THE US, THE UN AND THE IRAQIS THEMSELVES, V. 7.0

Kara, it makes sense for other reasons, as well. Sadr City is named for Muqtada Al Sadr's father, who was and remains a hero for the Shi'ite majority. That district's populations swelled enormously after the failed uprising in 1991. Before the war, they had sporadic electric service, little access to clean water and almost no access to sewage and waste removal; they had no jobs and no prospects.

Now they've been liberated. They have sporadic electric service, little access to clean water, almost no acess to sewage and waster removal--and they have no jobs and no prospects. Foreign fighters are not needed to explain Sadr's ability to recruit. That some Persian shi'ites join him is not to be wondered at. But the "foreign fighters" refrain dovetails nicely with the hoary old chestnut about how it is better to fight the terrorists there than here. Absent the invasion, and without the continued negelect of the impoverished Shi'ite majority, there would be no Mahdi's Army.

That's a lot of bunk, Setanta.

One Iraqi Shi'a religious family which opposed working with the US-led occupation [and trying to get control from the al-Hakim family] is the al-Sadr family, which calls itself "The Active Religious Seminary". Until recently it was headed by Grand Ayatollah Muhammad Sadiq al-Sadr, who was assassinated along with two of his sons by presumed agents of Hussein in Al-Najaf in 1999.

The loyalty of many of his supporters passed to another son, Hojatoleslam Muqtada al-Sadr, a mid-level cleric about 30 years of age. Unlike his father, Muqtada had little formal religious standing to interpret the Koran, and relied for religious authority on an Iran-based Iraqi exiled cleric, Ayatollah Kazem al-Haeri, who was a student of Bakir al-Sadr. The militia wing of this movement was known as the "Mahdi Army" and was estimated as of early 2004 to consist of about 500-1000 trained combatants along with another 5,000-6,000 active participants. According to another US DOD estimate, the Mahdi Army was a group of about 3,000 lightly armed devotees of Sadr before operations against the group started. It was a small group on the margins, and while it wass unknown how large the group is, it had been degraded.

On June 4, 2004 Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty reported that the Al-Mahdi Army consisted of 6,000 to 10,000 combatants.

Some younger Shiites have contended for power with the more traditional Shiite Muslims in the city and region. Sheik Muqtada al-Sadr and his young followers have sought to replace more traditional factions as the voice of Iraq's Shiite majority. The al-Sadr family portrays themselves as the ones doing the most to redress decades of suppression by Sunni Muslims under the Saddam's rule.

The al-Sadr group has drawn charges of involvement in attacks and intimidation in Al-Najaf that have highlighted political differences among Shi'a political organizations. The most notable of those attacks was a mob killing of a pro-US cleric, Abd al-Majid al-Khoi, shortly after his return from exile in London in early April. Al-Khoi was himself the son of another extremely powerful former grand ayatollah, Abolqassem al-Khoi. Al-Khoi was murdered as he emerged from the city's Imam Ali Mosque in a gesture of reconciliation with the mosque's custodian, who was popularly considered to have collaborated with Hussein's regime. The custodian was killed along with al-Khoi and it is unclear whether al-Khoi was an assassination target or was struck down because he tried to defend the other man.

Immediately after al-Khoi's murder, supporters of al-Sadr surrounded the house of another grand ayatollah in Al-Najaf, Ali Sistani, in what was taken to be a gesture of intimidation. Sistani -- who has said that Shi'a leaders should limit themselves to religious questions and stay out of politics -- went into hiding and only re-emerged after tribesmen loyal to him raced to Al-Najaf.

Al-Sadr's group denied it had anything to do with the April 2003 attempt on the elder al-Hakim, and said Hussein loyalists were to blame. But in 2004 an Iraqi judge issued an arrest warrant for al-Sadr in connection with the killing of Ayatollah Abd al-Majid al-Khoi in 2003.

Mustafa Al-Yaqubi was detained on April 3, 2004 in connection with the April 2003 murder of Ayatollah Sayyed Abdul Majeed al-Khoei. An Iraqi judge issued a warrant for Mr. Yaqubi's arrest as a result of an Iraqi criminal investigation and indictment. He was taken into custody at his home in An Najaf.

In early April 2004 the militia of Muqtada Al Sadr's army -- Jaysh Mahdi or Mahdi Army -- attempted to interfere with security in Baghdad, intimidate Iraqi citizens and place them in danger. The militia attempted to occupy and gain control of police stations and government buildings. During this attack, this illegal militia engaged coalition forces and ISF with small arms fire and RPGs. Coalition forces and Iraqi security forces prevented this effort and reestablished security in Baghdad. Coalition troops fought gun battles with members of Muqtada al-Sadr's Imam Al-Mahdi Army militia in the southern cities of Al-Nassiriyah, Amara, and Kut. Clashes etween al-Sadr's Al-Mahdi Army and coalition troops south of Baghdad tested the resolve of the United States' partners in Iraq.

