Consciousness is a Biological Problem

@yffer,

yffer;64398 wrote:

There's an unbridgeable gap between consciousness and biology. Don't you see that?

No, I do not see that. However, I can see how someone could hold certain terms to be of such a definition/description so as to cause a gap between consciousness and biological function--and in fact, I tend to see that as one major problem for not only some philosophical positions, but some psychiatric positions as well. Anyway, as I go, I'll explain more on that. I don't have time at the moment, but will be back. Thanks for the question and thoughts, and if you'd like to expound on that yffer, please do !

KJ

0 Replies

@Kielicious,

Kielicious wrote:

Epiphenomenalism is another form of dualism in that it tries to solve the interactionist problem by posing that the mind cannot and does not interact with not only the brain/body but nothing at all! One can already see the flaws in this point of view in that we know that the mind affects the body. Intentionality, the placebo effect and neural plasticity are just a few examples I can think of off the top of my head. Also this claim does us no good in finding out a way to validate it because it is by definition outside of science. It would be just as equivalent if I claimed that there were 6 epiphenomenal gremlins in the cylinders of my car and since they dont interact with the car it would be as if they werent even there... See, there would be no way to falsify that claim. (Kudos to Dennett for that example). Epiphenomenalism and dualism can be re-stated as the 'ghost in the machine' which is not only fallacious but stops us in our tracks in continuing research.

1. The fact that 'the mind affects the body,' as you say, does not disprove the impotence hypothesis, which is the basis of epiphenomenalism. In any case where you might say that the mind affects the body, there is no evidence that anything other than what the impotence hypothesis suggests has happened; i.e. the body is engaged in some behavior and 'in one's mind' one has experienced the effects of that behavior. Consider the placebo effect, which you mentioned. The fact that I think a drug works and then it does work, does not mean that by thinking that it works I have caused it to work. There is no way to prove, and no reason to believe, that my thoughts are causal of anything; they can be explained as the impotent experience of somehting affective in the body.

2. Your claim that epiphenomenalism is 'outside of science' is also false. It is completely compatiable with any kind of scientific conclusion, anything in the field of neuroscience e.g. The claim by scientists that consciousness is a biological phenomena (though they can't define what it is) and that it is affective on the body (though they can't say how) is the silly one.

3. As for 'the ghost in the machine,' I am not suggesting that there is a myserious consciousness within an otherwise scientifically cognizable world. I am suggesting that the world is scientifically cognizable through and in consciousness. The machine is in the ghost. We created the world that you think we have discovered.

1 Reply

@BrightNoon,

Brightnoon, long time no see.

I glad to see a reply but unfortunately it seems that your responses are along the lines of calling me wrong with no support for your assertions. Example:

BrightNoon wrote:

2. Your claim that epiphenomenalism is 'outside of science' is also false. It is completely compatiable with any kind of scientific conclusion, anything in the field of neuroscience e.g. The claim by scientists that consciousness is a biological phenomena (though they can't define what it is) and that it is affective on the body (though they can't say how) is the silly one.

You saying it isnt doesnt make it true. Show me how we could detect the epiphenomenal gremlins inside my car.

BrightNoon wrote:

1. The fact that 'the mind affects the body,' as you say, does not disprove the impotence hypothesis, which is the basis of epiphenomenalism. In any case where you might say that the mind affects the body, there is no evidence that anything other than what the impotence hypothesis suggests has happened; i.e. the body is engaged in some behavior and 'in one's mind' one has experienced the effects of that behavior. Consider the placebo effect, which you mentioned. The fact that I think a drug works and then it does work, does not mean that by thinking that it works I have caused it to work. There is no way to prove, and no reason to believe, that my thoughts are causal of anything; they can be explained as the impotent experience of somehting affective in the body.

Even though intentionality totally disproves your statement, and you havent supported your assertion other than you claiming I'm wrong, that the mind has no causal influence on the body, I will use your example (that the placebo effect has no influence on the body) against you.

The placebo effect and expectancy have a huge impact on the body, especially the brain. Just look at people who are depressed. FMRI, EEG and PET scans show that those who are depressed have decreased activity in their neo-cortex/pre-frontal cortex, more specifically reduced activity in the left frontal lobe and increased activity in the right frontal lobe. This is also noted by first hand experience that damage to the left frontal lobe from a stroke or other pathological conditions produce profound depression in the patient. This is also why typically happy moods are associated with higher activity in the left cerebral hemisphere. We could also go the opposite route and talk about nocebo effects. Clinical trials show that expectation and belief can have both positive and negative effects.

Hahn wrote:

Beliefs and expectations are not only conscious, logical phenomena, they also have physical consequences.

People can make themselves sick because they think they are sick. Likewise the opposite is true as well.

