THE US, THE UN AND THE IRAQIS THEMSELVES, V. 7.0

Still at it Ican? Selective response. The entire article condemns the Bush administration and you pick up something you think you can hang your hat on. I should remind you that northern Iraq was at that time practically an autonomous region controlled by the Kurds. Which would have been better to have delivered the missile strike or create the quagmire we now have in Iraq?

Actually McTag, I think Ican's first statement is true. (One out of three, something of a record eh?)

We did attack Iraq to oust Saddam. But we were told it was to disarm him of weapons that posed an "imminent" threat to the USA and which he could launch against UK interests "in 45 minutes".

Such lies of course inspired people to support an illegal war. (And yes if you detect a change in my position from guarded support to out right condemnation, you're right).

..... Its now out in the open that he knew it was never a threat to this country and that the real issue was regime change in Iraq, and to suck up to G W Bush.

Kara wrote:
... I cannot speak to the relative merits of alternative actions because they were actions not taken. It is logically fallacious to say that a certain outcome would have resulted if an alternative action was taken.


Kara, I don't understand this part of your post. In any kind of problem solving in which I've been involved, we always first speculate on alternatives, and then systematically investigate the probable consequences of each alternative, before searching for better alternatives, or before selecting one to go forward with.

For example, this is in fact the very nature of the Scientific Method. Every scientific theory the scientific consensus holds to be true, is held to be true until proven false. No scientific theory is taken to be absolutely true, but rather is taken to be true relative to what is currently known or believed to be known

raq: How bad can things get?

By Paul Wood
BBC Middle East correspondent, Basra


Just how bad are things in Iraq? Since just last week it has seen hundreds of deaths, suicide bombings, beheadings, yet more people kidnapped.
When I visited Basra exactly one year ago it was safe enough to stay in town on our own.

This time, we wouldn't dream of doing that. The chances of being kidnapped are too great.


It's true there have been some real, solid achievements over the past year.
There aren't petrol queues, or petrol riots, in Basra any more.

The electricity is on for longer. And oil exports from the south are up to 2.9 million barrels a day.

But here are some other statistics. Last month, the British Army fired 100,000 rounds of ammunition in southern Iraq.

The base in al-Ammara sustained more than 400 direct mortar hits.

The British battalion there counted some 853 separate attacks of different kinds: mortars, roadside bombs, rockets and machine-gun fire.

No British regiment has had such intense "contact", as they call it, since Korea.

Fury over Najaf

A year ago, the British Army was still congratulating itself on running one of the more peaceful parts of Iraq.


It seems sometimes UK troops are gingerly walking on the thin crust of a volcano, wondering how much pressure is building below


If you'd predicted all this, it would have been dismissed as doom-mongering.
British officers characterise the fighting in August as merely a spike in the violence.

They say quite rightly that the trouble had a particular cause.

The Americans were battling Shia gunmen loyal to the radical cleric Moqtada Sadr in Najaf.


The fury spilled over into Basra and al-Ammara.
The anger was fuelled by the widespread belief that US-led forces were attacking the two holy shrines in Najaf.

At the height of the crisis, a leading Shia figure in Basra told a British Brigadier: "There are lots of moderates here who support you. But if the shrines are touched, I'll kill you myself."

Uprising fears

Eventually a peace deal in Najaf brought peace to the rest of the south too.

Since the shrines were not touched, only about 400 hard-core gunmen joined the fight against the multi-national forces in Basra.

Still, in an area which is 99% Shia, the great danger for the British is of a general uprising.


It sometimes seems as if the troops are gingerly walking on the thin crust of a volcano, wondering how much pressure is building below.
The British - with tanks, air support and thousands of soldiers - say they could have destroyed the small militia force attacking them.

But they were asked by local people not to turn Basra into a war zone.

And because they didn't, the majority still welcomes them here.

Grateful for security

We went on a British patrol in the dead of night to stop and search vehicles on the road from al-Ammara to Basra.


None of Basra's 25,000 police officers came to the aid of the British soldiers in the August fighting. Some even helped the gunmen


At our checkpoint, drivers were made to get out and show their ID cards while soldiers looked under the seats and in the boot for illegal weapons.
Not one of the drivers or passengers expressed any resentment at this.

One explained that hostage-taking was especially bad on that stretch of road.

The gangs usually kidnap a driver, his lorry and its cargo, he said, and ransom the whole lot back to the company concerned.

Many drivers are killed. It's no surprise then that people are glad of the British presence.

Vicious intimidation

The problem is that very few people are actively supporting the fight against the militants.