By 07 April 2004 US-led coalition forces were involved in the most widespread fighting in Iraq since the fall of Saddam Hussein a year ago. Troops battled Shiite militias in half a dozen Iraqi towns and cities from near Kirkuk in the north to Basra in the south.

As of 08 April 2004 the Al-Mahdi Army had taken full control of the city of Al-Kut and partial control of Al-Najaf. Residents of Al-Kufah said militiamen had some control of that city as well. In Karbala, Polish and Bulgarian troops fought Al-Mahdi Army militants as hundreds of thousands of Shi'ites were gathering ahead of a religious festival. The Polish Army said commanders were meeting with moderate Shi'ite clerics after radicals demanded the withdrawal of coalition forces.

Hundreds of loyalists to radical Shi'ite cleric Moqtada al-Sadr attacked British troops Saturday 08 May 2004 in the center of Basra, south of Baghdad. They also assaulted the governor's offices there, and fired rocket-propelled grenades at the coalition headquarters. The British sent in reinforcements, tanks and armored vehicles to secure the area. Several Iraqi insurgents were killed in the gun battles. The violence erupted a day after a cleric in Basra told worshippers he would offer cash rewards for the killing or capture of British and American troops. He also said anyone who captured female soldiers could keep them as slaves. The cleric, Sheikh Abdul-Sattar al-Bahadli, said his offer was in response to the abuse of Iraqi prisoners by US soldiers. Al-Bahadli is the Basra representative of hard- line Shiite leader Muqtada al- Sadr.

The first week of August 2004 witnessed a cycle of growing violence which culminated with fierce clashes across central and southern Iraq between the Al-Mahdi Army and US, British, and Italian forces. It was the heaviest fighting since al-Sadr's forces agreed to a truce in June. In the southern city of Al-Nasiriyah, Iraqi fighters attacked Italian patrols with rocket-propelled grenades and gunfire. At least 20 Iraqis and one US soldier were reported killed on 5 August in Baghdad, Al-Najaf, and Al-Basrah. Militants brought down a US helicopter in Al-Najaf, though the US military recovered the crew unharmed. Al-Sadr offered to join a new reciprocal ceasefire, but it was unclear whether the fighting was a brief flare-up or the collapse of the truce.

The Guilty Dog(s) bark first.

Amazing erudition. A year ago most western commentators, especially from the Right, did not know there was a difference between Iran and Iraq, nor where they were, and cared little.

On BBC Radio4 this morning, news that tens of thousands of christians are leaving Iraq, because they feel so unsafe. There has been a christian community in Iraq for almost two thousand years, and they have been there longer than the arabs have. Now they feel they must leave.

So how is that bunk, McG? Your article comes from a web site maintained by a Mr. Pike, who lists for himself a long list of credentials in regard to the aero-space industry. This does not necessarily make him an expert on Iraq. But whether or not he were such an expert, your cut-and-paste does not in any way refute the claim that the majority of Sadr's forces are recruited from among the poor of Sadr City. I can't for the life of me think why you posted this, although it may have been the remark about foreign fighters. Your cut-and-paste does not assert that his force is comprised of any significant number of foreign fighters. It also confirms what i've written about the authority of Muqtada Al Sadr's father.

Perhaps you could elucidate where you claim the bunk to be McG.

This is the bunk.

One might presume that the best strategy now for the Iraqis is to convince the US it is no longer needed in Iraq to preserve order and keep the oil flowing at market prices. Once the US military is reduced to a few small garrisons, the Iraqis could then resume whatever it is they wish to resume, including but not limited to anarchy followed by its usual successor, the establishment of a new tyrannical leader who like Saddam would no doubt appreciate whatever oil revenue he could get.

Based on that presumption, I again propose that the US ought to hold a simple plebiscite as soon as possible. The plebiscite should simply ask: Do you want the US to remain in Iraq doing what the US thinks best, or do you want the US to leave Iraq and not do anything further in Iraq?

This approach would be great for Kerry (or even Bush) to implement. Kerry the Windsock has recently several times disclosed on TV that his plan (formerly his secret plan) is to start removing US troops from Iraq in 6 months. With the holding of such a plebiscite, Kerry would probably, in effect, be invited by the Iraqis to implement his plan. Bush could do the same.

With the US all but gone, the Iraqis including the al Qaeda among them, would then have only themselves to slaugter in their pursuit of oil revenue.

The only downside of this approach is that the pursuit of Iraqi oil revenue would eventually culminate in pursuit of all oil revenue. But why worry about that now?

