21
   

Who destroyed philosophy?

 
 
jeeprs
 
  1  
Reply Sun 11 Jul, 2010 01:59 am
@kennethamy,
You still don't get the difference between science and philosophy. Science assumes that the realm of perception is reality. A metaphysic reflects on our perception of that realm. That is why it is called 'meta'.
fresco
 
  1  
Reply Sun 11 Jul, 2010 02:12 am
@jeeprs,
(I would modify "science" to "much of science")

Quote:
Physics for example explains how it comes about that heavy objects "fall", by means of the concept of gravity; that heavenly bodies exert a gravitational pull, can perhaps be reduced to the curvature of space; but why space should be curved in an ontic world is a question to which the physicist neither has nor needs an explanatory answer - he may merely observe that the assumption of curved space makes possible some useful calculations and predictions. Those physicists who have become aware of the epistemological foundations of their science, have said this quite clearly, because they have realized that it is their own concepts, their own operations of distinction that bring forth the experiential world which they describe in their science.
jeeprs
 
  1  
Reply Sun 11 Jul, 2010 02:18 am
@fresco,
I don't know, though. Science does assume metaphysical naturalism, that the natural realm is reality. Or at least that if it understands the components, that which it is made from, then it will understand reality. Whereas the philosophical attitude, in Kantian terms anyway, says we are dealing with perception of phenomena. I have said previously, this means that reality is not what you see out the window, reality is you looking out the window. And why is the latter different? Because it includes the observer. And the observer, in turn, can't be made the direct object of perception.

Rather a good, and very current, blog entry here, on What is Naturalism also from a generally Kantian perspective.
fresco
 
  1  
Reply Sun 11 Jul, 2010 02:21 am
@jeeprs,
See my later edit (von Glasersfeld quote)

Also "the observation of observation" aka "second order cybernetics" has been attempted by "systems theorists" such as Bernard Scott. (Try googling him for a leaning towards "spirituality")
jeeprs
 
  1  
Reply Sun 11 Jul, 2010 02:35 am
@fresco,
that's interesting - I will look into that. I don't believe that the observer cannot be observed, but such observation is of a different order to observation of objective reality. (This is all very basic to phenomenology as you are no doubt aware as it seems to inform your outlook....)
0 Replies
 
Pepijn Sweep
 
  1  
Reply Sun 11 Jul, 2010 03:38 am
Gentle Robert (I appeal 2 U),

How do U do ?
0 Replies
 
jeeprs
 
  1  
Reply Sun 11 Jul, 2010 05:13 am
Eric Reitan on Metaphysical Naturalism: "...whatever scientists discover, through whatever methodologies they employ, will never be an understanding of reality itself. At best, science will be the project of describing in painstaking detail the world of appearances (what Kant called the empirical world) and constructing helpful conceptual models for engaging with it in ways that, we might say, decrease the frequency with which we are surprised....'

"Kant calls the world of appearances “empirical reality”—it is real in the sense that it’s a given, something we have to come to grips with. But even though space and time are therefore “empirically real,” they are not, for Kant, a feature of things as they are in themselves apart from our experience. They are, rather, the necessary form in which our faculties of perception present objects to us in experience. Kant captures this idea by saying that space and time, while empirically real, are transcendentally ideal."

That is about the most concise statement I have found yet of how Kant was an empirical realist and transcendental idealist. So Kant wouldn't say that 'the moon doesn't exist if there is nobody to perceive it'. He was an empirical realist. But how the moon exists 'in itself', unperceived by us, we don't know, and will never know.

Finally an observation from the same series of articles on 'the noumenal self'
Quote:
...it is possible to simply be—to become quiescent, if you will, and simply be what one is rather than attempt to know what one is.

And in this place of cognitive stillness, one discovers in a direct experiential way an ultimate reality that cannot be conceptualized or made into an object of study. This is the domain of mystical experience—and even though it is ineffable (that is, even if it cannot be made into an object of knowledge) it brings with it a kind of insight or enlightenment. One may not be able to adequately put this experience into propositional terms that can be affirmed as true, but that doesn’t mean one hasn’t in some sense encountered noumenal reality. One hasn’t encountered it as an object of experience (since that would turn it into a phenomenon). Rather, one encounters it in the way one experiences.
- emphasis added.

This is the point of meditation - to go back to that state of stillness again, and again, and again, until you gradually begin to realize what it is you are seeing, and who is seeing it - which are one and the same.
kennethamy
 
  2  
Reply Sun 11 Jul, 2010 08:40 am
@jeeprs,
jeeprs wrote:

Eric Reitan on Metaphysical Naturalism: "...whatever scientists discover, through whatever methodologies they employ, will never be an understanding of reality itself. At best, science will be the project of describing in painstaking detail the world of appearances (what Kant called the empirical world) and constructing helpful conceptual models for engaging with it in ways that, we might say, decrease the frequency with which we are surprised....'

"Kant calls the world of appearances “empirical reality”—it is real in the sense that it’s a given, something we have to come to grips with. But even though space and time are therefore “empirically real,” they are not, for Kant, a feature of things as they are in themselves apart from our experience. They are, rather, the necessary form in which our faculties of perception present objects to us in experience. Kant captures this idea by saying that space and time, while empirically real, are transcendentally ideal."