If you still dont believe me and wanna read more, here ya go: link

BrightNoon wrote:

3. As for 'the ghost in the machine,' I am not suggesting that there is a myserious consciousness within an otherwise scientifically cognizable world. I am suggesting that the world is scientifically cognizable through and in consciousness. The machine is in the ghost. We created the world that you think we have discovered.

Solipsism is absurd. It isnt even worth a response seeing how we went back and forth about it before.

1 Reply

@Kielicious,

Kielicious wrote:

You saying it isnt doesnt make it true. Show me how we could detect the epiphenomenal gremlins inside my car.

You claimed that epiphenomenalism is 'outside science,' by which I assumed you meant that the theory is not compatible with certain scientific findings: i.e. that such findings disprove it. I ask you, what scientific fact disproves the impotence hypothesis? If you can't find one, then your claim was incorrect, as I said. And no, I didn't go to the trouble of listing all the scientific findings that don't disprove epiphenomenalism...my bad :sarcastic:

Epiphenomenalism does not propose that there is something myserious, some gremlin, somewhere in your head. What epiphenomenology suggests is that consciousness is not a physical thing, as you claim, but rather the non-causal experience of physical events, such as brain activity. Our experience of laughing is caused by brain activity, not the other way around. There are no decisions, only the experience of deciding, which is experiencing the non-willed, chemical or physical process that is affective in causing the 'willed' action.

Quote:

Even though intentionality totally disproves your statement

How?

Quote:

I will use your example (that the placebo effect has no influence on the body) against you...The placebo effect and expectancy have a huge impact on the body, especially the brain. Just look at people who are depressed. FMRI, EEG and PET scans show that those who are depressed have decreased activity in their neo-cortex/pre-frontal cortex, more specifically reduced activity in the left frontal lobe and increased activity in the right frontal lobe. This is also noted by first hand experience that damage to the left frontal lobe from a stroke or other pathological conditions produce profound depression in the patient. This is also why typically happy moods are associated with higher activity in the left cerebral hemisphere. We could also go the opposite route and talk about nocebo effects. Clinical trials show that expectation and belief can have both positive and negative effects.

You have just offered convincing evidence that the brain has enormous influence on the mind (consciousness), but the issue is whether or not the mind is causal; i.e. whether or not our experiences are causes of events in the world (us walking down the street) or are efffects of events going on in the world over which we have no control, but which we experience.

Quote:

Solipsism is absurd. It isnt even worth a response seeing how we went back and forth about it before.

So your argument is that my argument is absurd...how absurd. But no really Kielicious, you should consider the possibility that it seems 'absurd' to you because you don't understand and won't learn. Enough said about that, let's just drop it.

1 Reply

@BrightNoon,

BrightNoon wrote:

You claimed that epiphenomenalism is 'outside science,' by which I assumed you meant that the theory is not compatible with certain scientific findings: i.e. that such findings disprove it. I ask you, what scientific fact disproves the impotence hypothesis? If you can't find one, then your claim was incorrect, as I said. And no, I didn't go to the trouble of listing all the scientific findings that don't disprove epiphenomenalism...my bad :sarcastic:

Its a shame more people dont understand science.

Epiphenomenalism cannot be disproven. That's like asking someone to disprove god, angels, ghosts, etc. You really should now what you're talking about first.

Also, your last statement of "I didnt go to the trouble of listing all the scientific findings that dont disprove epiphenomenalism...my bad." is quite hilarious. Dont disprove is a double negative, which can be restated as: prove. Why wouldnt you post findings in support of your assertion that prove epiphenomenalism? I really am laughing my ass off.

BrightNoon wrote:

Epiphenomenalism does not propose that there is something myserious, some gremlin, somewhere in your head. What epiphenomenology suggests is that consciousness is not a physical thing, as you claim, but rather the non-causal experience of physical events, such as brain activity. Our experience of laughing is caused by brain activity, not the other way around. There are no decisions, only the experience of deciding, which is experiencing the non-willed, chemical or physical process that is affective in causing the 'willed' action.

Yes it does and thats why you dont understand. Epiphenomalism is a byproduct of dualism. Just as Ryle phrased it as a "Category Mistake" and there is no Cartesian "Ghost in the Machine." If you dont know that dualism and epiphenomenalism are linked I suggest you do more reading on the subject.

Epiphenomenalism - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

BrightNoon wrote:

How?

Consciousness and Intentionality (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)

BrightNoon wrote:

You have just offered convincing evidence that the brain has enormous influence on the mind (consciousness), but the issue is whether or not the mind is causal; i.e. whether or not our experiences are causes of events in the world (us walking down the street) or are efffects of events going on in the world over which we have no control, but which we experience.

No, quite the opposite. Again just saying I'm wrong with no support doesnt fool anyone.

BrightNoon wrote:

So your argument is that my argument is absurd...how absurd. But no really Kielicious, you should consider the possibility that it seems 'absurd' to you because you don't understand and won't learn. Enough said about that, let's just drop it.

