InfraBlue and Cycloptichorn:
The following is an excerpt from the 9-11 Commission Report, Chapter 2.4, that identifies who Turabi is and describes the full character of al Qaeda. Al Qaeda is not a homogeneous group of terrorists. Rather it is an heterogeneous affiliation or confedration of many groups of terrorists.
Quote:Bin Ladin seemed willing to include in the confederation terrorists from almost every corner of the Muslim world. His vision mirrored that of Sudan's Islamist leader, Turabi, who convened a series of meetings under the label Popular Arab and Islamic Conference around the time of Bin Ladin's arrival in that country. Delegations of violent Islamist extremists came from all the groups represented in Bin Ladin's Islamic Army Shura. Representatives also came from organizations such as the Palestine Liberation Organization, Hamas, and Hezbollah.51
Please note in addition to Turabi, the previous quote mentions bin Laden's confederation, and bin Laden's Islamic Army Sura (i.e., bin Laden's al Qaeda).
The following quote is an excerpt from the 9-11 Commission Report, Chapter 2.4. It is a paragraph that too many have too narrowly and/or too illogically interpreted.
Quote:To protect his own ties with Iraq, Turabi reportedly brokered an agreement that Bin Ladin would stop supporting activities against Saddam. Bin Ladin apparently honored this pledge, at least for a time, although he continued to aid a group of Islamist extremists operating in part of Iraq (Kurdistan) outside of Baghdad's control. In the late 1990s, these extremist groups suffered major defeats by Kurdish forces. In 2001, with Bin Ladin's help they re-formed into an organization called Ansar al Islam. There are indications that by then the Iraqi regime tolerated and may even have helped Ansar al Islam against the common Kurdish enemy.54
Now let's examine this paragraph sentence by sentence.
Quote:To protect his own ties with Iraq, Turabi reportedly brokered an agreement that Bin Ladin would stop supporting activities against Saddam.
Note that Turabi, an acknowledged participant in bin Laden's confederation and bin Laden's Islamic Army Sura (i.e., al Qaeda), had ties to Iraq. So Turabi is at least one al Qaeda communication channel to Saddam. We probably cannot know for sure all the agreements negotiated between bin Laden and Saddam (i.e., between al Qaeda and Iraq) in that relationship.
Quote:Bin Ladin apparently honored this pledge, at least for a time, although he continued to aid a group of Islamist extremists operating in part of Iraq (Kurdistan) outside of Baghdad's control.
This group was also a member of bin Laden's confederation and bin Laden's Islamic Army Sura. That is, they were members of the al Qaeda confederation. There is no evidence that this group was not known to Saddam.
Quote:In the late 1990s, these extremist groups suffered major defeats by Kurdish forces.
Clearly these Kurdish forces did not choose to tolerate the harboring of this al Qaeda group in Iraq any longer, but instead chose to destroy it.
Quote:In 2001, with Bin Ladin's help, they re-formed into an organization called Ansar al Islam.
However, despite the Kurd's intolerance of the harboring of AaI's (i.e., Ansar al Islam's) al Qaeda predecessors, AaI was formed with bin Laden's (i.e., al Qaeda's) help. In 2001, AaI was thereby established as a member of al Qaeda's confederation and became harbored in northern Iraq. The intolerance that the Kurd's expressed and acted on toward the predecessors of AaI obviously did not materialize when AaI was established.
Whatever occurred or did not occur prior to 2001 is not relevent to AaI. All references to pre-2001 events that some allege are related to AaI's control or harboring are clearly not related at all to AaI's control or harboring, because AaI did not exist prior to 2001.
AaI with bin Laden's help became part of bin Laden's confederation and bin Laden's Islamic Army Sura (i.e., al Qaeda). In other words, as of 2001, two years before the US invaded Iraq, al Qaeda was harbored in Iraq.
Quote:There are indications that by then the Iraqi regime tolerated and may even have helped Ansar al Islam against the common Kurdish enemy.54
Well then, who probably did control the harboring of al Qaeda in Iraq? Did the Kurds, who were the acknowledged enemies of AaI's al Qaeda predecessors, exert their control over AaI? No! There's no evidence of that. Al Qaeda controlled that harboring. But then who willingly and knowingly and tolerantly harbored al Qaeda in Iraq? If not the Kurds, the enemies of the al Qaeda predecessors of AaI, then who? It had to be Saddam who willingly and knowingly and tolerantly harbored al Qaeda in Iraq. Otherwise, the Kurd's would probably have again at least attempted to destroy AaI, the al Qaeda successors of their al Qaeda enemies.
Alternatively, if Saddam did not tolerate AaI there and didn't want to bother to order his troops to remove AaI, he could have simply requested the Kurd's, the proven enemies of AaI's al Qaeda predecessors, to destroy AaI.
Again, all references to pre-2001 events that some allege are related to AaI's control or harboring are clearly not related at all to AaI's control or harboring, because AaI did not exist prior to 2001.