@guigus,
guigus wrote:
kennethamy wrote:Yes, it has the inevitability of Greek tragedy, only, of course, it is philosophical farce. The same old Idealism. Warmed up, of course, but no different at bottom, whether it is called "transcendental idealism" (the Kant brand), "absolute idealism" (the German 19th century brand) 'subjective idealism" (Berkeley's brand) or the shiny new Christmasy brand all ties up with bright wrapping paper and green ribbon (the Postmodern, Structuralism, Rorty "The World Well Lost" brand). It is the same nonsense.
Sorry, but again it is you that say the truth is out there as an object. This is the most naive materialism, which easily becomes idealism, as it has become when you tried to figure out what I was saying. This is no surprise for me: once you reduce the ideal to the material, it doesn't take much for the material to become an idea. What I am (literally) saying from the beginning is that truth is both ideal and material, and that there is both a difference and an identity between them. Since you deny that contradiction between difference and identity, your translation of my words has to become some sort of idealism.
I have no idea what it would mean to say that truth was an object. If it is, then it is an abstract entity, and has nothing whatever to do with materialism which is the view that whatever exists is a material object, and that implies there are no abstract entities. So, whatever you think I am, I am not materialist. Perhaps you mean that I don't believe (in fact, more strongly, I believe the follow is not true) that what is true is (
mutatis mutandis in anyway depends on what anyone believes is true (hopes it true, wants to be true, and so on). It that is what you believe, then you are right on the money. That is just what I do believe. (If it matters what I happen to believe, without argument). Not the least idea what you could possibly mean by saying I deny the difference between difference andidentity. If I have any idea what that would mean (and I don't think I do) for what it is worth I think it would be absurd to deny the difference between difference and identity since it is quite clear that those ideas contradict each other. If X and Y are identical, then X and Y are not different; and if X and Y are different, then X and Y are not identical. Where you could have got the idea that I deny that difference is impossible for me to figure out. It might be (I suppose) that you have a problem with English. That is the only possible explanation. But I hope I have disabused you of that absurd idea.