Yes, lets drop it.

1 Reply

@Kielicious,

Kielicious;65030 wrote:

Its a shame more people dont understand science.

Epiphenomenalism cannot be disproven. That's like asking someone to disprove god, angels, ghosts, etc. You really should now what you're talking about first.

Also, your last statement of "I didnt go to the trouble of listing all the scientific findings that dont disprove epiphenomenalism...my bad." is quite hilarious. Dont disprove is a double negative, which can be restated as: prove. Why wouldnt you post findings in support of your assertion that prove epiphenomenalism? I really am laughing my ass off.

Yes it does and thats why you dont understand. Epiphenomalism is a byproduct of dualism. Just as Ryle phrased it as a "Category Mistake" and there is no Cartesian "Ghost in the Machine." If you dont know that dualism and epiphenomenalism are linked I suggest you do more reading on the subject.

Epiphenomenalism - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

Consciousness and Intentionality (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)

No, quite the opposite. Again just saying I'm wrong with no support doesnt fool anyone.

Yes, lets drop it.

I read your above post, and I'm still waitiing for a rational response to my last post. I imagine I'll be waiting forever. I'm finished with you. :brickwall:

1 Reply

@BrightNoon,

BrightNoon;65442 wrote:

I read your above post, and I'm still waitiing for a rational response to my last post. I imagine I'll be waiting forever. I'm finished with you. :brickwall:

I did alot better than you. At least I gave support.

All your responses entail: your wrong.

That's all I get out of you which is why my last response didnt have much to it. However, at least I backed up what I said. You dont, and thats the problem because if everyone responded the way you respond what we would end up with is: not uh. ya huh. not uh. ya huh. not uh. ya huh. not uh. ya huh. not uh. ya huh.... ad infinitum.

I'll actually respond fully when you do, so in essence I'll be waiting.

1 Reply

@Kielicious,

Touching on epiphenomenalism (before moving on), from the little I have read on the concept, the stronger version seems to have been put down, and the weaker version is the straw which can be grasped, and, as mentioned above it does not really bring itself to being tested (really) thus neither proveable nor refuted, per se. That said, however, the greater bulk of evidence simply puts it on the historical shelf along with that homunculus that Descartes so believed.

What might be good to kind of take up here, is the event from the 'get-go,' so I'll do that. If anyone sees something I have missed, please do fill in any gaps. I will kind of put it in shortened form--as much as I feel I can, without losing too much.

What exactly happened before, in the long, long, LOOOONNNNGGG ago, being put aside for now, it starts out with the gamates. Also, without going into the details of how to make it happen, we get the large gamate, the ovum being 'hit up on' (wouldn't you know it) by the puny little gamate, the sperm. We get the chromosome mix, and the mitosis dance, and before you know it, a zygote . . . the precursor of the embryo--so to speak. The joined cell splits, and splits again, and again, with the DNA being copied in each new cell nucleus; for the most part (there can be problems, on those very rare occasions). (meiosis is for the sex cells)

The DNA molecules make up the chromosomes and contain the genes which code for proteins. The average human is estimated to have about 25,000 genes. (the X chromosome +/- 1,500 genes; Y chromosome 50 genes tops) These are the building blocks of not only the body, but the brain, as well--which is really just as much a body part as a heart, a stomach, a liver, or a muscle. Again, the chromosomes and DNA will be in every cell of the entire body.

As the embryo develops, we have three distinct layers of cells called the endoderm, mesoderm, and ectoderm. From this last one comes the central nervious system (CNS) and skin. In an area of the ectoderm, what is called a neural plate is assembled (starting from about 17 days after conception). As it develops, a neural groove is built in the center area as the outer fields go up and over to cover it. As these folds of cell tissue cover the groove, neural crests form--kind of as though they had been pinched off from the neural ectoderm. The inner portion of the neural crest makes the neural tube (from which all neurons are derived) which in humans is generally formed by about the third week after conception.

After this, differentiation kicks in (the stages are continious and graduated, and only generally divided). At the rostral (towards the nose or anterior) end of the neural tube three swellings build up--the primary vesicles. The entire brain comes from these. The rostral most portion is the prosencephalon (forebrain), the middle portion the mesephalon (midbrain), and the after portion the rhombencephalon (hindbrain). The prosencephalon then develops to further swellings which will make the optic vesicles and the telencephalic vesicles on each side--these become the two hemispheres--and below that the diencephalon--which becomes the thalamus and hypothalamus structures.

