WW2

When i was a wee Setanta, i had to schlep across campus to the Lie-berry, and go through stacks lookin' for references, and inscribing them in my painfully over-elaborated script onto 3x5 cards . . . i could not then have conceived of the tool we have here for the lazy man such as i . . .

Yoyoma

It might be a good idea, to look at H-Net German and H-Net War as well. There, you'll certainyl find a couple of more books recommodations, and reviews, which might be helpful.

There's a fairly new picture book out called "Brandstätten" ("Places of Fire"), written by the German historian Jörg Friedrich. It deals with photos taken of the effects of the Allied bombings of civilians and cities like Hamburg, Cologne and Dresden. It's rather controversial. There's a copy of Michael Kimmelman's, New York Times, December 6, 2003 review, "Photographs That Cry Out for Meaning" at:

http://george.loper.org/~george/trends/2003/Dec/959.html

There's a graphic photo there so be warned.

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Actually, I always consider a (university) library to be the best place (here in Germany, you can order most, sometimes even original sources, online from your library,from e.g. get magazine articles as pdf-link on your desktop or the originals only to be looked at [=copies forbidden] in the library).

It depends on your library resources--yes, a survey or policy study by a branch of someone's military or civil authorities based on the records which all such organizations maintian are often thought of as a primary source, although they are technically a secondary source. The primary source would be the report itself. Were you writing a book, you could not say you had done your research thoroughly without reading such reports, as well as the secondary sources which refer to them. For your purposes, you can use lists of primary sources to check the bibliography of a book to decide if you believe the author has done her research properly and thoroughly, before deciding to skim it or read it for your purposes. A United States Army Historian named S. L. A. Marshall (aka "Slam" Marshall) is a writer of history and biography who interviewed soldiers and marines in Dubya-Dubya Two and Korea immediately after they had come out of action ("after-action" reports from enlisted men was unheard of before the Army began the practice in the Second World War). Such works as these are more difficult to find however. When you read something that Churchill, or Rommel, or George Marshall wrote--you are getting the view from the top. After action reports, regimental, battalion and company "diaries" and histories give the perspective from below. The "truth" lies somewhere in between. A few years ago i purchased a sale book about the 29th Divison (the "Blue/Gray" National Guard division from Maryland and Virginia) which had gone ashore with the First Infantry division ("Big Red One") at Omaha beach on Normandy. When i picked it up, and looked at the appendices and the bibliography, it was immediately obvious that the author had done his homework and dug for his information. I'm not obliged to agree with his conclusions, and if i suspect an author of making ommissions to bolster the case for grinding his particular axe, i can put up or shut-up--i can go to a large library and try to get a copy of the primary source to check it out.

Here's a few examples from At Dawn We Slept, an excruciatingly careful analysis of the Pearl Harbor debacle, by Gordon Prange. He is writing specifically about the judgment of the "revisionist" historians who advocate a conspiracy theory:

"Regarding Toland's claim that the U.S. picked up radio signals of the Nagumo Force [Air Fleet One, the fleet commanded by Admiral Nagumo which attacked Pearl Harbor] on December 2, I made a double check with Genda [Commander Genda was Nagumo's Air Officer, and had designed the attack plan and the training plans] and Ishiguro, then communications staff officers of the Second Carrier Division [the two carriers, Soryu and Hiryu--two of the six carriers involved]. Both of them claim that there couldn't be absolutely any such case, since they both made utmost care of keeping radio silence even by sealing transmitter keys . . ."

Prange is here quoting correspondence which he received from Masataka Chihaya, a former Imperial Navy officer. What you see above in italics is a direct quote from page 742, the 2001 "60th Anniversary Edition"--what you see in brackets is what i have written by way of explanation for you. I've told you whose book i'm quoting, and where to find it in the book, so that you could see for yourself (and without reading the entire book). Prange is refuting the claim of John Toland in Infamy: Pearl Harbor and Its Aftermath that Americans had intercepted radio messages from Nagumo's fleet five days before the attack. Before quoting Chihaya, Prange notes:

"The diaries of the Third Battleship Division and the First Destroyer Division [both components of Nagumo's First Air Fleet] likewise make it clear that the ships did not break radio silence." (p. 742, op cit)

It is so obvious that Prange has done his homework, and so obvious that he is prepared not just to shoot down specious claims by conspiracy theorists, but prepared to shoot many holes in the thesis of Toland, a respected historian (respected by some, at any event).

Prange also shows why it is sometimes necessary to refer to the primary sources:

"Ogg [Robert L. Ogg, a 20-year-old electronics expert in the 12th Naval District (west coast), whom Toland claims told him he picked up a signal from the First Air Fleet, and identified by Toland as "Seaman Z"] directly contradicted Toland's assertion that he, Ogg, had told Hosmer [Ogg's immeidate superior] that these transmission could be from 'the missing carriers.' Not until December 7 did he associate the signals with the Pearl Harbor Task Force."

