Lusatian wrote:Nothing obsessive about it, however, I can see how you would like to think so given the blatant mistakes you included in your Genghis Khan post. "Have fun." With you I do.
I'm sure you think so. As for blatant mistakes, given that you refrained from the acid and childish sneers of your earlier post, i'll be more than happy to point out that you are wrong about that.
Quote:I see. So conversely the Chin Dynasty, Kwarazmian Empire, Xi-Xia rulers, Persia, the principalities of Russia, Hungary, Poland, and Bulgaria were all tribes. No nations counted among them.
Here you demonstrate your lack of a subtlety of comprehension. Certainly the nations to which you refer saw themselves as nations,
but Chinggis did not. To all and sundry, Chinggis and his personally loyal officers offered the choice of conquest and enslavement, or death. This is very much the attitude of tribal conquest, and the most notable aspect of Mongol conquest while Chinggis still lived is that there was no effort made to take advantage of the systems and polities already in place--beyond imitating the effective revenue collection methods of the Mandarins. Kubelai rises above the tribal level of his contemporaries because he saw the value of re-establishing the Mandarinate and the entire imperial apparatus of China, thereby effectively establishing a dynasty--something Chinggiss failed notably to do himself. But the Yuan was a feeble dynasty, and a pushover for the Ming.
Quote:Batu Khan and Subotai not only took Kiev (the capitol of the Russian civilization at the time), but indeed captured Moscow in 1238.
Absolutely, Batu Khan, the Khan of the
Tatar Golden Horde, burned the little wooden-walled settlement of the Kremlin--which can conveniently be referred to as Moscow--
eleven years after the death of Chingiss. Batu Khan was the grandson of Chingiss--and his armies were
Tatar, not Mongol; although certainly, Mongols formed a part of his army. To suggest that having had Chinggis as a grandfather makes Batu and the Tatars into Mongols is as absurd as saying that the accession of Georg, Elector of Hanover, to the English throne in 1715 as George I makes the English Germans. The specific point leads to the thesis which i expounded at the end of my post. The destruction of the Kievan Rus by the Mongols, while the Grand Duchy (Archduchy, Principality--the terms can here be used interchangeably) of Vladimire/Muscovy survived had precisely the effect i described. It was catalytic, but not foundational. The authority of the Kievan Rus was obliterated. The authority of the Moscovite Grand Dukes, descended from the Kievan Rus Prince, Vladimir Monomach, was established by the destruction of Kiev. The subsequent conquest of the Kremlin and Vladimir-Suzdal by the Tatars had far-reaching consequences indeed. The Mongols conquered and destroyed. Batu demonstrated that he had a good deal more canny understanding of upon which side his bread was buttered than did his famous, and politically clueless grandfather. The Tatars who followed Batu (by no means all of them, as many had always resented the Mongol influence) withdrew with him, and eventually established themselves in the Crimean. From there, they demanded tribute from Muscovy, and when it did not arrive, or even when it did but they felt the desire for a little sport--they raided the Ukraine and rounded up thousands, and in many years, tens of thousands of peasants to be used as slaves, or sold in Constantinople as slaves, after the conquest of that city by the Osmanli Turks in 1453. This rather witless response to Muscovite trucelence did no harm to the Muscovite Grand Dukes, but it gradually drove the Don Cossacks into a roughly stable alliance with Moscow. I acknowledge that the manner in which i wrote my remark can be construed to mean that the Mongols could not have overrun Moscovy--and that definitely would be an incorrect statement. That they did not, is, however, very significant, in that it left Muscovy as the only center of authority among the Rus.
Quote:The mongols under the generalship of Subotai also defeated the Germans when he crushed them with the Teutonic Knights and the Poles at Leignitz, 1241 (look that one up too).
Once again, Chingiss was dead and buried for 14 years when this event took place. The commanders of this army, equally composed of Tatars and Mongols, were Baidar and Kaidu, the latter a grandson of Ogedai. Subotai and Batu Khan were moving to the south, in the campaign which would lead to the defeat of the Hungarian King Béla, to which you referred--i have absolutely no reason to assume that Subotai was present at Leignitz, and much reason to believe he wasn't.
