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Consciousness is a Biological Problem

 
 
paulhanke
 
  1  
Reply Tue 25 Aug, 2009 10:47 am
@richrf,
richrf;85577 wrote:
There is no consensus on what consciousness is so there can be no way to determine whether it is a biological problem.


... I think you've missed the point ... if you go back to the OP and look at the list of philosophical theories, each takes a metaphysical position on mind/consciousness, and so the starting point is that there is no consensus on what mind/consciousness is ... to paraphrase with a fictitious conversation:

Kiel: "There is no consensus between the competing philosophical theories of mind/consciousness as to what mind/consciousness is, but I think that the mind-brain identity theory is the most coherent and most supported by scientific observation."

Rich: "Well, until you get all of those philosophical theories to agree with one another as to what mind/consciousness is, we can't possibly discuss this!"

Maybe a better way to approach this is to find a philosophical description of conscious experience that remains metaphysically neutral (say, phenomenology?) and then use that as a point of departure for analyzing which of the metaphysical positions is most coherent with respect to that description.

---------- Post added 08-25-2009 at 10:00 AM ----------

salima;85610 wrote:
consciousness is perception and memory is remembering-they are two different activities, processes or functions. thought is another process-the question is, what is performing these processes? I like the word psyche-that includes all the functions and means the entire self. then we have to ask what is the self-and it turns out to be all of the above, and we are stuck in a circle again.
Laughing
sorry, i am not trying to be funny, but it really is getting funny, isnt it?


... from a dynamic systems perspective, what you've described is simply but one example of how the world works ... from the processes emerges the psyche (a higher level process) - which feeds back and causally influences the processes Smile ...

---------- Post added 08-25-2009 at 10:09 AM ----------

BrightNoon;85488 wrote:
It seems to me that consciousness is inseperable from the content of consciousness. A consiousness without specific content is a logical ghost, an abstraction ala 'soul.'


... this may not be quite what you're getting at, but ...

Quote:
Since the 1980s, AI has expanded into a broader study of the interaction between the body, brain, and environment, and how intelligence emerges from such interaction. ... it has become increasingly evident that conceptualizing intelligence as a mere computational process cannot explain natural, adaptive forms of intelligence. (Natural, adaptive forms of intelligence require) a complete physical organism interacting with the real world: in other words, intelligence requires a body. The new approach to understanding intelligence has led to a paradigm shift which emphasizes the physical and information-theoretical implications of embodied, adaptive behavior, as opposed to the disembodied view of the computational framework.
("AI in the 21st Century" in 50 Years of Artificial Intelligence)

---------- Post added 08-25-2009 at 10:14 AM ----------

... anyhoo, my wife and I are spending the next week in Wyoming - sans computer ... later, folks! Smile
salima
 
  1  
Reply Tue 25 Aug, 2009 11:35 am
@paulhanke,
paulhanke;85612 wrote:
...
Quote:
Since the 1980s, AI has expanded into a broader study of the interaction between the body, brain, and environment, and how intelligence emerges from such interaction. ... it has become increasingly evident that conceptualizing intelligence as a mere computational process cannot explain natural, adaptive forms of intelligence. (Natural, adaptive forms of intelligence require) a complete physical organism interacting with the real world: in other words, intelligence requires a body. The new approach to understanding intelligence has led to a paradigm shift which emphasizes the physical and information-theoretical implications of embodied, adaptive behavior, as opposed to the disembodied view of the computational framework.
("AI in the 21st Century" in 50 Years of Artificial Intelligence)


... anyhoo, my wife and I are spending the next week in Wyoming - sans computer ... later, folks! Smile


so if they build the computer a body with senses, will that help?
oh, i hate to see how many more pages there will be to this thread in another week!!! good luck!
paulhanke
 
  1  
Reply Tue 25 Aug, 2009 11:59 am
@salima,
salima;85623 wrote:
so if they build the computer a body with senses, will that help?


