Was it a war crime when US nuked Hiroshima & Nagasaki?

In that case only Serbs would be in Hague International court for war crimes. They were only agressor and wars they started were held only and exclusively on Croatian and Bosnian territory (and very very shortly in Slovenia).
But, Croats and Muslims are there too.
(BTW, they all get along really well in prison - one more proof that Nazis/War Criminals/Slaughterers are "nationality" themselves)

As for Hiroshima/Nagasaki I think that it was war crime to a certain level, but I also doubt that USA knew EXACT proportions of destruction it will cause, especially in terms of diseases for decades after bomb. If we are going to talk about "allies" war crimes, I think much clearer war crime was bombing of Dresden for example.

MyOwnUsername

Dresden IMO was in some ways payback for the Bombing of London and the Buzz bombs. Which was indiscriminate bombing by the Germans of the civilian population? If you are going to throw stones you better be prepared to have them thrown back at you. I have very little sympathy to waste on the Germany or Germans of that time.

This is a true statement.

What is not true is that the UN existed at the time of the bombing.

From the UN:

"The United Nations officially came into existence on 24 October 1945, when the Charter had been ratified by China, France, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, the United States and by a majority of other signatories. United Nations Day is celebrated on 24 October each year."

Hiroshima was nuked on August 6, 1945.

August 6, 1945 predates 24 October 1945.

It is true that Franklin D. Roosevelt coined and began to use the term "United Nations" in reference to the allies prior to the nuking but it is not true that the UN as we know it, whose legitimacy Sofia attempted to invoke, existed at the time of the nukings.

It existed before it was ratified. It was just the Allied nations. Then they decided that they would stay like that to prevent further wars.

And October was after WW2.

of course it was payback. But it's still a crime. Sorry, but if someone kills my child I will maybe skip over my pacifism and kill that bastard, but will have no intention to kill his child. Dresden was massacre of civilians and similar massacre of civilians in e.g. Coventry can't justify Dresden. I have no sympathies for Nazis, for terrorists that crashed into WTC towers, jerks that abused prisoners or killed Iraqi civilians (including lots of kids) on wedding, or anyone else from that group of people, but will never mix them with Germans, Arabs and Americans.

Tobruk
It was only an unborn embryo at that time. Without features or form.

The killing of civilians was commonplace in WW2. Why should the bombing of Dresden be singled out as a war crime?

Germany was just a little upset because they forgot to develop a heavy 4 engine bomber of their own.

Who said it should be singled out? I think same about every intentional killing of civilians.

Actually it was called "The United Nations" since 1942.

Franklin D. Roosevelt coined the term to refer to the Allied Nations.

But as Au correctly points out they had no form or function and it was just a term to refer to the allies.

When they ratified a charter they opened a new page in international law, and Sofia tried to invoke this legal legitimacy prior to the organization's (not the mere term's) existence.



The "official" date of its end has always been disputed. Some say it was October 16th. Some as early as May 7th or 8th (I don't remember which one was the date of Germany's surrender).

But nevertheless, I agree with your point and revise my statement to say that the United Nations did not exist during WW2, even if the term did.

Japan signalled that they would surrender on the 15th of August 1945 and signed the surrender documents on the 2nd of September 1945.

Some Japanese divisions continued to fight for a few months and the last Japanese soldier to surrender was Hiroo Onoda(sp?) in the early 1970s.

Hiroo Onoda is a great story worth a whole new thread.

Whereas i am not going to comment on the relative legality of any of these actions by anyone, i want to point out the inaccuracy of this point of view. The Department of War had sent an official war warning to Admiral Husband Kimmel and Lieutenant General Walter Short on November 26, 1941. Nagumo's ability to successfully carry out Yamamoto's plan was the result of a profound and inexcuseable misunderstanding between the Navy and the Army. The situation is not exactly similar to the lack of effective communicaiton between the FBI and Central Intelligence prior to September 11, 2001; but in its consequences, the effects are very similiar--to me a demonstration of how quickly institutions forget such lessons, so intent are they on the preservation of their "turf."

