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The necessary truth of any truth

Forums: Philosophy, Logic, Truth, Necessity, Philosophy Language
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guigus
 
  1  
Reply Mon 14 Jun, 2010 04:19 am
@Zetherin,
Zetherin wrote:
Well, who would disagree with that? If it's not raining inside my house, the proposition "It is raining inside my house" is not true.


Ok, we have an agreement. So let us go from there: Quito must be the capital of Ecuador for the statement "Quito is the capital of Ecuador" to be true. Now, in the spirit of the "correspondence" theory of truth, let us refer to the statement "Quito is the capital of Ecuador" as the truth-bearer, of which the truth-maker is Quito being the capital of Ecuador "out there." What I am saying is that, if Quito ceases to be the capital of Ecuador, then the statement "Quito is the capital of Ecuador" ceases to be a truth-bearer, since it no longer beares any truth. This is why every truth bearer needs a truth-maker (every truth must be true). However, this is no tautology, since we are talking about two different things: a truth-bearer and a truth-maker. Maybe Quito can regain the status of "capital of Ecuador" in the future, by which that statement will be again a truth-bearer, but while the capital of Ecuador stays at another city, that same statement will not be a truth-bearer, don't you agree? Or you think that a statement can be a truth-bearer by bearing no truth?
guigus
 
  1  
Reply Mon 14 Jun, 2010 04:30 am
@ACB,
ACB wrote:
Sorry, I don't understand what you mean here. Less than actual?


When you think about something necessary, you are considering it as not yet an actuality, since necessity refers to something previous to that: you are focusing either on the necessity that it had to become actual as it is now or on the necessity it has now of remaining actual in the future. On the other hand, you are considering it as something beyond a mere possibility, which not only can be, but also must be. In other words: it is more than a mere possibility - more than possible - but not yet an actuality - less than actual.
0 Replies
 
guigus
 
  1  
Reply Mon 14 Jun, 2010 04:33 am
@kennethamy,
kennethamy wrote:
But I have very good reasons for rejecting contradictions. You make it sound as if the rejection of contradictions was an arbitrary decision, or a matter of taste. Wherever would you have got such an idea?


Are you aware of the many non-classical developments on the field of logic in the last and present century? This is not an original idea of mine at all.
0 Replies
 
guigus
 
  1  
Reply Mon 14 Jun, 2010 04:40 am
@kennethamy,
kennethamy wrote:
No need, all truths are true. That is a tautology. So, you needn't worry about it.


It would be a tautology if "truth" and "true" were meaning the same thing, but "truth" refers to a truth-bearer, while "true" refers to a truth-maker. Remember that you deny that a truth-bearer "contains" its truth maker? Now you are saying exactly the opposite: that a truth-bearer is identical to its truth-maker. Your problem is that you refuse to accept that both happen at once: a truth-bearer and its truth-maker are at once different and identical to each other.
guigus
 
  1  
Reply Mon 14 Jun, 2010 04:55 am
@Zetherin,
Zetherin wrote:
And I think sometimes people put the word "truth" in quotes when they think that truth is relative. That is, they think facts are determined by us. Guigus, is that what you meant?


No, I put "truth" in quotes just to draw attention to the use of a noun instead of an adjective. That is, to stress the difference in meaning between a "truth" and being "true": truth refers to a truth-bearer, while true refers to a truth-maker. So by saying "every truth must be true" I am saying, for instance, that for the statement "Quito is the capital of Ecuador" to be true Quito must be the capital of Ecuador (a truth-bearer needs a truth-maker).
0 Replies
 
guigus
 
  1  
Reply Mon 14 Jun, 2010 05:36 am
@kennethamy,
kennethamy wrote:
But I have very good reasons for rejecting contradictions. You make it sound as if the rejection of contradictions was an arbitrary decision, or a matter of taste. Wherever would you have got such an idea?


If you find a contradiction, then you have a better reason to accept it than any other reason you may have to reject it.
0 Replies
 
ACB
 
  1  
Reply Mon 14 Jun, 2010 06:37 am
@guigus,
guigus wrote:
a truth-bearer and its truth-maker are at once different and identical to each other.