... that's exactly what they're doing in robotics ... the early AI robots took forever to plan their next move in excruciating detail - and by the time they got around to moving, the world had changes (lots of robots crashing into things!) ... modern robotics leverages the environment (e.g., gravity, slopes) and the body (e.g., dynamic tension, body shape) to perform "morphological computation", so that things like locomotion are almost literally a "no-brainer" Wink ... Andy Clark takes this idea a step further to propose that we also take advantage of every opportunity to offload cognition out into the body and the world ...

salima;85623 wrote:
oh, i hate to see how many more pages there will be to this thread in another week!!! good luck!


... thanks! - I think I'll need it! Smile
Kielicious
 
  1  
Reply Tue 25 Aug, 2009 01:11 pm
@paulhanke,
In regards to what people interpret my stance to be on the OP, Paul is hitting the bullseye. I think the mind-brain identity theory is the best we've got so far and indeed seems to be where all the data resides. It seems to be regarded as a consensus in neuroscience, and I say this because the textbooks themselves actually frown upon the concept of dualism, but it is far from reaching a consensus amongst philosophers (obviously). So yes I think the mind is the brain and actually by going this route we avoid many obstacles than if we take up the nature of dualism. I think Ryle said it best when he made his analogy that looking for the mind in the brain is equivalent to looking for the university in the buildings and departments within the area. You're not going to find the university because the buildings themselves are what makeup the university.
BrightNoon
 
  1  
Reply Tue 25 Aug, 2009 01:34 pm
@Kielicious,
Paul, that wasn't the issue I was was adressing, but that's a very good point and I agree. In my philosophical system, such as it is, thought and sensation are not fundementally different; they differ only by degree. In other words, thought is essentially 'dumb.' The rationalistic conception of a mind which is 'purely intelligable' and independent of the body is incorrect.

This realization should lead to another, namely, that any body, any physical entity, should enjoy some form of experience. The greater the complexity and sensitivity of that body, the higher order of experience it has. This is easy to imagine on a contnuum composed of man, the higher apes, other primates, mammals, birds, reptiles, ampibians, etc. We should realize, however, that there is no logical reason to assume that the continuum, the hierarchy of complexity and 'consciousness' (though of course nothing like our own) should not also include bacteria, viruses, prions, cellular debris, organic compounds, molecules, atoms, protons, quarks, etc. Of course, the sort of consciousness we might hypothesize that they possess is totally foreign and really inconcievable to us.

---------- Post added 08-25-2009 at 03:49 PM ----------

Kielicious;85634 wrote:
In regards to what people interpret my stance to be on the OP, Paul is hitting the bullseye. I think the mind-brain identity theory is the best we've got so far and indeed seems to be where all the data resides. It seems to be regarded as a consensus in neuroscience, and I say this because the textbooks themselves actually frown upon the concept of dualism, but it is far from reaching a consensus amongst philosophers (obviously). So yes I think the mind is the brain and actually by going this route we avoid many obstacles than if we take up the nature of dualism. I think Ryle said it best when he made his analogy that looking for the mind in the brain is equivalent to looking for the university in the buildings and departments within the area. You're not going to find the university because the buildings themselves are what makeup the university.


The mind-brain identity theory does not even attempt, and wisely so, to explain how physical processes generate experience, though it does make the empirically verified claim that physical processes generate experience, and that certain physical processess generate certain sorts of experience: e.g. correlation's between a certain cortex and certain emotions.

The claim of this thread is that 'consciousness is biologicaly problem.' If by that you mean that biology (or other sciences) can provide convincing empirical evidence that physical processess generate experience, then you are quite right. If, on the other hand, you mean that (biology or other sciences) can explain how physical processess generate experience, then you are quite mistaken. And that inability is not a failure of knowledge which can be overcome; it is fundementally impossible for a science based in physical properties to account for experienced phenomena. Science as we all know doesn't really explain anything, it only defines what is already the case. It relates things, which is defines into existence, in equations: e.g. 2H + O = H2O.

