WW2

And, please, don't forget to let us read the finished product.

I can mention Normandy/D-Day/Japan

Market Garden operation directly effected Germany's ability to wage war? What other bombing related battles should I mention that involved Germany's ability directly to wage war?

There is a Dresden thread here, Boss, you should check it out . . . I guess i'd have to say that bombing in support of invasion and ground operations is not a topic a propos of your theme . . .

Bombings had become the order of the day & so had air raids about 1944, especially in the main cities. People got more or less used to it - as well as to the sitelong obituary notices in the local papers. [Especially soldiers on front vacancies 'laughed' about the fear of the civilians - my mother never went in the cellar (=bunker for the street] at all, when he was at home).

As an aside, the most quoted and very common joke from 1944 (although known to soldiers much earlier):
A man appears at the registrar's office. "I want my name changed." "Oh, but what is your name?" asks the official. "My name is Adolph Stinktier (=skunk)." "I understand," says the official. "How embarrassing. Would you prefer to be a Mr. Miller, Smith, Meyer or ….?" "No, no," interrupts the man. You misunderstand completely. I do not mind the 'Stinktier' at all, but I do not want to be an 'Adolf' anymore!"

I think that Normandy, and all of the battles waged against German forces in all theaters, are relevant and need to be referenced. My rational is that the air war strategy was always primarily intended to destroy the German ability to resist Allied arms. Effectiveness must, in my view, ultimately rest on how important a factor it (air war strategy) was in defeating German arms. One the strategy shifted from production of critical items to the more fragile transportation system, air targets greatly expanded and moved right onto the field of actual battle.

As important as I believe the change in air strategy was, and I believe Setanta would agree, you may want to limit your researches/paper to the Effectiveness of Allied Air Strategy Against German Strategic Targets. This is a much more limited approach, and probably more "do-able".

Walter Hintler's remarks give an important window on the bombings effect on the civilian population of German cities. The massive air raids were conducted around the clock; Americans by day, and the Brits by night. Living the most ordinary life was disrupted for a significant part of the German People. The civilian economy was wrecked, and had to increasingly be propped-up by the National government, and the resources available were stretched to the breaking point. The Gestapo became even more heavy handed to insure loyalty and dedication to the cause. The moral of the line regiments must have been affected as the men worried about the safety of their loved ones as the German cities were reduced to rubble. We know that as the war was ending, desertion from the ranks was wide-spread. Just how much effect did these factors have on German defeat?

It is fashionable in some quarters to condemn the destruction of enemy cities during WWII as a war crime. At the time destruction of enemy cities was regarded as legal, but regrettable, targets. The notion that enemy civilians are not legitimate targets is mostly a historic anomaly. Douhet's notions about the importance of concentrating air power directly upon the enemy civilian population far behind the lines, it was felt, did not get a fair test during wwi. The use of German air as a vital component of Blitzkrieg seemed to confirm Douhet's ideas, and the Blitz on British civilian targets was the application of that theory in practice. "Tit-for-tat", might have been Bomber Harris's reasoning.

However, we should not overlook the limitations of weapons technology of those times. Aircraft of the day were small, with limited cargo/bomb load capacity. That dictated the use of vast air armadas, and as numbers increase so does the margin of error. A small mistake by the pathfinder aircraft/crew might end up delivering the entire bomb load of the mission on the wrong target. In those days navigational errors were much easier to make, and bombadiers often had to identify their targets from the air while flying at a steady course and altitude as flak exploded around them. Not the sort of conditions that are conducive to cool appraisal of targets. The American air forces relied on the norden Bombsight, and it was much more effective than earlier bombsighting techniques. The Norden sight was so highly classified that crews were instructed to keep it from the enemy by any means, even if it meant their lives. How effective was the Norden bombsight? By modern standards where we can direct a munition into a designated window of the targeted building, it was terrible. To make up for the inability to reliably target any single bomb load within a "killing" distance of the target, Americans dropped a lot of bombs on the target area. British bombing conducted at night was even less focused onto single targets. As an operational matter WWII targeting had to rely on carpet bombing with at least thousands of tons of iron munitions dropped on each target. Lots of destruction and death occurred.