They are different from each other in one sense, and identical in another. You have explained the sense in which they are different, and the sense in which they are identical. And those are two different senses. Therefore, there is no contradiction.

"All truths are true" or "Every truth-bearer needs a truth-maker" cannot be both a tautology and not a tautology.
guigus
 
  1  
Reply Mon 14 Jun, 2010 11:13 am
@ACB,
ACB wrote:

guigus wrote:
a truth-bearer and its truth-maker are at once different and identical to each other.

They are different from each other in one sense, and identical in another. You have explained the sense in which they are different, and the sense in which they are identical. And those are two different senses. Therefore, there is no contradiction.

"All truths are true" or "Every truth-bearer needs a truth-maker" cannot be both a tautology and not a tautology.


The sense in which they are identical is not the one in which you considered them to be identical. Let me explain the sense in which I consider them to be identical. Whatever a true statement is, it must have a counterpart in the world, by which it is true. That statement and its counterpart must be the same thing, which appears here as a statement and there as its counterpart. If it is not the same thing here and there, truth itself is destroyed. This is the identity. But it is not a simple identity, since this "thing" that is here a statement and there its counterpart is also different here and there. Hence, instead of a simple identity (which would turn my statement into a tautology), what we have here is a contradictory identity. In fact, this is what we know about truth before anything else: that it involves two things, which are both the same and not the same.
0 Replies
 
Zetherin
 
  1  
Reply Mon 14 Jun, 2010 11:38 am
@guigus,
guigus wrote:

Ok, we have an agreement. So let us go from there: Quito must be the capital of Ecuador for the statement "Quito is the capital of Ecuador" to be true. Now, in the spirit of the "correspondence" theory of truth, let us refer to the statement "Quito is the capital of Ecuador" as the truth-bearer, of which the truth-maker is Quito being the capital of Ecuador "out there." What I am saying is that, if Quito ceases to be the capital of Ecuador, then the statement "Quito is the capital of Ecuador" ceases to be a truth-bearer, since it no longer beares any truth.


Remember that truth-bearers can be either true or false. That is why propositions can be false but still be truth-bearers. If the capital changed, the proposition "Quito is the capital of Ecuador" would still be a proposition, that is, it would still be a truth-bearer. However, it would be a false proposition.

Quote:
This is why every truth bearer needs a truth-maker (every truth must be true). However, this is no tautology, since we are talking about two different things: a truth-bearer and a truth-maker. Maybe Quito can regain the status of "capital of Ecuador" in the future, by which that statement will be again a truth-bearer, but while the capital of Ecuador stays at another city, that same statement will not be a truth-bearer, don't you agree?


The truth-maker is Quito being the capital of Ecuador; it is a state of affairs. Truth-makers are what is, and truth-bearers are, in a sense, an expression of what is. Of course there has to be a state of affairs, to have an expression of said state of affairs.

guigus
 
  1  
Reply Mon 14 Jun, 2010 12:40 pm
@Zetherin,
Zetherin wrote:
Remember that truth-bearers can be either true or false. That is why propositions can be false but still be truth-bearers. If the capital changed, the proposition "Quito is the capital of Ecuador" would still be a proposition, that is, it would still be a truth-bearer. However, it would be a false proposition.


If a truth-bearer means to you the same as a statement, whether true or false, then replace it by "true statement." My point is that "every truth must be true," and a truth-bearer can only be used for my purposes if it is taken as whatever holds a truth, and insofar as it holds it.
0 Replies
 
guigus
 
  1  
Reply Mon 14 Jun, 2010 12:47 pm
@Zetherin,
Zetherin wrote:
The truth-maker is Quito being the capital of Ecuador; it is a state of affairs. Truth-makers are what is, and truth-bearers are, in a sense, an expression of what is. Of course there has to be a state of affairs, to have an expression of said state of affairs.


