out of these fora exactly what you put into them . . .

Re: Jutlamd, Imperial German Navy

This kind of psychologizing is nonsense, equivalent to blaming the First World War on Wilhelm's withered right arm. Germany acquired a navy because, according to the military theory of the time, great powers were expected to have great navies. Wilhelm was an influential booster, but he wasn't the cause of the navy buildup.


German naval tactics were certainly not based on defending against a seaborne assault; they were Mahanian battle-fleet tactics, like every other naval power had at the time. And the British admiralty considered, but quickly dropped, any plans for a landing on German soil (which, in any case, would have been in lower Saxony, not in Schleswig-Holstein).


No economy was organized for total war, and the Germans did quite well in building their ships.


If the level of military spending is directly correlated to "aggression," then Ferguson's case is proven. But then there is no correlation. If there were, the United States would have been the most aggressive power in the world for the past 60 years.


Germany's domestic politics did not permit a thoroughgoing reform of the tax structure. Nevertheless, Germany pursued a foreign policy that can fairly be characterized as "aggressive," especially after the Kaiser dismissed Bismarck in 1890.


France's designs on Morocco had absolutely no bearing on the European balance of power, as Berlin was well aware. Germany saw Morocco as a means to drive a wedge between France and Britain, and as a bargaining chip for colonial concessions elsewhere. As it turned out, Berlin seriously miscalculated, both in 1905 and 1911, although it managed to get territory in central Africa as compensation for permitting France to exercise control over Morocco. The bec de canard territory, added to German Cameroon, however, was meager compensation for its diplomatic defeat.

Since I studied just a few aspects of Germany's history at that time (and I only used the original sources and German books) - far less at least than Setanta did - and since my abilities in English are far beyond* joe's, I just agree with both.

* actually meaning is BELOW; see joe's and my following responses.

Not quite. Wilhelm certainly wanted an understanding, if not an alliance, with Britain, as did other influential members of the German government. As late as 1912, with the Haldane mission, there was some talk of an entente between Germany and Britain based on mutual limitations on the nations' naval building programs. Granted, nothing came of these discussions, owing to both international and domestic political factors, but the idea of an Anglo-German entente or alliance was, at least, not totally ludicrous.


Meinst Du, dass Du Englisch besser als mich sprechen kannst? Wirklich? Dann bin ich ganz deprimiert

Joe, as i recall, the Germans were just playing Haldane along, because they didn't want the alliance, but they did not want to appear not to want it. Of course, we can differ on that aspect of it. By 1912, the "un-alliance" between France and Britain was sufficiently well established that any alliance between Germany and England was unrealistic. My take, anyway . . .

So sorry, Joe, and "no", I never thought so, and since I don't want you to deprimiert two days before christmas, I've done quickly some Strafarbeit:

link to
Walter's self punishing homework

I think the Germans took the Haldane mission much more seriously than the British did. At least the Germans (who were feeling the costs of unrestricted naval competition) were willing to make genuine concessions; the British, in contrast, really did not offer the Germans anything in exchange for being permanently relegated to a second-rank naval power. Wilhelm even told Haldane that Germany would limit its battleship program in exchange for what amounted to a non-aggession pact with Britain. London, however, was unwilling to go even this far, and so the talks led nowhere.


You are forgiven

Christmas is saved

I'd have to agree with you that the Brits were not acting in good faith when the sent Haldane to Berlin. The problem the Brits had with the non-aggression pact was its conflict with their "understanding" with France.

This is a topic which can be very fruitfull. I think most of these problems arose from the Imperial System created by Bismark. Wilhelm I said on at least one (and i believe more than one) occassion that he'd rather be King of Prussia than Emperor of the Germans. Bismark's creation was tailor made for a strong-willed and energetic chancellor, and a disinterested monarch. But by the time Willy II got in there, you had the opposite situation--with the Kaiser appointing the ministers of government, and Wilhelm II being strong-willed, but not particularly capable nor stable, the ministers he selected ended up being largely Imperial "Yes-men" who provided experise which Willy might or might not heed.

Chronos' objections aside, i believe, not that the German public was necessary bellicose by nature, but was easily lead into that path; and, with Wilhelm II's personality, you had a prescription for Germany becoming a threat to European peace and stability. I do not consider that war was inevitable. I do consider that the lack of a reliably stable government in the German Empire, with its great economic and military potential; the excitable passions of nationalism among the French and Germans--so often exploited for petty or personal political ends--and the "balance of power" paranoia of England, all created a situation of such instability that any spark could set it off. Sparks were not lacking. No notion of collective security existed, and 19th century notions of nationalism and the glory of the successful state ran counter to the genuine diplomatic trend to resolve differences by conference and concession as opposed to war. Neither Bismark nor Palmerston necessarily considered war and national aggrandisement as ends, and both were willing to play honest broker in tense international situations. With Wilhelm II "dropping the pilot," and Joe Chamberlain effectively destroying two political parties/alliances, all the careful diplomacy of the Bismark and Palmerston character went out the window. The Germans believed they could hold off a slow, ponderous Russia, whom they underestimated as a result of Russia's humiliation in 1905. The French believed that their defeat in 1870 resulted from a corrupt imperial system, which the republic had corrected. Too much rhetoric, not enough careful consideration.

I am not well these last few days; i've exhausted my analytic ability in this question, and the foregoing may well make less sense than i think.

Have a good holiday, Joe, Walter, Chronos . . . see ya in the funny papers.

I think the British thought they were acting in good faith in sending Haldane to Berlin. The problem was that London had no grasp of Germany's security dilemma. From Whitehall's perspective, Germany had no reason to build a fleet in the first place -- as Churchill stated, Britain's fleet was a necessity, while Germany's was a luxury. London, however, could not understand that the British fleet posed a threat to Germany, which Germany justifiably sought to counter with a fleet of its own. As such, London was simply unwilling to concede anything of value in exchange for limitations on Germany's dreadnought program, because London didn't think that Germany, by limiting its fleet, would have been giving up anything of value either.


Germany was a threat to European peace and stability simply by being Germany. A large military power in the middle of the continent was bound to exacerbate security issues throughout the continent. Prior to unification, the German states acted as a sort of buffer between the ambitions of the great powers. After 1871, however, a united German Reich no longer served this function.


I have a grudging respect for Bismarck, especially after 1875. I have no respect for Palmerston, who embodied the very worst attributes of pre-1914 British foreign policy.