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The necessary truth of any truth

 
 
kennethamy
 
  1  
Reply Mon 14 Jun, 2010 11:04 pm
@guigus,
guigus wrote:

kennethamy wrote:
That's easy. It must be that what he means by "exists for us" means "what we believe exists" not, "what does exist". And, if he means that, then he is right, since what Medievals believed about the Moon is not what modern scientists believe about the Moon. Of course, he is mixing up what X believes about the Moon with what the Moon is. So, what guigus thinks is that there are two Moons (or more). But that is, of course, absurd. And his belief that there are at least two Moons is the consequence of his confusion between, what is believed to exist, and what really does exist. There is only one Moon, but there are several beliefs about the sort of thing the Moon is. It is this constant confusion between what is believed, and what there is, (The Idealist Confusion) that leads him (and other neo-Idealists- post-structuralist, and the like) to saying things that imply absurdities like, there are several Moons (as if Earth were like Jupiter).


Once again these absurd conclusions arise from you own objectified view: I never said those different moons had an objective existence. It is truth itself that changes. The problem is precisely that for you truth is entirely objective, then it becomes for you that the objective world itself is changing, as if the moon was itself different. Of course, the moon itself also changed from medieval times to now, but this is not the king of change I am talking about. Medieval people saw an inaccessible object where we see I place we can go to. So the moon has indeed changed since then, it means a different thing. And nothing guarantee that what we know today for sure about it will not turn false in the future.


If you did not say that the different Moons has an objective existence (or in English, that there were different Moons) then I suppose you were saying that they had a subjective existence, or in English that the Moon (the very same Moon) looked different to the medieval people than it does to modern people. But that is no reason to think that there are two Moons. But only a reason to think that there is but one Moon, which looks different to different group of people. To say that there are several subjective Moons is only are poetic way of saying that the same Moon looks different to different people. Poetry is nice, but it is not philosophy. Again: One Moon, several ways in which it appears. Right? (Maybe not so sensitive as lots of different Moons, each of which appears exactly as it is, but the first has the advantage of literal truth. The second, the disadvantage of total confused falsity). I's rather be right than sensitive and wrong. That's just the way I am.
kennethamy
 
  1  
Reply Mon 14 Jun, 2010 11:08 pm
@Zetherin,
Zetherin wrote:

guigus wrote:

Zetherin wrote:
No, a truth is that the moon that existed for medieval people, exists for us. The moon is an object.


Jesus, I don't believe you are that insensitive. Medieval people looked at the moon and they didn't see an accessible object, as we see. They didn't see somewhere you can travel to, as we see. The "object" they saw was a completely different object than the one we see. You are just projecting the object you see right into the eyes of the poor medieval people.


They were looking at the same object, they just didn't know as much about the object as we do. Why does them not knowing as much about the object they were seeing, mean that they were seeing a different object? Were they also on a different earth, because they thought that the earth was flat? No, they were just wrong about the earth being flat - that doesn't mean they were on another earth!


Easy, as I said, it is the Idealist Confusion. It does back at least to Berkeley, and even further back if you count Protagoras. As Cicero wisely said, "There is nothing so absurd that some philosopher has not said it". It is as true today as it was true 3,000 years ago.
kennethamy
 
  1  
Reply Mon 14 Jun, 2010 11:10 pm
@Zetherin,
Zetherin wrote:

guigus wrote:

kennethamy wrote:
Well, that, of course, is false. They saw exactly the same object we now see. What you seem to mean is that they did not see it as we see it, or understand it as we understand it. And that may well be true. But there is all the difference in the world between what it is we see, and how it seems to us when we see it. You know that. The same thing, for instance, may look very different to us depending on how we see it. In bright sunshine, or when the say is hazy. But that doesn't mean that what we see on both occasions is not the very same thing. It is the very same thing, but it looks different. What is surprising about that? Is it to be expected that something necessarily will look that same no matter how it is seen, or who sees it? Why would you make such an obviously false assumption?


