Was it a war crime when US nuked Hiroshima & Nagasaki?

Report of the Committee on Political and Social Problems
Manhattan Project "Metallurgical Laboratory"
University of Chicago, June 11, 1945
(The Franck Report)


..."It is doubtful whether the first available bombs, of comparatively low efficiency and small size, will be sufficient to break the will or ability of Japan to resist, especially given the fact that the major cities like Tokyo, Nagoya, Osaka, and Kobe already will largely be reduced to ashes by the slower process of ordinary aerial bombing."

http://www.dannen.com/decision/franck.html

I suppose we should make sure we mean the same thing by "hint".

Obviously if MacArthur has the power to decide whether the Emperor is deposed or not, there was clearly the possibility that he could decide to let the Emperor to stay in power.

But we did not give Japan any reassurance that MacArthur would decide to do this.





Here is what they got:

Front side of OWI notice #2106, dubbed the “LeMay bombing leaflet,” which was delivered to Hiroshima, Nagasaki, and 33 other Japanese cities on 1 August 1945. The Japanese text on the reverse side of the leaflet carried the following warning: “Read this carefully as it may save your life or the life of a relative or friend. In the next few days, some or all of the cities named on the reverse side will be destroyed by American bombs. These cities contain military installations and workshops or factories which produce military goods. We are determined to destroy all of the tools of the military clique which they are using to prolong this useless war. But, unfortunately, bombs have no eyes. So, in accordance with America's humanitarian policies, the American Air Force, which does not wish to injure innocent people, now gives you warning to evacuate the cities named and save your lives. America is not fighting the Japanese people but is fighting the military clique which has enslaved the Japanese people. The peace which America will bring will free the people from the oppression of the military clique and mean the emergence of a new and better Japan. You can restore peace by demanding new and good leaders who will end the war. We cannot promise that only these cities will be among those attacked but some or all of them will be, so heed this warning and evacuate these cities immediately.”

http://www.cia.gov/csi/studies/vol46no3/article07.html

oralloy, I'm not sure how you found that government leaflet, but it was fair warning to Japan. Most still didn't accept the warning and perished. Thanks for finding and sharing it with us on this thread. c.i.

so there was no clue as to the atom bomb use. It was a complete surprise.

Steve, the Frank report was negative toward the deployment of nuclear weapons as turned out to be the case despite Farnk's assessment and those of other like mind. About the only thing the Frank Report got right, however, is that nukes inevitably - and in very short order, however used - would raise the stakes in the arms race game.

I'll note too the snippet you excerpted from context acknowledges the tenacity of " ... the will or ability of Japan to resist ... ", voicin' the opinion the bombs would be insufficient to accomplish the job of bringin' the war to a hasty end. That particular bit Frank got spectacularly wrong.

I think we should all stop arguing over this. if we didnt nuke them we would have had to invade them and who knows how long the war would have went on and how many american lives would have been lost.

Timber you point out the exact words I highlighted to argue the other way!

You say the fact the Japs did surrender proved Franck wrong.

I say Franck made it clear that atom bombing them would not bring about capitulation. Nevertheless the bombs were used. And that after Japan surrendered "unconditionally" the emperor was in fact left alone. If the allies had made it clear earlier that it was not their intention to prosecute or "molest" the emperor, the war could have ended sooner.

Funkystu. My whole point is that the atomic bombings were not necessary to end the war and save life but were undertaken for much more far reaching strategic concerns.

Actually, it was shown to me as part of an attempt to convince me that dropping those leaflets meant that there was no war crime committed with the A-bombings.

As far as the nature of the bombs, correct -- for Hiroshima.

In fact, the picture on the front of those leaflets would give the impression that they referred only to the napalm bombing that was already ongoing:




However, Japan was informed before Nagasaki, as the US government went public about the A-bomb right after Hiroshima.

Truman's press release about the A-bomb

Stimson's press release about the A-bomb


(EDIT to fix broken links)

Interesting posts Oralloy, thanks.

Stimson goes on and on about the development of the weapon and finally (I thought he would never mention it) talks about uranium.

Something else he doesnt mention is the fact that the secrets he was so keen to protect had all been given to Stalin by Klaus Fuchs (!)

Ahhhhh, but it did, Grasshopper - consider: that precisely is what, and in which order, happened.


The only concession re the Emperor's status and fate was that, if not directly and personally responsible for war crimes, he would remain at the discretion of the Allied Occupying Authority.



And my contention is that both immediate Pacific-war-endin', invasion-avoidin' considerations and longer range, global, on-goin' strategic considerations were operative. The two aspects were inextricably intertwined, and concommitant, in my view.

Interesting.

