@stew phil,
stew;102109 wrote:yes & no. It is true that the net benefit's of good in this world are the greatest in comparison with other possible worlds, but I'don't think you quite flesh out Leibniz reasoning for it, and some of the problems it imples.
His basic reasoning can be stated as such: ""If God is doing his(her) best, then this must be the best God can do."
The problem is, to say that this is the best possible world, is only true a-priori. No matter how you try and reason against the definition you can't because it holds true analytically.
Think about the real world now. There seems like plenty of things we could make better, how about curing aids or cancer for starters or preventing monsoons, earthquakes etc. Leibniz theodicy is so broad to the point of almost lacking any distinguishing criterion whatsoever that it becomes meaningless. Leibniz theodicy only holds, if an omni-everything God in fact exists. Otherwise, it is just another analytically true argument.
I think you are confusing two different things. 1. Whether it is actually true that this is the best of all possible worlds, and 2. How it
could be true that this is the best of all possible worlds despite the manifest amount to evil in it. I don't believe that even Leibniz believed he had shown this was the best of all possible worlds, although Voltaire in Candide, supposes he did. Leibniz (as I said before) clearly thinks faith is needed to believe it is true that every evil is a necessary evil. But, whatever Leibniz really believed, it is pretty clear that his theodicy only shows that it is not
impossible (self-contradictory) for this world to be the best of all possible worlds along with evil. That is what is called the
logical problem of evil. The argument had been that there was a logical contradiction in the supposition that a good, and all powerful God could create a world with evil. Leibniz shows only that there is no logical impossibility in this supposition. Not that it is in fact, true. Whether it is, in fact, true, is a different question. David Hume clearly made this distinction in his critique of the problem. So, it seems to me that you are not distinguishing between the logical problem of evil, and something else, namely, the
empirical problem of evil. Between whether it
could be that way, and whether it actually
is that way. It is important to distinguish those two issues. (That is why Leibniz really by-passes the question of whether God does exist. It is not relevant).