In the neural tube, nonneural precusor (epithelial) cells divide and give rise to the neurons. It is estimated that in humans some 250,000 neurons are 'born' from these precursor cells every minute during the peak production period (just a couple of months before birth). This process is very much influenced by hormones, both in the embryo and in the mother, with the turning on of genes--which in turn regulate neuron production. In the immediate period after the neuron cells are 'born,' they begin to segregate and migrate from the ventral area to the outside. Glial cells (astrocyte especially, here) rely on b1 integrin to build the proper scaffolding upon which the neurons 'climb' to the outer areas. (if there are problems with the proteins for directing that, we have misplaced and disorganized neurons with cognitive impairment)

The brain has the largest number of expressed transcripts (in genetic terms) of all organ systems; a fact reflected in the very large number of neurogenetic disorders there are. Over 30% of Mendelian diseases have neurological manifestations. Along with the single-nucleotide polymorphisms (SNPs) and copy number variations (CNVs) there are possible deletions, duplications, or inverted (relative to the reference sequence), nonsense and missense in genes.

What is clearly known, and what we should keep in mind here, at this point, is that from this genetic material that is the gamate combination (in however many ways) we arrive at working brain from that genetic materal. Then, when we have problems with genes along the chromosome arms, that code for neural things, we can run into problems with brain build (sometimes more directly, sometimes more indirectly). I will present a few of these in order to more firmly make it evident that brain, memory, cognitive function, and thus by extension consiousness are biological problems.

1 Reply

@KaseiJin,

Wow what a post!

Very interesting KJ and I must say that another problem the epiphenomenalists have is even uttering the word! Because if epiphenomenalism were true we could never talk about it. The sheer utterance of epiphenomenalism completely contradicts what E asserts:

wiki wrote:

Another criticism of epiphenomenalism is that the presence of the theory of epiphenomenalism seems to contradict the very idea. Most would agree that thinking is a mental process, but, if epiphenomenalism is true, how could someone ever express the idea of epiphenomenalism? It would be impossible, because this "expressing" would require the banned connection between mind and behavior.

Also another problem the epiphenomenalist would have to get around is natural selection and evolution. For what would be the evolutionary advantage of having consciousness if its epiphenomenal? We would do just the same as automata. The epiphenomenalists still havent gotten around this problem either. Also, I'm curious as to what other examples can serve as epiphenomenal besides consciousness, I cant think of any.

2 Replies

@Kielicious,

That's something that had not come to mind, Kielicious; I appreciate the information there. I can't think of anything else at the moment, but I'll run back through that encyclopedia again, and see if I see anything. I'll continue with the line of argumentation I'm presently working on, then, in the mean time. . .

Deletions on the long arm of a copy of chromosome 7 amounting to some 20 to 28 genes missing, in the q11.23 area, gives rise to the Williams-Beuren Syndrome (also known as William's Syndrome (WS), or, Elfin Face Syndrome). The missing genes lead to both facial and neural development markers which can be easily seen--especially the facial features of the upturned nose, wide mouth, and small chin (giving rise to the term Elfin, in that there is an elfish appearance).

Visual-spatial deficiency is a common trait. Gene studies and autopsies show low expression of Gtf2i in the peripheral visual cortex and superior parietal regions; also stubby, misdeveloped neurons in the dorsal parietal cortex have been noted. WS people have great trouble putting together even the easiest of puzzles (visuospatial construction deficit), and have trouble judging distance and negotiating stairs. Also, WS people overall have about 80% of normal brain volume.

While as usual, there will be those WS people (the word 'patient' is almost always avoided here, since the syndrome does not typically involve close medical or psychological observation) on both sides of the bell curve, but the sharpness/steepness of that cure appears to be quite high. For that reason, most WS brains measure as having a degree of mental retardation (cognitive deficiency) with a IQ norm at around 55, display motor impairment, and hypersocial activity. Their strengths lie in being able to recognize faces and things (non-spatial identification) with less social inhibition (lesser functioning amygdala [lack of emotional tag for fear]),① along with musical talent to varying degrees in many, and above average linguistical talent in some.

A quote by Allan Reiss, a psychiatrist as Stanford University School of Medicine nicely summed up an article in Science (Vol 310, 4 Nov, '05; p 804) with his saying that 'nobody expects there to be a simple, straight line [combinations and permutations in genetics is horrendous] 'connecting genes to the mind,' adding that, "We have the possibility of unraveling how genes and environmental modulators shape cognition and behavior." This is echoed by Ralph Adolph (cognitive neuroscientist at California Institute of Technology in Pasadena, USA) with, "I think we can certainly draw a link between genes and cognition, as long as we realize that the link is very complex and always brings in the environment in its mediation."

Here we have one example of how biological material, genes which make us, builds to a certain brain build in continuous reaction to and contact with the individual environment/historio-experience. This later factor works on combinations and 'feed-back' in gene to gene workings, but the lack of a number of certain genes (the former and prior matter), and thus the proteins they code for, in certain situations cannot be made up for. WS is one such situation; one in which consciousness as a result of brain activity within the particular build of that brain, is as it is due to genetic (thus biological) mishap, is less than its otherwise possible state.