There is no way to put experienced phenomena in a form which is compatible with the terms of science. Science cannot show how experience arises from brain activity in the same way that science can explain, e.g., how precipitate forms from a certain chemical reaction. This is so because, in the latter case all terms in the equation, on both sides, are of the same type; they exist in the same way; they are all quantifiable. While in the former case, not all terms are of the same type; a calcium ion does not exist in the same way as 'redness' or 'sadness.'

So which claim are you making; that science can convincingly claim that brain processess generate experience, or that science can explain how brain processess generate experience?
0 Replies
 
ACB
 
  1  
Reply Tue 25 Aug, 2009 02:32 pm
@Kielicious,
Kielicious;85634 wrote:
In regards to what people interpret my stance to be on the OP, Paul is hitting the bullseye. I think the mind-brain identity theory is the best we've got so far and indeed seems to be where all the data resides. It seems to be regarded as a consensus in neuroscience, and I say this because the textbooks themselves actually frown upon the concept of dualism, but it is far from reaching a consensus amongst philosophers (obviously). So yes I think the mind is the brain and actually by going this route we avoid many obstacles than if we take up the nature of dualism. I think Ryle said it best when he made his analogy that looking for the mind in the brain is equivalent to looking for the university in the buildings and departments within the area. You're not going to find the university because the buildings themselves are what makeup the university.


In my post #526 I sought an agreed definition of 'mind' and 'consciousness'. We haven't heard so much about mind, but as far as consciousness is concerned we have had many different definitions. As you started this thread, I suggest you give us your definitions of these two words. Then let's discuss the proposition "Consciousness is a biological problem" on that basis. Regardless of how the rest of us would normally define 'consciousness', let's all use your definition for the purposes of this thread. (It's only a word, after all.) Then we might make some progress!

I note from your above post that you favour the theory that the mind is identical with the brain. We obviously need an agreed definition of 'mind' in order to discuss this. (In order to avoid circularity, the word 'brain' should obviously not appear in the definition.)

Personally, I find many of Ryle's arguments unconvincing. They do not seem to be able to account for the first-personal aspect - that we each experience one particular person's thoughts 'from the inside'. This seems to be a difficulty for the mind-brain identity theory, but I don't think dualism solves it either. The more I think about this 'first-person' enigma, the more I am drawn towards the murky realm of solipsism....
0 Replies
 
richrf
 
  1  
Reply Wed 26 Aug, 2009 12:11 am
@paulhanke,
paulhanke;85612 wrote:
Maybe a better way to approach this is to find a philosophical description of conscious experience that remains metaphysically neutral (say, phenomenology?) and then use that as a point of departure for analyzing which of the metaphysical positions is most coherent with respect to that description.


Yes, I sought any definition that would be a starting point. Something that I could at least address with a comment. The primary issue, that I wanted to focus on was that you cannot apply the metaphysical notion of consciousness to a scientific paradigm called biology.

What a scientist can do is observe something such as a neuron doing a dance and define consciousness as THAT which a neuron is doing, and then proclaim that a consciousness manifests from a neuron. However, I can always retort, in exactly the same manner that consciousness is dancing and that those neurons are just manifesting from consciousness.

So it is a stalemate. However, I have one ace in the hole - the transcendental nature of knowledge.

Rich
odenskrigare
 
  1  
Reply Wed 26 Aug, 2009 12:15 am
@richrf,
richrf;85711 wrote:
Yes, I sought any definition that would be a starting point. Something that I could at least address with a comment. The primary issue, that I wanted to focus on was that you cannot apply the metaphysical notion of consciousness to a scientific paradigm called biology.

