The necessary truth of any truth

@Mad Mike,

Quote:

We're all looking at the same reality, so is it really a surprise that we draw similar conclusions?

No. That is mere conjecture. I challenge you to define "same" without getting involved in "functionality". Observer and observed are co-extensive.

(Note that ANY two items are necessarily both "similar" and "different". Trivially they are "similar" because they are both objects of comparison, and they are different because we count two)

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@kennethamy,

Quote:

Objects are neither true not false. Statement, or propositions are true of false, so the statement, that a particular table exists is true (or false). I still have no idea what "true being' means, though. Do you?

That you don't know what a true being is is precisely the whole problem. A true being is what makes your statements true: if there were no true being, there would be no true statement. When you say that Obama is president, the true being of your statement is that Obama is actually president. A true being is always inside your statement as a presupposition, a presupposition that must be true for your statement to be true. So as you can see, you know what a true being is, you are just not relating the name to the person. Attention though: it is irrelevant if a true being really exists, if it is there outside of us and without us. What matters is that whatever a true being is, any truth presupposes it and cannot exist without presupposing it.

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@Mad Mike,

Mad Mike wrote:

If "a truth" means "a true statement," then obviously "every true statement is true." The question really is whether a particular statement is true or false; calling it "a truth" before making that determination is begging the question.

My assertion is that "every truth must be true", and not that "every truth is already true." If it were already true, then there would be no point in saying it must be so. Any statement refers to something, and it also implicitly asserts its own truth. This truth it implicitly asserts (its own truth) needs (but does not guarantee) that whatever it refers to is true. Its (implicitly asserted) truth must be (but is not yet) the truth of that something. This is the true meaning of "every truth must be true."

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@Mad Mike,

Mad Mike wrote:

As for the "true beings" part, I'll reiterate that all beings are true, by which I mean, in this context, real. So to say "X is" automatically means the same as "X is real" or "X truly is." And "X is" is true if X exists, false if X doesn't exist. Long story short, in my view truth is the articulation of what is.

If you stop one minute to think about what you said, you will see that, since you define "being" as something that really exists, then you are just saying that "all beings are beings." In other words, if it is a being, then it is true, by definition. If it is not true, then it is not a being. I cannot say, however, that such a being is false, just that it is not a being, since a being is always already true. I cannot even say that a being is true, since it cannot be false. Finally, if I imagine a future being, I cannot call it a being, since it does not really exist. And if I have the slightly doubt about a being really existing, again I cannot call it a being. It would be better to never say the word "being" again in my life, don't you agree?

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@fresco,

fresco wrote:

You really need to get to grips with Richard Rorty's adage "truth is what works", if you are going to commune with the guts of "modern scientists". For example, try discussing the "truth" of the proposition that "a positron is an electron travelling backwards in time!"

That is why scientists decide matters by devising tests. Until you can devise a test that shows the truth of whatever you imagine, you stay in the limbo of these endless discussions. One good example is J. S. Bell's "theorem," which gave us the possibility of testing Einstein's "elements of reality." Before Bell, it was a matter of belief alone. Now it is a matter of devising a testing scenario that gets rid of as many "loopholes" as possible.

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@kennethamy,

kennethamy wrote:

1. If P (some statement) is true, then P must be true.
2. It must be that if P is true, then P is true.

a. 1 is false (for some values of P)
b. 2. is true (for all values of P).
c. 1. does not follow from 2.

To consider false that "If P (some statement) is true, then P must be true" you must surreptitiously take the second "P" for whatever makes that statement a truth, rather than for that statement itself. Symptomatically, you put parenthesis only on the first "P". Now consider that "If P (some statement) is true, then P (that same statement) must be true." Then just remember that any statement being true means it is the same as a true being, so as to arrive at a correct interpretation of "every truth must be true": if some statement is true in what it asserts, then it must assert something actually true in the world.

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@Mad Mike,

To begin with, it is not true that Quito is necessarily the capital of Ecuador, as I already showed, Quito need not be the capital of Ecuador, so it is not necessarily the capital of Ecuador. I mention this just to point out that it is a good thing that the truth of the statement is not dependent on the truth of the statement that Quito is necessarily the capital of Ecuador, for if it were, it would not be true.

