THE US, THE UN AND THE IRAQIS THEMSELVES, V. 7.0

are you kidding?

you are ...
Youve failed ...
Maybe you feel ...
I find that , with the certainty ...
Youre engaging in some kind of ...
youre not being convincing at all...
As far as my style of argument ...
You are predictable ...
My comment ...
I admit, I was and am engaging in vitriol a bit ...

'Beware a man who makes decisions without understanding the underlying facts. He is not to be trusted"

[chapt. 2.4;note 54;emphasis added]
In the late 1990s, these extremist groups suffered major defeats by Kurdish forces. In 2001, with Bin Ladin's help they re-formed into an organization called Ansar al Islam. There are indications that by then the Iraqi regime tolerated and may even have helped Ansar al Islam against the common Kurdish enemy.54

[chapt. 2.4;note 55;emphasis added]
With the Sudanese regime acting as intermediary, Bin Ladin himself met with a senior Iraqi intelligence officer in Khartoum in late 1994 or early 1995. Bin Ladin is said to have asked for space to establish training camps, as well as assistance in procuring weapons, but there is no evidence that Iraq responded to this request.55 As described below, the ensuing years saw additional efforts to establish connections.

[chapt. 2.5;note 75;emphasis added]
In mid-1998, the situation reversed; it was Iraq that reportedly took the initiative. In March 1998, after Bin Ladin's public fatwa against the United States, two al Qaeda members reportedly went to Iraq to meet with Iraqi intelligence. In July, an Iraqi delegation traveled to Afghanistan to meet first with the Taliban and then with Bin Ladin. Sources reported that one, or perhaps both, of these meetings was apparently arranged through Bin Ladin's Egyptian deputy, Zawahiri, who had ties of his own to the Iraqis.75

[chapt. 2.5; note 76; my emphasis added]
Similar meetings between Iraqi officials and Bin Ladin or his aides may have occurred in 1999 during a period of some reported strains with the Taliban. According to the reporting, Iraqi officials offered Bin Ladin a safe haven in Iraq. Bin Ladin declined, apparently judging that his circumstances in Afghanistan remained more favorable than the Iraqi alternative. The reports describe friendly contacts and indicate some common themes in both sides' hatred of the United States. But to date we have seen no evidence that these or the earlier contacts ever developed into a collaborative operational relationship. Nor have we seen evidence indicating that Iraq cooperated with al Qaeda in developing or carrying out any attacks against the United States.76

[chapt. 10.2;note 34; emphasis added]
In this restricted National Security Council meeting, the President said it was a time for self-defense. The United States would punish not just the perpetrators of the attacks, but also those who harbored them. Secretary Powell said the United States had to make it clear to Pakistan, Afghanistan, and the Arab states that the time to act was now. He said we would need to build a coalition. The President noted that the attacks provided a great opportunity to engage Russia and China. Secretary Rumsfeld urged the President and the principals to think broadly about who might have harbored the attackers, including Iraq, Afghanistan, Libya, Sudan, and Iran. He wondered aloud how much evidence the United States would need in order to deal with these countries, pointing out that major strikes could take up to 60 days to assemble.34

Regime Strategic Intent

Key Findings

Saddam Husayn so dominated the Iraqi Regime that its strategic intent was his alone. He wanted to end sanctions while preserving the capability to reconstitute his weapons of mass destruction (WMD) when sanctions were lifted.

 Saddam totally dominated the Regime's strategic decision making. He initiated most of the strategic thinking upon which decisions were made, whether in matters of war and peace (such as invading Kuwait), maintaining WMD as a national strategic goal, or on how Iraq was to position itself in the international community. Loyal dissent was discouraged and constructive variations to the implementation of his wishes on strategic issues were rare. Saddam was the Regime in a strategic sense and his intent became Iraq's strategic policy.

 Saddam's primary goal from 1991 to 2003 was to have UN sanctions lifted, while maintaining the security of the Regime. He sought to balance the need to cooperate with UN inspections--to gain support for lifting sanctions--with his intention to preserve Iraq's intellectual capital for WMD with a minimum of foreign intrusiveness and loss of face. Indeed, this remained the goal to the end of the Regime, as the starting of any WMD program, conspicuous or otherwise, risked undoing the progress achieved in undoing the progress achieved in eroding sanctions and jeopardizing a political end to the embargo and international monitoring.

 The introduction of the Oil-For-Food program (OFF) in late 1996 was a key turning point for the Regime. OFF rescued Bagdad's economy from a terminal decline created by sanctions. The Regime quickly came to see that OFF could be corrupted to acquire foreign exchange both to further undermine sanctions and to provide the means to enance dual-use infrastructure and potential WMD-related development.