①　　Interestingly, and paradoxically enough, a National Institute of Mental Health (NIMH; Maryland, USA)-led study teased out a difference between social-interaction-with people emotion inhibition and enviroment-scenes emotion inhibition. Emotional tags for fear is intact for scenes, but not for people; it's that precise.

1 Reply

@KaseiJin,

Fragile X syndrome (FXS) is a genetically caused mental retardation that affects some 1 in every 4,000 males, and 1 in every 6,000 females. SFX is caused by trimucleotied expansion repeat (CGG) within the FMR1 gene on chromosome X, resulting in the 5' untranslated region and loss of fragile X mental retardation protein (FMRP) expression. Since the female will have have a backup X, the mutation on the Male X more often leads to greater mental impairment. When the repeats are above 200, mental retardation is certain while individuals with up to between 200 and 55 are said to carry 'premutations.'

FXS patients will suffer from mental retardation, macroorchidism, facial dysmorphologies, and behavioral problems. Problems have been found to be related to (at the lower level) post synaptic in nature, and mRNA is involved. Dendratic spine number and structure have been shown occur too. There is overlap between FXS and autism spectrum disorders, which may point to other genes being indrectly affected, thus indirectly causing other malformation of brain structure.

What is clear from studies on FXS with humans and mouse models, is that the brain build that results due to gene mutation/malfunction, projects a degree of consciousness and mind that would otherwise not be the case without the brain structure that occurs due to it. There are measured deficiencies in inhibition, attention, visual-spatial processing, social cognition and executive cognition. Even in cases of premutations where no intellectual disability can be observed, measurable traits of cognitive strengths and weaknesses can be found.

A person with a range of repeats less than 30 (which appears to be the most common allele) will not have any mental impairments (in the absence of other major deficits) that have been found to arise from this single gene mutation. The non-mutation state is of course the normal brain build state, and so this intellectual deficit which is caused by brain misbuild, in turn, built as it will have been built, by the results of genetic mishap, shows direct and robust correlation. The FXS brain will always function in that limited state due to the biological underpinnings that built its propensity to function at all; one more clear line of evidence for brain function's being a biological matter, and consciousness being totally tied in with it.

1 Reply

@KaseiJin,

In a couple of places 'round on this great forum, at this general moment, we have discussions underway which all are pinned on one single element--from which we get this thing called 'CONSCIOUSNESS.'

Of course it would only be expected that we should try to delimit the range of possible definition of this term/concept as best we could, before going head first into the detailed, descriptive explanation and presentation of data that will be required from all fields that deal with this thing. However, it will surely prove to be a matter of some (to put it mildly) inquiry to put a good finger on just what this phenomenon is.

We can check the better of dictionaries, such as The Oxford English Dictionary, Webster's International Dictionary, 3rd. Ed, and so on, and see that we have a bit of a circle--since to describe consciousness we apply the matter of awareness, and self-awareness, and in defining awareness, we often find consciousness (or the state of being conscious [ which is only an adjective form of consciousness, but is not a really good one, as it turns out (to be explained later) ] ).

It has pointed out a number of times in various places by various authors that these typical description/definitions are lacking (since they are old). However, it is true that in describing consciousness, we have to include the element of 'having knowledge of, and being aware of our own existence (and of objects and events internally) and the existence of others and objects and events outside ourselves.' We thus have an internal perspective, and an external one--this latter being a matter of the observer's perspective.

Jumping a little, we will find that the most productive-in-outcome line of inquiry will be that of looking from the observer's perspective. The down-to-earth reason for that, is that to understand consciousness we must be able to relate with the third party of the same (since it only goes without speaking that we have many actors in the world, of, firstly (but most obviously not only) our own spieces).

We will look for wakefulness. In doing so we'll first catagorize slow wave sleep (SWS) as an opposite of a full 'alert and awake' state (state of consciousness). REM sleep presents no trouble because it too is a state of consciousness; but simply a lower saturation (or intensity) of the fuller state of consciousness. We look for objective signs like, being able to open eyes upon request, muscular tone compatible with movements against gravity, and a characteristic awake EEG pattern. Another thing that we'll have to keep in mind, is that while consciousness will require wakefulness, wakefulness does not guarantee consciousness. (vegetative states (VS), epileptic automatisms, and akinetic mutism will be discussed later in the thread)

Next, we will look for background emotions. This is not considered to be the primary emotions (fear, anager, sadness, happines, etc.) or social emotions (embarressment, guilt, compassion, etc.) but that of expressed configurations of body movement (overall posture, range of motion of limbs relative to the trunk, spatial profile of limb movements, etc.) that inform us about the likes of fatigue or enery level, discouragement or enthusiasm, malaise or well-being, etc. It is only true that these 'pre-verbal' signs are all checked out when we approach or observe others, and are used in assessing that other party's 'state of mind.'

