Was it a war crime when US nuked Hiroshima & Nagasaki?

I will check some sources and get back to you. In the meantime, i will observe that people love to "debunk" history. I do it myself. But to do so, one must "have one's ducks in a row." When, for example, i say that Bernard Law Montgomery was militarily, criminally incompetent, i am ready and able to point to specific details of his military operations, as well as complaints such as those expressed by Matthew Ridgeway when under his titular command.

So what you have done is provide your friend with statements from authority. The authority was not your own, so you didn't have sources to cite.

However, it is worth noting that your friend has replied with statements from authority. You might ask her to provide the sources for her contentions, because unless and until she does, her word is no better than yours.

Debunking history is fun, but it will quickly turn unpleasant unless you can provide some evidence.

As far as concerns Yamamoto, i'll see what i can dig up.

The veracity of Yamamoto's purported declarations is a matter of cobsiderable dispute. To the best of my knowledge your freind has a good point. Then again, so do those who lobby in favor of the remarks.

Personally, I lean against your freind's position, but remain unconvinced one way or the other. It is a fact Yamamoto had misgivin's about the attack (among other things, he felt the force he had been alloyyed was inadequate, or at best only marginally adequate to the task), and rather than press his success he immediately upon recovery of the second wave of bombers decided against re-armin' 'em to conduct further strikes as would have been tactically the right move, and withdrew his forces. He later was tasked with the island-by-island defense of Japan's Pacific conquests, a strategy for which he had little sympathy, though he discharged his duties in such regard honorably, diligently, and with soldierly loyalty and competence right up untill his death in '43.

I would like to note, Big Bird, that Yamamoto did not accompany the First Air Fleet, and that as complete radio silence was successfully enforced, he could not possibly have participated in any command decisions of the fleet after their departure from Hitokappu Bay, on November 26th (ironically, the same day that the War Warning message was sent to Kimmel and Short).

The decision not to launch subsequent attacks was entirely that of Vice Admiral Chuichi Nagumo, the old line battleship commander who was given command of the First Air Fleet based on seniority. Commanders Fuchida and Genda were in torments over this decision, but it was his, and no one could overrule him. Given what i have read of Yamamoto, i doubt that he would ever have thought of second-guessing the commander on the spot. Genda and Fuchida survived the war; ironically, Fuchida was aboard Missouri to witness the surrender. But Nagumo died on Saipan later in the war; while earlier, what few written records were available went to the bottom during the battle of Midway, when Kaga, Akagi, Hiryu and Soryu were all sunk (those were four of the six carriers which had been assigned to Nagumo's fleet, and Akagi had been his flagship).

I suspect that Nagumo took a good poker players attitude to quit while he was ahead. He had accomplished his mission, which was to cripple the Pacific Fleet while the Southern Operation took place. He had bagged none of the carriers, however, and no one among the Japanese knew where they were. There were very few American heavy cruisers in evidence, as well, which had to worry a man who had spent his entire career concerned with surface action between fleets. Furthermore, his task force consisted, in addition to the six carriers, of two fast battleships of the Nagano class, two fast heavies of the Tone class, a light cruiser (Japanese light cruisers of this era were floating, self-propelled coffins) and a dozen Kagero class destroyers. Those battleships, heavy cruisers and destoyers were at the top, the best in the world in 1941; and a large force of American heavies would have made minced meat of them. I don't think this is an occassion when it is appropriate to second-guess the man on the spot, and i understand Nagumo's reluctance to remain in the area. It was an eventual tragedy for Japan, but it would not have changed nor even delayed the eventual outcome, in my never humble opinion.

Quite right, Set - Its late, I'm tired, and put Yamamoto in Nagumo's shoes ... I screwed that up. I should go to bed. I think I will.

