The necessary truth of any truth

There is no state of affairs that tautologies represent.
There is no situation that is tautologous.
Factual propositions are decided by a corresponence of fact with the factual proposition that represents it.

Tautologies are propositions that are decided by logical methods; deduction, truth tables, etc.. There is no correspondence theory of truth that applies to tautology.

You are quite mistaken. I was not complaining about determinism, nor do I think any of this has anything to do with determinism. In fact, I was not complaining about anything at all. But what I was pointing out is that you were confusing the two statements:

1. Necessarily all truths are true, which is true, with,
2. All truths are necessarily true, which is false,

and I was pointing out the confusion. Apparently you still are confused. To paraphrase Samuel Johnson, while I can point out your confusion, I cannot make you understand that you are confused. And, apparently, neither can Zeth. or Emil. I think that what you really ought to do is to learn some logic, and modal logic, in particular. It may comfort you to think I am complaining about determinism since that may make you think you understand what is going on. Let me assure you once more that none of this has anything to do with determinism, but it has everything to do with logic, and, especially modal logic. Two subjects you apparently know little or nothing about.

You are quite mistaken. I was not complaining about determinism, nor do I think any of this has anything to do with determinism. In fact, I was not complaining about anything at all. But what I was pointing out is that you were confusing the two statements:

1. Necessarily all truths are true, which is true, with,
2. All truths are necessarily true, which is false,

and I was pointing out the confusion. Apparently you still are confused. To paraphrase Samuel Johnson, while I can point out your confusion, I cannot make you understand that you are confused. And, apparently, neither can Zeth. or Emil. I think that what you really ought to do is to learn some logic, and modal logic, in particular. It may comfort you to think I am complaining about determinism since that may make you think you understand what is going on. Let me assure you once more that none of this has anything to do with determinism, but it has everything to do with logic, and, especially modal logic. Two subjects you apparently know little or nothing about.

But what I was pointing out is that you [guigus] were confusing the two statements:

1. Necessarily all truths are true, which is true, with,
2. All truths are necessarily true, which is false,

and I was pointing out the confusion.

But if that means anything at all (which I rather doubt) it means that for every truth, there is some state of affairs that truth expresses. And not only is that not necessarily true, but it is false. For instance consider the truth that all bananas are bananas. That truth is true (what else would it be?) But there is no such state of affairs as that all bananas are bananas.

That is what I am struggling with from the beginning. Let me try once more to, as you say, clarify things. It is all in the way you read the sentence "every truth must be true." One way of reading it is by taking the word "truth" as anything capable of being either true or false (the sense of truth-bearer referred to by the Wikipedia article). By reading the sentence this way, you arrive at a necessary truth in the sense of determinism, that is, in the sense that "no truth is contingent." This happens because truth is displaced from the word "truth," which would mean the expression of a state of affairs, and fully relocated to the state of affairs itself. Necessity then refers no longer to how an expression of a state of affairs needs that state of affairs, but rather to that same state of affairs itself as if were its own expression: truth becomes necessary "out there," in the world, as if it were a necessary statement. The other way of reading the sentence is by taking the word "truth" as what it should mean: a true statement - or a true idea, or a true memory - insofar as it is true. By reading the sentence this way, you arrive at a completely different necessity, which does not apply to the state of affairs as if it were its own expression, but rather to its expression as different from it and needing it.

Hence, the necessary truth of any truth has nothing to do with a necessary state of affairs, but rather with the expression of that state of affairs depending on that same state of affairs.

guigus wrote:

... The other way of reading the sentence is by taking the word "truth" as what it should mean: a true statement - or a true idea, or a true memory - insofar as it is true. By reading the sentence this way, you arrive at a completely different necessity, which does not apply to the state of affairs as if it were its own expression, but rather to its expression as different from it and needing it.

I don't quite know what the second interpretation is all about. Why bother using this second, seemingly made-up, sense of the word "necessity" anyway? Just say "a truth must be", when you mean "a necessary truth".

kennethamy wrote:

But if that means anything at all (which I rather doubt) it means that for every truth, there is some state of affairs that truth expresses. And not only is that not necessarily true, but it is false. For instance consider the truth that all bananas are bananas. That truth is true (what else would it be?) But there is no such state of affairs as that all bananas are bananas.