Probably the most difficult aspect for me is why it is believed that the Japanese had a perfectly valid right to attack the US based on the fact that the US embargoed Japan; that America committed economic aggression, and that Japan was, by extension, a victim.

First, by and large, I've heard these arguments many times before (who hasn't?) and I think the substance of the "US forced Japan to do it" argument is predicated on three assumptions.

1) That America did not have a natural Right in refusing to sell oil (and steel) to the Japanese. Am I reading this correctly?

2) That Japan had to have the oil in order to survive. Was that true?

3) That the US had no reasonable (I think some intone "moral") justification to embargo Japan. Did it?

Can anyone give me their thoughts on these 3 points and, ultimately, whether or not the Japanese had a good case in going to war with the US?In perceiving itself a victim?

I really think that these points get ignored alot when people talk blithely about how the US led Japan into war. Yet so much depends on these assumptions in crafting the argument.

The issue is relevant because I can say from personal experience that the Japanese take these points for granted Alot. Along with the Nukes, it is also the basis for their self-described victim status that has become the focal point of present tensions between themselves and the rest of the region (especially the Chinese).

The issues to which you refer were adduced as defenses at war crimes trials. They were not very effective, and for good reasons. But the background of the issues is far from simple.

American and Japanese competition in the Pacific dated back to the 1870's. There was a large under class in Japan who faced poverty and discrimination at home. They emmigrated, as did many other Japanese simply seeking an opportunity to improve their economic status. Many settled in California, and the racial discrimination and violence were widespread. The Japanese government, which hadn't given a damn when those people lived at home, protested frequently and loudly. They had a perrenial chip on their shoulder about not being treated exactly as one would treat a European power, among whom they rightfully numbered the United States.

Many also had gone to Hawaii, and the Japanese had been contemplating annexation of those islands (ostensibly in secret, but they were rather obvious, and no one was fooled). People like Theodore Roosevelt and Henry Cabot Lodge loudly and publicly advocated the annexation of the islands, and when it was done, the Japanese howled.

Nevertheless, our relationship with the Japanese was no worse than with the European powers. During the Boxer Rebellion, Marines were put under the command of the Imperial Marines, and the Japanese were favorably impressed. There was, by and large, cordiality between the two nations in China, where their interests did not lead them to step on one another's toes.

The racial discrimination and violence continued, however, in California, and after Roosevelt had become President, he was exasperated by the necessity of dealing with California, which had passed legislation to keep the Japanese out of the public school system, and to restrict them to their own neighborhood schools. A plan to prevent them from owning land was shot down by the state's own Supreme Court.

As a result of the Spanish War, the United States found itself in possession of the Phillipine Islands, something they had not foreseen. This drew their interests, and their military power, into the Pacific as had not been the case previously. When a militarist regime was established in Japan in 1923 (i won't go into the reasons for that), they forgot all of the old cordiality, and remembered every greivance against the United States. Which leads us to your three points.

1. Although certainly the U.S. had a right to impose the embargo, this is understood in international politics to be a precusor to war, and one which the embargoed nation justifiably resents. The Japanese still had the racial chip on their shoulder, and disingenuously claimed that the invasion of China was done by officers acting on their own initiative, without orders from the Imperial government; nevertheless, they had to maintain a military presence to protect their interests. In this case, the U.S. was acting in a straightforward manner, but also in a bellicose way. Embargoing a nation stops just short of war, as the justification is usually a cause which could lead to war--in this case, the continued presence of Japanese troops in their millions in China.

2. The Japanese needed our oil to survive only to the extent that the military machine required it. The Imperial Navy was far larger than was needed simply to protect the home islands against any chimerical invader, and its purpose was obviously aggressive. The greatest need for oil arose from the necessity to provide bunker oil for the Imperial Navy. The average Japanese was sufficiently poor not to have been able to afford an automobile, much less gasoline to run it. Japanese industry only need large quantities of oil to fill the orders of the militarist state.

3. See the comments about China, above.

To maintain their army in China, along with a modern air force there, and a navy along the coast, the Japanese needed more oil than they were getting. This was true even before the American embargo. The militarist regime were two-faced liars about the invasion of Manchuria and then of the rest of China--they approved of it, and the "rash young officers" excuse was a flimsy fig-leaf which fooled no one. A militarist regime needs lots of materiele, most of which gets used up, to maintain large forces--and this requires lots of raw materials and energy. Energy in those days derived from oil-fired power plants. Japan envisioned the Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere, which was just a fancy was of saying complete hegemony on the east Asian rim. This meant more military force, which meant more raw materials, which meant more force to go get the raw materials, which meant . . . you get the picture, it is a self-accelerating process.

