0
   

North Carolina nearly nuked.

 
 
BillRM
 
  1  
Reply Sat 28 Sep, 2013 01:06 pm
@Walter Hinteler,
Quote:
Might be so. But the reason for those headlines in various papers worldwide is based on a map engineered by American Institute of Physics historian Andrew Wellerstein


LOL online you can get a copy of the book "The effects of nuclear weapons" put out by the US government and it would asking too must of European newspapers to check such sources?

No fact checkers.....?


http://www.fourmilab.ch/etexts/www/effects/
Walter Hinteler
 
  1  
Reply Sat 28 Sep, 2013 01:26 pm
@BillRM,
This is one of the few moments, I really don't get it.

The Guardian reported first about it. AP made a report about this report, which then was published by various newspapers.

"Nukemap" is on online-map-feature, created by Wellerstein.
He posted that map, which I had copied, on his blog about Goldsboro, 1961 as well.
This map was copied by various newspapers worldwide - as well as the AP-report, not just in Europe.

Fact check, you said ...?
BillRM
 
  1  
Reply Sat 28 Sep, 2013 01:33 pm
@BillRM,
footnote a ground base nuke explosion would be very dirty as far as fallout amounts are concern and in a large area people would need to keep indoor for a time downwind but since when is the wind patterns normally from the south to the north on the east coast as that map seem to indicate?

The fall out should be either blown off shore with a less likelihood of it being blown inland but a south to north winds are kind of unlikely to say the least.

Walter Hinteler
 
  1  
Reply Sat 28 Sep, 2013 01:35 pm
@Walter Hinteler,
Walter Hinteler wrote:

This map was copied by various newspapers worldwide - as well as the AP-report, not just in Europe.

Fact check, you said ...?
As far as I could find out with a quick fact check, that mentioned AP-report was actually at least in all five language I can understand and published in Asia, Australia, South America and North America. And in Europe.
Walter Hinteler
 
  1  
Reply Sat 28 Sep, 2013 01:38 pm
@BillRM,
BillRM wrote:
The fall out should be either blown off shore with a less likelihood of it being blown inland but a south to north winds are kind of unlikely to say the least.
The effects on "Nukemap" use the actual weather conditions. But certainly you might have different weather data of that day then published.
BillRM
 
  1  
Reply Sat 28 Sep, 2013 01:40 pm
@Walter Hinteler,
Quote:
AP-report was actually at least in all five language I can understand and published in Asia, Australia, South America and North America. And in Europe.


Sad that such silliness can be get that wide a distribution.
0 Replies
 
BillRM
 
  1  
Reply Sat 28 Sep, 2013 01:45 pm
@Walter Hinteler,
Quote:
The effects on "Nukemap" use the actual weather conditions.


Somehow that is unlikely but when I will get the time I will check it as anyone who fly on the East coast know that is not the normal wind pattern to say the least.

Walter Hinteler
 
  1  
Reply Sat 28 Sep, 2013 01:53 pm
@Walter Hinteler,
From Wellerstein's blog:

Quote:
The other response I commonly saw was one that assumed that any such fears of a bomb going off accidentally were exaggerated. Now this is kind of an interesting response. For the one thing, they’re discounting a contemporary, internal, once-classified evaluation made by a relevant expert. In exchange, they’re parroting either general skepticism at the idea that a nuclear weapon could technically be unsafe, or they are parroting a standard line about how hard it is to set off an implosion bomb accidentally, because all of the lenses need to detonate at exactly the same time. Which is sometimes the right approach (though not all American bomb designs were “one-point safe” — that is, there were designs that ran a real risk of producing a nuclear yield even if just one of the explosive lenses accidentally fired), but in this case, it’s entirely irrelevant, for reasons I’ll explain below.
[...]
What’s amazing about the above, in part, is that everything in quotation marks is coming from Sandia nuclear weapons safety engineers, not anti-nuclear activists on the Internet. This isn’t a movie made for public consumption (and I’ve been assured that it is not classified, in case you were wondering). It’s a film for internal consumption by a nuclear weapons laboratory. So it’s hard to not take this as authoritative, along with the other aforementioned document. Anyone who brushes aside such concerns as “hysterical” is going to have to contend with the fact that this is what the nuclear weapons designers tell themselves about this accident. Which is pretty disconcerting.
[...]
Lest you think that perhaps Sandia overstates it (which seems rather unlikely), take also the testimony of Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara into account. In January of 1963, McNamara explained at a meeting between the Defense and State Departments that he was opposed to Presidential pre-delegation of nuclear weapons in part because of the danger of accidental detonation — either ours or the Soviets’. In the meeting notes, posted some time back by the National Security Archive and forwarded to me by Schlosser, McNamara’s participation is listed as follows:

Mr. McNamara went on to describe the possibilities which existed for an accidental launch of a missile against the USSR. He pointed out that we were spending millions of dollars to reduce this problem to a minimum, but that we could not assure ourselves completely against such a contingency. Moreover he suggested that it was unlikely that the Soviets were spending as much as we were in attempting to narrow the limits of possible accidental launch. He went on to describe crashes of US aircraft[,] one in North Carolina and one in Texas, where, by the slightest margin of chance, literally the failure of two wires to cross, a nuclear explosion was averted.

This one’s interesting because it embeds these accidents in a context as well — the possibility of either us, or the Soviets, accidentally launching a nuke and wondering if a full-scale nuclear exchange has to follow. It’s not quite Strangelovian, since that would require a rogue commander, but it is very Fail-Safe.
... ... ...
Walter Hinteler
 
  2  
Reply Sat 28 Sep, 2013 01:56 pm
@BillRM,
BillRM wrote:

Somehow that is unlikely but when I will get the time I will check it as anyone who fly on the East coast know that is not the normal wind pattern to say the least.
So you make assumptions about how the wind is, but don't know the conditions? And what have "normal wind patterns" to do with a certain date which we know and with known, well-archived weather conditions at an exactly known place?
BillRM
 
  1  
Reply Sat 28 Sep, 2013 02:08 pm
@Walter Hinteler,
Quote:
So you make assumptions about how the wind is, but don't know the conditions? And what have "normal wind patterns" to do with a certain date which we know and with known, well-archived weather conditions at an exactly known place?


Do you have the date of this accident so I could indeed check if this very very unusable weather conditions/wind patterns exist or did not exist on that date?

One thing that jump out at you is the fall out pattern claim for this event as once more that is not how the winds normally blow on the east coast to the US.

An almost due north wind all along the east coast........?????????

Take a look at airport runways in the area they are set up in a east-west direction not a north south direction.
Walter Hinteler
 
  1  
Reply Sat 28 Sep, 2013 02:10 pm
@BillRM,
I'm out here.
BillRM
 
  1  
Reply Sat 28 Sep, 2013 02:48 pm
@Walter Hinteler,
Sorry you are out of there as I found this accident happen on Jan 24, 1961 and the wind was from the north to the south with heavy snow falls during that week due to a cold front coming in from the far north along the east coast.

Snow falls would have washed any fallout, in short order, out of the atmosphere and what fallout did spread would be toward the south not the North.

But is look so must better to have the fall out aim at the big northern cities.

BillRM
 
  1  
Reply Sat 28 Sep, 2013 03:04 pm
@BillRM,
Quote:


http://docs.lib.noaa.gov/rescue/mwr/089/mwr-089-04-0137.pdf

Haven, Conn., Wilmington, Del., Philadelphia, Pa., and
for t'he 22d at Hartford, Conn., Chattanooga, Term. and
Daytona Beach, Fla. Snowfall ranged from 2 t'o 16 inches
in Maryland, 10 to 30 inches in New JerscJ-, and 10 to 20
inches over southern New England.
Intense cold dominated the weat'her east of the ('on-
tinental Divide during the final week. The long-wave
pattern over North America (fig. 4A) remained strong1)-
amplified, and northerly winds continued to transport,
frigid air into the United St'at'es. Sub-zero minima wcrc
reported southward as far as Denver, Colo., St,. Louis,
Mo., Nashville, Tenn., and Richmond, Va. In the South,
only Brownsville, Tex., and sout'hern Florida escaped
freezing temperatures. M
0 Replies
 
cicerone imposter
 
  1  
Reply Sat 28 Sep, 2013 03:07 pm
@Walter Hinteler,
Nice map. What are the consequences of those living 500 miles away from Goldsboro? How about the exposure of those places between Goldsboro and (beyond) Yonkers NY? What's the rate of exposure and consequence at the different distance shown on that map? It had snow on that day.

