Why does God permit evil????

@Alan McDougall,

Alan McDougall;120380 wrote:

God being the Prime Mover must know he is the greatest he is not proud of it is just a fact and he find it humorous that we puny mortal praise him.

God wishes people to good because that attribute will help the person to prosper and be happy. Evil does not lead to happiness, "those that live by the sword will die by the sword"

Evil despots usually die by the violence they have perpetuated. Hitler shot himself, I would not want to die in the the terrible burden of evil that Hitler had, because there just might be a righteous god, that will hold me accountable. There is a sort of karma that operates right here on earth, "Sow to the wind and you will reap the whirlwind"

But why should we love God (as we are enjoined to do) if God is not good? We should, in that case, only fear Him. Like the worshipers of the god Baal feared him, and placated him with human sacrifice. Like a super King Kong.

1 Reply

@kennethamy,

kennethamy;120382 wrote:

But why should we love God (as we are enjoined to do) if God is not good? We should, in that case, only fear Him. Like the worshipers of the god Baal feared him, and placated him with human sacrifice. Like a super King Kong.

"The fear of God is the beginning of wisdom"

I do not perceive God as some sort of benevolent granddaddy in my opinion it is prudent not to mess with God, he just might really exist, it is said "that "God knows and numbered all the stars in the universe", "not a little sparrow falls that God does not see"

1 Reply

@Alan McDougall,

Alan McDougall;120388 wrote:

"The fear of God is the beginning of wisdom"

I do not perceive God as some sort of benevolent granddaddy in my opinion it is prudent not to mess with God, he just might really exist, it is said "that "God knows and numbered all the stars in the universe", "not a little sparrow falls that God does not see"

But then, you are saying that God does not deserve love or praise, but only fear. Fine. But that is not the traditional belief we have been talking about. It is more like idol-worship. I think the sparrow quote is supposed to indicate God's loving kindness, and not only His omniscience. Don't you?

1 Reply

@kennethamy,

kennethamy;120393 wrote:

But then, you are saying that God does not deserve love or praise, but only fear. Fine. But that is not the traditional belief we have been talking about. It is more like idol-worship. I think the sparrow quote is supposed to indicate God's loving kindness, and not only His omniscience. Don't you?

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Problem_of_evil#Logical_problem_of_evil

Logical problem of evil</SPAN>

One example among many of a formulation of the problem of evil is often attributed to Epicurus [9] and may be schematized as follows:

If a perfectly good god exists, then evil does not.
There is evil in the world.
Therefore, a perfectly good god does not exist.

This argument is of the logically valid form modus tollens (denying the consequent). In this case, P is "God exists" and Q is "there is no evil in the world".
Another theory exists as such:

God exists.
God is omnipotent, omniscient, and perfectly good.
A perfectly good being would want to prevent all evils.
An omniscient being knows every way in which evils can come into existence.
An omnipotent being who knows every way in which an evil can come into existence has the power to prevent that evil from coming into existence.
A being who knows every way in which an evil can come into existence, who is able to prevent that evil from coming into existence, and who wants to do so, would prevent the existence of that evil.
If there exists an omnipotent, omniscient, and perfectly good being, then no evil exists.
Evil exists (logical contradiction).[2]

Versions such as these are referred to as the logical problem of evil. They attempt to show that the assumed propositions lead to a logical contradiction and cannot therefore all be correct
Evidential problem of evil</SPAN>

The evidential version of the problem of evil (also referred to as the probabilistic or inductive version), seeks to show that the existence of evil, although logically consistent with the existence of God, counts against or lowers the probability of the truth of theism.
A version by William L. Rowe:

There exist instances of intense suffering which an omnipotent, omniscient being could have prevented without thereby losing some greater good or permitting some evil equally bad or worse.
An omniscient, wholly good being would prevent the occurrence of any intense suffering it could, unless it could not do so without thereby losing some greater good or permitting some evil equally bad or worse.
(Therefore) There does not exist an omnipotent, omniscient, wholly good being.[2]

[edit] Evidential problem of evil

The evidential version of the problem of evil (also referred to as the probabilistic or inductive version), seeks to show that the existence of evil, although logically consistent with the existence of God, counts against or lowers the probability of the truth of theism.
A version by William L. Rowe:

There exist instances of intense suffering which an omnipotent, omniscient being could have prevented without thereby losing some greater good or permitting some evil equally bad or worse.
An omniscient, wholly good being would prevent the occurrence of any intense suffering it could, unless it could not do so without thereby losing some greater good or permitting some evil equally bad or worse.
(Therefore) There does not exist an omnipotent, omniscient, wholly good being.[2]

Another by Paul Draper:

Gratuitous evils exist.
The hypothesis of indifference, i.e., that if there are supernatural beings they are indifferent to gratuitous evils, is a better explanation for (1) than theism.
Therefore, evidence prefers that no god, as commonly understood by theists, exists.[12]

These arguments are probability judgments since they rest on the claim that, even after careful reflection, one can see no good reason for God's permission of evil. The inference from this claim to the judgment that there exists gratuitous evil is inductive in nature, and it is this inductive step that sets the evidential argument apart from the logical argument.[2]
The logical possibility of hidden or unknown reasons for the existence of evil still exist. However, the existence of God is viewed as any large-scale hypothesis or explanatory theory that aims to make sense of some pertinent facts. To the extent that it fails to do so it is disconfirmed.[2] According to Occam's razor, one should make as few assumptions as possible. Hidden reasons are assumptions, as is the assumption that all pertinent facts can be observed, or that facts and theories humans have not discerned are indeed hidden. Thus, as per Draper's argument above, the theory that there is an omniscient and omnipotent being who is indifferent requires no hidden reasons in order to explain evil. It is thus a simpler theory than one that also requires hidden reasons regarding evil in order to include omnibenevolence. Similarly, for every hidden argument that completely or partially justifies observed evils it is equally likely that there is an hidden argument that actually makes the observed evils worse than they appear without hidden arguments. As such, from a probabilistic viewpoint hidden arguments will neutralize one another.[1]
A common response to the evidential argument is by claiming that we can see plausible and not hidden reasons for God's permission of evil. This is discussed in a later section.
[edit] Evidential problem of evil

The evidential version of the problem of evil (also referred to as the probabilistic or inductive version), seeks to show that the existence of evil, although logically consistent with the existence of God, counts against or lowers the probability of the truth of theism.

A version by William L. Rowe:

There exist instances of intense suffering which an omnipotent, omniscient being could have prevented without thereby losing some greater good or permitting some evil equally bad or worse.
An omniscient, wholly good being would prevent the occurrence of any intense suffering it could, unless it could not do so without thereby losing some greater good or permitting some evil equally bad or worse.
(Therefore) There does not exist an omnipotent, omniscient, wholly good being.[2]

Another by Paul Draper:

Gratuitous evils exist.
The hypothesis of indifference, i.e., that if there are supernatural beings they are indifferent to gratuitous evils, is a better explanation for (1) than theism.
Therefore, evidence prefers that no god, as commonly understood by theists, exists.[12]

These arguments are probability judgments since they rest on the claim that, even after careful reflection, one can see no good reason for God's permission of evil. The inference from this claim to the judgment that there exists gratuitous evil is inductive in nature, and it is this inductive step that sets the evidential argument apart from the logical argument.[2]

The logical possibility of hidden or unknown reasons for the existence of evil still exist. However, the existence of God is viewed as any large-scale hypothesis or explanatory theory that aims to make sense of some pertinent facts. To the extent that it fails to do so it is disconfirmed.[2] According to Occam's razor, one should make as few assumptions as possible.

Hidden reasons are assumptions, as is the assumption that all pertinent facts can be observed, or that facts and theories humans have not discerned are indeed hidden. Thus, as per Draper's argument above, the theory that there is an omniscient and omnipotent being who is indifferent requires no hidden reasons in order to explain evil.

It is thus a simpler theory than one that also requires hidden reasons regarding evil in order to include omnibenevolence. Similarly, for every hidden argument that completely or partially justifies observed evils it is equally likely that there is an hidden argument that actually makes the observed evils worse than they appear without hidden arguments. As such, from a probabilistic viewpoint hidden arguments will neutralize one another.[1]

A common response to the evidential argument is by claiming that we can see plausible and not hidden reasons for God's permission of evil. This is discussed in a later section.

1 Reply

@Alan McDougall,

Alan McDougall;120394 wrote:

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Problem_of_evil#Logical_problem_of_evil

Logical problem of evil</SPAN>

One example among many of a formulation of the problem of evil is often attributed to Epicurus [9] and may be schematized as follows:

If a perfectly good god exists, then evil does not.

There is evil in the world.

Therefore, a perfectly good god does not exist.