The army in Hawaii was there for a single purpose, which was the protection of the naval station there. The fleet was there for a single purpose, the projection of power in the Pacific. Long, long before the end of 1941, the United States well knew that we were not drifting, but rapidly cruising toward war with Japan. Intelligence estimates were quite good that the Japanese were rapidly approaching a situation in which the Imperial Navy could no longer effectively operate from a lack of bunker fuel. Prior to 1937, the United States had been the principle source for scrap metal to Japan, and both the United States and the Netherlands East Indies provided the lion's share of Japanese petroleum wants. In 1937, the United States put an embargo on the export of scrap metal, petroleum and petroleum products, and rubber to Japan. Additionally, the United States ecouraged the Dutch to cut off petroleum exports to Japan, and the French to cut off the export of raw rubber to Japan. The Dutch and French were unwilling, but gave into pressure and decreased the flow of those supplies considered vital in Japan. In 1940, we put a complete embargo on exports to Japan to include "humanitarian" goods--i.e., food and medicines. This was all a retaliatory policy in response to the Japanese invasion of Manchuria.

In 1928, the Congress urged the passage of the Kellogg-Briand Peace Pact, which was ratified by the Senate in 1929, and several other signatories joined us. It was an act designed to put to an end war as an extension of diplomacy. Before the ratification of this act in the Senate and in several foreign capitals, Secretary of State Kellogg, in a recorded discussion on December 7, 1928 (to the day, 13 years before the Pearl Harbor debacle), answered a crucial pair of questions as follows:

Q: "Suppose a country is not attacked - suppose there is an economic blockade...?"

A: "There is no such thing as a blockade [unless] you are in war."

Q: "It is an act of war?"

A: "An act of war absolutely . . . as I have stated before, nobody on earth, probably, could write an article defining 'self defense' or 'aggressor' that some country could not get around; and I made up my mind that the only safe thing for any country to do was to judge for itself within its sovereign rights whether it was unjustly attacked and had a right to defend itself and it must answer to the opinion of the world."

This transcript can be verified, and was entered into the transcript of the defense of Japanese officers after the war by attorneys defending them on the charge that the attack on Pearl Harbor was a war crime. They further cogently pointed out that we were actively supplying China with the materials of war; that a senior officer of the United States Army Air Force (Claire Chenault) was at that time commanding former USAAF and United States Marine Corp aviators actively flying to support the Chinese and attack the Japanese, to include engaging Japanese fighters and bombers; that the embargo of foodstuffs was undertaken with the full knowledge of accute food shortages in Japan in 1939 and 1940; that the United States was signatory to international treaties which recognized that no declaration of war is necessary if the war is considered justifiable as a measure of self-defense; that the Japanese had planned to deliver such a declaration in Wahsington, but that errors made in the Japanese embassy resulted in a delay in the delivery of that message. One might well imagine how much weight this carried with an American military tribunal.

It is indisputable fact, supported by American records that Admiral Nomura, the Japanese Special Envoy in Washington, received instructions to sever diplomatic relations on December 6, 1941, local time. This was decoded by American intelligence, and immediately realizing the import of the message (we had "Purple," the ability to decode Japanese diplomatic signals), a War Message, not simply a warning, was immediately ordered for transmission to Hawaii. It was sent by commercial telegraph. (As you cannot see my face, add your own irony here.) At 9:00 a.m., Nomura was instructed to deliver the message no later than 1:00 p.m.--with almost all of their equipment now destroyed, and documents burned, and the embassy staff on the way to Japan, Nomura and his few staff remaining labored to type up a message for delivery to the State Department and the White House. It was not, in any pragmatic sense, necessary, of course, because Purple assured we already knew it. That they failed by minutes to deliver the message on time was in some measure due to intentional delays by American officials.

