@Frank Apisa,
According to the definitions I am proposing here, I would say that when it comes to assertions about "the true nature of reality", a belief is something less substantial than a guess.
I propose to define beliefs as assertions that can't be said to be true or false, because the distinction is either meaningless or impossible to determine for that assertion.
And any assertion that is made based on knowable information (even though there are guesses involved) is not a belief. It might be a guess, a hypothesis, a prediction.... The important thing is that the uncertainty of such assertions is a different kind of uncertainty than that of beliefs.
The difference, as I see it, is that beliefs have uncertainty surrounding their relevance, while the uncertainty surrounding theories and guesses, etc, is one of functionality.
In other words, a belief can't even proven to be relevant.
A theory is either proven functional, or it is discarded. This is how a theory earns it's relevance.
For beliefs there is no such method or process that can change them into something less uncertain.
It is my opinion that this approach gives us greater clarity and precision when contemplating knowledge, belief and how to see which is which. What do you think?
