Why does God permit evil????

I will give the standard (Leibnizian) answers to your objections:

1. As I said, God could have created a world with no evil. But had He done so, he would not have created the best of all possible worlds, since the net amount of good would not have been as great as the actual world.

2. Your second objection just assumes that there are some logically unnecessary evils, and so, begs the question.

3. See number 1. Reducing all the evils would not reduce all the good, but a world in which there was no evil would contain as much good as the actual world which contains evil

Leibniz invented the calculus (So did Newton). For Leibniz, this what what mathematicians call a "minimax" problem in the calculus. God, the supreme mathematician, created a world with the maximum amount of good logically compatible with the minimum amount of evil.

Number one is a popular little theistic argument, and very silly. According to a theistic apologist, a world without evil would not be the best of all possible worlds. This just doesn't hold water. It screams of desperation. Doesn't it mean that god is punishing us by sending us to heaven when we die since there is no evil in heaven? Also, don't the doctrines of the major world religions call for an end to suffering and evil?

There are evils that have no good affect whatsoever, and sometimes they only serve to create more evil. For example, little children are raped and killed for senseless reasons and it only causes more suffering. Anyone who would be desperate enough to salvage their fictitious reality that they would believe that senseless murders of innocents was necessary for the greater good is spiritually poisoned and passively nihilistic.

Give me some examples of how 9/11 served a greater good that could not have been accomplished in a positive way?

You should read my post #120. You are confusing what is logically possible with what is actual. It may be improbable that this is the best of all possible worlds; but it is logically possible that it is. The original problem of evil tried to show it was logically impossible.

OK, I understand that you're not arguing that it is actual or likely, but the counters to the problem of evil don't hold water.

Simply put, as it has been many a time:

If it holds true that a being such as this "God" fellow exists, he is either not as powerful as he would like us to believe or he is unwilling.

That is my position on the matter.

Your position seems to exclude some other options.

Assuming the existence of God, one could also suggest that He is indeed as powerful as credited . . . and that He has a plan.

Where were you when He was creating the Universe?

What can oppose God's Will?

That's the argument God gives to Job. That is the might makes right argument. Is that argument all right when God makes it?

I would suppose that if one fully embraces the belief in an all-knowing and all-powerful God, one would have to accept the argument, or deny one's own faith by rejecting the argument, by essentially saying God is wrong.

But if God is wrong in this particular instance, then all of God's handiwork comes under question. But that, of course, makes the assumption that one might be correct in one's belief that God is wrong, which, of course, could be an erroneous belief.

It seems like there's a scent of Pascal's Wager in the air at this point.

Not being a scholar though, it's likely I'm in error.

I think an underlying question of "Why does God permit evil," might just as well be "Can we know God's mind?"

Why would an argument from might instead of right be any more cogent if God made the argument than anyone else? All He is saying is, "because I say so". Go back to the Euthyphro thread. Is what is right, right because God says it is right, or does God say it is right because it is right?

I think an underlying question of "Why does God permit evil," might just as well be "Can we know God's mind?"

Why? The question is how can God be good and all-powerful, and there be evil? That has nothing to do with what God is thinking.

I would not say that the might is right argument is correct. There are some who would, which is all I meant to note.

As a child, I got the parental "because I said so" argument quite often. I rarely thought they were right, but in retrospect I see that they often were.

In this regard, if we take the approach that we are all God's children, is it possible that the logic of the "because I said so," argument, while certainly open to debate, is largely irrelevant as we as His children can't possibly hope to understand His logic?

I had not followed the Euthyphro thread. It seems interesting. I'll spend some time on it this weekend. Thanks for pointing it out to me. My apologies if I am hammering away at something that has already been covered in that thread. If you want to suggest I shutuppa my face until I have read through it, I'm fine with that.



I'm not sure what you mean. If there is evil, wouldn't it follow that God thinks there is a need for it? If God created this "best possible world" wouldn't He have had to think about it?

People produce all kind of terrible argument. The arguments are still terrible.
Even if you parents were right, that is no reason to think that the argument is right. A true conclusion can be backed up by a lousy argument.

Once we say we "cannot understand God's logic" we have given up on rational discourse. Then, everything is up for grabs.