That Yamamoto's bold plan of attack was so successful is due almost entirely to the incredible monumental effort of the Imperial Navy officers and aviators who worked so hard for months to prepare. It was "known" in the United States that Japanese carriers hadn't the range to reach Hawaii. This was true of Kaga, Akagi, Hiryu and Soryu--Shokaku, recently commissioned, and Zuikaku, then making her maiden voyage, had the range to get there, but not to return. It was also "known" at the Navy Department that the Japanese were incapable of refueling their carriers at sea. Nagumo's First Air Fleet successfully refueled the carriers at sea on four occasions on the voyage to and from Hawaii. It was known to the Imperial Navy that aeriely launched torpedoes needed 70 meters or more of water to "porpoise," that is, to dive and return to the surface for their run--the water in the basin at Pearl Harbor has a mean depth of 40 meters. The Japanese successfully, in less than four months, developed a torpedo stabilization device, made of wood by unskilled workers, which allowed the torpedo to sink no further than 30 meters, shed the device and make the attack run--accurately, as events proved. The Japanese knew that the American battleships, with the heaviest deck armor in the world (Bismark might sink Hood in seven minutes--but could never have done that to Utah because of her deck armor, and Utah was commissioned in 1912), would be proof against their dive bombers. But the Japanese also used high-altitude, carrier-launched horizontal bombers. Therefore, they developed, again in under four months, 16" naval armor piercing rifle shells for use as bombs by horizontal bombers--Utah was one of their victims.

All of this, as regards the obstacles in the way of the Japanese, was known by the Navy Department. Nevertheless, Kimmel and Short had been warned. Their own aviation officers had described to them exactly the sort of scenario in which such a Japanese attack could have succeeded. They did not take appropriate measures to warn of or defend against such an attack. Short, with a primary mission of defending the naval station and the fleet, became convinced that the Japanese would never attack with the fleet in port (both he and Kimmel assumed the base would be the target, not the fleet), and was always relieved when the fleet returned to port for the weekend. He became obssessively paranoid about "fifth columnists" among the Japanese-Americans in Hawaii, and on that Sunday, American fighter aircraft were clustered in the centers of the airfields, to protect them from imaginary saboteurs, and the aircraft ammunition and anit-aircraft artillery ammunition was under lock and key, to assure these chimerical saboteurs would not use it to attack the airbases. One Japanese fighter pilot recounted how, on one strafing run, an American officer ran out into the road, and began firing his .45 at him (probably with tears of frustration in his eyes), so that he pulled up so as not to kill so valiant a man.

The Navy had several reports of submarine contacts in the days before the attack. Admiral Halsey was at sea with a division of a carrier, cruisers and destroyers, and after the receipt of the November 26 signal, ordered his ships to 24 hour battle stations--not everyone was asleep at the wheel. The one mobile radar station in operation that morning reported the approach of a large number of aircraft--and the duty officer informed them that they were already supposed to have packed up their equipment and returned to base, that he had no runner to send to Short's headquarters, and, in any event they were expecting a flight of B-17's (bound for the Phillipines) that morning (one might note that Los Angeles is east of Hawaii, not northJ).

The Navy and the Army dropped the ball very badly at Pearl Harbor that morning. In addition, Stimson, Hull, King and Marshall all failed to assure communication and cooperation between the services. No effort was made to discern what measures had been taken when the war warning was sent, ironically on the day Nagumo's fleet departed Hitokapu Bay for the attack on Hawaii. Many of the crucial Purple decoding transcript summaries were sent to Hawaii via the U.S. mails--acknowledgement of the receipt of such messages was returned in the same manner. Purple was considered such an important secret that knowledge of its very existence was restricted to a few government officials and military officers (apart, of course, from the Army and Navy signals officers who actually were engaged in intercepting and decoding these messages) on a "need-to-know" basis. Incredibly, neither Kimmel nor Short were on this list, and they received summaries only, and only when it was thought the information might be important to the discharge of their duties.