The Bombing Survey that several of us have directed you to above was intended to assess whether Douhet's theories about the effect of total air war on civilian targets was correct, or not. The matter was not resolved, but lived on as MAD (Mutually Assured Destruction). We have survived without nuclear exchange since the end of WWII, and so some would argue that Douhet was correct. The advent of "smart munitions", the increased lethality of single munitions, and the destructiveness of the weapons load on single aircraft, has increased the overall effectiveness of air power. The Allied Blitzkrieg into Baghdad would not have been possible without air superiority and close airsupport. Combined arms is here to stay.

It is interesting that usually A2K regulars carefully avoid providing much help to students with their class projects/papers. Here, on the other hand, is a young person whose approach to their problem has managed to get some big-time help out of us. I'm very happy to share sources and background materials to Yoyoma because we are asked only to help with research rather than writing the essay for him/her. Yoyoma seems to be willing to do the sort of in-depth research that I admire. Go get it Yomoma.

Asherman,

as said above, there are documents from the British Airforce (some A2K'ers saw this as well during their visit there) that in Münster (and I'm rather sure, this is no single example), civilian targets like hospitals, monasteries and churches, where exactly pointed out as targets. (There are interesting letters and diaries from soldiers, too, asking "WHY?").

I know (knew) both the pilot and the navigator of one of the bombers, which bombed my grandparents house (and their squadron leader as well): all the three said, their targets were explicite in the civilian town center.

But that was WWII, as you said.

Part of Douhet's thesis was that airpower concentrated on civilian targets far from the front lines is the key to victory in future conflicts. He reasoned that armies could not be effective without a strong modern industrial base, and civilian support. Without civilian workers it would not be possible to produce the arms, munitions and supplies need to keep an army in the field. Attacks on the enemy industrial system, Douhet argued, would include disruption of raw materials, destruction of factories, AND the ability and willingness of the civilian workforce to continue the struggle. Douhet and others argue(d) that destruction of enemy civilian moral was as important as annihilation of field armies.

Douhet was optimistic that when the destruction and lethality of total air war became evident, that national leaders would never willingly expose the civilian populations and homelands to attack. The threat of total war where there is no safe sanctuary from destruction would herald the end of War. Douhet was required reading after WWI by the General Staffs of the world's leading military powers. Civilian leaders, like Hitler, saw the benefits of waging total air war against civilian targets, but never believed that they to would be vulnerable to retaliatory attack. Wrong.

Questions about the validity of Douhet's ideas were never totally abandoned. The new Air Force wanted to emphasize the importance of airpower, and Douhet was just the sort of thinker the Strategic Air Command (SAC) liked. Gen. LeMay and others dismissed criticisms of Douhet by saying that the bombing campaign in Europe wasn't sufficiently terrible to obtain the desired result; surrender without delay. The speed with which the Japanese surrendered after two atomic attacks was cited as proof that Douhet was right. In any case, it was Douhet's theories that drove military strategy during the long Cold War. Neither the U.S., nor the U.S.S.R. could/would risk the sort of destruction attendant upon open and unrestricted warfare between the two rival systems. It worked and we survived to survey the ashes of Communist despotism.

Studies after WWII tended to recognize the relative ineffectiveness of mass bombing strategic targets. The scope of the destruction appalled almost everyone who saw it at first hand. Congressmen, Senators, and private citizens questioned the need to target sites with no direct militray significance. The loss of buildings having historical and cultureal importance caused a lot of hand wringing that still goes on. Once the risk of losing a war to Nazi Germany was gone, second guessing the operations that won the war became popular. Today, folks often form judgements based more upon modern military capability and sensibility than that current between 1933-1945. After living under MAD for fifty years it shouldn't be too surprising that today the politically correct view is that non-military civilian targets should never be consciously targeted. That is a nice and compassionate view, but is it a novelty that will guide all warring parties for from now until the end of history?

The radicals of Southwest Asia who hate the West are at war with us. They can not meet us openly in battle, and so they have resorted to the use of irregular war. Irregular war, they say, excuses them from following the international agreements adopted to spare un-necessary killing and destruction. Radical terrorists wear no uniforms and attack the softest and most vulnerable civilian targets they can find. Flying suicide planes into civilian offices is their own application of Douhet's ideas aimed at crushing the will and ability of the enemy to resist.