This argument is of the logically valid form modus tollens (denying the consequent). In this case, P is "God exists" and Q is "there is no evil in the world".
Another theory exists as such:

God exists.

God is omnipotent, omniscient, and perfectly good.

A perfectly good being would want to prevent all evils.

An omniscient being knows every way in which evils can come into existence.

An omnipotent being who knows every way in which an evil can come into existence has the power to prevent that evil from coming into existence.

A being who knows every way in which an evil can come into existence, who is able to prevent that evil from coming into existence, and who wants to do so, would prevent the existence of that evil.

If there exists an omnipotent, omniscient, and perfectly good being, then no evil exists.

Evil exists (logical contradiction).[2]

Versions such as these are referred to as the logical problem of evil. They attempt to show that the assumed propositions lead to a logical contradiction and cannot therefore all be correct
Evidential problem of evil</SPAN>

The evidential version of the problem of evil (also referred to as the probabilistic or inductive version), seeks to show that the existence of evil, although logically consistent with the existence of God, counts against or lowers the probability of the truth of theism.
A version by William L. Rowe:

There exist instances of intense suffering which an omnipotent, omniscient being could have prevented without thereby losing some greater good or permitting some evil equally bad or worse.

An omniscient, wholly good being would prevent the occurrence of any intense suffering it could, unless it could not do so without thereby losing some greater good or permitting some evil equally bad or worse.

(Therefore) There does not exist an omnipotent, omniscient, wholly good being.[2]

[edit] Evidential problem of evil

The evidential version of the problem of evil (also referred to as the probabilistic or inductive version), seeks to show that the existence of evil, although logically consistent with the existence of God, counts against or lowers the probability of the truth of theism.
A version by William L. Rowe:

There exist instances of intense suffering which an omnipotent, omniscient being could have prevented without thereby losing some greater good or permitting some evil equally bad or worse.

An omniscient, wholly good being would prevent the occurrence of any intense suffering it could, unless it could not do so without thereby losing some greater good or permitting some evil equally bad or worse.

(Therefore) There does not exist an omnipotent, omniscient, wholly good being.[2]

Another by Paul Draper:

Gratuitous evils exist.

The hypothesis of indifference, i.e., that if there are supernatural beings they are indifferent to gratuitous evils, is a better explanation for (1) than theism.

Therefore, evidence prefers that no god, as commonly understood by theists, exists.[12]

These arguments are probability judgments since they rest on the claim that, even after careful reflection, one can see no good reason for God's permission of evil. The inference from this claim to the judgment that there exists gratuitous evil is inductive in nature, and it is this inductive step that sets the evidential argument apart from the logical argument.[2]
The logical possibility of hidden or unknown reasons for the existence of evil still exist. However, the existence of God is viewed as any large-scale hypothesis or explanatory theory that aims to make sense of some pertinent facts. To the extent that it fails to do so it is disconfirmed.[2] According to Occam's razor, one should make as few assumptions as possible. Hidden reasons are assumptions, as is the assumption that all pertinent facts can be observed, or that facts and theories humans have not discerned are indeed hidden. Thus, as per Draper's argument above, the theory that there is an omniscient and omnipotent being who is indifferent requires no hidden reasons in order to explain evil. It is thus a simpler theory than one that also requires hidden reasons regarding evil in order to include omnibenevolence. Similarly, for every hidden argument that completely or partially justifies observed evils it is equally likely that there is an hidden argument that actually makes the observed evils worse than they appear without hidden arguments. As such, from a probabilistic viewpoint hidden arguments will neutralize one another.[1]
A common response to the evidential argument is by claiming that we can see plausible and not hidden reasons for God's permission of evil. This is discussed in a later section.
[edit] Evidential problem of evil

The evidential version of the problem of evil (also referred to as the probabilistic or inductive version), seeks to show that the existence of evil, although logically consistent with the existence of God, counts against or lowers the probability of the truth of theism.

A version by William L. Rowe:

There exist instances of intense suffering which an omnipotent, omniscient being could have prevented without thereby losing some greater good or permitting some evil equally bad or worse.

An omniscient, wholly good being would prevent the occurrence of any intense suffering it could, unless it could not do so without thereby losing some greater good or permitting some evil equally bad or worse.

(Therefore) There does not exist an omnipotent, omniscient, wholly good being.[2]

Another by Paul Draper:

Gratuitous evils exist.

