THE US, THE UN AND THE IRAQIS THEMSELVES, V. 7.0

Hmmm... I've been too busy reading about those being convicted to notice the few that are not.

georgeob1 wrote:

Did you attend the trials?

No, are you saying a person can't ever get information unless the person is there in person? What do we need the press for?

Pentagon Plays Down New Rise in Iraq Violence

By Bradley Graham
Washington Post Staff Writer
Wednesday, April 27, 2005; Page A16

Top Pentagon officials yesterday acknowledged a recent jump in insurgent violence in Iraq but described the escalation as nowhere near the peak levels of the past year and disputed suggestions that it represents a lack of progress.

At a news conference, Gen. Richard B. Myers, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, said the level of attacks is about the same as it was a year ago, with the insurgency retaining the ability to surge. But he and Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld cited other developments -- including a greater willingness by Iraqis to provide intelligence on insurgents and growth in Iraqi security forces and political institutions -- as evidence of improvement.


Gen. Richard B. Myers, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, said he thinks the United States is
Gen. Richard B. Myers, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, said he thinks the United States is "definitely winning" the conflict. (By Haraz Ghanbari -- Associated Press)

The latest increase in bombings, shootings, and rocket and mortar attacks has ended a period of greater calm that followed the Jan. 30 parliamentary elections. From a high of nearly 150 attacks a day immediately before the vote, the average had fallen to about 40, and the number of U.S. casualties had dropped sharply as well.

But over the past month, the daily total has edged up to about 50 or 60 attacks, about half of which are resulting in significant damage, injuries or deaths, according to Pentagon figures.

Of particular concern for U.S. authorities has been a rise in the number of suicide car-bomb attacks, some of which are now being used in tandem. Myers singled out this trend yesterday.

In the past, U.S. military authorities have attributed the suicide attacks not to Iraqi Sunni militants who dominate the insurgency but to foreign Islamic extremists who have joined the fight in Iraq. But U.S. analysts are still trying to identify the forces behind the rise in the suicide missions and have not ruled out the possibility that it reflects a hardening of Sunni opposition as a political impasse persists over the formation of a new Iraqi government.

Rumsfeld and Myers characterized the recent increase in attacks as relatively small and said it is not identifiable as a clear trend.

"It's up slightly in the last week," Rumsfeld said. "But what you have is a relatively small number of people who have weapons and who have money and who are determined to try to prevent democracy from going forward."

Still, their concern about the worsening security situation was evident in statements from both officials underscoring the need for a break in the political logjam in Iraq.

"The political process must go forward," Myers said. "We must have a cabinet appointed here very quickly."

Asked whether the rise in attacks shows the United States is winning or losing the conflict, Rumsfeld tried to shift the focus of the question, saying U.S. and coalition forces will not by themselves defeat the insurgency.

"The people that are going to defeat that insurgency are going to be the Iraqis," he said.

Myers responded more emphatically.

"I think we're definitely winning," he said. "I think we've been winning for some time."

As evidence that U.S. forces may be closing in on at least one major terrorist figure in Iraq, defense officials said Special Operations forces had nearly captured Jordanian militant Abu Musab Zarqawi in a raid two months ago that netted two of his associates.

According to the U.S. account, first reported Monday night by ABC News, U.S. forces had been in place to seize Zarqawi on Feb. 20 after receiving information that he would be attending a meeting in Ramadi. But shortly before the meeting, a car was pulled over at a checkpoint. A pickup truck trailing the car then turned and headed in the opposite direction.

U.S. authorities suspect Zarqawi was in the truck. But when U.S. forces pulled the vehicle over several miles later, he was not inside. Instead, they found a computer with photos of Zarqawi and other information related to him, as well as more than $100,000 in Euros.

Neither Rumsfeld nor Myers would discuss the incident. But Rumsfeld said the capture of members of Zarqawi's network has put the terrorist leader under greater pressure.

"I think he is on the run," the Pentagon leader said. "I think life for a terrorist, extremist, in that country is hard."

Gallup: 50% of Americans Now Say Bush Deliberately Misled Them on WMDs

By E&P Staff

Published: April 26, 2005 11:45 AM ET

NEW YORK Half of all Americans, exactly 50%, now say the Bush administration deliberately misled Americans about whether Iraq had weapons of mass destruction, the Gallup Organization reported this morning.