And he goes on to state:

"Nevertheless, he believed the Japanese broke radio silence, but not to any great extent. He reasoned the some ships "in a storm situation" must have violated radio silence. But, according to contemporary Japanese accounts, there was no such "storm situation." The Task Force encountered unusually favorable weather, considering the route and time of year. The ships met with some fog, high seas, winds, and light rain, but no major storms.

"In short, Ogg's account, although obviously given in good faith, is not sufficient to override the Japanese testimony as well as the tactical reasons for radio silence." (p. 743, op cit)

So Prange is saying that Toland has perpetrated one of the myths upon which the Pearl Harbor conspiracy theorists thrive--that the Japanese broke radio silence on December 2, and this was not reported to the commanders in Hawaii. Prange also points out that regardless of what commanders in Hawaii were or were not told, they were still responsible for their own saftety and defense, and had no reason to doubt that war was coming and coming soon--and that they had been sent the "War Warning" message on November 27. Toland repeats, probably in good faith what he claims Ogg told him. Ogg contradicts Toland, and is unable to substantiate having recorded anywhere that he had picked up such a signal, and denies that he reported any signals to his superior officer, Hosmer--Toland even manages to misspell Lt. Hosmer's name as Hosner in his book.

What this can all boil down to in practical terms for you is this: if you have carefully checked many reasonably reliable sources, and eleminated the contradictions, you can make conditional statements about where you believe the truth lies without making outrageous claims or unsupportable statements. In the example above, were i writing about the PH conspiracy theories, i would simply say: "there are claims made without reliable substantiation that the Japanese broke radio silence, which i believe to be unfounded claims--i think it is unlikely that this occurred." When you read a secondary source, ask yourself if you think the author has set out to prove a particular theory, or if the author has offered evidence, well-document and supported by interview and contemporary accounts, and then said: "therefore, i believe this, and not that." I am, i guess, hoping you would learn to judge the quality of your sources, and the reliability of the witnesses and the testimony.

Large public libraries, University libraries and archival institutions are often the best places to look. Specialized collections are great, but they are scattered about. The Library of Congress is super, and you've already been given a link to it. The Smithsonian is also a good source.

For you researches into this topic you might try the Military History sections of the various air forces involved in the WWII airwar. Associations of veteran pilots and officers who took part in the prosecuting and defending against the mass raids are invaluable for first person accounts. Gen. Galland has been an active participant in many reunions of allied and German fliers. I met him once at a reunion in Los Angeles, and he was the most memorable vet there. In fact, I've forgotten who all the others were. That's the sort of event where you keep your mouth shut and your ears open. What stories one can hear after old tongues loosen up!

<Just thinking loud that "primary sources" re 'the effect on Germany' would mostly by in Germany>

Mebbe you could lend our cellist friend here a hand, Walter, in finding out if there are English language editions of any of the sources you have . . .

Some -perhaps topic-related - documents are to be found online, like on this website

National Socialism and World War II: Primary Documents

(others are linked on the above website :wink: )

I very good site for searching primary documents (online) is this one:

History Guide

Area Bombing
Area bombing

Area bombing is a techinque. Operation Cobra in July, 1944, is the only example i know of in which area bombing (also known as carpet bombing) was used in direct support of ground operations. It was a disaster for Panzer Lehrer, the German division which was the target, but it was almost as much a disaster for the Americans who had to cross the area of the bombing afterward. Area bombing is actually just a polite term for dropping your bomb load in reference to a map coordinate, without any regard for what the bombs fall on. It was the term applied to what "Bomber" Harris and his aircrew were doing to Hamburg, Dusseldorf, Cologne, etc.

On a related note, something which i intend to add to the "Allied bombing a war crime" thread--Terry Gross interviewed a documentary film-maker on the NPR program Fresh Air today. Here's the blurb from NPR on the segment:



I took heed of something which McNamara said in one of the interviews, which they excerpted for the program. He said that Curtis Lemay once said to him, with regard to the fire bombing of Tokoyo: "If we had lost this war, we'd be prosecuted for war crimes."

Oops . . . sorry, Yoyoma, i didn't make something clear. All area bombing was strategic (i.e., not directly related to ground operations, which would tactical) with the one exception of Operation Cobra. There might have been other such operations, but i know of none. Someone might argue that the "terror" bombing by the Luftwaffe of enemy cities during an invasion, using the JuU87 & Ju88 might constitute area bombing, but i would unconvinced.

For practical purposes, when one speaks of the operational doctrine applied to a particular ground operation, one is speaking of tactics. When one attacks the enemy's production base, or makes decisions about where and when to conduct ground operations, one is speaking of strategy. Not a hard and fast rule, but one of those 95% of cases type of rule.

Last phase of war
During the last phase of the war (44-45), the campaign focused on heavily on transportation (rail system) --> this clearly weakened Germany's ability to deliver crucial war materials around but does this fall under strategic bombing, or tactical?