What a scientist can do is observe something such as a neuron doing a dance and define consciousness as THAT which a neuron is doing, and then proclaim that a consciousness manifests from a neuron. However, I can always retort, in exactly the same manner that consciousness is dancing and that those neurons are just manifesting from consciousness.


too bad your definition is non-falsifiable

richrf;85711 wrote:
So it is a stalemate. However, I have one ace in the hole - the transcendental nature of knowledge.

Rich


that's baloney
Kielicious
 
  1  
Reply Wed 26 Aug, 2009 01:33 am
@odenskrigare,
BrightNoon;85644 wrote:
So which claim are you making; that science can convincingly claim that brain processess generate experience, or that science can explain how brain processess generate experience?


I would in no way be claiming the latter. It is only in the former all that I am trying to accomplish with this thread. Science doesnt know alot about phenomena that we have an abundance of experimental data from, but are still left with unanswered questions (i.e. gravity). However, does that mean we will NEVER fully understand certain phenomena like gravity and consciousness? I dont think so. Perhaps one day, who knows but I dont think either of us are in a position to answer that question just yet. The main underlying point is that the mind and brain are connected which renders it a biological problem -but not ONLY a biological problem. I dont agree with Searle's Chinese Room argument. Besides if we knew how the brain creates consciousness we wouldnt be having this conversation now would we?


ACB;85650 wrote:
Regardless of how the rest of us would normally define 'consciousness', let's all use your definition for the purposes of this thread. (It's only a word, after all.) Then we might make some progress!


Consciousness and mind are definately vague and ambiguous terms, but as you say they're only words and with the point of this thread we dont really need specific definitions. We can easily describe it as subjective experience and go from there, but in all honesty dont we all know what consciousness is? or am I the only attendee at the solipsism show? Wink

ACB wrote:
I note from your above post that you favour the theory that the mind is identical with the brain. We obviously need an agreed definition of 'mind' in order to discuss this. (In order to avoid circularity, the word 'brain' should obviously not appear in the definition.)


Well, thats why this topic is so tricky. If you want to distinguish between first person and third person then yes brain and mind should be segregated. I find it similar when talking about illusions because there is both a 'subjective' experience of illusions and an 'objective' experience of illusions. Illusions wouldnt exist without its 'objective' makeup and likewise it wouldnt be an illusion without the 'subjective' aspect as well. Its two sides of the same coin.

ACB wrote:
Personally, I find many of Ryle's arguments unconvincing. They do not seem to be able to account for the first-personal aspect - that we each experience one particular person's thoughts 'from the inside'. This seems to be a difficulty for the mind-brain identity theory, but I don't think dualism solves it either. The more I think about this 'first-person' enigma, the more I am drawn towards the murky realm of solipsism....


I too dont enjoy many of Ryle's arguments but that one in particular holds weight in my opinion. Of course they dont account for the subjective nature of the mind but that's the whole point Ryle was making with that analogy. Minds are NOT something over-and-above the brain. They are just the state of the brain and that's why we can never locate consciousness because its just like trying to locate the university. Looking at the brain and not seeing consciousness is just like looking at the buildings and not finding the university. And while yes there is that 'barrier' for third parties but that's because it has to be! It wouldnt be consciousness if it werent subjective.
0 Replies
 
KaseiJin
 
  1  
Reply Wed 26 Aug, 2009 01:48 am
@Pathfinder,
Putting off lunch for a more important matter--discussion in this thread--I hope to work at making a few matters possibly more clear. (if I can)

I don't know if I'm the only who keeps a clear-page file of print outs of this thread, but it sure comes in handy when cross-examining, or trying to connect dots across the many posts. I'll try to keep my sentencing and paragraphing as simple as I can, for richrf. (for the moment, richrf, as I have told you, I trust your statement that you could not understand, and that you use simple sentences--although I have to hold at bay, a voice in the back of my head that questions how you would be able to read physics and quantum physics related works, then)


richrf;85577 wrote:
To summarize my findings;

There is no consensus on what consciousness is so there can be no way to determine whether it is a biological problem.