Polarstar:

I had promised to see what i could dig up for you, and so i had better live up to my engagement. Before proceeding, i'll point out again the issue of statements from authority. I make them myself often. I am prepared to provide a source for my statements. The uncomfortable situation in which you found yourself arose from making a statment from authority, but not having sources to cite for your statement's support. The individual who contradicted you, however, was also making statements from authority. Unless and until she provides her sources, her word is no better than your own. Even then, the matter of the reliability of the source arises. She may well be citing one of the many, many rivisionists who have made a tidy sum writing books about the "Pearl Harbor conspiracy." So, even as you ask for her sources, the simple ability on her part to provide a source does not mean that she has established the authority which she claims. Such authority needs to be vetted. The source which i will use here is At Dawn We Slept, Gordon W. Prange, with Donald M. Goldstein and Katherine V. Dillon. Mr. Prange served in the Second World War, and after the war, he was MacArthur's Chief of the G2 Historical Section, in Japan. He personally interviewed almost every surviving Japanese officer with knowledge of the Pearl Harbor attack. He interviewed dozens of American civilians and military officers who participated in the decision-making processes before the attack. He spent the period from 1944 to the publication of his book in 1981, 37 years, amassing his material. Mr. Goldstein is an associate professor (or was at the time of publication) in public and international affairs at the University of Pittsburgh. Miss Dillon is a Chief Warrant Officer, United States Air Force (Retired). When first i read this work, and considered the credentials of the authors, i abandoned any other accounts i had read which may have contradicted it. While at university, and during a few years, ten years after leaving university, i had read many of the revisionists. While sceptical of their material, many of the questions they raised, and gaps in data to which they pointed had not been answered in other accounts i had read. Mr. Prange's work has laid all of my doubts to rest. The book is still in print, and a paperbound edition was released in 2001, as a 60th anniversary edition (60th anniversary of the Pearl Harbor attack).

Isoroku Yamamoto was the most highly-respected military man in Japan in 1940. So much so, that his threat to resign as Commander in Chief, Combined Fleet, was used by his Chief of Staff, Captain Kameto Kuroshima, to force the Imperial Navy's Chief, Operations Section, Captain Sadatoshi Tomioka, to drop his opposition to the Pearl Harbor Plan. (Prange cites his interview with Captain Kuroshima, May 12, 1948; he had also interviewed Captain Tomioka in July, 1947.) Yamamoto had studied at Harvard, and had been the Naval attaché in Washington in the mid-1920's. (This is a matter of public record, so i provide no citation.) He was quite well aware of the fact that the United States Navy was larger than the Imperial Navy, and the industrial capacity of the United States far exceeded that of Japan. He was also suspicious of and disgusted by the alliance with Germany and Italy. Appointed Commander in Chief, Combined Fleet in August, 1939, he wrote to a naval academy classmate, Vice Admiral Shigetaro Shimada, in September, 1939, about his mistrust of "the machinatons of Ribbentrop and Hitler." He went on to say: "I shudder as I think of the problem of Japan's relations with Germany and Italy in the face of the tremendous changes now taking place in Europe." (Prange states that this correspondence was provided to him by Rear Admiral Teikichi Hori, both Yamamoto and Shimada being dead at the time he conducted his interviews.) More than this, Yamamoto told Prince Fumimaro Konoye (then the Japanese Premier), in September, 1940: "If I am told to fight regardless of the consequences, I shall run wild for the first six months or a year, but I have utterly no confidence for the second or third year. The Tripartite Pact [Japan-Germany-Italy] has been concluded, and we cannot help it. Now that the situation has come to this pass, I hope you will endeavor to avoid a Japanese-American war." (Prange cites Prince Konoye's memoirs, as well as noting that this same information appears in an interview transcript in Reports of General MacArthur: Japanese Operations in the Southwest Pacific Area, Vol. II, Part I.) Again writing to his old friend Shimada, in December, 1940, he stated: ". . . the present Government appears to be in complete confusion. Its action in showing surprise at America's economic pressure and fuming and complaining against it reminds me of the aimless action of a schoolboy which has no more consistent motive than the immediate need or whim of the moment. . . . It would be extremely dangerous for the Navy to make any move in the belief that such men as Prince Konoye and Foreign Minister Matsuoka can be relied upon . . . Nomura [Admiral Kichisaburo Nomura was sent to Washington as a special negotiator, largely because of his good relations with the Americans, and his reputation for opposing war with the United States--it was a bluff on the part of the Japanese government, however. He had not yet sailed for the United States, but his mission had been well publicized.] . . . Nomura has no confidence that he will succeed in his mission, and besides, it is expecting too much to adjust our relations with America through diplomacy at this late stage . . . " (Prange again cites correspondence provided to him by Rear Admiral Hori.)