A vicious campaign of intimidation doesn't help matters.
Last month, five cleaning ladies at a British base were murdered on their way to work.

Two local translators disappeared. Their severed heads were found outside the front gate.

But perhaps the most worrying development of the August fighting was that none of Basra's 25,000 police officers came to the aid of the British soldiers. Some even helped the gunmen.

I met one of the senior civilian political advisors to the military command.

Every time he came to Basra things seemed a "step change worse", he said.

The best thing to happen, he went on, would be for a new Islamic government to be elected in January which would ask multi-national forces to leave.

I don't think he was being facetious.

Exit strategy

Elections do form part of the exit strategy, but not in this way.

The hope is that national elections in January will produce a government with the authority and the legitimacy to face down the gunmen on its own.

But in local elections in the British sector this week, turnout was just 15%.

A government election with that much backing would be just one faction in the civil war which some American intelligence officials believe is brewing.

That is very much the worst case. But whatever happens, British officers no longer have any illusions that the southern corner of Iraq they run will be immune from the violence.

Harper's Magazine, September 2004 -- It was only after I had been in Baghdad for a month that I found what I was looking for. I had traveled to Iraq a year after the war began, at the height of what should have been a construction boom, but after weeks of searching I had not seen a single piece of heavy machinery apart from tanks and humvees. Then I saw it: a construction crane. It was big and yellow and impressive, and when I caught a glimpse of it around a corner in a busy shopping district I thought that I was finally about to witness some of the reconstruction I had heard so much about. But as I got closer I noticed that the crane was not actually rebuilding anything - not one of the bombed-out government buildings that still lay in rubble all over the city, nor one of the many power lines that remained in twisted heaps even as the heat of summer was starting to bear down. No, the crane was hoisting a giant billboard to the top of a three-story building. SUNBULA: HONEY 100% NATURAL, made in Saudi Arabia.

Seeing the sign, I couldn't help but think about something Senator John McCain had said back in October. Iraq, he said, is "a huge pot of honey that's attracting a lot of flies." The flies McCain was referring to were the Halliburtons and Bechtels, as well as the venture capitalists who flocked to Iraq in the path cleared by Bradley Fighting Vehicles and laser-guided bombs. The honey that drew them was not just no-bid contracts and Iraq's famed oil wealth but the myriad investment opportunities offered by a country that had just been cracked wide open after decades of being sealed off, first by the nationalist economic policies of Saddam Hussein, then by asphyxiating United Nations sanctions.

Looking at the honey billboard, I was also reminded of the most common explanation for what has gone wrong in Iraq, a complaint echoed by everyone from John Kerry to Pat Buchanan: Iraq is mired in blood and deprivation because George W. Bush didn't have "a postwar plan." The only problem with this theory is that it isn't true. The Bush Administration did have a plan for what it would do after the war; put simply, it was to lay out as much honey as possible, then sit back and wait for the flies.

The honey theory of Iraqi reconstruction stems from the most cherished belief of the war's ideological architects: that greed is good. Not good just for them and their friends but good for humanity, and certainly good for Iraqis. Greed creates profit, which creates growth, which creates jobs and products and services and everything else anyone could possibly need or want. The role of good government, then, is to create the optimal conditions for corporations to pursue their bottomless greed, so that they in turn can meet the needs of the society. The problem is that governments, even neoconservative governments, rarely get the chance to prove their sacred theory right: despite their enormous ideological advances, even George Bush's Republicans are, in their own minds, perennially sabotaged by meddling Democrats, intractable unions, and alarmist environmentalists.

Many of us were against the war and knew (or as close to knowing as we were able) that the reasons Bush and Rumsfeld put out there were not sufficient reasons to attack another country. ...

But back on point. I could posit that a much better outcome would have ensued if Bush had not attacked Iraq. Maybe I'm right, maybe I'm wrong. I wish we had had a chance to find out. But it is a logical fallacy for me to say with certainty that any other outcome is more than just speculation, or hope, or cloud-gathering.

1. We invaded Iraq to remove Saddam and thereby prevent him from continuing to shelter and otherwise aid and abet al Qaeda and other terrorists;
2. We invaded Iraq to help the Iraqis develop a government that will in future be unlikely to shelter and otherwise aid and abet al Qaeda and other terrorists.

Some ere, including you, have theorized that these were insufficient or not the real reasons. Perhaps you're right. But absent facts and/or logic to support your theory, I have no reason for believing your theory valid.

None of us agree with your 'most probable' outcomes. But I'll get to that in a minute.