Where does the unsafe areas begin and end?
0 Replies
 
oralloy
 
  0  
Reply Sat 28 Sep, 2013 05:11 pm
@Walter Hinteler,
Wellerstein's blog wrote:
The other response I commonly saw was one that assumed that any such fears of a bomb going off accidentally were exaggerated. Now this is kind of an interesting response. For the one thing, they’re discounting a contemporary, internal, once-classified evaluation made by a relevant expert. In exchange, they’re parroting either general skepticism at the idea that a nuclear weapon could technically be unsafe, or they are parroting a standard line about how hard it is to set off an implosion bomb accidentally, because all of the lenses need to detonate at exactly the same time. Which is sometimes the right approach (though not all American bomb designs were “one-point safe” — that is, there were designs that ran a real risk of producing a nuclear yield even if just one of the explosive lenses accidentally fired), but in this case, it’s entirely irrelevant, for reasons I’ll explain below.

It's an instinctive response borne out of endless reactions to nonsense concocted by internet kooks.

A2K is an island of integrity floating in a sea of gibbering idiocy. You'd be surprised at how much nonsense is out there on the internet.

I'm sure that once people stop reacting instinctively and start to think about what is being reported, there will be greater acceptance of the reports.

BTW, for miniaturized thermonuclear devices, instead of "all the lenses at the same time" it is both lenses (there are only two) with the proper timing (not at the same time).


Wellerstein's blog wrote:
Mr. McNamara went on to describe the possibilities which existed for an accidental launch of a missile against the USSR. He pointed out that we were spending millions of dollars to reduce this problem to a minimum, but that we could not assure ourselves completely against such a contingency. Moreover he suggested that it was unlikely that the Soviets were spending as much as we were in attempting to narrow the limits of possible accidental launch. He went on to describe crashes of US aircraft[,] one in North Carolina and one in Texas, where, by the slightest margin of chance, literally the failure of two wires to cross, a nuclear explosion was averted.

So what happened with the "close call" in Texas?!?
oralloy
 
  0  
Reply Sat 28 Sep, 2013 06:02 pm
@oralloy,
oralloy wrote:
BillRM wrote:
What engineer would design a nuclear weapon to power up when drop without the crew setting it to do so before hand!!!!!!!!!!!!!

I believe what they are saying is that, in the act of breaking apart, the disintegrating airplane's systems sent one of the bombs a "go" signal.

Yes.

I looked up that Wellerstein blog that Walter mentioned.
http://blog.nuclearsecrecy.com/2013/09/27/final-switch-goldsboro-1961/

Note: "Before the accident, the manual arming pin in each of the bombs was in place. Although the pins required horizontal movement for extraction, they were both on a lanyard to allow the crew to pull them from the cockpit. During the breakup, the aircraft experienced structural distortion and torsion in the weapons bay sufficient to pull the pin from one of the bombs, thus arming the Bisch generator."



The blogger did make some errors though.

This device was tested three times (not once):
Redwing - Cherokee
Hardtack I - Teak
Hardtack I - Orange

And the fission fraction of the device was exactly 50/50.

(And he shouldn't have rounded up. It was 3.8 MT.)
cicerone imposter
 
  1  
Reply Sat 28 Sep, 2013 07:32 pm
@oralloy,
More news on nuclear weapons.
Quote:
No. 2 nuke commander suspended amid casino probe
Associated Press ROBERT BURNS 3 hours ago
This image provided by the U.S. Navy shows Navy Vice Adm. Tim Giardina in a Nov. 11, 2011, photo. The U.S. strategic Command, the military command in charge of all U.S. nuclear warfighting forces says it has suspended its No. 2 commander, Giardina, for unspecific reasons, and he is under investigation by the Naval Criminal Investigative Service. (AP Photo/U.S. Navy).
View gallery
This image provided by the U.S. Navy shows Navy Vice Adm. Tim Giardina in a Nov. 11, 2011, photo. The …
WASHINGTON (AP) — The No. 2 officer at the military command in charge of all U.S. nuclear war-fighting forces is suspected in a case involving counterfeit gambling chips at a western Iowa casino and has been suspended from his duties, officials said.