That's it. And it means to say that "every truth must be true": a truth can be a true statement - or a true idea, or a true memory - and its being true can be a state of affairs - or an object, or an event. The point is: a truth can be many things, but whatever it is it must be true.
Zetherin
 
  1  
Reply Mon 14 Jun, 2010 01:01 pm
@guigus,
guigus wrote:

Zetherin wrote:
The truth-maker is Quito being the capital of Ecuador; it is a state of affairs. Truth-makers are what is, and truth-bearers are, in a sense, an expression of what is. Of course there has to be a state of affairs, to have an expression of said state of affairs.


That's it. And it means to say that "every truth must be true": a truth can be a true statement - or a true idea, or a true memory - and its being true can be a state of affairs - or an object, or an event. The point is: a truth can be many things, but whatever it is it must be true.


The reason why kennethamy pointed out the modal fallacy earlier is because, when you say "every truth must be true", it sounds like you are saying that all truths are necessary truths. And we know this to be false, since some truths are contingent truths. If all you mean is, necessarily, all truths are true, then what you say is true. However, if you mean that, all truths are necessarily true, then what you say is false. And, again, this is a good read on the modal fallacy - some people misplace the operator "necessarily" and this leads them to think a truth is necessary when it is not.

It may be helpful to understand what the difference between necessary and contingent truths is, if that is where your ignorance lies.
guigus
 
  1  
Reply Mon 14 Jun, 2010 01:02 pm
@Zetherin,
Zetherin wrote:
Of course there has to be a state of affairs, to have an expression of said state of affairs.


What you just said is perhaps the best way to interpret “every truth must be true,” since it actually makes us read it correctly: every truth (an expression of a state of affairs) must be true (depends on the said state of affairs to be able to express it).
Zetherin
 
  1  
Reply Mon 14 Jun, 2010 01:06 pm
@guigus,
guigus wrote:

Zetherin wrote:
Of course there has to be a state of affairs, to have an expression of said state of affairs.


What you just said is perhaps the best way to interpret “every truth must be true,” since it actually makes us read it correctly: every truth (an expression of a state of affairs) must be true (depends on the said state of affairs to be able to express it).


We must clarify what it is you mean when you say must be. Most of us here were under the impression you meant by "must be", "necessarily".
guigus
 
  1  
Reply Mon 14 Jun, 2010 01:09 pm
@Zetherin,
Zetherin wrote:
The reason why kennethamy pointed out the modal fallacy earlier is because, when you say "every truth must be true", it sounds like you are saying that all truths are necessary truths. And we know this to be false, since some truths are contingent truths. If all you mean is, necessarily, all truths are true, then what you say is true. However, if you mean that, all truths are necessarily true, then what you say is false. And, again, this is a good read on the modal fallacy - some people misplace the operator "necessarily" and this leads them to think a truth is necessary when it is not.

It may be helpful to understand what the difference between necessary and contingent truths is, if that is where your ignorance lies.


From very the beginning, I knew perfectly what kennethamy was complaining about. It is called determinism: to believe everything that happens could not happen in any other way, by having perfectly determinate causes. In other words, that everything is necessary. Hence, when there is a truth, in can only be a necessary truth. What I am saying is something else entirely. When I say that every truth must be true I am simply saying that being true is a necessary feature of every truth. But you will never understand it until you realize that necessity in that other sense is a flawed concept: an illusion.
kennethamy
 
  1  
Reply Mon 14 Jun, 2010 01:19 pm
@guigus,
guigus wrote:

Zetherin wrote:
Of course there has to be a state of affairs, to have an expression of said state of affairs.


What you just said is perhaps the best way to interpret “every truth must be true,” since it actually makes us read it correctly: every truth (an expression of a state of affairs) must be true (depends on the said state of affairs to be able to express it).


