The necessary truth of any truth

But I did not say it makes no sense "in modal logic". That is what you just said. What I said is that it makes no sense. And that means it makes no sense in English.

kennethamy wrote:

But I did not say it makes no sense "in modal logic". That is what you just said. What I said is that it makes no sense. And that means it makes no sense in English.

Ok, then we have a progress here, since it is the first time you don't refer to modal logic. So let's talk in English. I said there is no "truth to be expressed," truth itself is expression. Let me explain my English, then. For me, truth is the expression of a state of affairs. In a sense, it is like in the correspondence theory of truth, which also demands two "terms" for truth to happen, between which the "correspondence" happens. This is what I mean by "truth is expression." Is this clear enough English for you?

He basically means that there is no objective world, as far as I understand him. A truth is only true insofar as our expression of that truth. In other words, if we did not exist to express truth, truth would not exist.

But that's false.

Zetherin wrote:

He basically means that there is no objective world, as far as I understand him. A truth is only true insofar as our expression of that truth. In other words, if we did not exist to express truth, truth would not exist.

But that's false.

Sorry, but this is not what I mean. There is an objective world without us, only you cannot talk about truth without something expressing something else.

Well, that's not true. Truth is not the expression of a state of affairs. What makes you think that?

Suppose there is a truth X, and I express truth X.

Zetherin wrote:

Well, that's not true. Truth is not the expression of a state of affairs. What makes you think that?

What make you think the contrary? You keep talking all the time about a statement on one side and a state of affairs on the other side and on the correspondence between them, but you are the first to deny they are both needed for truth to be conceivable. It is such a curious thing: in the end you talk as if there were an absolute truth out there somewhere, which were its own expression. Of course I already knew this was your view, which you can confirm rereading some of my previous posts. However, it remains surprising.

Well, that's not true. Truth is not the expression of a state of affairs. What makes you think that?

Zetherin wrote:

Well, that's not true. Truth is not the expression of a state of affairs. What makes you think that?

Returning to our dear example, for "Quito is the capital of Ecuador" to be true Quito must be the capital of Ecuador. Here you clearly see the two "elements" of truth (or whatever you want to call them): the quoted stuff and what is needed for that quoted stuff to be true. This is what I am talking about: these to things exist within all truth, and they are both different from each other - hence the need for the quotes - and identical to each other - since the truth of the quoted stuff comes precisely from its identity to what is needed for it to be true.

kennethamy wrote:

But I did not say it makes no sense "in modal logic". That is what you just said. What I said is that it makes no sense. And that means it makes no sense in English.

Ok, then we have a progress here, since it is the first time you don't refer to modal logic. So let's talk in English. I said there is no "truth to be expressed," truth itself is expression. Let me explain my English, then. For me, truth is the expression of a state of affairs. In a sense, it is like in the correspondence theory of truth, which also demands two "terms" for truth to happen, between which the "correspondence" happens. This is what I mean by "truth is expression." Is this clear enough English for you?

A truth and an expression of a truth are two different things. Suppose there were no humans around to express truth at all. Do you think, then, that nothing would be true?

Also, what do you mean by "absolute truth", and how does it differ from, I suppose, a non-absolute truth?

The moon that exists for us did not exist for medieval people, and the moon that existed for them no longer exists for us.

But if you call that object "in itself" a truth you reduce the whole truth to just one side of it: the objective, external side.

It is truths that make true sentences true.

guigus wrote:

The moon that exists for us did not exist for medieval people, and the moon that existed for them no longer exists for us.

There we go. Now we've reached the core issue.

Why in the world do you think the moon that exists for us did not exist for medieval people?

No, a truth is that the moon that existed for medieval people, exists for us. The moon is an object.

That's easy. It must be that what he means by "exists for us" means "what we believe exists" not, "what does exist". And, if he means that, then he is right, since what Medievals believed about the Moon is not what modern scientists believe about the Moon. Of course, he is mixing up what X believes about the Moon with what the Moon is. So, what guigus thinks is that there are two Moons (or more). But that is, of course, absurd. And his belief that there are at least two Moons is the consequence of his confusion between, what is believed to exist, and what really does exist. There is only one Moon, but there are several beliefs about the sort of thing the Moon is. It is this constant confusion between what is believed, and what there is, (The Idealist Confusion) that leads him (and other neo-Idealists- post-structuralist, and the like) to saying things that imply absurdities like, there are several Moons (as if Earth were like Jupiter).

Zetherin wrote:

No, a truth is that the moon that existed for medieval people, exists for us. The moon is an object.

Jesus, I don't believe you are that insensitive. Medieval people looked at the moon and they didn't see an accessible object, as we see. They didn't see somewhere you can travel to, as we see. The "object" they saw was a completely different object than the one we see. You are just projecting the object you see right into the eyes of the poor medieval people.

Zetherin wrote:

No, a truth is that the moon that existed for medieval people, exists for us. The moon is an object.

Jesus, I don't believe you are that insensitive. Medieval people looked at the moon and they didn't see an accessible object, as we see. They didn't see somewhere you can travel to, as we see. The "object" they saw was a completely different object than the one we see. You are just projecting the object you see right into the eyes of the poor medieval people.

Well, that, of course, is false. They saw exactly the same object we now see. What you seem to mean is that they did not see it as we see it, or understand it as we understand it. And that may well be true. But there is all the difference in the world between what it is we see, and how it seems to us when we see it. You know that. The same thing, for instance, may look very different to us depending on how we see it. In bright sunshine, or when the say is hazy. But that doesn't mean that what we see on both occasions is not the very same thing. It is the very same thing, but it looks different. What is surprising about that? Is it to be expected that something necessarily will look that same no matter how it is seen, or who sees it? Why would you make such an obviously false assumption?

kennethamy wrote:

Well, that, of course, is false. They saw exactly the same object we now see. What you seem to mean is that they did not see it as we see it, or understand it as we understand it. And that may well be true. But there is all the difference in the world between what it is we see, and how it seems to us when we see it. You know that. The same thing, for instance, may look very different to us depending on how we see it. In bright sunshine, or when the say is hazy. But that doesn't mean that what we see on both occasions is not the very same thing. It is the very same thing, but it looks different. What is surprising about that? Is it to be expected that something necessarily will look that same no matter how it is seen, or who sees it? Why would you make such an obviously false assumption?

All that is fine, the problem is that things are always seen in some way by someone. This idea you have of something in itself is not a "truth," but rather a product of you imagination. The object you saw yesterday and you assume to be the same you see today is always seen by you in particular circumstances. You are always there and it is always an object for you, never an object in itself.