We will then check for attention. This will be observations that the third party will exhibit attention, orient themselves towards objects and concentrate on such as needed--in a relatively coherent and coordinated fashion. We must keep in mind that while the mere presence of attention towards an object will usually be a criterion for consciousness, that is not always the case.

Then, at this level of analysis, we have one more--and NO less important at all--factor, viz., LACK of attention towards an external object when that object (or event) could be recognized as being sufficient to draw attention. This, however, is true if it is on a temporary basis (as opposed to, for example, drowsiness, stupor, confusional states, etc.). If lack of attention is a sustained state, such as in VS, coma, or general anethesia, the description of consciousness is not applied to the being.

Then, we should fill this out with a fuller description in relation to brain states and functions that give rise to the above considerations--all the while, still working on the definition/description of consciousness. I will get back and keep it going, as soon as I can. . . but will try to avoid automerge, so it might be a couple of days? or . . .

0 Replies

@Kielicious,

"We will look for wakefulness. In doing so we'll first catagorize slow wave sleep (SWS) as an opposite of a full 'alert and awake' state (state of consciousness). REM sleep presents no trouble because it too is a state of consciousness; but simply a lower saturation (or intensity) of the fuller state of consciousness. We look for objective signs like, being able to open eyes upon request, muscular tone compatible with movements against gravity, and a characteristic awake EEG pattern. Another thing that we'll have to keep in mind, is that while consciousness will require wakefulness, wakefulness does not guarantee consciousness."..............KJ

i wanted to clarify something before we really get going on this if possible. i hope i am not putting the cart in front of the horse or anything. the quote above seems like a contradiction, if REM sleep is a state of a certain level of consciousness, how is it that consciousness requires wakefulness? or is REM sleep considered to be a sort of wakefulness?

i also wonder that you seem to be leaving out the part of the brain that is referred to as subconscious. maybe that also needs to be defined. because i would say the subconscious is conscious of things that the conscious part of the brain is not-though if the subconscious is conscious of what the conscious brain is, i do not know.

excuse me i am being diverted-be back later

2 Replies

@Kielicious,

I believe it is speaking of conscience. The conscience biologically is connected, but they mean in general is it REALLY connected, the process. I really believe in what you say though.

0 Replies

@salima,

my earlier train of thought was derailed:
"i also wonder that you seem to be leaving out the part of the brain that is referred to as subconscious. maybe that also needs to be defined. because i would say the subconscious is conscious of things that the conscious part of the brain is not-though if the subconscious is conscious of what the conscious brain is, i do not know. "

excuse me i am being diverted-be back later[/QUOTE]

now i see what a mess this is. i know that consciousness resides in all cells. so what makes that any different from the consciousness in the brain, or the subconscious part of it? or should that be referred to as something else entirely?

what you are really talking about is mind...i think. that is to say the conscious awareness that comes from the working of the brain? so the faculty of the brain would be the mind which works both on a conscious and subconscious level. how's that?

in other words, i am getting at the idea that we have to differentiate from the brain, the mind, consciousness, awareness, intelligence-none of them are really the same, but until we are on the same page about what they are we can hardly discuss it.

so in my diagram, the mind would be a faculty? process? which has parts-memory, rationality, emotions, ego, will (including weaker sign sof intent like wish and desire) and maybe something else i might have forgot? and the mind i think exists (maybe works is a better word) on many levels-that would be the distinction between conscious, unconscious, subconscious, sleeping, comatose, etc....

let me know if i am wrong KJ...

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@Kielicious,

Kielicious;65858 wrote:

We would do just the same as automata.

You assume we are not automata. The epiphenomenalist asssumes we are automata, merely automata aware of itself. The fact that we have awareness of our behavior does not mean that that awareness is causal of the behavior. As for evolution; consciousness is not something akin to webbed feet, long narrow beaks, gills, etc. which may develop due to certain evolutionairy pressures. Consciousness is not a 'thing' in the sense that those are things. Consciousness is experience. It will be affected by evolutionairy pressures only to the extent that the physical reality which it represents is affected. It's not as though consciousness could not exist in humans; its the experience of the world from a perspective: a certain thing being that thing in relation to neighboring things. We are complex things with complex relations to many things, so our experience is very complex. A stone or a tree is not fundementally different, only less complex.

1 Reply

@BrightNoon,

BrightNoon;68515 wrote:

You assume we are not automata.

Really? I ASSUME that I and everyone around me is not a zombie-like robot?

Ya I dont see any irony in that statement whatsoever.

However, since I am an open-minded person, I am willing to indulge your assertion. If you think we are automata then by all means show and convince. Good luck.

BrightNoon;68515 wrote:

The epiphenomenalist asssumes we are automata, merely automata aware of itself.

Glad to see that you notice the irony as well.

BrightNoon;68515 wrote:

The fact that we have awareness of our behavior does not mean that that awareness is causal of the behavior.