This is rather like a prize fight where one fighter is bound by the Queensbury Rules and his opponent is allowed to ignore the rules and use a baseball bat.

Ta hell with the Marquis of Queensbury, the only fight i ever lost, i slipped goin' round the corner . . .

We are caught in a quandry. We expect and demand that our forces strictly follow the rules, but there seems to be no penalty nor consequences when our enemies spit upon the agreements intended to lessen the sufferings of warfare. In the Shadow World, where much of the war on terrorism will be fought, the rules are less clear. In that "world" if the enemy kicks you where it hurts, you can kick him back or bite off an ear so long as the battle never reaches into the headlines.

Book
WW2

I don't know how easily you can shop, in terms of books, but it is oten best to go to primary sources, for example, The First and the Last, Adolf Galland, which i've already mentioned, certainly Churchill is giving you the version he wants posterity to read in The Second World War, but one always takes such things into account when reading history and autobiography. An example of a secondary source is Asherman, or Walter, or Timber, or i giving you information which we've read from primary sources. Walter could possibly recommend to you primary sources from Germany and Germans on the these topics--and possibly whether or not there is an English edition--libararies commonly ship books upon request. Asherman and i have already mentioned Albert Speer, who is a crucial primary source for the period. I believe Milch was the name of Speer's predecessor (c. 1936--1942 [?]). There are a host of good secondary sources out there, as well. Look under "policy studies" when you surf search engines, as this relatively new form of history has assumed an importance, in the hands of a reliable author, of primary (contemporary) biography, autobiography, and procedural recording. A well-written policy study will rely almost entirely on primary sources and procedural recording.

Absent the ability to buy, or the desire to buy, a lot of such books, make sure that the secondary sources you read are using primary sources, which can easily be ascertained by looking at the bibliography before purchase--one advantage of being able to handle a book before purchase. You could get your hints on-line, and likely find out on-line whether a book store near you has a copy you could inspect. No reputable book store manager would begrudge you examining a book in her presence before deciding to buy. There are a great many well-read people here who can suggest titles to you which are, in their experience, reliable secondary sources.

Just always remember that the "farther" from an eye-witness source your are, the weaker the evidence you're consulting. The rules of evidence in jurisprudence and in history are nearly identical, saving the procedural requirements of jurisprudence.

On the topic of a German view of the effect of air power on tactical and strategic military operations in the ETO, you simply can do no better than The Rommel Papers, B. H. Liddell-Hart, DaCapo Press; (April 1988) ISBN: 0306801574. It will be books of this type which will provide the most direct access. This is also why a library might be a better option than purchase. For 5000 words, if i thought ever i wanted to undertake such a task, i'd imagine i'd want to look at a minimum of 50 primary and highly reliable secondary sources. You don't really have to read every page of them, either--the secondary sources can point you to what you'll want to read in the primary sources.

You know, i might be willing to surrender a testicle for an iron-clad, life-time lease on a study carrell at the University of Illinois Graduate Library . . .

W2w
WW2

google:

"The Luftwaffe" + journals

and

"United States Army Air Force"

and

"USAAF"

and

"The Royal Air Force"

and

"RAF"

You can set your search parameters to "journals," and specific periods: "1939-1945," for example . . .

Never forget this resources:

You pay to help maintain it, so why not?[/color]

WW@
WW2

Dramatis Personae:

Adolf Hitler, German Chancellor, 1933-45

Winston Spenser Churchill, British Prime Minister, 1940-45

Franklin Delano Roosevelt, United States President, 1932-1945

Harry S. Truman, United States President, 1945-1952

Joseph Stalin (Josef Dugashivilli), Chairman of the Central Committee of the Politboro of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, 1931-1953

Feldmarschall Keitel, Feldmarschall Jodl, German Chiefs of Staff of the High Command of the Armed Forces

Air Marshalls Sir Arthur Tedder and Sir Arthur Harris, Commanders, Fighters and Bombers, respectively

Henry Stimson, United States Secretray of War; George C. Marshall, United States Army Chief of Staff; Henry "Hap" Arnold, Commander, United States Army Air Forces; and Curtis Lemay, Commander, Eighth United States Army Air Force (Bombardment)