Next, it is necessary that if Quito is the capital of Ecuador, then Quito is the capital of Ecuador, just as any proposition of the the form, if p, then p is necessarily true. But that, of course, does not mean in any sense at all that it is necessarily true that Quito is the capital of Ecuador. You must see the difference between:
1. Necessarily, if Quito is the capital, then Quito is the capital, and,
2. If Quito is the capital, then necessarily, Quito is the capital.

Just look at 1 and 2. The difference stares you in the face. 1. is of course true, and 2. is, of course false. You are confusing 1 with 2.

If it is true one day (May 1) that Quito is the capital, and if it is true the next day (May 2) that Guyaquil is the capital, then it will always be true that Quito is the capital on May 1 (and not that it is no longer true that Quito is the capital on May 1) . But even that does not mean that it is necessarily true that Quito is the capital on May 1, because even if it is, it might not have been. And if a statement might not have been true, then even if it is true, that statement is not necessarily true. I think you need to be clearer about what it means to say of a statement that it is necessarily true. To say of a statement that it is necessarily true is not just to say of that statement that is is true, it is to say of that statement that it is impossible that it should be false. Clearly, it is true that Quito is the capital, but equally clearly, it is possible that it should be false that Quito is the capital. Therefore, that Quito is the capital is true, it is not necessarily true, for it might have been false, I showed, and as you apparently agree.

As for your question, I can do no better than to point you to:

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Possible_world

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Necessarily, all truths are true, but all truths are not necessarily true. Some truths are contingently true. If you think that "necessarily, all truths are true" implies "all truths are necessarily true" then you are committing the modal fallacy.

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@kennethamy,

Hi Ken,
It's good to see that you're back and active.

Ken:
1. If P (some statement) is true, then P must be true.
2. It must be that if P is true, then P is true.

a. 1 is false (for some values of P)
b. 2. is true (for all values of P).
c. 1. does not follow from 2.
-------------------------------

URL: http://able2know.org/reply/post-4166691

I agree.
If p is true and analytic, then Necessary(p) is true and analytic.
If p is analytic, then (p <-> []p) and (<>p <-> p) are tautologies.

If p is true and synthetic, then Necessary(p) is false and analytic, ie. []p is then a contradiction, and <>p is necessarily true.

For all p: [](p -> p) -> (p -> []p), fails when p is synthetic.

1 Reply

@Night Ripper,

Night Ripper wrote:

Necessarily, all truths are true, but all truths are not necessarily true. Some truths are contingently true. If you think that "necessarily, all truths are true" implies "all truths are necessarily true" then you are committing the modal fallacy.

Ok, back to the beginning. First, I do not think that "all truths are necessarily true" follows from "necessarily, all truths are true." The necessary truth of any truth stands on its own feet, it follows from the nature of truth itself. When you say that "all truths are necessarily true," you inadvertently change the meaning of "all truths" to "all that is true." Do not do that: stick with "all truths" as meaning whatever goes on inside your head, so as to notice those truths must be made true (as they are) by whatever they refer to as going on outside your head. The sentence "all truths are necessarily true" just binds whatever you think or believe to be true insofar as it is true with whatever it refers to in the world. It is neither redundant nor necessary. We are talking about two different kinds of necessity here: one relates a subjective truth insofar as it is true to its (necessary) objective truth; the other applies to the whole truth as a property (the statement you defend). The objective truth of any subjective truth follows from that anything we believe to be true insofar as it is true must get its truth from a true being in the world. It is not complicated: it is obvious, although it is not necessary, since it has nowhere to get such a necessity from. It is just how things are: and so it is. That other kind of necessity, the one external to whatever it refers to, the one that adheres to things as a property, is an illusion, since it has nowhere to come from.

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@guigus,

There are two ways a proposition can be true, by definition or by correspondence with the facts.

1. All bachelors are unmarried males.
2. The cat is on the mat.

Of course, (1) is true because that's what those words mean. A bachelor is an unmarried male so you're really saying all unmarried males are unmarried males. This kind of truth is redundant but valuable because it can make explicit that which was only implicit.

