@SammDickens,
SammDickens wrote:
kennethamy wrote:
Yes, I agree with Kant that what we cannot know, we cannot know. But I did not need Kant to tell me about that. And, of course, supposing that there is "a thing in itself" which is unknowable, then it follows that no one will ever know about it. And I did not need Kant to tell me that either (see my previous remark). But whether there is a thing it itself is something I did not only need Kant to tell me about, but also would have liked him to argue for it, and not simply assume it. What we cannot know, we cannot know. Hooray for Kant! But whether there is something we cannot know? No Hoorays for Kant here. I am afraid that even Kant ties to sell what Stove called, "the worst argument in world".* Transcendental Idealist as he was, he fell for the Idealist fallacy hook, line, and sinker. Only a little more subtly (sneakily?) .
* Just to remind you:
We can know things only
o as they are related to us
o under our forms of perception and understanding
o insofar as they fall under our conceptual schemes,
etc.
So,
we cannot know things as they are in themselves.
Since, it should be clear that knowing things (as they are related to us, etc.) is exactly how we know things "as they are in themselves". Someone well characterized this argument is analogous to the argument, "Since we have eyes, we cannot see".
Ken, you presume that " it should be clear that knowing things (as they are related to us, etc.) is exactly how we know things 'as they are in themselves'." It is clear to me that you not only mistakenly take that as presumable, but you are wrong in your presumption.
You are saying that my knowledge of you is identical to your own knowledge of you, in which case my assertions above would be statements of fact instead of opinions with which I expect you to take exception. The thing in itself is the being as that being perceives, experiences, and knows itself, from the "inside" as it were. We only know beings other than ourselves from the "outside" as it were. We do not know their thoughts and emotions (at least in the case of people), the way their body's feel to them, their awareness of their environment and the forces at work around and within them.
A being as a thing in itself is called "I" and our knowledge of other beings is called "you."
Samm
I am going to challenge you Samm Dickens on account that you are talking about an area called psychology and not philosophy:
"We do not know their thoughts and emotions (at least in the case of people), the way their bodies feel to them, their awareness of their enviroment and the forces at work around and within them."
The first part (thoughts and emotions) deals with psychology proper and does not need to include philosophy. From what I can tell you are employing a Kantian Epistemology if I am not mistaken. But Kant's epistemology deals with time as being "inner sense". This "inner sense" occurs within subjects, or the "I". There is nothing emotional about it. It simply deals with a priori intuitions. Time being "inner sense" and space being "outer sense".
The thing-in-itself is not the being, but the Will. Being simply deals with phenomena, and is nothing more than the objectification of the will and it's affirmation. Go back and read Schopenhauer, Kant, and maybe even Hegel, and youll get a better understanding of this. Being can never be empty, but is, at least for Hegel, at it's barest form empty space (Space as an a priori inuition).... Ill just shut up.
Oh and no one has destroyed philosophy. As if the love of wisdom could ever be destroyed!