All that is fine, the problem is that things are always seen in some way by someone. This idea you have of something in itself is not a "truth," but rather a product of you imagination. The object you saw yesterday and you assume to be the same you see today is always seen by you in particular circumstances. You are always there and it is always an object for you, never an object in itself.


I knew it!


Yes, it has the inevitability of Greek tragedy, only, of course, it is philosophical farce. The same old Idealism. Warmed up, of course, but no different at bottom, whether it is called "transcendental idealism" (the Kant brand), "absolute idealism" (the German 19th century brand) 'subjective idealism" (Berkeley's brand) or the shiny new Christmasy brand all ties up with bright wrapping paper and green ribbon (the Postmodern, Structuralism, Rorty "The World Well Lost" brand). It is the same nonsense.
guigus
 
  1  
Reply Mon 14 Jun, 2010 11:14 pm
@kennethamy,
kennethamy wrote:
If you did not say that the different Moons has an objective existence (or in English, that there were different Moons) then I suppose you were saying that they had a subjective existence, or in English that the Moon (the very same Moon) looked different to the medieval people than it does to modern people. But that is no reason to think that there are two Moons. But only a reason to think that there is but one Moon, which looks different to different group of people. To say that there are several subjective Moons is only are poetic way of saying that the same Moon looks different to different people. Poetry is nice, but it is not philosophy. Again: One Moon, several ways in which it appears. Right? (Maybe not so sensitive as lots of different Moons, each of which appears exactly as it is, but the first has the advantage of literal truth. The second, the disadvantage of total confused falsity). I's rather be right than sensitive and wrong. That's just the way I am.


At least you recognize you were being a bit insensitive. I must stress again that you are taking truth to either be objective or subjective, when in fact it is both. This alternative you present between different objective moons and different subjective moons misses the point entirely: I am talking about truth, and truth is both objective and subjective. The objective side of it is the moon as an object that survived the scrutiny of our scientific investigation. Some aspects of it did not survive, others are still true today, and others are only true today. You cannot isolate the objective from the subjective side, otherwise you will forget the subjective-objective truth of the medieval age, which was different from ours. The objective moon we have today can be projected back to the medieval times, provided we remember it is our moon, not theirs.
kennethamy
 
  1  
Reply Mon 14 Jun, 2010 11:21 pm
@guigus,
guigus wrote:

kennethamy wrote:
If you did not say that the different Moons has an objective existence (or in English, that there were different Moons) then I suppose you were saying that they had a subjective existence, or in English that the Moon (the very same Moon) looked different to the medieval people than it does to modern people. But that is no reason to think that there are two Moons. But only a reason to think that there is but one Moon, which looks different to different group of people. To say that there are several subjective Moons is only are poetic way of saying that the same Moon looks different to different people. Poetry is nice, but it is not philosophy. Again: One Moon, several ways in which it appears. Right? (Maybe not so sensitive as lots of different Moons, each of which appears exactly as it is, but the first has the advantage of literal truth. The second, the disadvantage of total confused falsity). I's rather be right than sensitive and wrong. That's just the way I am.


At least you recognize you were being a bit insensitive. I must stress again that you are taking truth to either be objective or subjective, when in fact it is both. This alternative you present between different objective moons and different subjective moons misses the point entirely: I am talking about truth, and truth is both objective and subjective. The objective side of it is the moon as an object that survived the scrutiny of our scientific investigation. Some aspects of it did not survive, others are still true today, and others are only true today. You cannot isolate the objective from the subjective side, otherwise you will forget the subjective-objective truth of the medieval age, which was different from ours. The objective moon we have today can be projected back to the medieval times, provided we remember it is our moon, not theirs.


What I recognized is that you considered me to be insensitive. Again, like any good idealist, you confuse what you believe to be true with what is true. At bottom, of course, Idealism is simply a more complicated version of the fallacy of wishful thinking.
guigus
 
  1  
Reply Mon 14 Jun, 2010 11:22 pm
@kennethamy,
kennethamy wrote:
Easy, as I said, it is the Idealist Confusion. It does back at least to Berkeley, and even further back if you count Protagoras. As Cicero wisely said, "There is nothing so absurd that some philosopher has not said it". It is as true today as it was true 3,000 years ago.