My response to this is to ask how one can consider this to be evidence that the Mongols could have overrun Germany or France? Baidar and Kaidu left Poland,
and never returned. Alexander II of the Vladimir principality (i.e., Moscovy) was made the Prince of Novgorod in 1236. In 1240, he defeated the Swedes on the banks of the Neva, and got his cognomen, Alexander Nevsky. In 1241, the same year as Leignitz, he defeated the Teutonic Knights, and drove them from Russia. He then crushed them at Lake Peipus in Estonia, in 1242. The chronology begs your contention that the defeat of a handful of Teutonic Knights who had joined Duke Henry of Silesia, and the Polish
Pans and their fuedal levy at Leignitz is evidence that all of Europe trembled before the Mongol. If the Teutonic Knights were destroyed by Baidar and Kaidu at Leignitz, how were they able to make so marvelous a recovery as to attempt to again invade Russia
in that same year? In fact, the Mongols destroyed a largely Polish army at Leignitz; the Teutonic Knights who joined the Poles and Silesians did so volutarily, as the main body of that quasi-religious order were preparing an invasion--the invasion which was defeated in Estonia by Nevsky the following year. It is a completely false statement to contend that the Germans were defeated at Leignitz. The Germans present there were Silesians; although Germans, this hardly authorizes a blanket statement that they "defeated the Germans when he crushed them with the Teutonic Knights and the Poles at Leignitz." Some Germans were slaughtered at Leignitz. The ability of Nevsky to raise a Russian army which could effectively defeat the Teutonic Knights in the following year also gives evidence that the influence of the Mongol raids into eastern Europe was not at all as great as your post would suggest--both Germans and Russians had more than sufficient energy and resources to continue their military bickering.
When Ogedai died in 1241, Subotai, Baidur and Kaidu all returned to Mongolia. Torogene became the regent for her son Guyak, but with his death in 1248, the Mongols were again left leaderless, and it was not until 1251 that Mongke became the final ruler in the "dynasty" of Chinggis. In Europe, as in Asia, the Mongols were a force of destruction, of subjugation, of slaughter for its own sake. No lasting polity or culture was founded by them, apart from Kubelai's feeble Yuan dynasty, which did not survive him by even a century.
Furthermore, that the excellent discipline and horsemanship of the Mongols allowed them to defeat one enemy after the other,
in the open plains and steppes of central Asia and eastern Europe is no evidence that it would have served them to assure the conquest of Germany and France. The deep forests, the rolling wooded hills, the myriad rivers and streams of central and western Europe would likely have negated their tactical advantages as surely as it did the Huns more than seven centuries earlier. Aetius and his Frankish allies defeated the Huns because they (the Huns) could not deploy and attack as was their custom. When the advantage of mounted troops was made null by terrain, the equivalent displine of the Gallic foot on the Roman model commanded by Aetius, and the expertise of the Frankish horsemen in precisely that terrain, spelled doom for the Huns. There is no reason to assume that the Mongols would have fared any better, and much reason to assume that they would
not have done any better. The Poles and Magyars defeated in 1241 and 1242 were wild, undisciplined horsemen. The handful of Teutonic Knights at Leignitz fought on foot. The feudal levy of the French in the 13th century might have been as militarily weak in terms of organization as were the Poles and Magyars, but their discipline was far better. Duke Henry's Silesian levy's were certainly no match for the Mongols and Tatars, but that is no evidence that the Mongols could have overrun the heavily forested highlands of Bohemia and driven across the Rhine. That the Mongols reached the gates of Vienna is not evidence of their invincibility, either. The Osmanli Turks managed that feat on more than one occassion, and they failed utterly to drive out of the Balkans and establish themselves.
Writing in
Military History magazine in June, 1997, Erik Hildinger sums up very well the meaning of the invasions of Europe in the early 1240's, in his comment on Leignitz:
Terrible as the debacle at Liegnitz was, it had ultimately been pointless--a Mongol effort to support a conquest [i.e., a Tatar conquest]
that was suddenly abandoned, leaving nothing but a wide swath of destruction and death as the Mongol legacy in eastern and central Europe.
Which has been my point all along. The Mongols left no legacy but bags of ears rotting away to nothing, bloodsoaked battlefields and villages, and a brand new political playing field for the survivors.
Quote:Genghis Khan personally invaded Afghanistan in 1219, subjugating the entire country and destroying most of the land's cities (not that they were great in stature).
This is a false statement, not the one i made. You have, conveniently for your argument, ignored this portion of what i wrote: "They did not penetrate to the Hinud Kush, although bound in that direction." Once again, the effect of the Mongols as catalytic was felt. As you point out yourself, the cities of Afghanistan were not great in stature. The life of the Afghan peoples (many tribes, many ethnic groups) has never revolved around the cities, and many invaders have made themselves masters of the cities, only to be driven from the land in defeat. The point about the Hindu Kush is crucial; first, it is evidnce that the Mongols did not in fact, as you contend, "subjugate the entire country." The other important aspect of this
fact, is that, as the destruction of the Kievan Rus allowed for the rise of the Vladimir, or Muscovite principality, so the destruction wrought in Afghanistan allowed for the rise of the Pathans in the Hindu Kush (those tribes who are these days commonly referred to as the Pashtoons--or however it is that westerners have decided to spell it currently.) Once again, my point is made--the Mongols were catalyst, but left no foundation.
Quote:Another catagorically false statement. If you meant the quriltai that immediately followed his death then you should know that there was absolutely no struggles for power between his sons and generals.