Had we not invaded Iraq, there would be no Mahdi's Army. Muqtada Al Sadr's father was taken out by the Ba'atist security services because he had credentials as a religious leader--which his son lacks. Muhammad Sadiq al-Sadr was a focus for Shi'ite resistance to the Ba'atist regime, and Muqtada trades upon that for his recruitment.

Of all the districts of Baghdad, the Sadr City district continues to have the least reliable and fewest services available. Reconstruction contracts throughout Iraq have gone to American and other foreign companies. The sorts of unskilled jobs which could be offered to Iraqis are not being offered, and discontent continues to simmer, and in that district of the city in particular. I would not be at all surprised if it were shown that Al Sadr himself is behind the continued atttacks on basic service infrastructure in that part of Baghdad which continues to make it difficult to give them reliable electric service, clean water and sewage and waste removal. Such a situation is a prime recruiting ground for terrorists, and although having shown himself to frequently be politically clueless, Muqtada has shown himself to be a rabble-rouser par excellence among young Iraqi Shi'ites. Without that discontent, and Muqtada's waning claim to represent the true desires of the Shi'a majority, there would be no Mahdi Army.

Your cut-and-paste job does not contradict what i wrote. If you wish to believe so, help yourself.

So if the US had not invaded Iraq, what would be different now?

Try 'no insurgency'.......

Yes, things would have been so different. Instead of Iraqi people terrorizing Iraqi government we would have had a continuation of Iraqi government terrorizing Iraqi people.

Ican
When did it become our obligation to right the wrongs of the world. Hell we can't even right the wrongs here at home. If the Iraqi people wanted freedom from Saddam it was their obligation not ours to fight for it. And now that we have freed them from their tyrant take a good look at the thanks we are getting.

We get thanks everyday. Especially from the people who were NOT baathists. It's primarily Baathists and outsiders leading the insurgency because we removed them from power and stopped their gravy train.

How do you spell 'power vacuum'?

McG
Sadr and the Mahdi army are neither Baathists nor foreigners they are Iraqi Shi'ites. The very people that Saddam was terrorizing

Sadr and the Mahdi army are a speck of the resistance in Iraq.

Pretty damned important speck, though, with fighting raging around the holiest shrine of Shi'a Islam. If anything seriously damaging happens to that place, you can look forward to seeing the fulfillment of your fond desire for foreign terrorists to blame. There's a hell of a lot of Shi'ites in the world, and not nearly all of them live in Iraq.

Posted on Sun, Aug. 15, 2004

Offensive resumes in Najaf, prompting desertions of Iraqi troops

By Hannah Allam, Tom Lasseter and Dogen Hannah

Knight Ridder Newspapers

BAGHDAD, Iraq - U.S. and Iraqi forces launched a renewed assault Sunday on Shiite Muslim militiamen in the southern holy city of Najaf in a risky campaign that was marred from the onset by an outcry from Iraqi politicians and the desertion of dozens of Iraqi troops who refused to fight their countrymen.

The latest siege began Sunday afternoon, a day after Iraqi Prime Minister Iyad Allawi's administration announced that fighting would resume after negotiations between government officials and aides to Muqtada al-Sadr failed to end the militant cleric's 10-day rebellion. The failed cease-fire talks, desertions and renewed fighting further undermined Allawi's leadership just as Iraq was poised to take its first step toward free elections by picking a national assembly.

More than 100 delegates walked out of a national conference that was hailed as Iraq's first experiment with democracy after decades of dictatorship. Enraged over the fresh violence in Najaf, the delegates left the meeting hall declaring that, "as long as there are airstrikes and shelling, we can't have a conference."

The day's events illustrated the dilemma that plagues Allawi and his American supporters.

It will be difficult, if not impossible, for Allawi to establish his leadership, hold Iraq together and prod the country toward democracy without crushing his militant opponents, not only in the Shiite south but also in the old Saddam Hussein strongholds north and west of the capital. But to do that, Allawi must rely on unpopular U.S. troops, whose offensives only lend support to the charge that Allawi is an American puppet.

Sunday's showdown in Najaf was troubled even before the fighting resumed. Several officials from the Iraqi defense ministry told Knight Ridder that more than 100 Iraqi national guardsmen and a battalion of Iraqi soldiers chose to quit rather than attack fellow Iraqis in a city that includes some of the holiest sites in Shiite Islam. Neither U.S. military officials nor Iraqi government officials would confirm the resignations.

"We received a report that a whole battalion (in Najaf) threw down their rifles," said one high-ranking defense ministry official, who didn't want his name published because he's not an official spokesman. "We expected this, and we expect it again and again."

"In Najaf, there are no Iraqi Army or police involved in the fighting. There were in the beginning, but later the American forces led the fighting," said Raad Kadhemi, a spokesman for al-Sadr. "Only the mercenaries and the bastards are supporting the Americans and helping them ... We salute our brothers who abandoned participating in the fight against the Mahdi Army."