I think I am beginning to get a glimpse of what is happening here, with this expression quoted above. I will firstly expound on what I see as a strong possiblity on this glimpse, before presenting more on how the first part is most obviously incorrect.

richrf;85542 wrote:
I have my own personal definition for consciousness, . . . Now this is the kicker:

Conscious memory transcends a single physical life, and manifests as innate skills and inherited characteristics which differ from one conscious being to another.

Based upon this definition, consciousness cannot biological (physical). It must be either energetic, or supra-energetic.

This would be my definition and rationale.


This general flow is heading towards a proper mode of discussion, I'd say. Of those of the 'believing in a soul' camp, only richrf has offered any definitions:

richrf;84707 wrote:

soul: that which remembers (has memory) from one physical life to the next. It physically passes this memory through genes which interact with the human nervous system.

consciousness:
that which is observing, learning, creating, for its own amusement via the souls. Multiple souls are like the human nervous system.

separability: Not possible. Everything is intertwined at the lowest level. Therefore, any attempt to measure any particular thing is impossible. Hence all measurements must be questioned. Measuring what?


In following up, richrf has come back with the following:

richrf;85590 wrote:
I can discuss philosophical definitions, I can discuss the Bohm definition (which I find a fascinating quantum metaphysical concept), I can discuss my definition, I can discuss yours. What I cannot do, is answer the question whether consciousness is biological until there is a consensus definition of what consciousness is.

Using my definition, I believe consciousness is not biological for the reasons given. You can make a case for your definition if you would like. But everyone is talking about something different, so I don't know what there is to discuss, other than a statement of how someone feels. (bold mine)


Here, we can get a glimpse of the dilemma, namely that a hinderence has possibly developed in richrf's frame of mind towards the basic concensus definition/description due to this latter's leaning much more so towards being brain based--which does not mention, at least, anything similar to part of the definition he has provided.

The English word consciousness does have a base concensus of definition--there is no mistake on that--which is easily proved by dictionary cross referencing. There will be differences of finery of descriptive diagrams (as I had pointed out in much earlier posts on that matter, and as we have seen in recent 'expounding-on-the-finery-of-the-term' posts), which I say we need not let get in the way of forward understanding on the matter.

Now, here is where we can possibly come to full agreement. If we carefully and thoughtfully look over all the definition/descriptions given by several on this thread, we will find one common denominator--being aware. In English, the word consciousness is a noun which was created from the adjective conscious which originally described a state of knowing of something privately (esp. within oneself) and by extension, and later usage, 'of knowing'. Therefore, the English word consciousness is synonymous with awareness (as conscious is synonymous with aware [both being adjectives]).

[size=3]I make the motion here, that for the purpose of this discussion, we define/describe, as a bare minimum, that by 'consciousness' we mean 'awareness.'[/size]


I will await word on secondings (etc.) of the motion, but will take that basic requirement myself (and hope all participants will agree). Then, we can come to the other element which may have led to that possible dilemma, namely the source of awareness. Is is the brain, a biological entity, alone? or is it something else, like a 'soul' or 'spirit' or 'some universal cosmic entity [god],' or, simply some all pervading 'force' or 'energy.'

Of those in the 'soul' believing group, only richrf has offered any definition/description of what a soul is. (see above) Salima has also offered some definition/description of consciousness which is perhaps could be seen as an effort to give a source of awareness (though there may be some points of contention):

salima;85610 wrote:
how about this for a definition?

consciousness is perception (as interpreted by the senses available to the organism perceiving) of anything ( including its own form).
[actually i want to use a different word for organism that would include inanimate objects, but i cant think of one.]

consciousness-is not self awareness: that would be ego, . . . (bold mine...for further details, see there)


And while I know this'll be another long one, I ask, PLEASE FOLKS . . . follow through, 'cause I cannot be on line at the same time as all of you, usually. (I acknowledge that paulhanke will be out for a while, and will miss his voice)