Finally, the most notorious of Yamamoto's letters: In January, 1941, he wrote to a friend of his, Ryoichi Sasakawa, who was a rabid and jingoistic nationalist, as follows:



Unfortunately, this "friend" seized upon this as evidence of Yamamoto's bellicose attitude, and published the letter. That was more than bad form, it was a betrayal of the confidence of a friend. Revisionist "historians," eager to make their point, have been so blind as to use this as evidence of Yamamoto's attitude toward war in the same manner as the Japanese nationalists did when it was published in 1941. Just a reading of that passage throws doubt onto such a contention; taken in concert with the other portions of Yamamoto's correspondence which i have cited, and the undoubted knowledge of the United States which Yamamoto possessed, this passage clearly shows that Yamamoto had no illusions that war with the United States would be "war to the knife," and a war Japan could not win. One of the most telling pieces of evidence for his attitude, however, comes from the memoirs of Prince Konoye cited above. Konoye stood to gain nothing by providing that information, and might well have mitigated the sense of his own guilt by having painted Yamamoto as a war monger. Instead, he honestly described Yamamoto's opposition to war with the United States.

When you will have discussed this with your friend, ask her for the source of her statements. Please write it down. I was in such a ludicrous discussion with a pigheaded young man (the young are often more set in their views and more conservative than their elders), and i posted a thread here on the Pearl Harbor revisionists and the official reports, which can be found here. Please note that the passage i have written before the bibliography is contemptuous sarcasm, and not to be taken seriously. It would be interesting to see if your friend's source appears in the list of revisionists.

Setanta

Tea and tradition have common ancestors in London and somewhere else, Boston I think or was that to do with rogue traders trying to evade customs duty? I forget



Tea = Rosy Lee.

Example: "Cup of rosy?"

More at

http://www.cockneyrhymingslang.co.uk/list.asp?order=englishtoslang&letter=T

I believe it had as much to do in Boston, with the rabble-rousing ambitions of a failed maltster named Sam Adams, who, as history so often does in its popular mode, has been credited with being a brewer of renown. Mr. Adam's fame in his own lifetime, if in fact one ought not to say infamy, had to do with brewing trouble, rather than malted barley and hops . . .

Though the main intention for the US of using the A-bombs is to threaten the expansion of soviet communism, one is definite not enough to show that the American have enough nuke capability. i think that's why the US used 2 rather than just one. On the other hand, it's not a crime at all, consider to the number of innocent civilians and army men and women murdered by the Japanese imperialism, it's just a piece of cake.

Many thanks Mr. Setanta, Mr. Timberlandko and Mr. Orallary.

Sorry for not posting on time, but the week's been a little busy (in a good way ).

I looked for "At Dawn We Slept" at the local library, but they didn't have it. Maybe I'll buy it at Waldenbooks sometime. It might even contain the quotes I've been looking for and provide for some corroboration for the character of Yamamoto.

In my friend's defense, I honestly don't think she's of a revisionist mindset. I can understand why you think so, Mr. Setanta, but I don't really believe she is because she doesn't talk in the way of a conspiracy theorist. Perhaps this is a little too much personal information (hopefully, she won't consider it a "betrayal"), but she's a Combat Systems Officer and Tactical Officer of one of our country's Destroyers. I might not have taken much stock in what was said from someone else, but she's pretty smart and assertive (and tough as nails).

From your standpoint, the current history of Yamamoto has been validated and would require some strong contravening evidence.

From her standpoint, the original (pre-1945) history was validated, and requires strong contravening evidence not yet presented.

I don't want to play the middle man though. I don't have too much time to be an essayist on this thread and, again, I'm not interested in the Admiral's life to the point that I would devote daily resources to it (does that make me anti-intellectual? :wink: ).

However, in response to your suggestions, I did ask about her sources. She mentioned some of her fellow co-workers who are apparent history buffs (some of who agreed and disagreed and we all had a pretty good time of it). Also, our group talked about Admiral Yamamoto making more than a few comments and speeches to his troops on more than one occassion even before the Pearl Harbor attack. All and all it was pretty engaging. And, at the end, everyone said that if I really wanted to know, I would have to visit the National Archives and be prepared to bring a Japanese dictionary or an interpreter.

I told them the same thing: I'm not THAT interested. (Actually, I made a non-committal answer, but they got the point).

