North Carolina nearly nuked.

Might be so. But the reason for those headlines in various papers worldwide is based on a map engineered by American Institute of Physics historian Andrew Wellerstein

This map was copied by various newspapers worldwide - as well as the AP-report, not just in Europe.

Fact check, you said ...?

The fall out should be either blown off shore with a less likelihood of it being blown inland but a south to north winds are kind of unlikely to say the least.

AP-report was actually at least in all five language I can understand and published in Asia, Australia, South America and North America. And in Europe.

The effects on "Nukemap" use the actual weather conditions.

The other response I commonly saw was one that assumed that any such fears of a bomb going off accidentally were exaggerated. Now this is kind of an interesting response. For the one thing, they’re discounting a contemporary, internal, once-classified evaluation made by a relevant expert. In exchange, they’re parroting either general skepticism at the idea that a nuclear weapon could technically be unsafe, or they are parroting a standard line about how hard it is to set off an implosion bomb accidentally, because all of the lenses need to detonate at exactly the same time. Which is sometimes the right approach (though not all American bomb designs were “one-point safe” — that is, there were designs that ran a real risk of producing a nuclear yield even if just one of the explosive lenses accidentally fired), but in this case, it’s entirely irrelevant, for reasons I’ll explain below.
[...]
What’s amazing about the above, in part, is that everything in quotation marks is coming from Sandia nuclear weapons safety engineers, not anti-nuclear activists on the Internet. This isn’t a movie made for public consumption (and I’ve been assured that it is not classified, in case you were wondering). It’s a film for internal consumption by a nuclear weapons laboratory. So it’s hard to not take this as authoritative, along with the other aforementioned document. Anyone who brushes aside such concerns as “hysterical” is going to have to contend with the fact that this is what the nuclear weapons designers tell themselves about this accident. Which is pretty disconcerting.
[...]
Lest you think that perhaps Sandia overstates it (which seems rather unlikely), take also the testimony of Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara into account. In January of 1963, McNamara explained at a meeting between the Defense and State Departments that he was opposed to Presidential pre-delegation of nuclear weapons in part because of the danger of accidental detonation — either ours or the Soviets’. In the meeting notes, posted some time back by the National Security Archive and forwarded to me by Schlosser, McNamara’s participation is listed as follows:

Mr. McNamara went on to describe the possibilities which existed for an accidental launch of a missile against the USSR. He pointed out that we were spending millions of dollars to reduce this problem to a minimum, but that we could not assure ourselves completely against such a contingency. Moreover he suggested that it was unlikely that the Soviets were spending as much as we were in attempting to narrow the limits of possible accidental launch. He went on to describe crashes of US aircraft[,] one in North Carolina and one in Texas, where, by the slightest margin of chance, literally the failure of two wires to cross, a nuclear explosion was averted.

This one’s interesting because it embeds these accidents in a context as well — the possibility of either us, or the Soviets, accidentally launching a nuke and wondering if a full-scale nuclear exchange has to follow. It’s not quite Strangelovian, since that would require a rogue commander, but it is very Fail-Safe.
... ... ...

Somehow that is unlikely but when I will get the time I will check it as anyone who fly on the East coast know that is not the normal wind pattern to say the least.

So you make assumptions about how the wind is, but don't know the conditions? And what have "normal wind patterns" to do with a certain date which we know and with known, well-archived weather conditions at an exactly known place?

http://docs.lib.noaa.gov/rescue/mwr/089/mwr-089-04-0137.pdf

Haven, Conn., Wilmington, Del., Philadelphia, Pa., and
for t'he 22d at Hartford, Conn., Chattanooga, Term. and
Daytona Beach, Fla. Snowfall ranged from 2 t'o 16 inches
in Maryland, 10 to 30 inches in New JerscJ-, and 10 to 20
inches over southern New England.
Intense cold dominated the weat'her east of the ('on-
tinental Divide during the final week. The long-wave
pattern over North America (fig. 4A) remained strong1)-
amplified, and northerly winds continued to transport,
frigid air into the United St'at'es. Sub-zero minima wcrc
reported southward as far as Denver, Colo., St,. Louis,
Mo., Nashville, Tenn., and Richmond, Va. In the South,
only Brownsville, Tex., and sout'hern Florida escaped
freezing temperatures. M

The other response I commonly saw was one that assumed that any such fears of a bomb going off accidentally were exaggerated. Now this is kind of an interesting response. For the one thing, they’re discounting a contemporary, internal, once-classified evaluation made by a relevant expert. In exchange, they’re parroting either general skepticism at the idea that a nuclear weapon could technically be unsafe, or they are parroting a standard line about how hard it is to set off an implosion bomb accidentally, because all of the lenses need to detonate at exactly the same time. Which is sometimes the right approach (though not all American bomb designs were “one-point safe” — that is, there were designs that ran a real risk of producing a nuclear yield even if just one of the explosive lenses accidentally fired), but in this case, it’s entirely irrelevant, for reasons I’ll explain below.