It is you that are saying that truth exists as an object outside of us. Hence, it is you that are objectifying the idea. What I am saying is that you need both to have a truth, which is why the truth about the moon changed from medieval times to now. Thanks to that, truth can evolve and we can today say that we know more about the moon the the medieval people did. However, their truth was different from ours, as the truth of future generations will be. I am no idealist, I am not saying we create reality or that each one has a different reality, precisely because for me truth is not a total objectivity.
guigus
 
  1  
Reply Mon 14 Jun, 2010 11:25 pm
@kennethamy,
kennethamy wrote:
What I recognized is that you considered me to be insensitive. Again, like any good idealist, you confuse what you believe to be true with what is true.


Sorry, but how do you interpret this line:

Quote:
Maybe not so sensitive as lots of different Moons, each of which appears exactly as it is, but the first has the advantage of literal truth.


You admitted at least the possibility of having been insensitive, don't you agree?
0 Replies
 
kennethamy
 
  1  
Reply Mon 14 Jun, 2010 11:27 pm
@guigus,
guigus wrote:

kennethamy wrote:
Easy, as I said, it is the Idealist Confusion. It does back at least to Berkeley, and even further back if you count Protagoras. As Cicero wisely said, "There is nothing so absurd that some philosopher has not said it". It is as true today as it was true 3,000 years ago.


It is you that are saying that truth exists as an object outside of us. Hence, it is you that are objectifying the idea. What I am saying is that you need both to have a truth, which is why the truth about the moon changed from medieval times to now. Thanks to that, truth can evolve and we can today say that we know more about the moon the the medieval people did. However, their truth was different from ours, as the truth of future generations will be. I am no idealist, I am not saying we create reality or that each one has a different reality, precisely because for me truth is not a total objectivity.


Well, yes, of course. What is true is independent of that we believe is true. That is why it is called, "reality". What do you mean it is as if I thought that truth is independent of what we think, hope, desire, to be true? It is exactly that. As someone put it, truth (reality) is what is left over when we stop believing it.
kennethamy
 
  1  
Reply Mon 14 Jun, 2010 11:29 pm
@guigus,
guigus wrote:

kennethamy wrote:
Easy, as I said, it is the Idealist Confusion. It does back at least to Berkeley, and even further back if you count Protagoras. As Cicero wisely said, "There is nothing so absurd that some philosopher has not said it". It is as true today as it was true 3,000 years ago.


It is you that are saying that truth exists as an object outside of us. Hence, it is you that are objectifying the idea. What I am saying is that you need both to have a truth, which is why the truth about the moon changed from medieval times to now. Thanks to that, truth can evolve and we can today say that we know more about the moon the the medieval people did. However, their truth was different from ours, as the truth of future generations will be. I am no idealist, I am not saying we create reality or that each one has a different reality, precisely because for me truth is not a total objectivity.
0 Replies
 
kennethamy
 
  1  
Reply Mon 14 Jun, 2010 11:32 pm
@guigus,
guigus wrote:

kennethamy wrote:


because for me truth is not a total objectivity.


Why would it make any difference what truth is for you, or for me? Why should anyone (except for our mothers or spouses) care what we believe truth to be? What matters is what truth is.
0 Replies
 
guigus
 
  1  
Reply Mon 14 Jun, 2010 11:35 pm
@kennethamy,
kennethamy wrote:
Yes, it has the inevitability of Greek tragedy, only, of course, it is philosophical farce. The same old Idealism. Warmed up, of course, but no different at bottom, whether it is called "transcendental idealism" (the Kant brand), "absolute idealism" (the German 19th century brand) 'subjective idealism" (Berkeley's brand) or the shiny new Christmasy brand all ties up with bright wrapping paper and green ribbon (the Postmodern, Structuralism, Rorty "The World Well Lost" brand). It is the same nonsense.