That is about the most concise statement I have found yet of how Kant was an empirical realist and transcendental idealist. So Kant wouldn't say that 'the moon doesn't exist if there is nobody to perceive it'. He was an empirical realist. But how the moon exists 'in itself', unperceived by us, we don't know, and will never know.

Finally an observation from the same series of articles on 'the noumenal self'
Quote:
...it is possible to simply be—to become quiescent, if you will, and simply be what one is rather than attempt to know what one is.

And in this place of cognitive stillness, one discovers in a direct experiential way an ultimate reality that cannot be conceptualized or made into an object of study. This is the domain of mystical experience—and even though it is ineffable (that is, even if it cannot be made into an object of knowledge) it brings with it a kind of insight or enlightenment. One may not be able to adequately put this experience into propositional terms that can be affirmed as true, but that doesn’t mean one hasn’t in some sense encountered noumenal reality. One hasn’t encountered it as an object of experience (since that would turn it into a phenomenon). Rather, one encounters it in the way one experiences.
- emphasis added.

This is the point of meditation - to go back to that state of stillness again, and again, and again, until you gradually begin to realize what it is you are seeing, and who is seeing it - which are one and the same.



Yes, I agree with Kant that what we cannot know, we cannot know. But I did not need Kant to tell me about that. And, of course, supposing that there is "a thing in itself" which is unknowable, then it follows that no one will ever know about it. And I did not need Kant to tell me that either (see my previous remark). But whether there is a thing it itself is something I did not only need Kant to tell me about, but also would have liked him to argue for it, and not simply assume it. What we cannot know, we cannot know. Hooray for Kant! But whether there is something we cannot know? No Hoorays for Kant here. I am afraid that even Kant ties to sell what Stove called, "the worst argument in world".* Transcendental Idealist as he was, he fell for the Idealist fallacy hook, line, and sinker. Only a little more subtly (sneakily?) .

* Just to remind you:

We can know things only

o as they are related to us

o under our forms of perception and understanding

o insofar as they fall under our conceptual schemes,

etc.

So,

we cannot know things as they are in themselves.

Since, it should be clear that knowing things (as they are related to us, etc.) is exactly how we know things "as they are in themselves". Someone well characterized this argument is analogous to the argument, "Since we have eyes, we cannot see".
fresco
 
  1  
Reply Sun 11 Jul, 2010 10:02 am
@kennethamy,
So you agree that there is no meaning to "a thing in itself" ?
kennethamy
 
  1  
Reply Sun 11 Jul, 2010 10:06 am
@fresco,
fresco wrote:

So you agree that there is no meaning to "a thing in itself" ?


No. I just think that we have no reason to believe there is such a thing. I think I know what it is supposed to mean.
fresco
 
  1  
Reply Sun 11 Jul, 2010 10:08 am
@kennethamy,
You don't believe in "things in themselves" then ?
kennethamy
 
  1  
Reply Sun 11 Jul, 2010 12:31 pm
@fresco,
fresco wrote:

You don't believe in "things in themselves" then ?


I don't believe that there are thing in themselves, if that is what you mean. But, so as not to confuse you, I do believe that objects exists independently of mind or human perception.
fresco
 
  0  
Reply Sun 11 Jul, 2010 01:31 pm
@kennethamy,
That's priceless ! Very Happy
Fil Albuquerque
 
  1  
Reply Sun 11 Jul, 2010 01:37 pm
@fresco,
...it is !!!
0 Replies
 
kennethamy
 
  1  
Reply Sun 11 Jul, 2010 01:44 pm
@fresco,
fresco wrote:

That's priceless ! Very Happy


Kind of you to say so. I thought you might object, but I see you thought better of it. There is no reason to think that the world is not as it appears to commonsense, corrected by science, of course, is not as it appears. If you have some reason to think otherwise, please mention it.
0 Replies
 
Fil Albuquerque
 
  1  
Reply Sun 11 Jul, 2010 01:48 pm
so....the world it is as it is, but not as it is in itself...
Pepijn Sweep
 
  0  
Reply Sun 11 Jul, 2010 02:01 pm
@Fil Albuquerque,
Cool Shocked Drunk Not Equal Heineken Grolsch Mr. Green 2 Cents Not Equal Drunk Batavia
0 Replies
 
kennethamy
 
  1  
Reply Sun 11 Jul, 2010 02:03 pm
@Fil Albuquerque,
Fil Albuquerque wrote:

so....the world it is as it is, but not as it is in itself...


I'll let you know just as soon as you explain what you mean.
kennethamy
 
  1  
Reply Sun 11 Jul, 2010 02:07 pm
By the way, it occurred to me that when I said that objects are mind independent some might have thought I meant that how objects appear is mind independent. I did not mean that. I meant that their existence is mind independent. Commonsense and science determine how objects appear, and commonsense and science are, of course, products of the mind,
Fil Albuquerque
 
  1  
Reply Sun 11 Jul, 2010 02:12 pm
@kennethamy,
it was an ironic remark on what you yourself said...
neither y neither Pep get it...shame !
0 Replies
 
 

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