 By 2000-2001, Saddam had managed to mitigate many of the effects of the sanctions and undermine their international support. Iraq was within striking distance of a de facto end to the sanctions regime, both in terms of oil exports and the trade embargo by the end of 1999.

Saddam wanted to recreate Iraq's WMD capability--which was essentially destroyed in 1991--after sanctions were removed and Iraq's economy stabilized, but probably with a different mix of capabilities to that which previously existed. Saddam aspired to develop nuclear capability--in an incremental fashion, irrespective of international pressure and the resulting economic risks--but he intended to focus on ballistic missile and tactical chemical warfare (CW) capabilities.

 Iran was the pre-eminate motivator of this policy. All senior level Iraqi officials considered Iran to be Iraq's principal enemy in the region. The wish to balance Israel and acquire status and influence in the Arab world were also considerattions, but secondary.

 Iraq Survey Group (ISG) judges that events in the 1980s and early 1990s shaped Saddam's belief in the value of WMD. In Saddam's view, WMD helped save the Regime multiple times. He believed that during the Iran-Iraq war chemical weapons had halted Iranian ground offensives and that ballistic missile attacks attacks on Tehran had broken its political will. Similarly during Desert Storm, Saddam believed WMD had deterred Coalition Forces from pressing their attack beyond the goal of feeing Kuwait. WMD had even played a role in crushing the Shi'a revolt in the south following the 1991 cease-fire.

 The former Regime had no formal written strategy or plan for the revival of WMD after sanctions. Neither was there an identifiable group of WMD policy makers or planners separate from Saddam. Instead, his lieutenants understood WMD revival was his goal from their long association with Saddam and his infrequent, but firm, verbal comments and directions to them.

Ican
The only one who blamed the troops NY's ex mayor and Bush supporter Rudy G.

Au the inspectors had twelve years to inspect. Some of us think that was enough.

Boy, are you Bush supporters allied to some dangerous fruitcakes- the ones not yet put in prison, that is.

almost 100% of the creative writers, artists and journalists in the US are either against GWB or have serious reservations about him

"They wanted to go. They were begging to go," said David Albright, a former weapons inspector who now heads the Institute for Science and International Security and who lobbied in vain for the UN agency in April 2003 to be allowed to resume work in Iraq. "They would have gone to Al Qaqaa and said, 'Here's the HMX. Burn it.'

Whenever the president is criticized for something the troops did or did not do in Iraq, the troops aren't seeing that as the president's problem. They are seeing it as criticism of THEM. And they resent it mightily. That might be one reason they are voting overwhelmingly for President Bush.

Foxfyre, how can you know or say what the "troops" think about what is said in the media? Soldiers, and the military in general, have always voted Republican.

It seems to me that almost 100% of the creative writers, artists and journalists in Communist USSR, in Nazis Germany, in Fascist Italy, and in Shinto Japan were either for JS, AH, BM, and H, respectively, or had few reservations about them.

Actually it's more like 75 to 80% which is the problem. It is the radical left-wing activists who have controlled the media since the 1970's and their agenda is waaaaaaay left of George Bush and the majority of Americans. Writers, playwrights, actors, etc. are included in this as they control the image that gets shown in the movies and on TV. This is why it is so difficult to get any kind of objective information and see both sides of any issue. It isn't so much a problem for us news and politics addicts, but it is a problem when some do trust the evening news to tell it without spin to give a particular impression.

Quote:

The discouraging thing to me is that our country will back our leader in a war that should never have been waged. More and more people know that the war was a tragic mistake, but it can't be undone so we must struggle on. The only thought people have now is How can we make the best of a bad deal?

If one backed Bush and the war, they see the bright side now and applaud every sign of hope from Iraq to vindicate their bellicosity. Those of us who were against the war are not joyous at the chaos in Iraq. If they are like me, they are disheartened and believe more strongly than ever that war is seldom a means of solving problems.

Sad words, I hope not prophetic ones. I think OBL's taped message released this week will be a boost for the Bush campaign, as it will indicate unfinished business with terrorists- even though Bush left the Osama hunt to wage war in Iraq. That fact will be conveniently glossed over.

I marched against this war, in London and again in Manchester. It made no sense to me then, and it makes no sense to me now. News out last week put the number of Iraqis dead because of the war, at one hundred thousand. 100 000 Most of these were women and children and non-combatants. Many of them were women in childbirth and their babies, who were unable to get to a hospital or get medical help because of the situation on the streets.

GWB may think God will forgive him. I don't think so. I wouldn't.