Was it a war crime when US nuked Hiroshima & Nagasaki?

I'm not sure about "annihilated," but pay the consequences sounds better.

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oralloy wrote:

Steve (as 41oo) wrote:
>(5) Following are our terms. We will not deviate from them. There are no alternatives. We shall brook no delay.

>doesnt sound like an invitation to negotiate terms to me

It wasn't. Japan had to either accept our terms unconditionally, or be annihilated.

ok so we agree on that. And the Japanese chose annihilation. Why? Because there was no guarantee the Emperor himself would not be "molested". Had there been, the war would have ended earlier and without the atomic bomb experiments.

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Steve (as 41oo) wrote:

>ok so we agree on that. And the Japanese chose annihilation. Why? Because there was no guarantee the Emperor himself would not be "molested". Had there been, the war would have ended earlier and without the atomic bomb experiments.

There were no experiments, except for the ordinary measurements that occur every time a new weapon is used in combat.

Had we been willing to give the Japanese their guarantee for the Emperor, the war would have ended a few days earlier. But it wouldn't have changed the A-bombs, as the Japanese were not willing to surrender "just with a guarantee for Hirohito's sovereignty" until after the second A-bomb was dropped.

And they gave up about a week before the third A-bomb drop in any case.

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cicerone imposter wrote:

I'm not sure about "annihilated," but pay the consequences sounds better.

How about "rain of ruin"? Smile

Had they persisted past the third A-bomb, the blockade would have starved 10 million of their civilians.

Hard to tell how many would have been killed had we invaded to capture Tokyo. But had they not given up after that, we would probably have starved the lot of them.

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oralloy wrote:

Had we been willing to give the Japanese their guarantee for the Emperor, the war would have ended a few days earlier.

So why didn't you? If it was America's intention to treat the Emperor with respect why not say so?

oralloy wrote:

But it wouldn't have changed the A-bombs,

I dont think American would have used the weapons against a country that had already surrendered.

oralloy wrote:

as the Japanese were not willing to surrender "just with a guarantee for Hirohito's sovereignty"

so what more did they want?

oralloy wrote:

until after the second A-bomb was dropped.

So they were willing to face national annihilation rather than risk dishonour to the Emperor? Hiroshima was annihilated. Nagasaki was annihilated. The Allies are resolute, no further terms are offered so the story goes. But about a week before the third bomb is used, the Japanese suddenly give up. The Emperor is afforded the status of a constitutional monarch and not charged with war crimes. What actually went on after the Nagasaki bomb? Did the Japanese, who had resigned themselves to national destruction over the principle of the Emperor's honour, suddenly cave in when America used a second atom bomb? Or was there some indication after Nagasaki from Truman that the Emperor would not be touched? I believe, but I admit I have no proof, that Truman knew Postdam would be rejected, and knew he had the power to end the war by getting the Japanese to surrender, not by dropping more atom bombs on them but simply by signalling an acceptable (to them) future status of their Emperor.

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oralloy, The word just sounded too ominous like "total and complete" destruction - although it may have been the message and plan.

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Steve (as 41oo) wrote:

oralloy wrote:
>>Had we been willing to give the Japanese their guarantee for the Emperor, the war would have ended a few days earlier.

>So why didn't you? If it was America's intention to treat the Emperor with respect why not say so?

It was not our intention to provide Japan with any guarantee of Hirohito's sovereignty (as Japan asked for after Nagasaki) or any guarantee that the imperial line could continue by letting Hirohito's son step in as constitutional monarch (as Grew advised).

The only guarantee that we were willing to provide Japan, was our guarantee that Hirohito could be deposed at MacArthur's whim.

Steve (as 41oo) wrote:

oralloy wrote:
>>But it wouldn't have changed the A-bombs,

>I dont think American would have used the weapons against a country that had already surrendered.

But we still would have dropped the two A-bombs that were dropped before they tried to surrender.

That means there would be no real change.

Steve (as 41oo) wrote:

oralloy wrote:
>>as the Japanese were not willing to surrender "just with a guarantee for Hirohito's sovereignty"

>so what more did they want?

They wanted to be in charge of all war crimes trials for Japanese war criminals.

They wanted to be in charge of disarming and standing down their own armed forces.

They wanted there to be no occupation of the Japanese islands.

Steve (as 41oo) wrote:

>So they were willing to face national annihilation rather than risk dishonour to the Emperor?

Apparently not. Once it became clear that the alternative really was annihilation, they gave up quickly enough.

Steve (as 41oo) wrote:

>Hiroshima was annihilated. Nagasaki was annihilated. The Allies are resolute, no further terms are offered so the story goes. But about a week before the third bomb is used, the Japanese suddenly give up. The Emperor is afforded the status of a constitutional monarch and not charged with war crimes. What actually went on after the Nagasaki bomb?