The Euthyphro dilemma is central here.

That is exactly what He is doing. We are being perfected in this imperfect world and the evil has a role in this process. Yes, I am sure I have a grasp of that problem as I live accordingly, and it works.

Let me be absolutely clear: I refer to the next world, not to this one.

So I take it you are referring to the Irenaean theodicy, where God's purpose is not to construct a paradise in this world, but rather, a means towards a perfect end (supposing an afterlife in the next world). Essentially, this world is a place of creative "soul making." Would you call that description accurate?

I do not disagree that this theodicy shows with some plausibility the need for an im perfect, person-making world. However, my problem is whether it justifies the actual extent of human suffering, e.g. the gigantic evils of the Jewish Holocaust, Rwanda Genocide, cancer etc. You may attribute that to the moral wickedness of human action, but still, can such a painful creative process leading to an infinite good be the expression of a morally perfect, divine goodness? Assuming we even need a divine command theory to reach moral goodness?

Of course I am expecting a yes answer here from you, but for the religious skeptic, the problem of evil has not been sufficiently resolved.

Of course, if there is no God, then there is no problem of evil

You just are not interested in the problem of evil. But even an atheist can be (and have been) interested in it. It poses an interesting logical problem of whether God's goodness and power can be reconciled with the existence of evil

And besides, atheists ought to be interested in the problem if only because it question of how there can be a God in the fact of evil has always been thought to be one of the main arrows in the atheist's quiver.

But, whatever Leibniz really believed, it is pretty clear that his theodicy only shows that it is not impossible (self-contradictory) for this world to be the best of all possible worlds along with evil. That is what is called the logical problem of evil. The argument had been that there was a logical contradiction in the supposition that a good, and all powerful God could create a world with evil. Leibniz shows only that there is no logical impossibility in this supposition. Not that it is in fact, true.

If it could be shown that a world without the Holocaust would be less good than a world with the Holocaust, it might.

Even if there is a God, there need not be a problem of evil. Once again the argument assumes much too much about God for it to be worthwhile to analyze. Well, not worthwhile in my eyes - as you noted, I'm just not interested in this.



I am not a strong atheist. That is, I do not believe that God doesn't exist, I just don't believe in God. As far as "ism's" go, I most closely relate to ignosticism when speaking about "God".

With that said, sure, this poses an interesting logical problem if we assume all of these metaphysical notions about God, but let it be known that "God" doesn't have to have these metaphysical notions applied. There are many notions of "God", just to be clear, and some do not flirt with this "perfectly good" quandary.



I don't know what you mean by this. I have "evil" in my quiver? Personally, I don't believe evil has anything to do with God existing or not existing. God doesn't necessarily have to have anything to do with morality. And, as far as this "problem" is concerned, I still don't understand it. Because, well, I haven't a clue what "perfectly good" means. There are many things unclear here. For one, who is judging the "good" and "evil" voiced in the argument? What notion of "God" are we speaking about? We can't just say "God" and have a meaningful discussion without further clarification. Have we attempted to grasp what these omni- properties really entail? Can we even? Do we know what we're saying when we say "good" exists or "evil" exists? Why do we assume God is logical? Why do we assume God has human foibles and considers, has intentions, thinks, plans, and does such things humans do?

My point is, which is in parallel to Kant's view, is that it might be a stretch to say all non contradictory concepts are possible. This is a major assumption, and in some ways it amounts to a sense of hyperrationalism. So perhaps the logical possibility that Leibniz supposes is questionable.

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And can you actually show that? Or should we all proceed on the supposition that it might be possible? Is that good evidence to justify such a belief?

1. God is perfectly good
2. God is omnipotent

3. There is evil.

It looks as if at least one of the above statements has to be false. They cannot all be true.

If "perfectly good" means as you say, I don't know why any Christians, Jews, or Muslims would think number one is true. As far as I know (and this is 8 years of Christian school talking), in the Biblical texts, God has done evil (or do we just not call it evil when God does it? whatever the case, he did kill many people). And, I think it could be perceived as a gratuitious amount of evil. Hell, it's gratuitious compared to any humanly standard!

No, I cannot show it is true. But there is no reason that I know of to think it is not possible.