Yes it does! Thats why we are having this conversation right now!

Epiphenomenalism cannot even be asserted because the very act of asserting it contradicts its entire claim. The epiphenomenon is influencing the assertion, which it cannot do:

wiki wrote:

Another criticism of epiphenomenalism is that the presence of the theory of epiphenomenalism seems to contradict the very idea. Most would agree that thinking is a mental process, but, if epiphenomenalism is true, how could someone ever express the idea of epiphenomenalism? It would be impossible, because this "expressing" would require the banned connection between mind and behavior. If epiphenomenalism is true and thinking is a mental process, then its truth is ineffable.

Get it?

BrightNoon wrote:

As for evolution; consciousness is not something akin to webbed feet, long narrow beaks, gills, etc. which may develop due to certain evolutionairy pressures. Consciousness is not a 'thing' in the sense that those are things. Consciousness is experience. It will be affected by evolutionairy pressures only to the extent that the physical reality which it represents is affected.

You're clearly missing the point.

If pleasures and pains have no effect on our behaviour then there would be no reason why we adhere to certain aspects essential to life. Similarly, what stops us from indulging in manifestly destructive activities to our well-being? Obviously, pains and pleasures do have profound effects on us but for the epiphenomenalist the explanation for this is --to this day-- awaiting fruitful inference.

So to say that epiphenomenalism is actually in cooperation with evolution is completely false. It actually goes against evolution.

BrightNoon;68515 wrote:

A stone or a tree is not fundementally different, only less complex.

Really? So a rock is somewhat conscious too, only 'less complex'.

I see you have delve into panpsychism now.

I completely disagree. I dont think that consciousness is a fundamental aspect to reality, but again since I am so open-minded I will entertain your assertions and wait for good evidence and inference.

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@salima,

Some thoughtful questions there, salima. I have found time and time again, that there is a tendency with animals (of course I am including the H. sapien here) to 'want it here, now!' This most usually (not always, I'd say) gets in the way of the learning/understanding process. You are taking the 'middle path' (to borrow, a little). To whatever deficiency there may be in it, my typical process of presentation is to work with detail from the bottom, going up to the top through data and case-in-point examples which can be correlated, cross-examined or compared, which all work in choral unison to reach towrds an understanding--it takes time and detal, and thorough concentration, patience, and conscientiousness to follow along. Be this the optimum procedure or not, I cannot really decide (although I sense that it is).

Salima, as I have pointed out a couple of times, in a couple of areas, over a number of posts, we must strive (as we are using English as a medium to communicate the concepts and ideas we have in mind, as are, into the minds of others--that is, we don't want parts of the idea being dropped or misarranged during that communication 'bridging') to take care with our English, as best we can. (that too will mean taking the time needed, and being careful) Here, in this brain science area, the English is old, much older than the understanding we have now. For that reason we are in a bind, and need to readjust our language.

For example, if we look at one sentence you have written (and not to point to you yourself at all, simply the English language),
[indent] " because i would say the subconscious is conscious of things that the conscious part of the brain is not-though if the subconscious is conscious of what the conscious brain is, i do not know," (bold and color mine)[/indent]
we will find, through present definitions, that this appears to be saying that 'sub-conscious' is 'conscious,' therefore what is 'conscious?' A bit confusing, it could easily be said.

Therefore (I just love color...hee, hee, hee....) this is what is happening in the area that you are questioning. Sub-conscious is not a good term; it's a bit misleading and can cause confusion, so we can put it back in the dictionary and leave it there. What we have is simply CONSCIOUS. This is the state that is the living activity of, especially, neurons (but also some other glia cells in the brain). We must immediately clarify, with this understanding, that conscious alone, does not mean consciousness !

Little by little we will have to go into neuroanatomy and function because it will prove only necessary for a more balanced and proper understanding, but I'll like to use one example to help understanding emerge, here.

There is a structure that every normal brain has, the central sulcus which runs vertically along a plane about from the leading edge of the ears, which is a major fold (convolution) of the cortical sheet. (sheet because the tissue of the cortext when layed flat and stretched out, is like a sheet with a number of layers involved) Just in front of the central sulcus, running vertically, lays the primary motor area (Brodmann's area 4) and in front of that, a bit on the lower side, is the premotor cortical area, and above that, running over the top of each hemisphere and down into the medial (middle, as in the middle of brain) is the supplimental motor (both areas together make up Brodmann's [here after B ]area 6).