To the south of the China Sea lies Borneo, the Celebes, the Netherlands East Indies and Malaya. That region is rich in both petroleum and mineral resources. The Japanese military machine, mired in a Chinese war they could never hope to win (but they would not admit that to themselves), decided that they would go after those resources, controlled by the English and the Dutch. This became the Southern Operation. Staging in Shanghai and Taiwan, the Southern Operation would have the Phillipine islands on the left flank as it advanced south. Taking out the Phillipines to remove that threat would lead to war with the United States (the embargo was less important as a reason for war than this military fact of life--but it was a convenient causus belli, an excuse for war). Therefore, Yamamoto conceived the plan to attack the United States Navy at Pearl Harbor. He had no illusions about American military might or the character of Americans, having spent a good deal of time in the United States--he told a friend in a letter that they would only win such a war when they dictated terms in the White House. Many Japanese considered this evidence of his bellicosity (his friend very shabbily published the letter); but they weren't thinking in the same terms as Yamamoto, who knew the impossibility of landing on the American west coast and marching overland 3,000 miles to the Atlantic.

Nevertheless, he was faithful to his duty as an officer of the Imperial Navy, and conceived the Pearl Harbor attack as a means of neutralizing the United States for the crucial time period needed to carry out the Southern Operation. The attack on Pearl Harbor, one of the most brilliantly conceived and executed military operations in history, fell far short of accomplishing what it might have. Nonetheless, it accomplished what Yamamoto intended, and the Southern Operation went forward virtually without a hitch--except for those pesky Americans in the Phillipines who would not just roll over and play dead.

The oriental concept of "face" is what prevents the Japanese from acknowledging the consequences of an out of control militarist regime running their nation for a generation. Claiming to be victimized is far more comfortable than admitting crimes.

Sanctions were imposed on Japan as a result of her continuin' aggressions in mainland Asia, primarily China. In 1931, Japan invaded Manchuria, withdrew from The League of Nations in 1933 when faced with stern "Cease-and-Desist" opposition, then in 1937 turned toward a China weakened by civil war. Among the incidents attendent thereon was the Rape of Nanking, an atrocity which shocked and outraged much of the world. By 1940, Japan had control of all but the interior of China. The brutality of the Japanese occupation was notorious. In the meanwhile, Japan had withdrawn from, repudiated, or openly defied various treaties datin' back to the early 1920s concernin' naval and other military development, production, and deployment.

Intended as a bargainin' chip - "stop your warrin', get out of China and Manchuria, and we'll resume trade" - the sanctions failed to slow Japanese aggression. Rather than accede to Western demands, Japan in 1940-'41 expanded her military reach into Southeast Asia in her quest for petroleum, metals, and rubber. The US, British, and Dutch joined in a cto blockade. enforcin' the embargos and isolatin' Japan from maritime commerce involvin' war-critical materiel. Talks continued through 1941, aimed at findin' some way to bring about a halt to Japanese aggression, with endin' the sanctions in return for Japanese withdrawl to pre-1931 territory as the US-Allied focus. Japan had a different idea.

While engaged in the talks, Japan was structurin' her pre-emptive strike on US, British, and Dutch bases around the Pacific Rim in her own bid to end the embargo on her own terms. In late November 1941, as a new round of talks were beginnin', Japan secretly dispatched her fleet, with orders to neutralize the blockading forces and sieze strategic ports and bases. The official announcement of Japan's withdrawl from the talks and de facto declaration of war was to be delivered by the Japanese Embassy in Washington shortly before the Pearl Harbor attack began. A problem decodinin' the "Final Response" resulted in the Japanese ultimatum bein' delivered some time after Washington had become aware of the unannounced attack and the devastation of the US Pacific Fleet.

No doubt consideration of Japan's demonstrated politico-diplomatic behavior durin' the decade-long runup to December 7, 1941 played heavilly in Allied decision-makin' in 1945. Japan bought herself her own misfortune.

Well, he made it clear that some people thought that it wouldn't bring about capitulation.

Others thought it would.



No one really knew if the A-bombs would make Japan accept our terms.

There were widespread hopes that Japan could be shocked into accepting our terms without an invasion.

And there were widespread fears that Japan wouldn't accept our terms even after a series of A-bombs, Soviet entry into the war, and a tightened blockade combined with bombing their railways -- making an invasion necessary.





They were the biggest A-bombs we had.

Fears that they weren't enough couldn't be eased simply by using larger ones. All we could do was use the A-bombs that we had, and hope that they were enough to make Japan accept our terms.





Given that the Japanese government did not try to surrender with just that term until after the Soviets entered the war, the war would not have been shortened enough to avoid the A-bombs.

However, it is true that the war would have ended on August 10th, instead of August 14th, if we had made it clear.