Now assuming (2) is true, it is only true because the cat is actually on the mat. This kind of truth is a correspondence between the proposition and the facts. When I say "the cat is on the mat" is true if and only if the cat is actually on the mat then I'm not saying something redundant because I'm talking about the proposition on one hand and the facts, the state of reality, on the other.

Assuming you understand all this, please tell me what is necessary about the truth of (2) "the cat is on the mat". It would seem to me that the cat doesn't have to be on the mat, there's nothing necessary about that bit of truth, but nevertheless it is contingently true.

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@Owen phil,

Owen phil wrote:

I agree.
If p is true and analytic, then Necessary(p) is true and analytic.
If p is analytic, then (p <-> []p) and (<>p <-> p) are tautologies.

If p is true and synthetic, then Necessary(p) is false and analytic, ie. []p is then a contradiction, and <>p is necessarily true.

For all p: [](p -> p) -> (p -> []p), fails when p is synthetic.

Being it synthetic or analytic, any statement must get its truth from outside of itself, in the world. If you say that "a regular chair has four legs," the truth of what you say will forever depend on a regular chair having four legs out there, in the world, regardless of whether you consider that statement an analytic or a synthetic one. The criteria that utterly decides truth is the necessary relation between a subjective and an objective truth. The kind of necessity you are concerned with has nothing to do with the necessity that binds something we believe to be true insofar as it is true with whatever makes it actually true in the world.

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@guigus,

You just mean by, "all truths are necessarily true" that " necessarily, if some proposition is true, then it is true" which is true enough, but is different from, "all propositions are necessarily true" which is just false. All this talk about subjective and objective truth just confuses the issue, as well it might, since the distinction between subjective and objective truth is, itself, only a confusion. There is no such thing as "subjective truth" (although there is, of course, such a thing as believing that some proposition is true. But that is no more subjective truth than is the fact that I believe that something is an elephant makes anything a subjective elephant. There are no subjective elephants, there are just elephants, and there are no subjective truths, there are just truths. (Although, as I just pointed out, there is such a thing as believing that something is an elephant, and there is such a thing as believing that some proposition is true).

1 Reply

@guigus,

I understand you to be saying that:

1. A truth is necessarily a truth, by the law of identity - just as 2 is necessarily 2, or a tree is necessarily a tree.
2. It is necessarily true that if a belief corresponds to an actual state of affairs, then that belief is true. If the belief corresponds to an actual state of affairs now, then it is true now, even if we have not yet verified the correspondence.

I think it is more helpful to use the expression 'actual state of affairs' rather than 'true being'.

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@kennethamy,

kennethamy wrote:

You just mean by, "all truths are necessarily true" that " necessarily, if some proposition is true, then it is true" which is true enough, but is different from, "all propositions are necessarily true" which is just false. All this talk about subjective and objective truth just confuses the issue, as well it might, since the distinction between subjective and objective truth is, itself, only a confusion. There is no such thing as "subjective truth" (although there is, of course, such a thing as believing that some proposition is true. But that is no more subjective truth than is the fact that I believe that something is an elephant makes anything a subjective elephant. There are no subjective elephants, there are just elephants, and there are no subjective truths, there are just truths. (Although, as I just pointed out, there is such a thing as believing that something is an elephant, and there is such a thing as believing that some proposition is true).

I already addressed this objection, but I'll do it again:
1) A subjective truth is whatever you believe to be true insofar as it is true.
2) An objective truth is whatever makes a subjective truth actually true.
Let me give you an example: you saw elephants last year in a certain savanna. This year, you didn't see them yet. The subjective truth is your belief on their presence there last year, of which the objective truth is their actual presence there then. Now I ask you: how can this truth cease to be true this year? Simple: the elephants can all have been killed. Then, what happens? You will no longer have the objective truth from which to make your subjective truth true. If there were no difference between the subjective and objective dimensions of any truth, no truth could ever cease to be true. The world would freeze and we would have elephants forever on that savanna. It is comforting, I agree, but with money involved, I would bet those elephants are history by now.

