@richrf,
richrf;85920 wrote:However, in order to give purpose to all this experiencing, I have also enfolded the concept of an evolving meta-consciousness that does not end at death but continues on through multiple physical lives, and the experiences build upon each other.
First, I just have to state the obvious and say that reality doesn't require a purpose; it's not missing something if it has no purpose. We as humans just feel the need to give it one, and maybe we have to do this for the purpose of survival. Some people, myself included, seem quite able to function knowing that there is no ultimate purpose for that functioning, and then some people stop eating, stay in bed all day, and shrivel up into the walking dead. I'm thinking you didn't mean that there is an absolute, objective purpose, but rather that you, in your philosophical system, are gving it one. If that's the case, I understand; every system is based on some arbitrary premises and goals. There is no wrong system, so long as it is internally coherent and not contradictory. That's what I love about philosophy: blank canvass.
Anyway, I like the idea of meta-consciousness evolving from consciousness. I too see everything on an infinite continuum, from the most primitive sort of visceral sensation without reflection and thought, through our own state of complex thought, on to some unimaginable higher order of meta-thought, and so on. However, are you saying that this could happen in some cases, or that it does in fact always occur on the 'death' (destruction of the 'real' entity) of the consciousness? If the latter, I have to disagree. As I've said in earlier posts, in my view, consciousness is direct result (not a cause) of complex structure of some kind which allows for complex interaction of the entity in question with the world. If that 'real' (existing independently of our perception of it) structure becomes damaged, or dissolves altogether, such that it can no longer perform its function of complex reaction, then the associated consciousness dissapears as well. A brain in a grave no longer produces any consciousness becuase its structure has broken down such that it no longer enables reactions with the environment. Certainly though, in some cases (pretty rare I imagine), the destruction of a complex structure and its associated consciousness might lead to the formation of an even more complex structure and higher consciousness. But then, that old structure can't have been really destroyed, it must have been appropriated by another structure,
enlisted in its service, so to speak.
First, let me say that, when I talk about the external world (existing independently of our experience of it), I refuse to use scientific terms. I try ot use the least anthrogenic terms as possible. There can be no true description of the external world, but it can be less false if only because every term is false, and I'll use less terms. And in any case, I see that external world as, not governed by laws, but ruled by absolute, brute force. As Pathfinder brought up the idea of a force underlying all things and causing all events, I might say that the basic cause of the world's dynamic is always the will to power, as Nietzsche said. Let me qualify that though, as I ciriticex P.F. for making such a claim. I'm not literally saying that there is, in everything in the external world, a conscious will to achieve power, nor am I saying that there is actually a force underlying all events which is seperate from those events; I'm just giving a name to the observed tendency of things to 'battle' with one another. The pre-socratics had an idea like this as well. They hypothesized that the world consisted of several basic, indivisable elements, such as earth, wind, fire and air (no, not the seventies band..
), and that these basic elements constantly vied with each other for supremacy, and that the result of their warring was all the events in the world; i.e. through their competition, they came into different relationships to one another (different ratios, densities, etc.), thus creating all the things in the world which we see, which are composed on those basic elements in differing those relations to one another: e.g. sometimes fire dominant, sometimes wind, etc. So, I'm suggesting something similiar, except without any specific substances, and without reference to substance at all actually. I just want to try to define the external world (as I imagine it to be of course, I can't really know) purely in terms of this dynamic of power. For example, instead of explaining a game of pool in terms of velocity, elasticity, mass, etc., I would like to be able to define it in terms of one entity becoming dominant or inferior (in power, which means influence or effect) relative the others.
So, back to the main point; a complex structure generating consciousness cannot become a more complex structure generating meta-consciousness if it is actually destroyed, and loses its ability to interact in complex ways with the world. If that structure is appropriated by, enlisted into the service of, a stronger, more influential, more
dominant, other entity, without being destroyed, it will become a part of a new entity, which as a whole is more complex and generates a higher sort of consciousness. That other, more dominant element which forced the first structure into its own system and sphere of inflluence is still dominant; it used its strength to control other entities, which make the whole new entity more powerful than the one dominant entity could hope to be on its own. The same thing is easily observed in any social interaction. A gangster might be pretty tough and pretty successful at robbing people, but if he uses his strength instead to build a group of other, lesser gangsters around himself, the new unit of which he is the head, is more powerful than he could ever be alone.
Quote:As a matter of practical everyday existence, we do share our experiences with other individuals (conscious bodies), in such a way that we do get outside of our own experiences. Now there are humans whose experiences can be so much out of the norm that we call them crazy. However, it is possible that they are sharing with us experiences that are so far beyond our own sensory capacity that we are simply unable to comprehend what they are suggesting.