That question is best addressed by the books "Japan's Decision to Surrender" by Robert JC Butow, and "Japan's Longest Day" by the Pacific War Research Society.

Steve (as 41oo) wrote:

>Did the Japanese, who had resigned themselves to national destruction over the principle of the Emperor's honour, suddenly cave in when America used a second atom bomb?

It is hard to separate the two A-bombs and the Soviet entry into the Pacific war, since they all came so close together.

But it is clear that Japan's mindset before the three events was quite different from their mindset after the three events.

They were never given any guarantee for their Emperor other than the guarantee that MacArthur would have the power to depose him.

Steve (as 41oo) wrote:

>I believe, but I admit I have no proof, that Truman knew Postdam would be rejected, and knew he had the power to end the war by getting the Japanese to surrender, not by dropping more atom bombs on them but simply by signalling an acceptable (to them) future status of their Emperor.

Truman knew Potsdam would be accepted, because he knew we were going to force Japan to accept it.

FDR could have ended the war the day after Pearl Harbor simply by surrendering to the Japanese.

The point was not to "end the war early". The point was to "end the war on our terms early".

That requires taking some time to bash Japan into accepting all our terms.

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We can't look back with 21st century eyes and make this a valid debate.
Somethings we do know about the bombings:
1. according to estimates that were made at the time-approx 1mil allied lives were projected to be lost in the assault on Japan.

2. During WWII the killing of civilians was an exceptable part of war. ALL countries were doing it.

3. The power of Fat Man and Little Boy were unknown.

4. Truman did not want to drop one in the ocean for the Japaneese to see. He flet nothing would be gained by killing fish. Also he only had two bombs that he hoped would work.

5. Truman considered the bombs just another weapon in the arsenal. When asked how long it took him to make the decision to drop the bombs, he snapped hi fingers and said "that fast."

6. After the bombing of Heroshuma, the Japanesse still did not want to surrender. It was only after dropping the second bomb did the finally surrendered.

7. And, remember. there was three days between the two bombs and they were asked if they wanted to surrender.

America did what it needed to do to end the war.

And, if you realize, America was the first country to try and pull back the building of nuclear bombs. Albiet it took over 30 years for them to do it.

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I agree with your overall point, but there are a couple of nitpicks:

ralpheb wrote:

3. The power of Fat Man and Little Boy were unknown.

We had a pretty good idea of their power from the Trinity test.

ralpheb wrote:

Also he only had two bombs that he hoped would work.

The third bomb was about a week away. Had the war continued, there would have been three more A-bombs in September, four more in October, five more in November, at least seven more in December, and probably ten a month from there on.

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oralloy,
We knew that they would explode, but we did not have an idea that they would be as devistating as what they were.
Also, we may have projected that additional bombs would be built, but I think if the Japaneese did not surrender he would have continued to use the tools available to him.
I think what also pushed the Japaneese to surrender was their not knowing how many bombs we had. I think if we had not followed up with the second bombing the Japaneese would have been an even more violent fight than what was projected.

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Funny:

http://www.toonedin.com/movies/WhiteTrashXmas.swf

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You know oralloy I was just beginning to come round to your way of thinking on this (after all this time) when a little research disproves your point

oralloy wrote:

It was not our intention to provide Japan with any guarantee of Hirohito's sovereignty (as Japan asked for after Nagasaki) or any guarantee that the imperial line could continue .......

This is not true.

from http://www.doug-long.com/hirosh2.htm

Quote:

Martin Sherwin has also followed up on Stimson's observation: "That unconditional surrender remained an obstacle to peace in the wake of Hiroshima, Nagasaki, and the Soviet declaration of war - until the government of the United States offered the necessary (albeit veiled) assurance that neither Emperor nor throne would be destroyed - suggests the possibility, which even Stimson later recognized, that neither bomb may have been necessary; and certainly that the second one was not." (Sherwin, pg. 237, emphasis in original). As noted earlier, Stimson explained, "the Allied reply [to Japan's 8/10 surrender offer]... implicitly recognized the Emperor's position" (Stimson & Bundy, pg. 627)

This exactly re inforces the points I have been making all along.

1. That even after the two bombs, and the entry into the war of USSR, the key to getting the Japanese to surrender was the status of the Emperor.
2. The Japanese said they would accept Potsdam ON CONDITION that the status of the Emperor remained.
3. That the United States offered that "necessary" assurance.
4. It was a surrender conditional on the status of the Emperor. The Japanese would have surrendered at or soon after the time of Potsdam had the "necessary assurance" been given then.