Quote:

1. We invaded Iraq to remove Saddam and thereby prevent him from continuing to shelter and otherwise aid and abet al Qaeda and other terrorists;

2. We invaded Iraq to help the Iraqis develop a government that will in future be unlikely to shelter and otherwise aid and abet al Qaeda and other terrorists.

Some here, including you, have theorized that these were insufficient or not the real reasons. Perhaps you're right. But absent facts and/or logic to support your theory, I have no reason for believing your theory valid.

Fair enough. Let's take them one at a time.

1. We invaded Iraq to remove Saddam and thereby prevent him from continuing to shelter and otherwise aid and abet al Qaeda and other terrorists;

This doesn't mention WMD at all. Why? Whether or not you believe it, Bush & Co. used the WMD issue to coerce the American people into supporting their desire to remove Saddam.

Whether or not Saddam was harboring AQ (and I think you know that most of us don't accept your circumstantial evidence as fact... there is more evidence that the Saudis did than Iraq ever did) the reason that was given to the American public was that they, and the world, were in danger of a WMD attack by Saddam if we didn't act immediately.

If you are going to list removing Saddam as a reason for invasion, then you either have to mention that WMD are the primary reason we were going to remove him or that the Bush admin. predicated lies upon the American people in order to garner support for their war. Which, by the way, is extremely immoral and unjust.

2. We invaded Iraq to help the Iraqis develop a government that will in future be unlikely to shelter and otherwise aid and abet al Qaeda and other terrorists.

Okay, now this one I like much better.

There is little doubt that Iraq needed regime change. My question to you is, do you seriously believe that there is going to be a new ruling party in Iraq anytime soon who is pro-US? Who is pro-Israeli? Who will not sympathize with terrorists who are anti-US and Israeli, at least to the level at which Saddam did (which looks like not at all except for Hamas, or at the very largest strech, 'not much')?

What good is it to remove the threat you know, only to be faced with a potentially larger one which you do not know?

If the overall goal of the war was to provide security for the American people, then I would say we have failed. The new Iraq is much more of a threat than the old Iraq was; we've taken a dangerous, yet relatively stable situation, and replaced it with a volatile one in which many Iraqis now see us as the bad guys - at least as bad as Saddam.

There is no evidence whatsoever that Saddam had any ability to attack America. None. Those who said he did were wrong.

As for the sheltering AQ issue... it would seem that Iraq, at most, was only a small player in the harboring AQ story. A question for you, ICann: if every time we invade a country, the AQ operatives just up and leave, how are we ever supposed to stop them by invading countries?

You yourself have said that it is more of an ideology than a leadership-based thing. So how do we stop that ideology by going to war?

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY (page 12 and 13)

...

The enemy is not just "terrorism." It is the threat posed specifically by Islamist terrorism, by Bin Ladin and others who draw on a long tradition of extreme intolerance within a minority strain of Islam that does not distinguish politics from religion, and distorts both.

The enemy is not Islam, the great world faith, but a perversion of Islam. The enemy goes beyond al Qaeda to include the radical ideological movement, inspired in part by al Qaeda, that has spawned other terrorist groups and violence. Thus our strategy must match our means to two ends: dismantling the al Qaeda network and, in the long term, prevailing over the ideology that contributes to Islamist terrorism.

The first phase of our post-9/11 efforts rightly included military action to topple the Taliban and pursue al Qaeda. This work continues. But long-term success demands the use of all elements of national power: diplomacy, intelligence, covert action, law enforcement, economic policy, foreign aid, public diplomacy, and homeland defense. If we favor one tool while neglecting others, we leave ourselves vulnerable and weaken our national effort.

What should Americans expect from their government? The goal seems unlimited: Defeat terrorism anywhere in the world. But Americans have also been told to expect the worst: An attack is probably coming; it may be more devastating still.

Vague goals match an amorphous picture of the enemy. Al Qaeda and other groups are popularly described as being all over the world, adaptable, resilient, needing little higher-level organization, and capable of anything. It is an image of an omnipotent hydra of destruction. That image lowers expectations of government effectiveness.

It lowers them too far. Our report shows a determined and capable group of plotters. Yet the group was fragile and occasionally left vulnerable by the marginal, unstable people often attracted to such causes. The enemy made mistakes. The U.S. government was not able to capitalize on them.

No president can promise that a catastrophic attack like that of 9/11 will not happen again. But the American people are entitled to expect that officials will have realistic objectives, clear guidance, and effective organization. They are entitled to see standards for performance so they can judge, with the help of their elected representatives, whether the objectives are being met.

We propose a strategy with three dimensions: (1) attack terrorists and their organizations, (2) prevent the continued growth of Islamist terrorism, and (3) protect against and prepare for terrorist attacks.

...

