The necessary truth of any truth

So would it be appropriate to think of 'truth' as a kind of interface between a true belief and an actual state of affairs? A kind of bipolar abstract object linking the two, such that when its subjective 'belief' pole is in the 'on' position (i.e. registering 'true') its objective 'state of affairs' pole is also in the 'on' position (registering 'actual'), and vice versa? When one pole is 'on', the other is automatically also 'on', but nevertheless the two poles are distinct?

Or is that too fanciful an analogy?

To say that a belief (or a statement, or a sentence, or a proposition; depending on what you think is the truth-bearer) is true is to say that there is a relation, and that one term of the relation is the truth-bearer (belief, if you like) and the other term of the relation is something not the belief (etc.) namely some fact, or some state of affairs in the world. So truth is the name of a dyadic relation between what is true, and a truth-maker, as I just said, a fact, or a state of affairs. Of course, just what that relation is requires more (a lot more) specification. Philosophers often call that relation, "correspondence" and so, that vies of truth is called the "correspondence theory" of truth.

I would have thought it was simply true that I believed there were elephants there last year. All beliefs are, I guess, subjective in the sense that they are things of the mind (mental). But how would that mean that it was subjectively true that I had such a believe last year? It is true, of course, that I believe that I had such a belief last year. Is that what you mean. But if I did believe that there were elephant on the Savannah last year, then it is true that I believed that there were elephants on the Savannah last year. Whether or not I actually believed something is just a fact. Either I held that belief or I did not hold that belief. That beliefs themselves are subjective (in the sense that they are mental "object") is irrelevant. I think you confuse two things. 1. the fact that I believed something, with, 2. that the fact was itself, a belief. Just because the fact I believed was about what is subjective, does not make the fact that I believed it, subjective. What I believed is one thing. That I believed it, is quite a different thing. You are confusing the what with the that. Just because what I believed was subjective doesn't mean that i believed it was subjective. Another example. I believe that I am in pain. My pain is (I suppose) subjective. But that I do believe I am in pain is obviously, objective.

However, we must extract all consequences of this understanding: it all means that truth holds within itself a contradiction between difference and identity

You really ought to distinguish between necessarily every truth is true, and every truth is necessarily true. All you have to do is to notice where the necessarily operator appears. It is a matter of simple ambiguity. (Example: it is necessarily true that if Obama is president, then Obama is president. But it is not true at all (let alone necessarily true) that if Obama is president then necessarily, Obama is president, let alone that if Obama is president then Obama is necessarily president).

kennethamy wrote:

What you say about tautologies is quite true, only what you say does not appl9 to the statement, "every truth must be true" because that statement is not a tautology. If is, in fact, false, as I (among others) have explained. It looks like a tautology to you because you mix it up with a different statement that is a tautology. That statement you mix it up with is the statement, "It must be that every truth is a truth". That statement is a tautology. I really don't know how to put your mistake any clearer. It should be easy to see how the two different statements are different simply by inspection.

What I'm arguing is that a true statement must be true, but the thing the statement describes may not be necessarily true. In your Quito example, if the statement "Quito is the capital of Ecuador" is to be true, then Quito necessarily must be the capital of Ecuador. But that doesn't mean that the statement "Quito is necessarily the capital of Ecuador" is true in any other context.

Slow down, dude. We're talking about two things, and I don't think we're really disagreeing, we just have to separate the two issues. The truth of the statement "Quito is the capital of Ecuador" is not dependent on the truth of the statement "Quito is necessarily the capital of Ecuador."

For the first statement to be true, Quito must in fact be the capital of Ecuador, so in that sense, it's necessary that Quito be the capital of Ecuador for the statement to be true.

I haven't read this whole thread, but

I think I'll stick to correspondence. At least I understand that.

I am reluctant to allow contradictions, as I believe they undermine the basis of rational thought. I would prefer to say that truth is a complex object which is not "different from itself" but possesses 'poles' (or aspects) that are different from each other, although they necessarily have the same truth-values.

Would you say there is a similar necessary connection between false beliefs and non-actual (i.e. counterfactual) states of affairs? Is there an equivalent complex object called 'falsity'? Or is falsity only a negative, i.e. the absence of truth?

kennethamy wrote:

I think I'll stick to correspondence. At least I understand that.

For the same reason, many people stick with creationism.

kennethamy wrote:

I think I'll stick to correspondence. At least I understand that.

For the same reason, many people stick with creationism.

ACB wrote:

I am reluctant to allow contradictions, as I believe they undermine the basis of rational thought. I would prefer to say that truth is a complex object which is not "different from itself" but possesses 'poles' (or aspects) that are different from each other, although they necessarily have the same truth-values.

Would you say there is a similar necessary connection between false beliefs and non-actual (i.e. counterfactual) states of affairs? Is there an equivalent complex object called 'falsity'? Or is falsity only a negative, i.e. the absence of truth?

Think: if being rational depends on a previous decision to reject contradiction based on belief, then rationality depends on an irrational decision. This is a contradiction, but unfortunately it is also something else: inconsistency.

Left something out earlier, namely what I think is confusing me about "necessary" truth. What I'm arguing is that a true statement must be true, but the thing the statement describes may not be necessarily true. In your Quito example, if the statement "Quito is the capital of Ecuador" is to be true, then Quito necessarily must be the capital of Ecuador. But that doesn't mean that the statement "Quito is necessarily the capital of Ecuador" is true in any other context.

guigus wrote:

kennethamy wrote:

I think I'll stick to correspondence. At least I understand that.

For the same reason, many people stick with creationism.

Well, I am certainly not going to adopt any view that makes no sense.