Mr. McNamara went on to describe the possibilities which existed for an accidental launch of a missile against the USSR. He pointed out that we were spending millions of dollars to reduce this problem to a minimum, but that we could not assure ourselves completely against such a contingency. Moreover he suggested that it was unlikely that the Soviets were spending as much as we were in attempting to narrow the limits of possible accidental launch. He went on to describe crashes of US aircraft[,] one in North Carolina and one in Texas, where, by the slightest margin of chance, literally the failure of two wires to cross, a nuclear explosion was averted.

BillRM wrote:

What engineer would design a nuclear weapon to power up when drop without the crew setting it to do so before hand!!!!!!!!!!!!!

I believe what they are saying is that, in the act of breaking apart, the disintegrating airplane's systems sent one of the bombs a "go" signal.

No. 2 nuke commander suspended amid casino probe
Associated Press ROBERT BURNS 3 hours ago
This image provided by the U.S. Navy shows Navy Vice Adm. Tim Giardina in a Nov. 11, 2011, photo. The U.S. strategic Command, the military command in charge of all U.S. nuclear warfighting forces says it has suspended its No. 2 commander, Giardina, for unspecific reasons, and he is under investigation by the Naval Criminal Investigative Service. (AP Photo/U.S. Navy).
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This image provided by the U.S. Navy shows Navy Vice Adm. Tim Giardina in a Nov. 11, 2011, photo. The …
WASHINGTON (AP) — The No. 2 officer at the military command in charge of all U.S. nuclear war-fighting forces is suspected in a case involving counterfeit gambling chips at a western Iowa casino and has been suspended from his duties, officials said.

Navy Vice Adm. Tim Giardina has not been arrested or charged, Iowa Division of Criminal Investigation special agent David Dales said Saturday. The state investigation is ongoing.

Giardina, deputy commander at U.S. Strategic Command, was suspended on Sept. 3 and is under investigation by the Naval Criminal Investigative Service, a Strategic Command spokeswoman said.

The highly unusual action against a high-ranking officer at Strategic Command was made more than three weeks ago but not publicly announced at that time. The command is located at Offutt Air Force Base near Omaha, Neb.

Air Force Gen. Robert Kehler, who heads Strategic Command, suspended Giardina, according to the command's top spokeswoman, Navy Capt. Pamela Kunze. Giardina is still assigned to the command but is prohibited from performing duties related to nuclear weapons and other issues requiring a security clearance, she said.

cicerone imposter wrote:

A final word on this issue. A nuclear bomb must be "set" before it becomes a nuclear bomb. The uranium must be in place or it will result in a conventional weapon explosion. An accidental dropping will not have the uranium capsule in place. Nuclear weapons work on implosion.
I defy any scientist to refute this claim.

Yes CI. It seems the US may have constantly had active nukes in the air at that time to deter the Soviets. They aren't much of a deterrent if they have no nuclear material.

It’s not quite Strangelovian, since that would require a rogue commander, but it is very Fail-Safe.

With the radio open, the President attempts to persuade Grady that there is no war. Understanding orders that such a late recall attempt must be a Soviet trick, Grady ignores them. The Vindicator's defensive systems operator fires two missiles that decoy the Soviet interceptor missiles to detonate at high altitude. Grady tells his crew that "We're not just walking wounded, we're walking dead men," due to radiation from the burst. He intends to fly the aircraft over Moscow and detonate the bombs in the plane. His copilot agrees, noting "There's nothing to go home to."

When it becomes apparent that one bomber will get through Soviet defenses and destroy Moscow, the American President states that he will order an American bomber to destroy New York City at the same time, with the Empire State Building as ground zero; this also involves a grave personal sacrifice, as the First Lady is visiting New York and the President decides not to warn her. On hearing this, the supposedly atheist Communist leader bursts out with "Holy Mother of God!" - he is appalled, but realizes that this is the only way to prevent a worldwide nuclear war which will probably destroy humanity - 'others' (presumably the Soviet military) would not accept the unilateral destruction of Moscow, and would depose him and retaliate. The bomb is dropped by a senior general within Strategic Air Command, who orders his crew to let him handle the entire bombing run by himself so as to assume all the responsibility; he then takes his own life.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fail-Safe_%28novel%29