"This is the highest percentage that Gallup has found on this measure since the question was first asked in late May 2003," the pollsters observed. "At that time, 31% said the administration deliberately misled Americans. This sentiment has gradually increased over time, to 39% in July 2003, 43% in January/February 2004, and 47% in October 2004."

Also, according to the latest poll, more than half of Americans, 54%, disapprove of the way President Bush is handling the situation in Iraq, while 43% approve. In early February, Americans were more evenly divided on the way Bush was handling the situation in Iraq, with 50% approving and 48% disapproving.

Last week Gallup reported that 53% now believe that the U.S. invasion of Iraq was "not worth it." But Frank Newport, editor in chief at Gallup, recalled today that although a majority of the public began to think the Vietnam war was a mistake in the summer of 1968, the United States did not pull out of Vietnam for more than five years, after thousands of more American lives were lost.
E&P Staff ([email protected])

What a wonderfuly distorted statement of historical reality . . .

Your reference A perused the same fallacious "intelligence" that your reference B did, ican.
False! Check the dates: A was published 9/20/2004 or 19 months after the US invaded Iraq; B was delivered 1/5/2003 or 43 days before our invasion of Iraq.

Your reference F merely summarizes your reference A.
Do you have any evidence to support this hypothesis of yours? Or is this merely speculation on your part, InfraBlue?

Your reference B has been discredited, and been shown to be at best a display of gross incompetence, and at worst an example of willful, instigative demagoguery.
False! Only the part of reference B claiming Iraq possessed ready-to-use WMD has subsequently been shown to be false. It was shown to be false by reference E published 9/30/2004. The "sinister nexus" part has not been "discredited." The only piece of B's "sinister nexus" part that my argument depends on (please review my argument at the end of this post) is Powell's claim that the US twice requested Iraq to extradite the leadership (e.g., Zarqawi) of the AQ.

Your reference D confirmed the existence of Ansar al Islam camps in northern Iraq. It does not confirm the contention that Iraq harbored those camps. Those camps were beyond the control of Iraq, and under the control of the Kurds in that area.
True except for the fact that the Kurds didn't control those camps anymore than did Saddam's regime controlled them! Al Qaeda controlled those camps.

But then my argument (see quote below) isn't based on the allegation "that Iraq harbored those camps." By the way, the phrase beyond the control of Iraq is not equivalent to the phrase Iraq could not gain control --especially, when requested to do so by the US.

The rest of your contention about extradition of "AQ leadership" and or the lack thereof is merely speculation on your part, ican.
Do you have any evidence to support this hypothesis of yours? Or is this merely speculation on your part, InfraBlue?

1. President Bush announced to the nation, Tuesday night, 9/11/2001, that our war was not only with the terrorists who have declared war on us, it is also with those governments that “harbor” terrorists. President Bush announced to the nation, to Congress and to the rest of the world, Thursday night, 9/20/2001, that our war was not only with the terrorists who have declared war on us, it is also with those governments that “support” terrorists. [Reference A]

2. Al Qaeda terrorist bases are necessary for the successful perpetration by al Qaeda terrorists of al Qaeda terrorism. [Reference A]

3. The US must remove those governments that persist in knowingly providing sanctuary for al Qaeda terrorist bases. [Reference A]

4. On 9/11/2001 there were terrorist training bases in both Afghanistan and Iraq. The terrorist training bases in Afghanistan were established in 1988 after the Russians abandoned their war in Afghanistan. The terrorist training bases in Iraq were re-established in 2001 after the Kurds had defeated them a couple of years earlier. [References A, B, C, D, F]

5. We invaded Afghanistan in October 2001 without obtaining UN approval and removed Afghanistan's tyrannical government, because that government refused to attempt to remove the terrorist bases from Afghanistan. [Reference A]

6. We invaded Iraq in March 2003 without obtaining UN approval and removed Iraq's tyrannical government, because that government refused to attempt to remove the terrorist bases from Iraq. [References A, B, D, E, F]

7. We are attempting to secure a democratic government of the Afghanistan people’s own design in Afghanistan primarily because such a government is presumed less likely to permit the re-establishment of terrorist bases there. [Reference A]

8. We are attempting to secure a democratic government of the Iraq people’s own design in Iraq primarily because such a government is presumed less likely to permit the re-establishment of terrorist bases there. [Reference A]

9. I think that only after this enormously difficult work is completed successfully, will the US again possess sufficient means to seriously consider invasions to remove any other tyrannical governments that refuse to attempt to remove terrorist bases from their countries.

