rosborne979 wrote:Einherjar wrote:Hawks must have some sort of freakish hearing deficiency. For all I know Aris may well think terrorism is a valid response to imperialism, though I suspect not, but all he said was that terrorism is a predictable consequence of imperialism.
And retaliation is a predictable consequence of terrorism. I guess we are in agreement.
We are
Quote:Einherjar wrote:the terrorists primary beef is with their own corrupt governments, and they blaim the US for supporting these governments.
Correct.
Einherjar wrote:Oh, and a common trait among opressive despotisms is that they are not very receptive of constructive criticism from their own populations.
Correct.
So we perceive the conflict similarly.
Quote:So what do you suggest the terrorists (or the populations) do to solve their beef with their government?
A hard question indeed. I personally have a tendency to take a moral relativistic approach to such conflicts as this, that is, pointing out the mechanisms of cause and effect as well as the strategies different groups might employ without choosing alegiances. I find this approach quite satisfactory most of the time. It does not discriminate between the objectives, only between productive and counterproductive ways of reaching them. The question you ask has at least as many answers as there are objectives, (beefs with the governments) probably more, and the answers might well differ from country to country.
The group which desire a new arab superstate have at their disposal wide, but not widely militant, support in arab populations. They could try to influence their rulers to create some sort of panarabic union, and in fact they did back in the 60's (I think). Their plans were foiled by the west, particularly by britain who's prime minister was obsessed with being 'Churchillian' or in other words a hard liner. To do this he needed an enemy with imperial ambitions, and he settled on panarabic nationalism as his nemesis of choice. His actions in the middle east are widely criticized today, and contributed massively to antibritish (and even anti western) sentiments in the region. The US has since replaced the British as the high profile imperialist enemy for arab nationalists.
As this approach failed, arabs with such interest have begun to support, in words if not in deed, the one militant movement which is currently pursuing such an arab superstate. This movement is perhaps more religious than it is extremist, and desire for this superstate to be a caliphate, basically an Islamic despotic theocracy. As no secular movement calling for a panarabic superstate seem viable, and as obstacles to the common agenda is galvanizing, this primarily nationalistic group has joined the islamists in calling for a new caliphate to be created by other than peaceful means. These people are however, like most of their fundamentalist brethren, only paying lip service to the idea. The militant adherents of a new caliphate, al qaida, is currently involved with upping the ante in their struggle with the US in order to galvanize support and mobilise the inactive majority supporting their objectives. If they can get enough of their supporters put their money and lives where their mouths are, their objectives should be within reach.
The religious fanatics can not achieve their goals by diplomatic means as the nationalists attempted, since they call for a transfer of power to one single individual in addition to panarabic unity.
Those calling for democracy and civil liberties have multiple options available to them. They could opt for an armed uprising, to do this they would have to somehow rally their base, and get a significant number up in arms about these issues. Even if successful this would result in mass casualties, and there is a good chance that even if the local regime failed to crush the uprising, other movements would hijack the revolution, and install an equally, if not more suppressive government instead. Or the country could end up divided among dozens of warlords.
Another approach might be to have two men dress up as mujahedin, raise a green flag on which is written al qaida in golden letters, and wait for the US to come liberate them. this will not work off course if their government chooses to comply with US demands.
The third approach would be to try to change the regime from within, using non militant activism. A movement with such an approach would enjoy western sympathies, although it is uncertain to what extent this would translate into outside pressure on the regime, and wether such pressure would have any effect on the policies of said regime. The democratic movement in Burma doesn't have much to show for its efforts. And under some regimes activism of any sort would be tantamount to suicide, or worse. Would enough people be prepared to sacrifice themselves for the cause to force change?
I'm sure I have overlooked both agendas and viable strategies here, and the strategies outlined are only overall approaches. I'm sure I could draw far more detailed schemes, but I don't feel like putting in the effort or doing the research at the moment.
What you are asking me to do in your original question however is express a preference for one of these approaches. You are asking me to choose an agenda, (or you might have been thinking particularly of Al Qaidas agenda) interject personal objectives (such as minimising casualties) and restrictions (such as say dismissing any tactics targeting civilians even if it would reduce the total bodycount, and increase the chances of success), and then weigh objectives against each other according to personal emphasis. (Do my emphasis rest on minimising casualties or maximizing chances of success? Would I be willing to empower a competing revolutionary movement in order to bring down the regime, risking that their agenda is pushed through instead of mine? What compromises would I be willing to make in my agenda in order to enlist wider support?)
I actually don't have a personal oppinion on this. That is, I preffer the human rights agenda and the democracy agenda, but whatever the agenda I have no preferences among the strategies. Perhaps with more information I would have.