And this was not given, deliberately, by Truman and Byrnes who expected Potsdam to be rejected (the Japanese didnt directly reject it, they accepted it but added the condition the US would accept only after the atomic bombings). Truman knew exactly what he was doing. The form of words of Potsdam and the manner in which it was announced made it inevitable that the US could claim the Japanese had rejected it.

And we have Trumans own words for this

Quote:

In his diary Truman wrote that he was "sure" that Japan will not accept the Potsdam Proclamation, "but we will have given them the chance". That is, the proclamation was a pro forma statement meant to give some sort of justification for a decision that had already been made: the use of the atomic bomb.

from http://www.wsws.org/articles/2005/aug2005/hiro-a08.shtml

Far from agreeing with you I am reconfirmed in my opinion that the US in 1945 was determined to use the new atomic weapon, and on live targets; and thus ensured that a premature peace (with consequent lack of an enemy to use it against) did not pre-empt the plan.

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Steve (as 41oo) wrote:

>You know oralloy I was just beginning to come round to your way of thinking on this (after all this time) when a little research disproves your point

oralloy wrote:

>>It was not our intention to provide Japan with any guarantee of Hirohito's sovereignty (as Japan asked for after Nagasaki) or any guarantee that the imperial line could continue .......

>This is not true.

>from http://www.doug-long.com/hirosh2.htm

Quote:
>Martin Sherwin has also followed up on Stimson's observation: "That unconditional surrender remained an obstacle to peace in the wake of Hiroshima, Nagasaki, and the Soviet declaration of war - until the government of the United States offered the necessary (albeit veiled) assurance that neither Emperor nor throne would be destroyed - suggests the possibility, which even Stimson later recognized, that neither bomb may have been necessary; and certainly that the second one was not." (Sherwin, pg. 237, emphasis in original). As noted earlier, Stimson explained, "the Allied reply [to Japan's 8/10 surrender offer]... implicitly recognized the Emperor's position" (Stimson & Bundy, pg. 627)

Where is this veiled assurance?

All I see is an explicit assurance that MacArthur could depose the Emperor at his whim.

Steve (as 41oo) wrote:

>This exactly re inforces the points I have been making all along.

>1. That even after the two bombs, and the entry into the war of USSR, the key to getting the Japanese to surrender was the status of the Emperor.
>2. The Japanese said they would accept Potsdam ON CONDITION that the status of the Emperor remained.

They only said that AFTER Nagasaki was bombed.

We were going to nuke them again in about a week, too, if they clung to that request. But they dropped that request on August 14.

Steve (as 41oo) wrote:

>3. That the United States offered that "necessary" assurance.

The only assurance I've ever seen that we offered was the assurance that MacArthur could depose the Emperor at will.

That was written explicitly into the surrender terms.

Steve (as 41oo) wrote:

>4. It was a surrender conditional on the status of the Emperor.

The only condition regarding the Emperor was the guarantee that MacArthur could depose him at will.

Steve (as 41oo) wrote:

>The Japanese would have surrendered at or soon after the time of Potsdam had the "necessary assurance" been given then.

They would have just forgotten all the other conditions they were insisting on at the time?

Steve (as 41oo) wrote:

>And this was not given, deliberately, by Truman and Byrnes who expected Potsdam to be rejected (the Japanese didnt directly reject it, they accepted it but added the condition the US would accept only after the atomic bombings).

Japan's response to Potsdam opened the next morning when their newspapers called it "a thing of no great moment" under the headline "LAUGHABLE MATTER".

Then, that afternoon, the Prime Minister held a press conference where he said that "The government does not regard the Potsdam Proclamation as a thing of any value. The government will just ignore it with contempt. We will press forward resolutely to carry the war to a successful conclusion."

Had they told us at that time the conditions they wanted to add, there would have been four of them. But they did not try to tell us that they wanted to add any conditions until the day after Nagasaki.

We did not give them any of the conditions they wanted.

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oralloy wrote:

We did not give them any of the conditions they wanted.

oh yes you did

Quote:

"the Allied reply [to Japan's 8/10 surrender offer]... implicitly recognized the Emperor's position" (Stimson & Bundy, pg. 627)

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Steve (as 41oo) wrote:

oralloy wrote:
>>We did not give them any of the conditions they wanted.

>oh yes you did

Well let's see,

Their desire that there be no occupation of the Japanese home islands, not granted.

Their desire that they be allowed to stand down and disarm their own military, not granted.

Their desire to be in charge of their own war crimes trials, not granted.

Their desire that we guarantee Hirohito's sovereignty as ruler of Japan, not granted.

Nope. None of the four conditions were granted.

Steve (as 41oo) wrote:

Quote:
>"the Allied reply [to Japan's 8/10 surrender offer]... implicitly recognized the Emperor's position" (Stimson & Bundy, pg. 627)

Our reply to their surrender offer (an offer which Japan made only after Nagasaki) contained an explicit guarantee that MacArthur would have the power to depose Hirohito at will.