Arabic-language satellite channels broadcast live all day from inside the Imam Ali shrine in Najaf, where dozens of members of al-Sadr's Mahdi Army militia chanted vows to defend the holy site. Plumes of smoke rose from just outside the shrine, and reporters heard the crackle of machine-gun fire and the deeper booms of tank and mortar rounds. Many journalists had fled the area after Iraqi police evicted them and threatened them with arrest if they stayed.

Sober-faced Iraqi colonels gathered inside the defense ministry command center, their cell phones ringing with continuous updates from the battlefield. American military advisers wandered in and out of the room, located at the end of a marble hallway in the massive, heavily guarded palace that serves as headquarters for U.S.-led forces and American civilian administrators.

"Aziz is trapped in the ancient fortress with two wounded men and two of his vehicles surrounded!" shouted one Iraqi officer.

The officers, most of them decorated veterans from the former regime, shook their heads at the thought of Iraqis battling Iraqis on sacred soil. Several said they would resign immediately if senior officers ordered them to serve in Najaf. They asked to withhold their names for fear of reprimand.

"I'm ready to fight for my country's independence and for my country's stability," one lieutenant colonel said. "But I won't fight my own people."

"No way," added another officer, who said his brother - a colonel - quit the same day he received orders to serve in the field. "These are my people. Why should I fight someone just because he has a difference in opinion about the future of the country?"

However, an Iraqi military analyst inside the ministry defended the assault, saying that crushing al-Sadr's militia would finally bring stability to the volatile southern Shiite region and smooth the way to national elections. The analyst, who spoke on background because he wasn't authorized to give interviews, said force was the last resort because "dialogue and rational policy" had failed with al-Sadr's men.

The analyst said Iraqi forces are taking precautions against damaging the Imam Ali shrine, a place of pilgrimage for millions of Shiites, but added that battles in the area were inevitable because militiamen holed up there were attacking from the shrine.

"Iraqi forces will shoot them even if they are inside," the official said. "The militia itself has violated this place, storing weapons there and using it as a fort."

Halfway through the interview, two mortars landed outside his office with deafening thuds that rattled windows throughout the building.

"That? That's just music," the analyst said with a grim smile.

Another mortar strike Sunday killed two Iraqis and wounded 17 at a bus station near the Baghdad convention center, where the national conference was under way. Pools of blood dried in the blazing sun and pieces of flesh were still stuck to the seats of a bus at the scene. In total, nine Iraqis died and 56 were injured in Sunday's violence in Baghdad, according to the Iraqi health ministry.

At an Iraqi national guard base near the border of Sadr City, the vast Baghdad slum that serves as al-Sadr's support base and recruiting ground, 1st Sgt. Khalid Ali described the death threats he and other Iraqi troops have received from the Mahdi Army. He drew distinctions between fighting fellow Iraqis and fighting militiamen, whom he holds responsible for the deaths of two of his relatives.

"There are concerns about what's happening in Najaf because most of the people working here are Shiite and they are concerned about what happens to their sacred sites," Ali said. "We do not fight our brothers, we fight against those people who are sabotaging our country. The Mahdi Army is not Shiite, they are saboteurs."

But when Ali was asked about the number of guardsmen who have quit since al-Sadr's latest uprising, U.S. Army 1st Lt. Vernon Sparkmon cut him off.

"Certain things, you can't discuss," Sparkmon told Ali. "If somebody asks that question, that's, like, classified stuff."

I can't believe you could ask such a dense question. Had we not invaded Iraq, you can bet your bottom dollar Muqtada Al Sadr would not have been raging around the south of the country in charge a few hundred to a few thousand armed militia. When his father was murdered, he did not rise up against the Ba'atists. Someone else here has mentioned the term power vacuum. You would do well to consider the implications of the term. To an extent, we created the Mahdi Army. That's no big criticism, it was bound to happen. A vaid criticism would be that we're not doing anything effective to deal with the situation.

If Dubya Had Read What Poppy Wrote . . .

In his memoir, "A World Transformed," written five years ago, George Bush Sr. wrote the following to explain why he didn't go after Saddam Hussein at the end of the Gulf War.

"Trying to eliminate Saddam...would have incurred incalculable human and political costs. Apprehending him was probably impossible.... We would have been forced to occupy Baghdad and, in effect, rule Iraq.... There was no viable "exit strategy" we could see, violating another of our principles. Furthermore, we had been consciously trying to set a pattern for handling aggression in the post-Cold War world. Going in and occupying Iraq, thus unilaterally exceeding the United Nations' mandate, would have destroyed the precedent of international response to aggression that we hoped to establish. Had we gone the invasion route, the United States could conceivably still be an occupying power in a bitterly hostile land."