I suppose "state of affairs" wasn't the correct term. I simply meant that there must be a truth X, before truth X can be expressed. I'm differentiating between a truth, and an expression of a truth (like, say, a proposition). Or, maybe better yet, a fact and an expression of a fact. Although none of that is really relevant to this discussion.

guigus wrote:

That is what I am struggling with from the beginning. Let me try once more to, as you say, clarify things. It is all in the way you read the sentence "every truth must be true." One way of reading it is by taking the word "truth" as anything capable of being either true or false (the sense of truth-bearer referred to by the Wikipedia article). By reading the sentence this way, you arrive at a necessary truth in the sense of determinism, that is, in the sense that "no truth is contingent." This happens because truth is displaced from the word "truth," which would mean the expression of a state of affairs, and fully relocated to the state of affairs itself. Necessity then refers no longer to how an expression of a state of affairs needs that state of affairs, but rather to that same state of affairs itself as if were its own expression: truth becomes necessary "out there," in the world, as if it were a necessary statement. The other way of reading the sentence is by taking the word "truth" as what it should mean: a true statement - or a true idea, or a true memory - insofar as it is true. By reading the sentence this way, you arrive at a completely different necessity, which does not apply to the state of affairs as if it were its own expression, but rather to its expression as different from it and needing it.

I don't quite know what the second interpretation is all about. Why bother using this second, seemingly made-up, sense of the word "necessity" anyway? Just say "a truth must be", when you mean "a necessary truth".

Quote:

Hence, the necessary truth of any truth has nothing to do with a necessary state of affairs, but rather with the expression of that state of affairs depending on that same state of affairs.

What? What is the necessary truth of a truth? Is there also a necessary truth of a necessary truth of a truth, too?

guigus wrote:

Hence, the necessary truth of any truth has nothing to do with a necessary state of affairs, but rather with the expression of that state of affairs depending on that same state of affairs.

What? What is the necessary truth of a truth? Is there also a necessary truth of a necessary truth of a truth, too?

Zetherin wrote:

kennethamy wrote:

But if that means anything at all (which I rather doubt) it means that for every truth, there is some state of affairs that truth expresses. And not only is that not necessarily true, but it is false. For instance consider the truth that all bananas are bananas. That truth is true (what else would it be?) But there is no such state of affairs as that all bananas are bananas.

I suppose "state of affairs" wasn't the correct term. I simply meant that there must be a truth X, before truth X can be expressed. I'm differentiating between a truth, and an expression of a truth (like, say, a proposition). Or, maybe better yet, a fact and an expression of a fact. Although none of that is really relevant to this discussion.

guigus wrote:

That is what I am struggling with from the beginning. Let me try once more to, as you say, clarify things. It is all in the way you read the sentence "every truth must be true." One way of reading it is by taking the word "truth" as anything capable of being either true or false (the sense of truth-bearer referred to by the Wikipedia article). By reading the sentence this way, you arrive at a necessary truth in the sense of determinism, that is, in the sense that "no truth is contingent." This happens because truth is displaced from the word "truth," which would mean the expression of a state of affairs, and fully relocated to the state of affairs itself. Necessity then refers no longer to how an expression of a state of affairs needs that state of affairs, but rather to that same state of affairs itself as if were its own expression: truth becomes necessary "out there," in the world, as if it were a necessary statement. The other way of reading the sentence is by taking the word "truth" as what it should mean: a true statement - or a true idea, or a true memory - insofar as it is true. By reading the sentence this way, you arrive at a completely different necessity, which does not apply to the state of affairs as if it were its own expression, but rather to its expression as different from it and needing it.

I don't quite know what the second interpretation is all about. Why bother using this second, seemingly made-up, sense of the word "necessity" anyway? Just say "a truth must be", when you mean "a necessary truth".

Quote:

Hence, the necessary truth of any truth has nothing to do with a necessary state of affairs, but rather with the expression of that state of affairs depending on that same state of affairs.

What? What is the necessary truth of a truth? Is there also a necessary truth of a necessary truth of a truth, too?

I agree that if there is no truth to be expressed , then there is no truth to be expressed. That is a necessary truth.

The phrase, "a necessary truth of a truth" makes no sense. However, it is a theorem in the best known system of modal logic (S5) that if P is a necessary truth, then it is necessary that P is necessary. This is called the reiteration theory for obvious reason. I suggest that before you talk about modal logic, that you learn some. (I am, of course, addressing guigus, although it would be my advice to anyone that if they are going to discuss something, they ought to know what they are talking about).