But if that means anything at all (which I rather doubt) it means that for every truth, there is some state of affairs that truth expresses. And not only is that not necessarily true, but it is false. For instance consider the truth that all bananas are bananas. That truth is true (what else would it be?) But there is no such state of affairs as that all bananas are bananas.
kennethamy
 
  1  
Reply Mon 14 Jun, 2010 01:30 pm
@guigus,
guigus wrote:

Zetherin wrote:
The reason why kennethamy pointed out the modal fallacy earlier is because, when you say "every truth must be true", it sounds like you are saying that all truths are necessary truths. And we know this to be false, since some truths are contingent truths. If all you mean is, necessarily, all truths are true, then what you say is true. However, if you mean that, all truths are necessarily true, then what you say is false. And, again, this is a good read on the modal fallacy - some people misplace the operator "necessarily" and this leads them to think a truth is necessary when it is not.

It may be helpful to understand what the difference between necessary and contingent truths is, if that is where your ignorance lies.


From very the beginning, I knew perfectly what kennethamy was complaining about. It is called determinism: to believe everything that happens could not happen in any other way, by having perfectly determinate causes. In other words, that everything is necessary. Hence, when there is a truth, in can only be a necessary truth. What I am saying is something else entirely. When I say that every truth must be true I am simply saying that being true is a necessary feature of every truth. But you will never understand it until you realize that necessity in that other sense is a flawed concept: an illusion.


You are quite mistaken. I was not complaining about determinism, nor do I think any of this has anything to do with determinism. In fact, I was not complaining about anything at all. But what I was pointing out is that you were confusing the two statements:

1. Necessarily all truths are true, which is true, with,
2. All truths are necessarily true, which is false,

and I was pointing out the confusion. Apparently you still are confused. To paraphrase Samuel Johnson, while I can point out your confusion, I cannot make you understand that you are confused. And, apparently, neither can Zeth. or Emil. I think that what you really ought to do is to learn some logic, and modal logic, in particular. It may comfort you to think I am complaining about determinism since that may make you think you understand what is going on. Let me assure you once more that none of this has anything to do with determinism, but it has everything to do with logic, and, especially modal logic. Two subjects you apparently know little or nothing about.
ughaibu
 
  1  
Reply Mon 14 Jun, 2010 01:33 pm
@kennethamy,
kennethamy wrote:
1. Necessarily all truths are true, which is true, with,
2. All truths are necessarily true, which is false,
Let me assure you once more that none of this has anything to do with determinism
Great. Hopefully you'll quit the crap about compatibilism by appeal to the above modal fallacy.
0 Replies
 
guigus
 
  1  
Reply Mon 14 Jun, 2010 01:50 pm
@Zetherin,
Zetherin wrote:
We must clarify what it is you mean when you say must be. Most of us here were under the impression you meant by "must be", "necessarily".


That is what I am struggling with from the beginning. Let me try once more to, as you say, clarify things. It is all in the way you read the sentence "every truth must be true." One way of reading it is by taking the word "truth" as anything capable of being either true or false (the sense of truth-bearer referred to by the Wikipedia article). By reading the sentence this way, you arrive at a necessary truth in the sense of determinism, that is, in the sense that "no truth is contingent." This happens because truth is displaced from the word "truth," which would mean the expression of a state of affairs, and fully relocated to the state of affairs itself. Necessity then refers no longer to how an expression of a state of affairs needs that state of affairs, but rather to that same state of affairs itself as if were its own expression: truth becomes necessary "out there," in the world, as if it were a necessary statement. The other way of reading the sentence is by taking the word "truth" as what it should mean: a true statement - or a true idea, or a true memory - insofar as it is true. By reading the sentence this way, you arrive at a completely different necessity, which does not apply to the state of affairs as if it were its own expression, but rather to its expression as different from it and needing it.
0 Replies
 
Owen phil
 
  1  
Reply Mon 14 Jun, 2010 01:53 pm
@kennethamy,
There is no state of affairs that tautologies represent.
There is no situation that is tautologous.
Factual propositions are decided by a corresponence of fact with the factual proposition that represents it.

Tautologies are propositions that are decided by logical methods; deduction, truth tables, etc.. There is no correspondence theory of truth that applies to tautology.
 

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