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oralloy wrote:

Their desire that we guarantee Hirohito's sovereignty as ruler of Japan, not granted....

Quote:

>"the Allied reply [to Japan's 8/10 surrender offer]... implicitly recognized the Emperor's position" (Stimson & Bundy, pg. 627)

[/quote]

Quote:

ultimately we did allow Japan to retain their Emperor; as Truman biographer Robert Donovan described it, "accept a condition but call it unconditional surrender." (Robert Donovan, "Conflict and Crisis", pg. 99)

If it sounds like a condition, works like a condition, looks like a condition etc. its a condition. Even if you call it an uncondition.

Truman could have got the Japanese peace faction off the hook anytime he wanted. Instead by not giving the assurances over the Emperor the Japanese were desperate for, he deliberately played into the hands of the war faction.

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Steve (as 41oo) wrote:

Quote:
>ultimately we did allow Japan to retain their Emperor; as Truman biographer Robert Donovan described it, "accept a condition but call it unconditional surrender." (Robert Donovan, "Conflict and Crisis", pg. 99)

>If it sounds like a condition, works like a condition, looks like a condition etc. its a condition. Even if you call it an uncondition.

Well, we did give them conditions, including the condition that MacArthur would have the power to depose the Emperor at will.

However, a condition that "the Emperor could be deposed at MacArthur's whim" does not sound, work, or look like a "guarantee that the Emperor will remain sovereign leader of Japan".

Steve (as 41oo) wrote:

>Truman could have got the Japanese peace faction off the hook anytime he wanted. Instead by not giving the assurances over the Emperor the Japanese were desperate for, he deliberately played into the hands of the war faction.

Whether the peace faction was on the hook or not was not Truman's concern.

Japan was going to accept all our conditions, and get no conditions of their own, or they were going to cease to exist.

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oralloy wrote:

... or they were going to cease to exist.

An option with considerable support in the highest reaches of Japanese Government right through the collapse of the miltarist's botched coup attempt, which failed to prevent the following morning's broadcast of the Emperor's recorded announcement of capitulation.

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ralpheb wrote:

oralloy,
We knew that they would explode, but we did not have an idea that they would be as devistating as what they were.

Sorry for the delayed reply.

The yield of the Hiroshima bomb was in line with what they had predicted.

And they had done sufficient measurements at the trinity test to determine that the implosion bombs would function similarly well.

ralpheb wrote:

but I think if the Japaneese did not surrender he would have continued to use the tools available to him.

Yes. Though Truman would have shifted tactics had Japan not surrendered right away, and started saving them up to clear the beaches when we invaded.

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oralloy wrote:

Steve (as 41oo) wrote:
Quote:
>ultimately we did allow Japan to retain their Emperor; as Truman biographer Robert Donovan described it, "accept a condition but call it unconditional surrender." (Robert Donovan, "Conflict and Crisis", pg. 99)

>If it sounds like a condition, works like a condition, looks like a condition etc. its a condition. Even if you call it an uncondition.

Well, we did give them conditions, including the condition that MacArthur would have the power to depose the Emperor at will.

However, a condition that "the Emperor could be deposed at MacArthur's whim" does not sound, work, or look like a "guarantee that the Emperor will remain sovereign leader of Japan".

There is a game of semantics going on here. The United States imposed Terms. Those terms were originally to be accepted without Condition. That is the terms were to be accepted by the Japanese, and the United States would accept no terms or conditions in return. To repeat, you did not impose conditions, you imposed terms which you told the Japanese had to be accepted unconditionally or the war would continue. The Japs accepted Postsdam, but asked for assurances about the Emperor to be agreed, i.e they accepted but with conditions, and Truman took that as a rejection. [Which as he himself admits, he knew they would].

After Nagasaki the Japanese again asked for conditions, i.e. the treatment of the Emperor but this time as Stimson makes clear the form of words in the US reply made clear there was an implicit acceptance of the Japanese concerns.

Of course as the victorious power, the United State in the person of MacArthur, retained the ultimate sovereignty and sanction to depose the Emperor. It would have been strange indeed if it had been the other way round. But the US made it clear it was not their intention to depose, humilliate or molest the Emperor, which was enough for Hirohito to win over his war cabinet and order the instrument of surrender.

Truman himself admits he expected Potsdam not to result in an end to the war. What was his game? Why did he not allow the Stimson form of words that could have ended the war straight away? The basic Japanese condition to the surrender Terms was the same after Nagasaki as it was at Potsdam, but after the uranium and plutonium bombs Truman accepted, why?

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Was it a war crime when US nuked Hiroshima & Nagasaki?

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