Do you mean that we are able to communicate our individual experiences to others, via symbols (writing, speech, etc.), such that the other person is stimulated to experience something similiar and thus partially understand, or do you mean that we actually share the individual experience itself? The former obviously happens. If write 'the big tree is falling down' you can picture a big tree falling down in your mind, but it's very likely not the same image I am seeing in my mind, and if it is, that's purely a coincidence. As for the latter, I don't see how that could happen. Experience can only be individual, because experience is being a part of the world and seeing the rest through that part; it is an entity seeing the world through itself. If that maxim is correct, and of course that's debatable, then it follows that no two seperate entities can have the same experience, or somehow directly transmit experience to one another, as they would have to literally BE the other so that they could see the world through that other. And if one entity did become another and thereby become able to see the world through that other entity, i.e. from its perpsective, then the first entity is no longer the first entity! And it wouldn't be seeing through someone else's eyes, but rather through it's own. So I don't see how entities can directly share individual experience.
Quote:Another issue that comes to mind, is that if we are all evolved from the same cells at the beginning, then shouldn't everything have the same evolved with the same consciousness? Animals, insects, reptiles, fish, etc. If not, then when did consciousness enter into the game and why only for humans?
I wish I knew more about the details of biological evolution, but my answer is that very-very-very-complex structure can only arise from very-very-complex structure, which can only arise from very-complex structure, which can only arise from complex structure, and so on ad infinitum. In other words, there had to be a progression, complexity couldn't just appear all at once from extreme simplicity. This relates nicely with what I was saying above about defining events in the world in terms of the dynamics of power. As weaker entities (less complex) either battle and eliminate the weakest in a darwinian process, or begin to cooperate to form new, larger, more complex entities, we begin to see increasingly influential and dominant, and complex (and so more conscious), entities. Why is it only humans? We are at the avante garde, for now anyway. History isn't over and something more complex might yet stampt us out, co-opt us, or we might evolve given enough time. If Homo Erectus could have thought about such issues, I'm sure he would have asked, 'why is homo erectus' the only conscious entity? At any moment in history, there is always one sort of entity, or actually just one, which is the most advanaced, just because it would be really improbably for all entities in the universe to ever be competely equal in complexity. We happen to be it right now...as far as we know.
---------- Post added 08-27-2009 at 01:22 AM ----------
KaseiJin;85927 wrote:Since it might be better to hold a definition for consciousness alone, at first, and then work on determining the source[s] of consciousness, I would tend to think that it would be better to leave the delimiting 'of an individual' out--since that would surely be a source, rather than just the phenomenon.
That's quite right, but aren't we all in agreement that consciousness is a phenomena only experienced by individuals? Does someone hold that groups of individuals have a consciousness, rather than several? If we were to say that consciousness is the totality of experience, but exclude any mention of the individual, for whom is it experience? Can experience just exist, and not be experienced by someone? I see your point and theoretically it would be preferable to seperate the epistemology form the ontology, but in this case, the two are so solely linked that I don't think it's possible, unless we remove any mention of experience from the definition altogether, which would be absurd in my mind-the two, even in common parlance are, if not synonymous, very much related. If I say 'in my consciousness, there is an image of an apple' and 'in my mind, I experience the image of an apple' aren't I saying the same thing?
Quote:Then, looking over the main predicate (in black) I question what value there would be in having experience and not being aware of having had that experience?
None whatsoever. All of my definitions are synonymous, they could each stand on their own. The idea was to provide several versions in the event that one of them is confusingly written, and so that there isn't misinterpretation; i.e. its pretty unlikely that each line would be mininterpreted in the same way. Anyway, I guess I failed eh?
What I was trying to express is the following; consciousness consists of everything that the individual experiences, but none of that which he does not experience, whatever
that might be (it is unknown by definition because it is not experienced: i.e. no thought or sensation of/about it). In other words, what is known comprises consciousness, and what it not known (and we don't know what that might be of course) is not part of consciousness; if it were, it would be known.
Quote:Additionally, how can the thinking process (thoughts) occur without awareness--since it is most obvious in the real, practical world that unless there is awareness of memory storage (including language things) it can hardly be imagined that associative processing (as thought basically is) can occur? Then, as a human (for now) is born with a capacity for awareness, they operate, and through this operation (activity) acquire experience and sensation--which capacity, as is well demonstrated through research and case studies in the neurosciences, is initially innately hard-wired in the brain. Therefore, once again, I argue that the common denominator is awareness.