Towards the rear (posterior or dorsal) of that central sulcus lays the somatosensory cortical area (B 3,1,2 (in order from central sulcus to dorsal)) and ...finally...(for my purpose now) we come to the posterior parietal cortex (B 5, 7) positioned on the upper side above B 40 (parietal-temporal-occipital association cortex). (and temporal does not refer to time, in any way, but is derived from the word 'temple'--that certain area just in front of, and ever so slightly above the ear's forward edge)

And now, the point (thanks for being careful, patient, and attentative to the necessary details). The posterior parietal cortex communicates with both the supplimental and premotor cortex, and we, as whole, fully awake and aware brains, never ever really know about that at all !! These cortical areas are of course made up of (and not only, please keep in mind) neurons, and these clusters of neurons are alive and active and communicating with those other clusters--in other words, they are conscious--BUT by our definitions (which I am still in process of laying out, actually) we can not say that they have consciousness.

Due to this type of thing, what we find is that there is a pretty much a single continuum of conscious, and, rapid eye movement sleep (REM) is a state of up and running, conscious structures which are doing so at a certain level which comes close to, but is not, a full state of normal brain consciousness--especially as regards that individual brain.

We have to draw some rather definite lines of definition/description of terms when discussing anything, and here, it is no less a manditory thing. By the definition/description of consciousness (as opposed to merely conscious, again) we cannot, at the moment, say that all cells in the body have states of consciousness--regardless of our natural human tendency to patternize and anthropomorhpize things.

I'll then continue with that definition/description of, and details of, consciousness tonight or tomorrow.

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@KaseiJin,

KaseiJin;63283 wrote:

Would you not tend to concur, Aedes, that matters of moral, social, ethical, philosophical, and even artistic implications, are those phenomena which result from the fact of consciousness--when we maintain in our working definition the properties of awake and aware, self-awareness, upper level cognition?

Absolutely. And it's hard to deny, since these various domains of thought are to all appearances absent when consciousness is lacking.

1 Reply

@Aedes,

Thanks for highlighting that most special aspect of the fact of consciousness, Aedes.

Then, in continuation, we would want to look at the inner aspect, the subjective (or first person) aspects which the third party will be observing and measuring (as in acting/reacting towards, with, or against). Here, most unfortunately, is where we can run into a mine field which requires all kinds of acrobatic tip-toeing; 'can,' I point out (it can also be avoided). There is a way to avoid that, if a person so wishes, and yet arrive the desired location of having an adequate understanding of the definition/description of consciousness.

One first large and arguably ambigious umbrella of a description is phenominal consciousness and access consciousness. It must firstly be observed that these ideas, mostly propogated earlier on by Block, are both talking about the singularity of a state of consciousness (as of an outcome, or result of being in that state).

The former will be the result of an event of sensory input acknowledgment--say the trace of the sweetness of a ripe strawberry, the degree of tone, hue, and brightness of the redness of it, the sharpness of the sting that the wasp's stinger made you suddenly aware of, and so on. The latter will be the result of a (potential) event of, for example, relating the events of the day verbally, drawing up an emotion memory of that particular strawberry picking episode, when reflecting on it after having seen an ad in a magazine for whipcream, and so on. (multiply system integration)

We can find ever so slightly overlapping and hued definitions such as creature consciousness, talking about that basic definition of being awake and aware (see post #52), transitive consciousness, and state consciousness (Rosenthal, 2009). Additional, along the same line as above, we can find terms such as meta-self awareness, private & public self-awareness (two catagories under the compound noun), consciousness, and (as we would expect with the language we've had up to now) unconsciousness. (Morin, 2006; Silvia, 2001; etc)

After that, if we were to dance among the mine ladened field of flowers, we will find all kinds of theories and models being presented, and a seemingly never ending 'hornet's nest' (to borrow a term given a certain location on the battlefield at Shiloh [Mississippi, USA--Civil War]). Globalist to localist accounts from the most specualitive (globalists McFadden, John; localists Hamerof, Penrose) will be found along with the more 'hard-data-based,' such as global neuronal workspace (Baars, 1988); carrying more accuracy.① We find things like core consciousness, primary consciousness, implicit/explicit consciousness, and first-order theories, high-order theories (HOT), and then some.

We will surely find that elements that are being looked at by all this will overlap, and are real neuronal events, and thus we can screen and boil it all down into a more practical understanding without hard problems or easy problems, hard questions, or easy questions--although such do make for good philosophy.

In what I intend (hope?) to be my final definition/description of consciousness post--for the purpose of this particular thread (which Kielicious has kindly allowed me some leeway on)--I will draw out some of the basic concerns of the summarized and most pragmatic elements of consciousness, and by such, the definition/description of consciousness. I will then argue from there on all points which evidence the most sound understanding that consciousness is a biological problem, not one of any immaterial nature at all (no immaterial soul or spirit), not one to be explained by any said electromagnetic fields hovering around the vicinity or the head, nor by quantum mechanics, nor any said immaterial divine nature.

① We can find elements of accuracy, and overlap, in almost all of these, but the better theories will have the least 'real-time' problems--as I take and understand them in relation to hard data from the neurosciences.

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Consciousness is a Biological Problem

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