The Japanese actually had a good case for war. That the United States knew that their actions might drive the Japanese to war was well known in Washington and the nation at large. At the beginning of November, the Japanese changed their naval codes, even though this was "unscheduled," and these five largest Japanese carriers "disappeared"--we no longer knew where they were. Almost every vessel, to the smallest, which was be a part of the "Southern Operation" against the Netherlands East Indies, Singapore, the Phillipines and British Borneo was identified, and its whereabouts known in November, 1941. No one paid attention to what was not there. We were not even aware that the Japanese were building a carrier, much less that Zuikaku had been commissioned and completed her sea trials. American performance in the Pacific in 1941 (as well as the performance of responsible civilian and military authorities in Washington) was nothing short of pathetic. Yamamoto's plan, Genda's operational plans and training plans, and Nagumo's execution were nearly faultless. We committed one of history's greatest military blunders; the Japanese pulled off what is arguably, and in my opinion, the most brilliant naval operation in history, surpassing even the destruction of the Russian fleet in 1905. When passing around blame, this is one of those rare occasions upon which there were actually more people deserving than there was blame to pass around. Kimmel and Short were ruined; Stimson, Hull, King and Marshall went on to greater career heights. For this disasterous loss of American ships, aircraft and men, we largely have ourselves to blame. That we were ". . . an unsuspecting country minding their own business . . . " is very, very far indeed from the historical fact.

(Please note, Sofia, that i do not consider you stupid or naive for holding what is a lamentably common belief.)

Most people, including me, have heard of the disastrous F-ups that allowed the attack to remain a surprise, though I enjoyed reading your narrative.

I did know we were ducking in a bit, as I discussed here on other threads, when others argued we didn't come in to the war soon enough to suit them. We were offering behind the scenes help, but I had no idea we were engaging the enemy, as you say, or that we were embargoing food.

When I say 'unsuspecting', maybe that is a bit partisan. They didn't intend a sneak attack, but that is what they are guilty of. We did have our hands in the mix, but in a very mild way, IMO. You are perhaps saying in the BIG picture, we should have suspected... and I am saying on Dec. 7, 1941, we were in bed. Both true.

I have thought FDR was resisting full out war because of public sentiment. Your narrative seems to point to something more sinister--that he set us up to find ourselves the object of attack, to get his proper public outrage and permission to go to war. I've heard that opinion before.

Is it yours, as well?

<In this case, not stupid or naive, but maybe... choosy with my rhetoric...>

No, i think this all rather caught FDR flat-footed as well. As his successor, Truman pointed out, the buck stops at that desk. More than anything else, we badly underestimated our enemy.

Isoruku Yamamoto was an extraordinary man. His plan figuratively took the breath from the Imperial Staff. His stature was such that constant and measured pressure got approval for the plan. He knew Americans well. In a letter to a right-wing military man who was his friend, he stated that Japan would only win a war with the United States when we dictated the terms of peace in the White House. This was published, against his wishes, and quite out of context. It was seen as endorsement for war from a military icon in Japan, which had been by then, a military state for almost two decades. (In 1923, a disasterous earthquake with the resultant fires had devasted the nation--the civilian government was incapable of dealing with the emergency, and the military, already the most highly regarded institution after that of the Emperor, were the only ones capable of any useful response. The government were obliged to accept military terms--the Ministers of the Navy and the Army obtained the right of veto of any government measure. Additionally, the Minister of the Army was required to be an officer on the active list. As the Imperial Staff had complete control of personnel, any Army Mininster appointed unacceptable to the military authorities could simply be retired--the civilian authorities were therefore administratively castrated.)