But we had no intention of giving Japan any such promise. Had Japan insisted on getting a guarantee for their Emperor, we would have nuked them again for it.





It seems clear with hindsight that they were not needed to make Japan accept our terms.

However, the motive for dropping the bombs was to try to make Japan accept our terms.

I'm not sure that anyone really believes that.





I've heard them too.





When I hear the argument, I usually counter by saying that Japan forced us to nuke Hiroshima.





We were well within our rights to embargo Japan as a response to the atrocities they were committing.

The Japanese had no legal cause to launch a war of aggression against us or against anyone else.

It is worth noting in defense of a quiet, friendly and basically decent man that in the last meeting of the Imperial General Staff with Hirohito before the First Air Fleet was ordered to Hawaii, he shocked and horrified the officers present by asking if all of this was really necessary. The meeting was expected to go off pro forma, and the emperor was to nod and give his rote approval. That he objected left the military officers present flumoxed. They could, of course, simply have ignored him, and gone ahead with their plans, but that was not in their make-up, and they well understood the position they would be in if it became known to the Japanese people that the Emperor had opposed a war they had launched.

In the end, Hirohito relented. For all that he was basically a good man, he hadn't the stuff in him to steel his will, make the militarists back down, and take charge of the country. But before the meeting was over, the officers of the Imperial Navy's First Bureau, responsible for planning and operations, were literally on their knees, bowing their foreheads to the ground and pleading with the emperor.

I'm glad we left Hirohito on the throne. What he lacked in 1941 to prevent the war, he more than made up for in assuring a stable, peaceful Japan after the war.

But however weak or quiet or gentle or good with flowers he was, its impossible to hide the fact that the whole thing was done in his name. He would have got a fair trial in London...then hung.

Hirohito was swimming against a 2,000 year old tide of emperors being nothing but ceremonial figureheads, pawns in the games of other, ambitious and usually ruthless men. I give him credit for going that far bucking the trend. I think it must have haunted him, because his subsequent decision to be seen in public, and to be photographed with MacArthur, was a complete rejection of the traditions of the past, the moral equivalent of tearing down the Berlin wall.

Really, Steve, how can you not understand the intimidating force of tradition? Now, that's done with, how about a nice cuppa?

Many thanks for the inputs gentlemen (and Ladies?)

Mr. Setanta, Admiral Yamamoto has a historic reputation for foresight (predicting disaster against the US), quiet humility (respecting his enemy), and honor (carrying out his duty though he disagreed with it). I think most of us agree on these points.

However, I've recently had a conversation with an acquaintance of mine (a US servicemen, in fact) about this military figure. We were talking about the events in SE Asia, and the discussion eventually drifted to Yamamoto.

The conversation from that point didn't unfold as one might imagine. In hindsight, I should have kept my peace. I know next to nothing about Yamamoto.

She told me that the "fantasy" (her word for it) of Yamamoto was invented to impress foreigners (particularly the US). She later made an interesting claim (statement of fact?).

I made a mild comment that Yamamoto inherently opposed the attack on Pearl Harbor. She shot back, asking how I could believe that, knowing that he had approved/planned the attack. I was a little surprised. She used the same tack as Mr. Timberland: setting events in a timeline to prove a point. She was also very convincing (not to say that you aren't Timber :wink: ).

I suggested Yamamoto's phrase about the "Sleeping Giant." She told me that the Japanese Admiral never uttered those words. She asked me when he said it.

"Uh, December 7th, 1941."

How do I know?

"It's written in History Books."

How do the History books know?

It must have been recorded somewhere (I think).

Where?

"Well, in Historic Documentation?"

When?

(As you can probably guess, I'm a little flustered at this point) "1942?"

No. 1970.

27 Years after he died.

I also talked about Yamamoto's phrases about six months of victory and ultimate defeat envisioned at the hands of the US. She, in effect, told me that they were all unsubstantiated claims made after the war ended (and after he died); that even the letters some had claimed existed or "pawned off" either couldn't be found (didn't exist) or could not be traced to pre-war origins (popular claims notwithstanding).

The crux of the disagreement: Is Yamamoto accurately portrayed in History books?

And the foundation of that disagreement is: Is there verifiable evidence to support/contradict the portrayal?

For my part, I'd like to ask everyone if my friend is right: That the phrases used to describe Admiral Yamamoto, in fact, don't have any evidentiary basis.

Can anyone direct me to any transcripts and documents attributed to Yamamoto? Primary Source material? (Not heresy or reproductions, but something like an archive or an original diary)

I don't have much interest in the man per se. But it gets under my skin when I get caught flat-footed in conversations. I'd like resolve this nagging question.