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@ACB,

ACB wrote:

I understand you to be saying that:

1. A truth is necessarily a truth, by the law of identity - just as 2 is necessarily 2, or a tree is necessarily a tree.
2. It is necessarily true that if a belief corresponds to an actual state of affairs, then that belief is true. If the belief corresponds to an actual state of affairs now, then it is true now, even if we have not yet verified the correspondence.

I think it is more helpful to use the expression 'actual state of affairs' rather than 'true being'.

That's really good news that you got it, or that you agree. Now "true being" may be harder than "actual state of affairs," but unfortunately it's both more rigorous and more simple. In fact, we have here a structural feature of language itself: truth as a noun and as an adjective. As a noun, truth must be subjective: if you take some time to inspect yourself while trying to make that noun (truth) mean an "actual state of affairs," you will notice a distance between you and whatever you mean, since you are referring to the "actual state of affairs" by means of your belief on it, while if you try to mean by "truth" that same belief, you will see that distance disappear. On the other hand, if you talk about a "true being," truth becomes an adjective of the noun referring to that "actual state of affairs" itself, hence incorporating itself into it: truth becomes objective.

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@ACB,

ACB wrote:

I understand you to be saying that:

1. A truth is necessarily a truth, by the law of identity - just as 2 is necessarily 2, or a tree is necessarily a tree.
2. It is necessarily true that if a belief corresponds to an actual state of affairs, then that belief is true. If the belief corresponds to an actual state of affairs now, then it is true now, even if we have not yet verified the correspondence.

I think it is more helpful to use the expression 'actual state of affairs' rather than 'true being'.

I would like to clarify two things though:
1) Although there is indeed an identity between subjective and objective truth, this does not follow from the identity principle. On the contrary, it is the identity principle that follows from it, infamously using that identity to deny the very difference upon which it stands, from which precisely comes its lawful nature.
2) The necessity that links a subjective truth with its objective counterpart is not itself necessary: there is no necessary truth in saying a truth needs a true being to make it a truth. This is just another way to enunciate the principle of identity, that is, to discard any difference between subjective and objective truth.

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@guigus,

I would have thought it was simply true that I believed there were elephants there last year. All beliefs are, I guess, subjective in the sense that they are things of the mind (mental). But how would that mean that it was subjectively true that I had such a believe last year? It is true, of course, that I believe that I had such a belief last year. Is that what you mean. But if I did believe that there were elephant on the Savannah last year, then it is true that I believed that there were elephants on the Savannah last year. Whether or not I actually believed something is just a fact. Either I held that belief or I did not hold that belief. That beliefs themselves are subjective (in the sense that they are mental "object") is irrelevant. I think you confuse two things. 1. the fact that I believed something, with, 2. that the fact was itself, a belief. Just because the fact I believed was about what is subjective, does not make the fact that I believed it, subjective. What I believed is one thing. That I believed it, is quite a different thing. You are confusing the what with the that. Just because what I believed was subjective doesn't mean that i believed it was subjective. Another example. I believe that I am in pain. My pain is (I suppose) subjective. But that I do believe I am in pain is obviously, objective.

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@guigus,

So would it be appropriate to think of 'truth' as a kind of interface between a true belief and an actual state of affairs? A kind of bipolar abstract object linking the two, such that when its subjective 'belief' pole is in the 'on' position (i.e. registering 'true') its objective 'state of affairs' pole is also in the 'on' position (registering 'actual'), and vice versa? When one pole is 'on', the other is automatically also 'on', but nevertheless the two poles are distinct?

Or is that too fanciful an analogy?

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@guigus,

One will not reach very far going about telling truths.

To evacuate a stadium filled with people, it's very fatal to tell the truth about a possible bomb being hidden there, one MUST tell a lie to safely evacuate the masses, else they are prone to trample eachother to death in their fear and hysteria.

Themistocles the unsung hero of Battle of Salamis back in ancient Greece, would motivate the Athenian by telling a lie.

Too often people will not belive the truth, because it's not plausible, therefor a wise and cunning person will tell something plausible instead.

1 Reply

The necessary truth of any truth

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