Navy Vice Adm. Tim Giardina has not been arrested or charged, Iowa Division of Criminal Investigation special agent David Dales said Saturday. The state investigation is ongoing.

Giardina, deputy commander at U.S. Strategic Command, was suspended on Sept. 3 and is under investigation by the Naval Criminal Investigative Service, a Strategic Command spokeswoman said.

The highly unusual action against a high-ranking officer at Strategic Command was made more than three weeks ago but not publicly announced at that time. The command is located at Offutt Air Force Base near Omaha, Neb.

Air Force Gen. Robert Kehler, who heads Strategic Command, suspended Giardina, according to the command's top spokeswoman, Navy Capt. Pamela Kunze. Giardina is still assigned to the command but is prohibited from performing duties related to nuclear weapons and other issues requiring a security clearance, she said.


My roommate on a trip to Central Asia had a similar job with the Navy.
0 Replies
 
oralloy
 
  0  
Reply Sat 28 Sep, 2013 07:50 pm
@parados,
parados wrote:
cicerone imposter wrote:
A final word on this issue. A nuclear bomb must be "set" before it becomes a nuclear bomb. The uranium must be in place or it will result in a conventional weapon explosion. An accidental dropping will not have the uranium capsule in place. Nuclear weapons work on implosion.
I defy any scientist to refute this claim.

Yes CI. It seems the US may have constantly had active nukes in the air at that time to deter the Soviets. They aren't much of a deterrent if they have no nuclear material.

It appears that maybe CI worked with nukes mostly during the A-bomb era??

After WWII they modified the A-bomb designs so that the uranium or plutonium could be easily inserted and removed from the bombs. And it was never inserted unless a bomb was being prepared for actual use, likely in a bomber already flying over enemy territory.

However, this system only lasted through the first generation of H-bombs. After that, they stopped doing it because it was getting harder and harder to achieve as bomb designs got more complicated and finely-tuned.

The bomb we are talking about here would have been the second generation of H-bombs and would not have had such a system. However, if CI is mainly familiar with the A-bomb era or the earliest H-bombs, it is easy to see why he thought this would be the case.
cicerone imposter
 
  1  
Reply Sat 28 Sep, 2013 07:56 pm
@oralloy,
We also worked with thermonuclear weapons. The safety systems were closely similar from one bomb to the next.

In the beginning of my work with nukes, we used to handle the uranium capsules with our hands. By the time I got my discharge four years later in 1959, we no longer had to manhandle the capsules. There were also many other "improvements" that were made during the four years I was in the USAF. Some were just awesome, but I can't talk about them.

One of the worries I had was the exposure to radiation and impotence, but I have two sons. We wore exposure badges that were measured for radiation exposure regularly.
0 Replies
 
oralloy
 
  0  
Reply Sun 29 Sep, 2013 07:02 am
@Walter Hinteler,
Wellerstein's blog wrote:
It’s not quite Strangelovian, since that would require a rogue commander, but it is very Fail-Safe.


Quote:
With the radio open, the President attempts to persuade Grady that there is no war. Understanding orders that such a late recall attempt must be a Soviet trick, Grady ignores them. The Vindicator's defensive systems operator fires two missiles that decoy the Soviet interceptor missiles to detonate at high altitude. Grady tells his crew that "We're not just walking wounded, we're walking dead men," due to radiation from the burst. He intends to fly the aircraft over Moscow and detonate the bombs in the plane. His copilot agrees, noting "There's nothing to go home to."

When it becomes apparent that one bomber will get through Soviet defenses and destroy Moscow, the American President states that he will order an American bomber to destroy New York City at the same time, with the Empire State Building as ground zero; this also involves a grave personal sacrifice, as the First Lady is visiting New York and the President decides not to warn her. On hearing this, the supposedly atheist Communist leader bursts out with "Holy Mother of God!" - he is appalled, but realizes that this is the only way to prevent a worldwide nuclear war which will probably destroy humanity - 'others' (presumably the Soviet military) would not accept the unilateral destruction of Moscow, and would depose him and retaliate. The bomb is dropped by a senior general within Strategic Air Command, who orders his crew to let him handle the entire bombing run by himself so as to assume all the responsibility; he then takes his own life.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fail-Safe_%28novel%29


Shocked

So, not a happy ending I take it.
0 Replies
 
 

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