As for my position on the source of awareness, I will greatly adhere to the likes of:

Ramachandran wrote:
I won't pretend to have solved these mysteries [of consciousness], but I do think there's a new way to study consciousness by treating it not as a philosophical, logical, or coneptual issue, but rather as an empirical problem. Phantoms in the Brain, 1998; p. 228


Edward Slingerland wrote:
The realization that the body-mind is an integrated system is counterintuitive [historical culture-wise], but treatments based on this insight appear to be massively more effective than dualism-based treatments-pharmaceutical interventions, for instance, have done more for the treatment of mental illness in a few decades than millennia of spiritual interventions, from exorcisms to Freudian analysis. Recognizing that there is no point at which the ghost enters the machine allows us to go ahead with stem cell research, and understanding that personhood is not an all-or-nothing affair, helps us get a better grip on what is going on with severe dementia in the elderly. Physicalism matters because it simply works better than dualism, and - once the reality of this superiority is fully grasped - this pragmatic consideration is an irresistibly powerful argument for creatures like us. What Science Offers the Humanities, 2008; pp 292,93
(note for richrf: This professor is professor of Asian Studies, and is a research chair in Chinese Thought and Embodied Cognition at the U of British Columbia. He presents both sides of the issue well and quite fairly, and concludes that both disciplines can offer a rich cultural gift to society, yet the humanities will have to listen to what comes out of the neurosciences. He has also authored: The Analects of Confucius and ffortless Action: Wu-wei as Conceptual Metaphor and Spiritual Ideal in Early China.)

Joseph LeDoux wrote:
In spite of my own contention that consciousness is not the be-all and end-all of mind and behavior, I nevertheless have considerable sympathy for the belief that neuroscience will come to explain consciousness. Descartes was correct in thinking about unconscious mental processes in physical terms; he erred, however, in conceiving of consciousness as nonphysical. Synaptic Self-How Our Brains become Who We Are, 2002; p 18


Victor Lamme wrote:
Only by moving our notion of mind towards that of brain can progress [in understanding the mind-brain relationship] be made Trends in Cognitive Sciences, Vol 10, No. 11, 2006; p 494


Rodney Cotterill wrote:
Finally, in this brief survey of he whole picture, as it appears to the author, let us turn to a particularly venerable issue. The flow of signals around that core circuit, and their modification through interactions with other brain components, has been conjectured to underlie thought itself, this being percieved to be nothing other than a sort of internally generated, but out-there-experienced, masque of the body's transactions with the surroundings, including the latter's human components. Seen in this light, there is no longer a problem of body/mind, only a situation of body/ability-to-simulate-body's-interactions-with-environment. Enchanted Looms-Conscious Networks in Brains and Computers, 1998; p 434
and so on and on so . . . (this is just to give a taste here. ALSO I have just now noticed some new incoming posts....will respond tomorrow or Friday. Please forgive my length here...)
richrf
 
  1  
Reply Wed 26 Aug, 2009 02:03 am
@KaseiJin,
KaseiJin;85720 wrote:
hinderence has possibly developed in richrf's frame of mind


I disagree. I think the problem is that I don't understand a word that you are saying. And I can vouch for that.

Rich
odenskrigare
 
  1  
Reply Wed 26 Aug, 2009 02:06 am
@Kielicious,
the feeling's mutual

but how can you not agree with something like

[INDENT]The realization that the body-mind is an integrated system is counterintuitive [historical culture-wise], but treatments based on this insight appear to be massively more effective than dualism-based treatments-pharmaceutical interventions, for instance, have done more for the treatment of mental illness in a few decades than millennia of spiritual interventions, from exorcisms to Freudian analysis. Recognizing that there is no point at which the ghost enters the machine allows us to go ahead with stem cell research, and understanding that personhood is not an all-or-nothing affair, helps us get a better grip on what is going on with severe dementia in the elderly. Physicalism matters because it simply works better than dualism, and - once the reality of this superiority is fully grasped - this pragmatic consideration is an irresistibly powerful argument for creatures like us. What Science Offers the Humanities, 2008; pp 292,93
[/INDENT]