Well, you agree with them, right?

How do we stop an ideology by going to war in countries? We cannot possibly hope to detain or kill everyone who holds to these ideologies; it simply isn't going to happen with 100% certainty.

I would also say that we cannot afford, as a country, to go to war with several other countries, even if they cost LESS than the Iraq war did. It's a simple matter of economic priorities.

Informed Comment

Thoughts on the Middle East, History, and Religion

Juan Cole is Professor of History at the University of Michigan

Wednesday, September 22, 2004

If America were Iraq, What would it be Like?

President Bush said Tuesday that the Iraqis are refuting the pessimists and implied that things are improving in that country.

What would America look like if it were in Iraq's current situation? The population of the US is over 11 times that of Iraq, so a lot of statistics would have to be multiplied by that number.

Thus, violence killed 300 Iraqis last week, the equivalent proportionately of 3,300 Americans. What if 3,300 Americans had died in car bombings, grenade and rocket attacks, machine gun spray, and aerial bombardment in the last week? That is a number greater than the deaths on September 11, and if America were Iraq, it would be an ongoing, weekly or monthly toll.

And what if those deaths occurred all over the country, including in the capital of Washington, DC, but mainly above the Mason Dixon line, in Boston, Minneapolis, Salt Lake City, and San Francisco?

What if the grounds of the White House and the government buildings near the Mall were constantly taking mortar fire? What if almost nobody in the State Department at Foggy Bottom, the White House, or the Pentagon dared venture out of their buildings, and considered it dangerous to go over to Crystal City or Alexandria?

What if all the reporters for all the major television and print media were trapped in five-star hotels in Washington, DC and New York, unable to move more than a few blocks safely, and dependent on stringers to know what was happening in Oklahoma City and St. Louis? What if the only time they ventured into the Midwest was if they could be embedded in Army or National Guard units?

There are estimated to be some 25,000 guerrillas in Iraq engaged in concerted acts of violence. What if there were private armies totalling 275,000 men, armed with machine guns, assault rifles (legal again!), rocket-propelled grenades, and mortar launchers, hiding out in dangerous urban areas of cities all over the country? What if they completely controlled Seattle, Portland, San Francisco, Salt Lake City, Las Vegas, Denver and Omaha, such that local police and Federal troops could not go into those cities?

What if, during the past year, the Secretary of State (Aqilah Hashemi), the President (Izzedine Salim), and the Attorney General (Muhammad Baqir al-Hakim) had all been assassinated?

What if all the cities in the US were wracked by a crime wave, with thousands of murders, kidnappings, burglaries, and carjackings in every major city every year?

What if the Air Force routinely (I mean daily or weekly) bombed Billings, Montana, Flint, Michigan, Watts in Los Angeles, Philadelphia, Anacostia in Washington, DC, and other urban areas, attempting to target "safe houses" of "criminal gangs", but inevitably killing a lot of children and little old ladies?

What if, from time to time, the US Army besieged Virginia Beach, killing hundreds of armed members of the Christian Soldiers? What if entire platoons of the Christian Soldiers militia holed up in Arlington National Cemetery, and were bombarded by US Air Force warplanes daily, destroying thousands of graves and even pulverizing the Vietnam Memorial over on the Mall? What if the National Council of Churches had to call for a popular march of thousands of believers to converge on the National Cathedral to stop the US Army from demolishing it to get at a rogue band of the Timothy McVeigh Memorial Brigades?

What if there were virtually no commercial air traffic in the country? What if many roads were highly dangerous, especially Interstate 95 from Richmond to Washington, DC, and I-95 and I-91 up to Boston? If you got on I-95 anywhere along that over 500-mile stretch, you would risk being carjacked, kidnapped, or having your car sprayed with machine gun fire.

What if no one had electricity for much more than 10 hours a day, and often less? What if it went off at unpredictable times, causing factories to grind to a halt and air conditioning to fail in the middle of the summer in Houston and Miami? What if the Alaska pipeline were bombed and disabled at least monthly? What if unemployment hovered around 40%?

What if veterans of militia actions at Ruby Ridge and the Oklahoma City bombing were brought in to run the government on the theory that you need a tough guy in these times of crisis?

What if municipal elections were cancelled and cliques close to the new "president" quietly installed in the statehouses as "governors?" What if several of these governors (especially of Montana and Wyoming) were assassinated soon after taking office or resigned when their children were taken hostage by guerrillas?

What if the leader of the European Union maintained that the citizens of the United States are, under these conditions, refuting pessimism and that freedom and democracy are just around the corner?

posted by Juan @ 9/22/2004 06:53:26 AM