Sorry, but again it is you that say the truth is out there as an object. This is the most naive materialism, which easily becomes idealism, as it has become when you tried to figure out what I was saying. This is no surprise for me: once you reduce the ideal to the material, it doesn't take much for the material to become an idea. What I am (literally) saying from the beginning is that truth is both ideal and material, and that there is both a difference and an identity between them. Since you deny that contradiction between difference and identity, your translation of my words has to become some sort of idealism.
guigus
 
  1  
Reply Mon 14 Jun, 2010 11:46 pm
@kennethamy,
kennethamy wrote:
Well, yes, of course. What is true is independent of that we believe is true. That is why it is called, "reality". What do you mean it is as if I thought that truth is independent of what we think, hope, desire, to be true? It is exactly that. As someone put it, truth (reality) is what is left over when we stop believing it.


What is left when you take yourself out of the world is not the world, since the world you know about, which is what you are talking about, only exists for you (or someone else that remains). What is left is something you don't know about. It doesn't mean there is no objective world: it only means there is also a subjective one, and that the objective needs the subjective to become true. If you go, there must remain someone else for the world to remain true.
kennethamy
 
  1  
Reply Mon 14 Jun, 2010 11:50 pm
@guigus,
guigus wrote:

kennethamy wrote:
Yes, it has the inevitability of Greek tragedy, only, of course, it is philosophical farce. The same old Idealism. Warmed up, of course, but no different at bottom, whether it is called "transcendental idealism" (the Kant brand), "absolute idealism" (the German 19th century brand) 'subjective idealism" (Berkeley's brand) or the shiny new Christmasy brand all ties up with bright wrapping paper and green ribbon (the Postmodern, Structuralism, Rorty "The World Well Lost" brand). It is the same nonsense.


Sorry, but again it is you that say the truth is out there as an object. This is the most naive materialism, which easily becomes idealism, as it has become when you tried to figure out what I was saying. This is no surprise for me: once you reduce the ideal to the material, it doesn't take much for the material to become an idea. What I am (literally) saying from the beginning is that truth is both ideal and material, and that there is both a difference and an identity between them. Since you deny that contradiction between difference and identity, your translation of my words has to become some sort of idealism.


I have no idea what it would mean to say that truth was an object. If it is, then it is an abstract entity, and has nothing whatever to do with materialism which is the view that whatever exists is a material object, and that implies there are no abstract entities. So, whatever you think I am, I am not materialist. Perhaps you mean that I don't believe (in fact, more strongly, I believe the follow is not true) that what is true is ( mutatis mutandis in anyway depends on what anyone believes is true (hopes it true, wants to be true, and so on). It that is what you believe, then you are right on the money. That is just what I do believe. (If it matters what I happen to believe, without argument). Not the least idea what you could possibly mean by saying I deny the difference between difference andidentity. If I have any idea what that would mean (and I don't think I do) for what it is worth I think it would be absurd to deny the difference between difference and identity since it is quite clear that those ideas contradict each other. If X and Y are identical, then X and Y are not different; and if X and Y are different, then X and Y are not identical. Where you could have got the idea that I deny that difference is impossible for me to figure out. It might be (I suppose) that you have a problem with English. That is the only possible explanation. But I hope I have disabused you of that absurd idea.
guigus
 
  1  
Reply Mon 14 Jun, 2010 11:57 pm
@kennethamy,
kennethamy wrote:
I have no idea what it would mean to say that truth was an object. If it is, then it is an abstract entity, and has nothing whatever to do with materialism which is the view that whatever exists is a material object, and that implies there are no abstract entities. So, whatever you think I am, I am not materialist. Perhaps you mean that I don't believe (in fact, more strongly, I believe the follow is not true) that what is true is ( mutatis mutandis in anyway depends on what anyone believes is true (hopes it true, wants to be true, and so on). It that is what you believe, then you are right on the money. That is just what I do believe. (If it matters what I happen to believe, without argument). Not the least idea what you could possibly mean by saying I deny the difference between difference andidentity. If I have any idea what that would mean (and I don't think I do) for what it is worth I think it would be absurd to deny the difference between difference and identity since it is quite clear that those ideas contradict each other. If X and Y are identical, then X and Y are not different; and if X and Y are different, then X and Y are not identical. Where you could have got the idea that I deny that difference is impossible for me to figure out. It might be (I suppose) that you have a problem with English. That is the only possible explanation. But I hope I have disabused you of that absurd idea.