I would competely agree. The terms I use, sensation and thought, I'm using in a very specialized sense, because I've developed them for use in a certain system that I'm trying to work out. They refer to what anyone would ordinarily think they refer to, but they are not related to one another as they are in ordinary usage. They are not opposites or different kinds. As I'm using the terms sensation and thought, the two are exactly of the same kind (phenomenological, i.e. experienced), one is not mental and the other bodily; they do not 'exist' in different 'places.' There is no duality. Thought is understood as a complex of sensations. The most primitive thought is a sensation defined in terms of another sensation. As we travel along the continuum toward greater complexity, we see a hierarchical progression; thought defined in terms of thought, creating meta-thought; then meta thought defined in terms of meta-thought, creating meta-meta-thought, etc. And so sensation is the basis for thought, and the two differ only by degree of complexity, not in any essential way.
So, to get to your point, I would agree with your description of how a young baby develops the ability to think as a result of integrating sensations into memory, eventually forming more compex thoughts, such as the ability to reflect, the sense of time, basic logic, symbols, etc., in a progression as sensation builds on sensation and schematic thoughts (complexes of accumulated sensation which are constantly present as fixed schema in the present experience, by which that present experience (visceral sensation) is evaluated) develop.
Something that is very confusing in my argument, but which is really vital to understand the whole system, is the idea that thought should be considered timeless or less bound to time, while sensation is more bound to time; this is due to the fact that what we consider the present is defined by visceral sensation; 'present' is when any given sensation, or set of sensations occuring simulteineously, is more significant relative the accumulated memories of previous sensations than it will ever be again. As it is 'pushed back,' so to speak, by newly arriving visceral sensation, and as it becomes related with other old sensations (memories), it becomes less bound the present. And so, the point is that, the basic visceral sensations, which define the present, are not alone in the present. They mark the present, but in any given moment, there are also higher order complexes of sensation (thoughts) being experienced as well. This coexistance of visceral sensation and various tiers of thought allows for the analsys of the present (as when a 'decision is made') in terms of fixed ideas which are not at the mercy of present conditions: reasoning.
So, this is the language in which I'd describe the baby's mental development. I don't have a place for the formal term 'awareness.' To me that seems redundant. If I've already defined sensation and thought as the content of experience, then oboviously to experience one or the other a person must have awareness of them. If you mean 'awareness' in contrast to self-awareness, i.e. as a neccessary prelude to self-awareness, then I would agree with that concept. First, an entity must be aware (I would say, 'must experience sensation'), and then, after a period of being aware (accumulating sensations, which develop into more and more fixed schematic thought), that entity can reflect upon its own condition of awareness (evaluate the present visceral experience in terms of something not present-'step back' from the present to judge it) and become self-aware. And like everything else, self-awareness isn't an absolute; some entities may be more or less self-conscious than others.
Quote:The green colored area, and the blue colored area, simply appear to be emphasizing that consciousness cannot hold any content of what has not been experienced or thought of up to the very moment of each moment as time passes. The final portion of the black area, from the first of the definition, emphasizes once again that 'up to the moment total.' It cannot escape me, I must press, that we have to have awareness to be able to say that we know of something.
Yes, I would say that some experience (the image of a firetruck e.g.) which once was visceral sensation, then became a memory of that sensation (i.e. a thought), but presently has vanished and is no longer being experienced is, for so long as it continues ot not be experienced, not a part of consciousness. I think of consciousness as a constantly changing phenomenon, composed of a series of moments. but it could just as easily be thought of as a whole, from birth to death of the person in question. I suppose it's arbitrary which way we think of it.
Quote:Therefore all-in-all, I argue that we are better off with that simple, bare minimum of a definition for consciousness, namely, awareness. Do you feel, BrightNoon, there is room to start off, at least, (1) by saying that by consciousness, we mean awareness?
But awareness
of what? One cannot simply 'be aware,' in the same way that one cannot just see, or just hear. Never has anyone seen, heard, or been aware, and not also seen
something, heard
something, and been aware of
something. What is that soemthing? We can't go so far as to say that they are seeing 'real' things, like a house, a bird, etc., as that brings up further problems; we can only say that they are seeing visual sensuations/thoughts, hearing auditory sensations/thoughts, aware of some kind of sensation/thought, as opposed to any 'real' thing which might exist outside and independently of the sensation of it. I say that they experience sensation or thought, meaning appearance, not any 'reality' which may exist outside and independent of our experience of it. So, I would happily accept a definition which stated that
consciousness is the total awareness of sensation and/or thought. But that, in effect, is the same as saying 'consciousness is the sum of all experience of sensation and thought.'