In simple military terms, it would be foolish nearly to the point of suicide to attack to the south while the Pacific fleet remained on the flank of the attack. To attack the Netherlands East Indies, British Borneo and Singapore, the Japanese had to move with the Phillipines on their flank. Therefore, the attack, which was by then the only way to continue to fuel Japanese industry and the military, could not succeed without at least "masking" the Phillipines by an attack--and the Japanese were not going to attack without planning to overrun the Phillipines. This in turn would bring in the Pacific fleet. Yamamoto made the equation simple for those who would not see. Attacking the oil rich islands of Holland and Britain necessitated attacking the United States. Attacking the United States meant (as he well knew if others in Japan did not) taking on the greatest industrial and military potential in the world, even if then slumbering. When Yamamoto wrote of dictating terms in the White House, it was an ironical description of the impossibility of the war. He knew that 3000 miles of mostly difficult terrain separated the west coast from the east, and he knew what the American reaction would be; he knew that Japan could not win. But in the circumstances, there really was nothing else to do. Given the situation, he did his level best, and that was very much indeed. Genda and others on Yamamoto's staff had predicted 35 or 40% losses of aircraft and aircrew in the initial attack. Nagumo's fleet got off almost scot-free. Genda and others pleaded with Nagumo to launch another attack (Genda envisioned delivering two or three more attacks as the fleet cruised past the islands, heading for the Mandates). Nagumo was the responsible individual, however, and he decided against it; which was well for us. Kimmel was worried most for the "tanker farms" of bunker oil which sat on shore at Pearl Harbor. A subsequent attack which destroyed those would truly have crippled the Navy. Nagumo is not to be faulted for not being another Yamamoto, which was well for us. He had carried out the most successful surprise attack in the history of naval warfare, his losses were negligible, he didn't know where the American carriers were, there were major cruiser forces unaccounted for, the First Air Fleet was escorted by two fast battleships, a light cruiser and destoyers. Caught at sea by any substantial force, if the Americans were willing to take heavy losses (which all Japanese naval officers knew was likely--they did not underestimate us as we did them), he would have lost most if not all of the carriers. Those six carriers were the biggest and best which Japan had. The two carriers of the Eleventh Air fleet, assigned to the "Southern Operation," could not launch as many planes as could any one of Nagumo's carriers. The loss of any of those carriers would be disasterous for the Imperial Navy. This was proven when we "got our revenge" at Midway. It is difficult and foolish to second-guess the responsible party on the scene, and Yamamoto never made a word of recrimination or even of regret slip to Nagumo.

On the side of the Unites States, we were playing a dangerous game, rather like boys playing mumble-dee-peg. Our government and our military performed like a bunch of rank amateurs. I think it far more likely that Roosevelt envisioned a scenario in which war with Japan would eventually come (and without any cynical desire for it to justify a rush to go to war), and that this would eventually allow him to go to war in Europe, which was his obsessional focus. Consider if you will that absent the Pearl Harbor attack, military planners saw a situation in which a large and powerful Pacific fleet would be able to challenge Japan; it would be possible to reinforce and supply MacArthur in the Phillipines (Kimmel did order such a taks force; when he was relieved, the plan was cancelled), and the the Pacific theater would be a long, slowly bleeding war of attrition which the Japanese could not possibly win. When viewing this in retrospect, keep in mind that no one was planning on a basis of "Well, now they gutted our battleship resources in the Pacific, so how will we proceed next?" All planning was predicated upon achieving a local superiority of force, and an eventual absolute superiority of force. I give no credence whatsoever to the conspiracy theories, all of which i have ever read of make the same basic mistake that Kimmel and Short made--that the target of the Japanese was the Pacific Fleet, not the naval base. Everyone, almost without exception, from top to bottom, planned to defend Hawaii from invasion, not to protect the Pacific fleet. The conspiracy theorists all point out the crucial significance of the base, and how we ought to have planned to defend it. We did. The Japanese did not attack the base, they attacked the Fleet.

The US navy's command was called CINCUS which was pronounced sink us. It was changed after Pearl Harbor.

I just voted yes, but haven't read the thread.

We'll see, I'll listen to various sides.

Back when I have read it.

Most here probably know that a prime motivator for me is not liking bombs, any kind, but especially a-bombs, and further, later more potent bombs. (Yes, I have heard Teller speak, at.. heh, the Newman Club.) Using an A bomb against a city or cities? How is this defensible by anyone, I don't get it.

As Rodney said, can't we all get along? I say that tongue in cheek, but he had a point. Why in the world would anybody bombing a city be okay, no matter who did it.

So it would've been ok if they had just firebombed the city and killed 3 times that number instead?

No.