The hypothesis of indifference, i.e., that if there are supernatural beings they are indifferent to gratuitous evils, is a better explanation for (1) than theism.

Therefore, evidence prefers that no god, as commonly understood by theists, exists.[12]

These arguments are probability judgments since they rest on the claim that, even after careful reflection, one can see no good reason for God's permission of evil. The inference from this claim to the judgment that there exists gratuitous evil is inductive in nature, and it is this inductive step that sets the evidential argument apart from the logical argument.[2]

The logical possibility of hidden or unknown reasons for the existence of evil still exist. However, the existence of God is viewed as any large-scale hypothesis or explanatory theory that aims to make sense of some pertinent facts. To the extent that it fails to do so it is disconfirmed.[2] According to Occam's razor, one should make as few assumptions as possible.

Hidden reasons are assumptions, as is the assumption that all pertinent facts can be observed, or that facts and theories humans have not discerned are indeed hidden. Thus, as per Draper's argument above, the theory that there is an omniscient and omnipotent being who is indifferent requires no hidden reasons in order to explain evil.

It is thus a simpler theory than one that also requires hidden reasons regarding evil in order to include omnibenevolence. Similarly, for every hidden argument that completely or partially justifies observed evils it is equally likely that there is an hidden argument that actually makes the observed evils worse than they appear without hidden arguments. As such, from a probabilistic viewpoint hidden arguments will neutralize one another.[1]

A common response to the evidential argument is by claiming that we can see plausible and not hidden reasons for God's permission of evil. This is discussed in a later section.

What has all this to do with my post you are replying to?

1 Reply

@kennethamy,

kennethamy;120395 wrote:

What has all this to do with my post you are replying to?

I was not replying specifically to you post, but posted the link for information.

It has everything to do with your posts, you keep stating that the existence of evil makes it illogical to believe in a good benevolent god , thus by your logic god cannot exist, you are making assumptions based on the idea of a perfect benevolent god. I do not agree that God is only benevolent, because evil exists and therefore; God has a split personality both good or bad

Read from the Bible book of Numbers Chapter 31 (read the whole chapter). This chapter shows god in another light, here he asks Moses to commit genocide on the Midiannite people

1 Reply

@Alan McDougall,

Alan McDougall;120401 wrote:

I was not replying specifically to you post, but posted the link for information.

It has everything to do with your posts, you keep stating that the existence of evil makes it illogical to believe in a good benevolent god , thus by your logic god cannot exist, you are making assumptions based on the idea of a perfect benevolent god. I do not agree that God is only benevolent, because evil exists and therefore; God has a split personality both good or bad

Read from the Bible book of Numbers Chapter 31 (read the whole chapter). This chapter shows god in another light, here he asks Moses to commit genocide on the Midiannite people

you keep stating that the existence of evil makes it illogical to believe in a good benevolent god

In fact, I have been saying exactly the contrary of that. You ought to try to read more carefully. (Sometimes I wonder...).

0 Replies

@kennethamy,

kennethamy;120280 wrote:

Yes. So? I still don't know what you mean by "being logical", and if God were an invention, then God would exist, since all inventions exist. (Like the computer). So, I don't think you mean that God is an invention. I think you mean that the concept of God is an invention. And, of course, that is true, since all concepts are human inventions, aren't they? And why cannot inventions be logical, whatever that means? I find it impossible to make out what you are saying. Why don't you try again? What does it mean to say that God is an invention? You cannot mean that literally. The cotton 'gin was an invention. God is like the cotton 'gin?

So you are reducing the argument to silly interpretation of meanings, if you want to be pedantic be my guest. You know darned well what I am inferring but you are not capable of answering, so you play the superior pedant.

---------- Post added 01-16-2010 at 05:43 AM ----------

Alan McDougall;120401 wrote:

I was not replying specifically to you post, but posted the link for information.

It has everything to do with your posts, you keep stating that the existence of evil makes it illogical to believe in a good benevolent god , thus by your logic god cannot exist, you are making assumptions based on the idea of a perfect benevolent god. I do not agree that God is only benevolent, because evil exists and therefore; God has a split personality both good or bad

Read from the Bible book of Numbers Chapter 31 (read the whole chapter). This chapter shows god in another light, here he asks Moses to commit genocide on the Midiannite people

Alan I dont think Ken really knows what he believes, thats why he cant understand others views.

If you are telling me God is malevolent as well as benevolent should I find that satisfactory? Should I admire him? You are saying that god does allow evil and that is logical, is that right?