Herman Goring, Riechsmarschall, Commander in Chief, Luftwaffe; Albert Kesselring, Generalfeldmarschall, Commander, Luftflotte II (Battle of Britain)

Junkers JU-87, "Stuka" and JU-88

Heinkel He111

Dornier Do17

Messerschmidt Me109

Messerschmidt Me262

Focke Wulf FW190

Supermarine Spitfire

Hawker Hurricane

Hawker Tempest

Hawker Typhoon

Handley-Page Halifax II

Bristol Blenheim IV

Vickers Wellington

Avro Manchester

Avro Lancaster

Lockheed P-38 "Lightning"

Curtiss P-40, "Tomahawk," "Kittyhawk," and "Warhawk"

Republic P-47 "Thunderbolt"

North American P-51 "Mustang"

Boeing B-17 "Flying Fortress"

Consolidated B-24 "Liberator"

North American B-25 "Mitchell"

Boeing B-29 "Superfortress" (i am uncertain if this was used in Europe)

That's a short list, Boss, go to the horses mouth . . .

(Edit: I probably gave you bad search advice, i just putz around myself to find what i want. Take these lists to your friendly neighborhood computer geek and ask how to frame your search.)

While I agree in principle with Sedanta's advice to go to primary sources, there are exceptions. Sometimes the primary sources don't exist for the detail you are looking for, and you just have to make do with secondary sources. Modern military history doesn't often lack in primary sources, but the researcher is swamped by too many. No two observers of the same event will report it exactly alike. Each witness responds and edits their account to conform with their own underlying assumptions. Given two contradictory accounts in the primary sources, which do you choose. This is a constant problem for conscienceous students.

Another problem is that the witness caught up in the event only sees a small portion of it. Dodging bullets tends to warp the objectivity of the observer. Who best can report on the airwar, a pilot who flew fifty missions, or the operations officer who planned and evaluated the missions without ever setting foot in an airplane? The pilot's account may be written years after the actual events and colored by the passing of time. It is still a primary document, as is the carefully noted spreadsheets of the operations officer. Strictly speaking the Strategic Bomb Survey is a secondary source, but we treat it as a primary because of the authoritative way it was compiled. Generally, if the source gives you analysis it is probably a secondary source.

Here is another example. If you want to understand the formal basis on which most Civil War officers understood tactics and strategy, where would you look? The answer would probably be the West Point curriculum for the years leading up to the Late Unpleasantness. The book that formed the theoretical basis for tactics and strategy was Jomini's "Summary of the Art of War", still a classic in the study of military history. Jomini was one of Napoleon's officers, and his book reflects the lessons he took from the Napoleonic Wars. In the mid-19th century almost everyone wanted to be another Napoleon, and thats what the studied to be. Unfortunately, military science rushed ahead of the theorists with rifles that were accurate at long range and other improvements in weapons and munitions. The result was the suicidal tactics used by both armies. Marching densely formed units across open fields into the mouths of cannon no longer worked so well as it did for Napoleon and Wellington. Is Jomini a primary, or secondary source in this case? BTW, Clauswitz was also a Napoleonic era officer whose insights were probably more sophisticated than Jomini, and whose work is as important to training todays officers has it was a hundred years ago.

One problem which one encounters in the secondary histories, however, Ash, is that the event occurred within the lifetimes of a great many people still living. I did advise secondary sources if a persusal of the bibliography shows a thorough research, and in conjunction with primary sources. The prejudices of Adolf Galland not only inform his memoir, they informed his decisions as commander of the fighter wing. The number of secondary sources on this topic is an even bigger, more daunting figure than the number of primary sources (at least in terms of personal memoirs). This is one reason why i also recommend policy studies. I've read Galland, as well as memoirs of several British and American fighter and bomber pilots, which compliments nicely the policy studies and survey histories i've read. Knowing the players and the aircraft also provides enormous "linking" resources when searching the web--this a principle reason to be familiar with primary sources, because in web searches, the author's names and titles dredge up thousands and thousands of "hits."

I wasn't disagreeing with you, only amplifying on the theme.