My friend also gave me a creed (or screed) that makes me believe that she's not a conspiracy theorist; I made note of them. She was talking about the National Archives and her credits in Military History (Though she's a Business/management major), but you probably agree with them. Thus, hopefully, you two might have some common ground :wink:.

The short version:

1) Archeology is always better than History.

2) Occam's Razor

3) Nobody can prove a negative

All I personally know is: I've got some reading to do...

Thank you gentlemen. Sometime later, I'd like to ask about Hirohito. I think Yamamoto may have been a genuinely honorable person (the "CSO" and some others in the group didn't think so, others in the group did). However, I have alot of doubts about Hirohito. I'd like to address them here if anyone can oblige at a later date.

Again, thanks to everyone for their inputs.

I am too.

My posts about Hirohito are only meant to challenge inaccurate claims that the US's official position on Hirohito was a secret ploy to prevent Japan from surrendering.

That isn't correct. The main intent was to force Japan to accept our surrender terms before an invasion happened.





The reason we used two is because Japan accepted our surrender terms after the second one was ready for use, but before the third one was ready for use.





While I am sympathetic with the "eye for an eye" point of view regarding the bombings, I don't think that applies to the technical question of whether the laws of war were violated.

Oralloy wrote "My posts about Hirohito are only meant to challenge inaccurate claims that the US's official position on Hirohito was a secret ploy to prevent Japan from surrendering."

Nothing I have read on this thread has convinced me that the atom bombings were necessary. In fact many eminent people, as listed above, have said exactly the opposite. So my contention that the bombs were used not as a military necessity but as an experiment and a demonstration of American power in the nuclear age still stands.

Of course they weren't necessary. But that conclusion is one that comes from hindsight.

It is not a conclusion that was readily apparent at the time the bombs were dropped.





And it is still contradicted by the historical record.

Was it a war crime when Japan committed the Rape of Nanking?

Yes.

Oralloy wrote:-

"Of course they weren't necessary"

As I've been arguing all along that they were not necessary, perhaps you could explain how you come to the same conclusion with the benefit of hindsight.

especially as you and Timber have been arguing that they were absolutely necessary to

a Force the Japanese to surrender
b Avoid an invasion of the Japanese mainland

?

Hindsight allows us to look at what the Japanese government was thinking at the time, and we can see that Hirohito and the non-military faction had already decided to give up no matter what -- they just wanted to do that negotiation nonsense with the Soviets instead of accept our terms.

As soon as the Soviets declared war, it was inevitable that they would accept our terms, bombs or no bombs, because at that point it was their only way of giving up.





I haven't been arguing that they were necessary. I've agreed they weren't necessary from the beginning.

What I've been saying is that the lack of necessity wasn't apparent to the US government at the time the bombs were dropped.

They didn't know that the Japanese government was so close to accepting our terms when the bombs were dropped. That knowledge only came later when the historians were able to show us what was going on within the Japanese government.

I don't believe the powers that be in the U.S. call it a crime if the civilian men, women, and children are people of color. Dubya had the audacity to say 9/11 was the greatest atrocity ever perpetrated on these American shores. To him and his kind, the near genocide of Native Americans don't count. The most notorious mass murderer of civilians, Custer, was a hero.

Custer was more than a few jokers short of a full deck . . . but you're right, many still consider him some kind of hero . . . in Monroe, Michigan, he's a big time idol . . .

Custer's grasp on reality (or rather, lack thereof) was proven by his own written word. Captain Benteen (who cordially despised the man) was in charge of the pack train, and Custer sent his last written command to Benteen, to the effect that he had the hostiles on the run, and had spotted their "village," and tells Benteen to "come on with the trains." Benteen turned around, rode to the head of the valley, found Major Reno, and they stuck it out for the next three days until the hostiles grew weary of the game and left them alone.

Custer has got to be the worst thing ever to come out of the state of Michigan--no mean accomplishment, that . . .

Ah, don't go blaming Michigan, Set. There's enough blame to go around. His ego had been stoked and stroked during the Civil War. I still haven't figured out how he, who graduated at the foot of his class from West Point, managed to get breveted to brigadier rank during that conflict, while classmates with higher rankings had trouble making colonel. It's a fairly safe bet that he intended to seek the White House at some point. We should all be grateful to Ta-Shunka Witko (Crazy Horse) for saving the USA from that possibility.