References:

A. 9-11 Commission, 9/20/2004
www.9-11commission.gov/report/index.htm

B. Secretary of State, Colin Powell’s speech to UN, “sinister nexus,” 2/5/2003:
NEW LINK:
http://www.state.gov/secretary/former/powell/remarks/2003/17300.htm

C. “The Encyclopedia Britannica, Iraq”
www.britannica.com

D. "American Soldier," by General Tommy Franks, 7/1/2004
“10” Regan Books, An Imprint of HarperCollins Publishers

E. Charles Duelfer's Report, 30 September 2004
www.cia.gov/cia/reports/iraq_wmd_2004/Comp_Report_Key_Findings.pdf

F. From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia.
http://en.wikipedia.org

We're talking about a car which had already passed two checkpoints, whose occupants had informed the authorities about their presence and their intentions, being shot up.

Makes one wonder what freak show the next administration will come up with to distract the populace .....

The UK Attorney General is an advisor to the UK Prime Minister who sets and is accountable for policy. The excerpts I have seen from this 'legal advice' merely point to the arguments some will use to contest the legality of the then contemplated step. They stop well short of declaring it illegal.

Blair accused of 'gross deception' as Goldsmith's advice is published
By Colin Brown, Deputy Political Editor
28 April 2005


The Attorney General's doubts about the legality of the Iraq war were finally laid bare after his secret advice to the Prime Minister was leaked.

The publication of Lord Goldsmith's report last night could prove to be the "smoking gun" that shows Tony Blair misled Parliament and the country over the war.

Last night, Mr Blair - unaware that the report was about to be leaked - was caught out still claiming on Sky News that the advice from the Attorney General "didn't change".

Professor Peter Hennessy, an expert on constitutional affairs, said: "The whole thing reeks." Dominic Grieve, the Tory legal affairs spokesman said: "There has been a gross deception."

Families of some of the British soldiers killed in Iraq said they were preparing a legal case against the Prime Minister, based on the leaked document.

The Attorney General rushed out a statement, defending his role. He made clear that he changed his view because the Prime Minister had assured him that Saddam was in breach of UN resolutions. However, it has become clear that the assurance was based on intelligence that Saddam was building up an arsenal of WMD that has proved false. Lord Goldsmith said: "What this document does, as in any legal advice, is to go through the complicated arguments that led me to this view. Far from showing I reached the conclusion that to go to war would be unlawful, it shows how I took account of all the arguments before reaching my conclusion.

"The document also makes it clear that the legal analysis might be altered by the course of events over the next week or so.

"Between 7th March and 17th March, 2003, I asked for and received confirmation of the breach of UN Security Council resolutions. It was also necessary to continue my deliberations as the military and civil service needed me to express a clear and simple view whether military action would be lawful or not.

"The answer to the question was it lawful, yes or no, was, in my judgement, yes. And I said so to Government, to the military, to Cabinet and publicly."

In his report to Mr Blair, Lord Goldsmith warned in the document that British troops involved in any invasion of Iraq might face prosecution in the international courts and said the "safest legal course" would be to secure a new Security Council resolution authorising war.

Lord Goldsmith said he believed the UK and US would need "strong factual grounds" and "hard and compelling evidence" of Iraqi breaches of United Nations resolutions before taking military action.

The six key arguments used by Lord Goldsmith to question the legality of the war were leaked at the weekend, but the full report strips away the last vestiges of defence by Mr Blair for his claim, repeated this week, that he had clear advice that the war was legal.

In the advice, Lord Goldsmith also challenged the Prime Minister's assertion that the war was justified because Saddam Hussein had flouted UN resolution 1441 on weapons of mass destruction.

Lord Goldsmith said he believed the wording of the resolution left it "unclear" whether it authorised war. "In these circumstances, I remain of the opinion that the safest legal course would be to secure the adoption of a further resolution to authorise the use of force," he said.