1 Reply

@Alan McDougall,

This is why it is clear to me that no such god exists, when even believers can not come to any common agreement on what god is or is not. Thirty three thousand denominations of one branch of one faith is obvious that to each their own.

God is vengence.
God is not vengence, god is love.
God is neither love nor vegence, god is beyond comprehension.
God is not beyond comprehension or else we would never even arrive at god in the first place.
God is only comprehensible if you believe in god., those who don't believe can never understand god.
God doesn't require any understanding or believing because he is beyond need.
God won't send anyone to hell, he will just not let you hang out with him. Who wants to hang out with someone who doesn't believe in them?
God doesn't judge anything, he just wanted to create the universe and see how it unfolded.
God exists in a timeless realm, he has the power to do things even though not having time would make it impossible to do anything, but since god is god, god can act even when it is impossible.
God doesn't exist.

1 Reply

@Krumple,

Exactly so. Its like debating the weather it changes before you can mention it. When a difficult question becomes too difficult, he miraculously transforms into another god. Invention, as I have mentioned is the key word, It has to be logical before you can consider it.

0 Replies

@xris,

xris;120419 wrote:

So you are reducing the argument to silly interpretation of meanings, if you want to be pedantic be my guest. You know darned well what I am inferring but you are not capable of answering, so you play the superior pedant.

---------- Post added 01-16-2010 at 05:43 AM ----------

What I think you mean (although I don't think you, yourself, are clear about it) is that there is no God, but that there is only the concept of God. In the way that there are no unicorns, but there is only the concept of unicorn, and you put this thought into the misleading way of, "God is an invention". But I don't know that is what you mean, since what you say makes no sense. You gave no argument. But this thread has nothing to do with whether or no God exists. It has to do with the question, why God permits evil to occur. That is, the thread asks why, if there is a God, does He allow evil.

Now, isn't that right?

1 Reply

@kennethamy,

kennethamy;120436 wrote:

What I think you mean (although I don't think you, yourself, are clear about it) is that there is no God, but that there is only the concept of God. In the way that there are no unicorns, but there is only the concept of unicorn, and you put this thought into the misleading way of, "God is an invention". But I don't know that is what you mean, since what you say makes no sense. You gave no argument. But this thread has nothing to do with whether or no God exists. It has to do with the question, why God permits evil to occur. That is, the thread asks why, if there is a God, does He allow evil.

Now, isn't that right?

No its not right. I did not say if he existed, I made the statement that the invention is not logical. This invention ,get it?

If you want to describe a unicorn and the invention is logical then it has more chance of existing, if its not logical then its pointless debating a silly invention.

1 Reply

@xris,

xris;120438 wrote:

No its not right. I did not say if he existed, I made the statement that the invention is not logical. This invention ,get it?

If you want to describe a unicorn and the invention is logical then it has more chance of existing, if its not logical then its pointless debating a silly invention.

What "invention" are you talking about? Don't you mean just, the concept of God? And what you are saying is that the concept of God is "not logical". But, the question is, what do you mean by saying that? What "is not logical" about the concept of God? Can you explain that?

2 Replies

@kennethamy,

kennethamy;120439 wrote:

What invention are you talking about? Don't you mean just, the concept of God? And what you are saying is that the concept of God is "not logical". But, the question is, what do you mean by saying that? What "is not logical" about the concept of God? Can you explain that?

The concept of god is not a definition its an idea. It has no value for debate. To debate, you need to invent a god . This invention is not logical.

1 Reply

@kennethamy,

kennethamy;120439 wrote:

What "invention" are you talking about? Don't you mean just, the concept of God? And what you are saying is that the concept of God is "not logical". But, the question is, what do you mean by saying that? What "is not logical" about the concept of God? Can you explain that?

The concept of a unicorn is coherent and stable. The concept of God, however, is incoherent as it contains contradictions (e.g. he is perfectly good and omnipotent but permits evil), and flexible enough to avoid difficult questions.

2 Replies

@xris,

xris;120450 wrote:

The concept of god is not a definition its an idea. It has no value for debate. To debate, you need to invent a god . This invention is not logical.

What does "inventing" a god mean if it doesn't mean inventing the concept of a god? Can you explain it? And, why is inventing (the concept of god) not logical? What is no logical about it?