(emphasis mine)
KaseiJin
 
  1  
Reply Wed 26 Aug, 2009 08:07 am
@richrf,
richrf;85721 wrote:
I disagree. I think the problem is that I don't understand a word that you are saying. And I can vouch for that. Rich


I have no real choice but to accept your admission here, then. It was in no way an intention to diminish your standing; it did look to me as though you might have had problems accepting the general definition/description of consciousness (since it had been provided by a number of people, and is in every dictionary) because of it's general lean towards brain things. Also, because a difference in simply defining consciousness per se, and demonstrating the source of consciousness, can be seen, the thought had arisen. It had come to mind (based on your overall posting here, and in other places) that your effort might have been to identify a source, rather than define the word, and thus a possible mental block towards accepting the general definition might have arisen--or so I had come to feel.

Anyhow, richrf, odenskrigare, other fellow posters, what might be your view towards the following?:

KaseiJin;85720 wrote:

[size=3]I make the motion here, that for the purpose of this discussion, we define/describe, as a bare minimum, that by 'consciousness' we mean 'awareness.'[/size]


This would be a very bare minimum definition of what consciousness is, a starting place, a tool to work with. Is this, at least, acceptable? With an overall agreement on this, I reason we can move forward with the questions and discussion on whether we are more evidently looking at a biological source, or an immaterial source.
odenskrigare
 
  1  
Reply Wed 26 Aug, 2009 08:45 am
@Kielicious,
it's a better definition than mine

and yes, I agree, your definition avoids the behaviorist trap
0 Replies
 
richrf
 
  1  
Reply Wed 26 Aug, 2009 09:04 am
@KaseiJin,
KaseiJin;85758 wrote:
thus a possible mental block towards accepting the general definition might have arisen--or so I had come to feel.


You are free to feel whatever you want to feel, but is this psycho-analysis or critical analysis?

mental block
A mental block is an informal term used to mean either repression of painful thoughts, or an inability to continue a train of thought, like in the case of writer's block.

May, I make a similar observation:

That Pathfinder was just thrown off for doing a lot less than what you are continually doing which is a direct attack on my psychological well-being. In psychology this is called projection:

Psychological projection (or projection bias) is the unconscious act of denial of a person's own attributes, thoughts, and/or emotions, which are ascribed to the outside world, like the weather, the government, a tool or another person or people.

What we have here is a remarkable demonstration of how scientific inquiry is really performed. That is: 1) Persistent use of ridicule 2) Scientists protection each other by circling the wagons and 3) Suppression and banishment of opposing views. Perfect.

You can call consciousness whatever you want. I feel that Pathfinder is due an apology.

Rich
0 Replies
 
odenskrigare
 
  1  
Reply Wed 26 Aug, 2009 09:11 am
@Kielicious,
http://www.coolstuffinc.com/images/Products/mtg%20art/Unglued/I%27m%20Rubber,%20You%27re%20Glue.jpg

wow nice retort rich
0 Replies
 
ACB
 
  1  
Reply Wed 26 Aug, 2009 09:17 am
@KaseiJin,
KaseiJin;85720 wrote:
I make the motion here, that for the purpose of this discussion, we define/describe, as a bare minimum, that by 'consciousness' we mean 'awareness.'


That's OK with me.

"Consciousness" means "awareness".

"Consciousness is a biological problem" means "Consciousness can be fully explained biologically."

The question then is:
Does consciousness (awareness) have a biological or an immaterial source?

Rich - I appreciate that you have up to now been using the word "consciousness" to refer to the (supposed) immaterial source itself (e.g. in your statement "neurons are just manifesting from consciousness"). To avoid confusion, however, I suggest that for the purposes of this discussion you use a different word (may I propose "meta-consciousness"?) to refer to the immaterial source.