The advice said "a reasonable case" could be made that resolution 1441 permitted the use of military action. But it added: "However, the argument that resolution 1441 alone has revived the authorisation to use force ... will only be sustainable if there are strong factual grounds for concluding that Iraq has failed to take the final opportunity [to disarm].... We would need to be able to demonstrate hard evidence of non-compliance and non co-operation. Given the ... resolution as a whole, the views of Unmovic and the IAEA will be highly significant ... You will need to consider very carefully whether the evidence of non-co-operation and non-compliance by Iraq is sufficiently compelling to justify the conclusion that Iraq has failed to take its final opportunity." The document, leaked to Channel 4 News, states that the UK had previously gone to war in Kosovo in 1999 and taken part in air strikes against Iraq in 1998's Operation Desert Fox on the basis of advice that the legality of the action was no more than "reasonably arguable".

But he warned: "A 'reasonable case' does not mean that if the matter ever came before a court I would be confident that the court would agree with the view."

For the first time, the legal advice on war we weren't allowed to see
The following is a summary of the Attorney General's advice
28 April 2005


26. To sum up, the language of resolution 1441 leaves the position unclear and the statements made on adoption of the resolution suggest that there were differences of view within the Council as to the legal effect of the resolution. Arguments can be made on both sides. A key question is whether there is in truth a need for an assessment of whether Iraq's conduct constitutes a failure to take the final opportunity or has constituted a failure fully to cooperate within the meaning of OP4 such that the basis of the cease-fire is destroyed. If an assessment is needed of that situation, it would be for the Council to make it. A narrow textual reading of the resolution suggests that sort of assessment is not needed, because the Council has predetermined the issue. Public statements, on the other hand, say otherwise.

27. In these circumstances, I remain of the opinion that the safest legal course would be to secure the adoption of a further resolution to authorise the use of force. The key point is that it should establish that the Council has concluded that Iraq has failed to take the final opportunity offered by resolution 1441, as in the draft which has already been tabled.

28. Nevertheless, having regard to the information on the negotiating history which I have been given and to the arguments of the US Administration which I heard in Washington, I accept that a reasonable case can be made that resolution 1441 is capable in principle of reviving the authorisation in 678 without a further resolution.

29. However, the argument that resolution 1441 alone has revived the authorisation to use force in resolution 678 will only be sustainable if there are strong factual grounds for concluding that Iraq has failed to take the final opportunity. In other words, we would need to be able to demonstrate hard evidence of non-compliance and non-cooperation. Given the structure of the resolution as a whole, the views of UNMOVIC and the IAEA will be highly significant in this respect. In the light of the latest reporting by UNMOVIC, you will need to consider very carefully whether the evidence of non-cooperation and non- compliance by Iraq is sufficiently compelling to justify the conclusion that Iraq has failed to take its final opportunity.

30. In reaching my conclusion, I have taken account of the fact that on a number of previous occasions, including in relation to Operation Desert Fox in December 1998 and Kosovo in 1999, UK forces have participated in military action on the basis of advice from my predecessors that the legality of the action under international law was no more than reasonably arguable. But a "reasonable case" does not mean that if the matter ever came before a court I would be confident that the court would agree with the view.

I judge that, having regard to the arguments on both sides, and considering the resolution as a whole in the light of the statements made on adoption and subsequently, a court might well conclude that OPs 4 and 12 do requ1re a further Council decision in order to revive the authorisation in resolution 678. But equally I consider that the counter view can be reasonably maintained.

However, it must be recognised that on previous occasions when military action was taken on the basis of a reasonably arguable case, the degree of public and Parliamentary scrutiny of the legal issue was nothing as great as it is today.

31. The analysis set out above applies whether a second resolution fails to be adopted because of a lack of votes or because it is vetoed. As I have said before, I do not believe that there is any basis in law for arguing that there is an implied condition of reasonableness which can be read into the power of veto conferred on the permanent members of the Security Council by the UN Charter.

So there are no grounds for arguing that an "unreasonable veto" would entitle us to proceed on the basis of a presumed Security Council authorisation. In any event, if the majority of world opinion remains opposed to military action, it is likely to be difficult on the facts to categorise a French veto as "unreasonable". The legal analysis may, however, be affected by the course of events over the next week or so, eg the discussions on the draft second resolution.

If we fail to achieve the adoption of a second resolution we would need to consider urgently at that stage the strength of our legal case in the light of circumstances at the time.