1 Reply

@ACB,

ACB;120451 wrote:

The concept of a unicorn is coherent and stable. The concept of God, however, is incoherent as it contains contradictions (e.g. he is perfectly good and omnipotent but permits evil), and flexible enough to avoid difficult questions.

I cringe every time I hear this statement because it is grossly over stated and sorry to say, incorrect. Despite myself wanting to support it, I can't and here is why.

Technically, god could be good and perfectly good in definition and also allow evil to occur. How is that possible? Well because the solution of evil might not be how we would solve it. For example, god could forgo "our" response to evil with his response to evil. ie. later on he justifies all evils. So in a sense god fulfills his goodness by bringing all those things that were evil, to justice. We think the very allowance of evil to occur would constitute god not owning to the definition of perfect goodness. Why does preventing evil become the only means by which perfect goodness could arise? Here is a possible example, and mind you very hypothetical.

A dog owner has two vicious dogs. Knowing the nature of his violent dogs he has placed them into a kennel together despite what other dog owners would think. "You can't place two vicious dogs in the same space or they will tear each other to bits." The dog owner of course knows that to be a possibility but goes through with it anyways. Now it would seem as though by allowing such a thing to happen, he is not preventing the evil but becomes a catalyst for evil to happen. Which is true, however there is a possibility that the two vicious dogs might fight and grow bored of fighting each other and learn to accept each others presence. Those who would be quick to deny such a possibility are being close minded. Now if the dog owner knew with absolute certainty that the dogs would fight, but later grow to accept each other, then is it evil to place them in the same kennel together? It wouldn't be. So would keeping them seperate be the ultimate goodness or perfect goodness? No, because the dogs still have the potential to be vicious towards each other. In other words, if god knows that by allowing evil it will bring about goodness then by all means he is actually fulfilling the definition even though it sounds like a contradiction. This is a HUGE assumption though and it would HAVE to mean that for every evil there is a good result, but that is incredibly sketchy if true.

So ultimately evil could be the means to a perfect end. Despite my disagreement and rather harshness that it comes from evil actions, it does on occasion lead to something positive. As dangerous as that is to say, it can't be denied.

So if you want to be a good parent, always keep your children separated so you can always be certain they will never bring harm towards each other. Then and only then could you be considered a good parent.

1 Reply

@ACB,

ACB;120451 wrote:

The concept of a unicorn is coherent and stable. The concept of God, however, is incoherent as it contains contradictions (e.g. he is perfectly good and omnipotent but permits evil), and flexible enough to avoid difficult questions.

But Leibniz showed that "he is perfectly good and omnipotent but permits evil" is not a contradiction. That is what I have been arguing throughout this thread. So, you have to show it is a contradiction despite Leibniz's theory that if all evils are logically necessary evils then what you say is a contradiction is not a contradiction at all. Have you any other "contradiction" in mind? (Could you mention the difficult questions you say are avoided? (Actually, avoiding them is a good thing, if it can be done. It is evading them that is bad).

0 Replies

@kennethamy,

kennethamy;120454 wrote:

What does "inventing" a god mean if it doesn't mean inventing the concept of a god? Can you explain it? And, why is inventing (the concept of god) not logical? What is no logical about it?

The concept of god does not describe a particular god, there are thousands of descriptions. We are not debating a god who is bad or is not all powerful, we are debating a god who is all powerful, good but allows evil. This to me is illogical, this invention of a particular god is not logical....If he was all powerful he could invent a world where evil is not a necessity ,where we are all perfect. We could all go straight to heaven with the installation of these lessons incorporated into our psyche. To have an all powerful god , good and permitting evil is not logical.

---------- Post added 01-16-2010 at 10:51 AM ----------

kennethamy;120459 wrote:

But Leibniz showed that "he is perfectly good and omnipotent but permits evil" is not a contradiction. That is what I have been arguing throughout this thread. So, you have to show it is a contradiction despite Leibniz's theory that if all evils are logically necessary evils then what you say is a contradiction is not a contradiction at all. Have you any other "contradiction" in mind? (Could you mention the difficult questions you say are avoided? (Actually, avoiding them is a good thing, if it can be done. It is evading them that is bad).

You have to contradict yourself to qualify this statement.

1 Reply

@Alan McDougall,

"Guilt: Although the most acute judges of the witches, and even the witches themselves, were convinced of the guilt of witchery, the guilt nevertheless was nonexistent. It is thus with all guilt." -- Nietsche "The Gay Science"

0 Replies

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