So let's all have a go at answering the question shown in bold underlined italics above. I myself would say that the source is biological. Regardless of the source, however, the subjective first-personal nature of consciousness is a total mystery.
odenskrigare
 
  1  
Reply Wed 26 Aug, 2009 09:22 am
@ACB,
ACB;85772 wrote:
Rich - I appreciate that you have up to now been using the word "consciousness" to refer to the (supposed) immaterial source itself (e.g. in your statement "neurons are just manifesting from consciousness")


I don't get it

neurons manifest from matter

ACB;85772 wrote:
I myself would say that the source is biological. Regardless of the source, however, the subjective first-personal nature of consciousness is a total mystery.


nailed it twice

it is a mystery

let's be honest with ourselves and not pretend we can explain the fuzzy bit with a "transcendent spirit"

for my part, I think there could be an anima mundi, but this idea is of course useless as a research paradigm
0 Replies
 
salima
 
  1  
Reply Wed 26 Aug, 2009 09:26 am
@odenskrigare,
odenskrigare;85722 wrote:
the feeling's mutual

but how can you not agree with something like
[INDENT]The realization that the body-mind is an integrated system is counterintuitive [historical culture-wise], but treatments based on this insight appear to be massively more effective than dualism-based treatments-pharmaceutical interventions, for instance, have done more for the treatment of mental illness in a few decades than millennia of spiritual interventions, from exorcisms to Freudian analysis. Recognizing that there is no point at which the ghost enters the machine allows us to go ahead with stem cell research, and understanding that personhood is not an all-or-nothing affair, helps us get a better grip on what is going on with severe dementia in the elderly. Physicalism matters because it simply works better than dualism, and - once the reality of this superiority is fully grasped - this pragmatic consideration is an irresistibly powerful argument for creatures like us. What Science Offers the Humanities, 2008; pp 292,93
[/INDENT](emphasis mine)


this is a good quote (originally posted by KJ), but what no one seems to agree with me on is that it doesnt have to negate the possibility of dualism.
if we see the 'mind' or 'consciousness' or 'awareness' as resulting from the brain, and purely physical, we can mess with it all we want (as in the above quote i mean) and possibly get it to work better, we can define it as a self-repairing machine. to someone who believes there is a source (of that biological thing we are trying to discuss) that is beyond the brain it is no dilemma, because that source would be untouched by any adjustment to the physical. the ethics of it all would be why are we doing it and to achieve what results.
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richrf
 
  1  
Reply Wed 26 Aug, 2009 09:35 am
@ACB,
ACB;85772 wrote:
So let's all have a go at answering the question shown in bold underlined italics above. I myself would say that the source is biological. Regardless of the source, however, the subjective first-personal nature of consciousness is a total mystery.


Hi ACB,

I would say that consciousness as defined in this thread, is an aspect of meta-consciousness, which entails all aspects of human information processing as I previously defined it.

As such, the physical body and consciousness are just two-sides of the same coin. They are one and the same just different manifestations. One is denser than the other. There is no clear distinction at the quantum level of the material (or Classical) and non-material. The Schnitt, as Bohr would call it, or dividing line cannot be found.

In addition, the meta-consciousness (and therefore consciousness), which includes that which one becomes aware of in one life-time (e.g. skills, inherited characteristics, innate abilities), move through multiple lives (is transcendental) in a manner closely akin to Bohm's enfolding and unfolding concepts of consciousness and matter. This can be roughly illustrated by the way a hologram enfolds and unfolds images in its wave patterns. Light being the mechanism for unfolding.

Meta-consciousness, as anything in the universe, cannot be destroyed though it can be weakened during the enfolding and unfolding process. This is similar in process to a hologram that becomes weaker as the pieces become smaller. For example, this is how we might experience memory loss during a life or between lives.

Rich
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