I agree that if there is no truth to be expressed , then there is no truth to be expressed. That is a necessary truth.

kennethamy wrote:

I agree that if there is no truth to be expressed , then there is no truth to be expressed. That is a necessary truth.

This tautology shows what prevents you from understanding the necessary truth of any truth: you think of truth itself as being expressed, instead of its expressing whatever makes it a truth. Truth does not exist without or before the expression of a state of affairs: truth is a true statement, or a true idea, or a true memory, which necessarily expresses whatever in the world makes it a truth. There is no "truth to be expressed," truth itself is expression.

This tautology shows what prevents you from understanding the necessary truth of any truth: you think of truth itself as being expressed, instead of its expressing whatever makes it a truth. Truth does not exist without or before the expression of a state of affairs: truth is a true statement, or a true idea, or a true memory, which necessarily expresses whatever in the world makes it a truth. There is no "truth to be expressed," truth itself is expression.

guigus wrote:

kennethamy wrote:

I agree that if there is no truth to be expressed , then there is no truth to be expressed. That is a necessary truth.

This tautology shows what prevents you from understanding the necessary truth of any truth: you think of truth itself as being expressed, instead of its expressing whatever makes it a truth. Truth does not exist without or before the expression of a state of affairs: truth is a true statement, or a true idea, or a true memory, which necessarily expresses whatever in the world makes it a truth. There is no "truth to be expressed," truth itself is expression.

There is no "truth to be expressed," truth itself is expression.
Makes no sense.

I think, so far as I can understand what you are saying at all, that you are confusing what is expressed with the expression of it. Suppose it is a truth that the cat is on the mat. That is one thing. But the expression of that truth, namely, the statement that the cat is on the mat, is a quite different thing, and are independent of each other, for either one may exist without the other existing. Your failure to distinguish between a truth and the expression of a truth, then leads you to write, that, " truth does not exist without or before the expression of a state of affairs", which is clearly false. (The same kind of confusion is the cause of your belief that, " truth is a true statement, or a true idea, or a true memory" which is also clearly false.

There is no "truth to be expressed," truth itself is expression.
Makes no sense.

I think, so far as I can understand what you are saying at all, that you are confusing what is expressed with the expression of it. Suppose it is a truth that the cat is on the mat. That is one thing. But the expression of that truth, namely, the statement that the cat is on the mat, is a quite different thing, and are independent of each other, for either one may exist without the other existing. Your failure to distinguish between a truth and the expression of a truth, then leads you to write, that, " truth does not exist without or before the expression of a state of affairs", which is clearly false. (The same kind of confusion is the cause of your belief that, " truth is a true statement, or a true idea, or a true memory" which is also clearly false.

kennethamy wrote:

I think, so far as I can understand what you are saying at all, that you are confusing what is expressed with the expression of it. Suppose it is a truth that the cat is on the mat. That is one thing. But the expression of that truth, namely, the statement that the cat is on the mat, is a quite different thing, and are independent of each other, for either one may exist without the other existing. Your failure to distinguish between a truth and the expression of a truth, then leads you to write, that, " truth does not exist without or before the expression of a state of affairs", which is clearly false. (The same kind of confusion is the cause of your belief that, " truth is a true statement, or a true idea, or a true memory" which is also clearly false.

What is truth for you?

If that happens to mean, "what do I mean when I say that a proposition is true, I mean what I hope is meant by that sentence. And Aristotle put that very well: Aristotle wrote, "To say that something is true is to say that what is, is, and to say that what is not, is not". That about nails it, don't you think?

kennethamy wrote:

There is no "truth to be expressed," truth itself is expression.
Makes no sense.

Perhaps in modal logic it makes no sense. But fortunately the world is much more than modal logic.

He basically means that there is no objective world, as far as I understand him. A truth is only true insofar as our expression of that truth. In other words, if we did not exist to express truth, truth would not exist.

But that's false.

Zetherin wrote:

He basically means that there is no objective world, as far as I understand him. A truth is only true insofar as our expression of that truth. In other words, if we did not exist to express truth, truth would not exist.

But that's false.

Of course that is false, if that is what he means (even basically). But you seem to be a lot better at ferreting out what he means than I am. I have my hands full is trying to find out whether he means anything at all. You always assume he means something.