I referred to the contradiction between difference and identity: the fact that the subjective and objective aspects of truth are both different and identical to each other, which constitutes a contradiction. I referred thus to that you deny that contradiction, that is, that for you truth is just objective, so there is no difference within it. For me there are both a difference and an identity within truth itself, which constitutes a contradiction, and that contradiction is constitutive of truth itself. All this mess results from that you refuse to consider that contradiction for even a moment.
0 Replies
 
kennethamy
 
  1  
Reply Mon 14 Jun, 2010 11:59 pm
@guigus,
guigus wrote:

kennethamy wrote:


What is left when you take yourself out of the world is not the world, since the world you know about, which is what you are talking about, only exists for you (or someone else that remains).


It is a tautology and and therefore, a necessary truth that I can know only about what I can know about. (You make it sound like an epiphany, when it is no more that a trivial truth). But it is simply false that the world I am talking about exists only for me (or someone else in it). For let me assure you that I know that there existed a world before I existed, and a world after I cease to exist. And, moreover, I know that there was a world that existed before any people existed, and almost certainly, a world that will exist when all people have ceased to exist. Again, where would you have got the very idea that I don't believe that? You must take me for an ignorant fool. Anyone with the least amount of sense and education knows that the existence of the world neither depends on his existence, or on the existence of people.
guigus
 
  1  
Reply Tue 15 Jun, 2010 12:06 am
@kennethamy,
kennethamy wrote:
It is a tautology and and therefore, a necessary truth that I can know only about what I can know about. (You make it sound like an epiphany, when it is no more that a trivial truth). But it is simply false that the world I am talking about exists only for me (or someone else in it). For let me assure you that I know that there existed a world before I existed, and a world after I cease to exist. And, moreover, I know that there was a world that existed before any people existed, and almost certainly, a world that will exist when all people have ceased to exist. Again, where would you have got the very idea that I don't believe that? You must take me for an ignorant fool. Anyone with the least amount of sense and education knows that the existence of the world neither depends on his existence, or on the existence of people.


No, I am not taking you for an ignorant fool. I would not be here discussing with you if I thought so. And of course I know about a world before people and I surely know the world will continue after people. I am just saying this is so insofar that world is our past or our future. In its own future without us, as also in its own past before us, the world will be something we cannot conceive. We can only conceive it after us as our future, and before us as our past, so it may well be that we imagine something that did not happen, or something that will not happen, as it may well be that we will never know we were wrong.
0 Replies
 
fresco
 
  1  
Reply Tue 15 Jun, 2010 12:13 am
Quote:
For let me assure you that I know that there existed a world before I existed, and a world after I cease to exist.

Laughing
The speaker here seems to unaware of two points:
1. "Time" is a psychological construct, whence the concept "before".
2. Ontology (existence) and epistemology (knowledge) are inextricably enmeshed with each other.

The two points are linked via a consideration of the specifically developed human activity of "prediction and control".
ughaibu
 
  1  
Reply Tue 15 Jun, 2010 12:33 am
@fresco,
fresco wrote:
1. "Time" is a psychological construct, whence the concept "before".
What does this mean? And does the same apply to space and the concept "behind"?
fresco
 
  1  
Reply Tue 15 Jun, 2010 12:44 am
@ughaibu,
Yes. Read up Einstein on "simultaneity" or Peat on "non-locality". Time and space are co-aspects of the observer's reference frame. For example at the sub-atomic level, "negative time" is a valid concept.
ughaibu
 
  1  
Reply Tue 15 Jun, 2010 02:31 am
@fresco,
fresco wrote:
Time and space are co-aspects of the observer's reference frame.
Okay, how does this equate to them being "psychological constructs"?
0 Replies
 
 

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