Once again, your capacity for subtlety fails you. I do not say here, nor was there any inferential basis to suggest that i was saying that there was a power struggle within the Mongol tribes. Your facile statement here ignores several salient points. The Mongolian steppes were occupied by far more tribes than those who were called Mongols. The armies of the Great Khan were recruited on the Mongolian steppes, in the Kansu corridor between China and the central Asian steppes, and in the central Asian steppes proper. The tribal struggles to which i refer are the power struggles within those tribes which were satellites and allies of the Mongols, and they engrossed the attention of Chinggis' loyal adherents for years--on the occassion of his death, at the death of Ogedai, at the death of Guyak, and after the death of Mongke. The devil's bargain made with the Tatars was definitely a realistic decision on the part of Chinggis--the attempt to obliterate them, a tribal society every bit as disciplined as the Mongols, and every bit as militarily effective, would have bled Chingiss' armies white, and ended his roll of victories. His canny decision, as a tribal leader, to involve the Tatar in his conquests assured massive new levies of reliable warriors, and prevented the continuance of the worst blood-letting of Mongols which had occurred since he had begun his conquests. Although none of the other tribes of the Mongolian steppes, the Kansu corridor and the central Asian highlands attained to the excellence of the Tatars and Mongols--each set of brush fire uprisings at the death of each successive Khan assured the gradual, and rather rapid, enervation of the Mongol armies. With the death of Ogedai, the attempt to overrun Europe was abandoned altogether. The conquest of the middle east continued, but as i have noted, it was stopped in 1260 by the Mamelukes, and the death of Mongke in 1259 (while the Mongols were conquering the Song--more than 30 years after the death of Chinggis the conquest of China was still not complete) assured the withdrawal of Mongol forces beyond the Oxus--a frontier they would never again cross. The very loyalty of the Mongol "Princes" and the military leaders under their command assured that each new thrust to the west, the southwest or the southeast would be abandoned upon the death of whoever currently held the Khanate. Chingiss in 1227, Ogedai in 1241, Guyak in 1248, Mongke in 1259--each event caused the Mongol "empire" to contract far more quickly than it had ever expanded.
Quote:Suffice to say, I guess you never heard of the Khan's Yasa legal code, military decimal organization that is still studied today at West Point, first pony express (and indirect mail system) in history, or the first official international trade regulation in Asia.
None of these "innovations" survived Chingiss. The Yasa code, the decimal system and the express couriers were simply outgrowths of Mongol military practice and tradition, and were not writ large until Chinggis had gotten a good look at the efficiency of the Mandarinate in China. Revenue collection by the Mongols, on those notably rare occassion in which any of their victims survived to generate any revenue, was a direct imitation of the Manadarin system. These were imitative, and not innovative--and they melted away with the collapse of the Mongol "empire" after 1260. Kubelai squandered the military resources of the Yuan in his reign, and that "dynasty" was already enervated and supine three generations after his death when the Ming arrived. I have not "elevated Charlemagne above the Khan." I have simply pointed out that Charlemagne rose a little above the tribal values of the Salian Franks in instituting education and communications systems--and he, like Chinggis, simply copied the achievements of an older, much better organized empire--in his case, the incomplete memories of the Romans. In fact, his decision to honor the tribal value of partible inheritance, and the consequent fragmentation of his kingdom upon his death, clearly demonstrates that he rose very little indeed above the level of the tribal. You seem to think that the ability to slaughter wantonly over vast distances somehow gives Chinggis and the Mongols a claim to "greatness." By such a standard, any number of petty rulers throughout history who have had no qualms about putting entire populations to the sword have a claim to greatness. When you write something out in long-hand, you are using the direct descendant of the carolignian script first regularized in the reign of Charlemagne. The major highways of France, and the river boat routes used to this day were first established in his reign. For all of its absurdities, the Holy Roman Empire was the most notable product of Charlemagne's rule--for whatever its failures, it was
the major political power in Germany until Frederick II just managed to squeak out a victory in the Seven Years War. Chinggis left no such legacy behind.
Therefore, i revert to my original analysis:
"The biggest single effect, to my mind, of the irruption of the Mongols and Tatars into the center of Eurasia was the collapse of the Kievan Principate, the fatal wounding of the remant of the Roman Empire, and the death of the Ayyubid Dynasty. The consequence of that was new authority with different appeals to legitimacy in the form of the Muscovite Archdukes, the Osmalin Turks, the Mamelukes. The Mongols did not provide foundation, they were simply catalyst."
I find your arguments to be either naive, or disingenuous because of a desire to ridicule me. I don't care about that of course, and i'll make no personal remarks about you--i don't know you, am unlikely ever to meet you, and don't really care what you are like personally. I will note however, that dripping acid contempt upon the ideas of others does you no good, and does nothing to increase the force or validity of your arguments.