Terror - The clock is ticking...

I am sorry but the all knowing Setanta does not agree with you. He says the North Koreans had missle development programs going quite early.

And, please,no Bull. I would not believe anything you say with regard to the so called--"Republican Hawks blocking the fulfillment". I don't believe left wingers unless I see evidence.

Here is Setanta's screed-

Setanta

1 Reply report Mon 16 Dec, 2002 12:09 pm Good points made, Boss. When first i saw the title of this thread, i thought, hell, thumbed their collective noses? We have no business to tell them what to do. The Korean case is a little clearer, in that we are still technically at war, and have every reason to put pressure on them about a nuclear policy. In the final analysis, however, i agree with you that much of what we try to impose on members of the international community smacks of hypocricy. As for Iran, i would say that we have no place dictating to them, but any acquisition of nuclear arms on their part is a legitimate cause for alarm. They openly supported muslim fighters during Lebanon's tragic civil war, and have openly declared that they consider the US to be the "Great Satan." This is very dangerous ground for our foreign policy, however. One of our greatest security resources throughout our history has been the two oceans which separate us from the "old world." This continues to be significant, in that nations like Iraq and Iran could not yet conceivably deliver a nuclear device in any conventional manner--if this ever happens to us, it will more than likely be a terrorist act. But North Korea and China both have missile development programs, and routinely sell their wares on the international market without much discrimination. Brazil also produces missiles for tactical purposes. Any and all of these products could be used to develop a longer-range missile, but it is unlikely that the US will be "targetable" by middle eastern states at any time in the foreseeable future. So, what is our interest, and our justification for interferring in the internal military affairs of other nations? This is an area in which we need to tread very carefully.

Missile technology is not nuclear technology.

Trust me, they're not the same. Oh, you thought they were? Somehow I'm not surprised. For one thing, missile technology can be used to shoot Gene Roddenberry's ashes into orbit. Try doing that with an A bomb.

And rocket science is not related to ICBM's either!

As you may have noticed a lot of countries have rockets but don't have nukes. And don't use them for nukes. N. Korea, for example, claims (with a whole lot of world scepticism) to have launched a satellite in 1998. Considering the US claims the right to shut down access to its satellites at will, a lot of countries don't want to rely on us for things like GPS services or communications.

Do I have to take you by the hand and read to you?

Note;
North Korea

In contrast, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) provides an example of safeguards succeeding in their aim of detecting a violation of safeguards obligations. It was subsequently brought to the attention of the international community through the UN Security Council.

The DPRK acceded to the NPT in 1985 as a condition for the supply of a nuclear power station by the then USSR. However, it delayed concluding its NPT Safeguards Agreement with the IAEA, a process which should take only 18 months, until April 1992.

During that period, in late 1985, it brought into operation a small gas-cooled, graphite-moderated, natural-uranium (metal) fuelled "Experimental Power Reactor" of about 25 MWt at Yongbyon, on the west coast 55 km north of Pyongyang. It exhibited all the features of a plutonium production reactor for weapons purposes and produced only about 5 MWe. North Korea also made substantial progress in the construction of two larger reactors designed on the same principles, a prototype of about 200 MWt (50 MWe) at Yongbyon, and a full-scale version of about 800 MWt (200 MWe) at Taechon, 25 km north of Yongbyon.

In addition it completed and commissioned a reprocessing plant for the extraction of plutonium from spent reactor fuel. That plutonium, if the fuel was only irradiated to a very low burn-up, would have been in a form very suitable for weapons. Although all these facilities at Yongbyon were to be under safeguards, there was always the risk that at some stage, the DPRK would withdraw from the NPT on some pretext and use the plutonium for weapons.

One of the first steps in applying NPT safeguards is for the IAEA to verify the initial stocks of uranium and plutonium to ensure that all the nuclear material in the country have been declared for safeguards purposes. While undertaking this work in 1992, IAEA inspectors found discrepancies which indicated that the reprocessing plant had been used more often than the DPRK had declared. This suggested that the DPRK could have weapons-grade plutonium which it had not declared to the IAEA. Information passed to the IAEA by a Member State (as required under the IAEA's Statute) supported that suggestion by indicating that the DPRK had two undeclared waste or other storage sites.

In February 1993 the IAEA called on the DPRK to allow special inspections of the two sites so that the initial stocks of nuclear material could be verified. The DPRK refused, and on 12 March announced its intention to withdraw from the NPT (three months notice is required). In April 1993 the IAEA Board concluded that the DPRK was in non-compliance with its safeguards obligations and reported the matter to the UN Security Council. In June 1993 the DPRK announced that it had "suspended" its withdrawal from the NPT, but subsequently claimed a "special status" with respect to its safeguards obligations. This was rejected by IAEA.

Once the DPRK's non-compliance had been reported to the UN Security Council, the essential part of the IAEA's mission had been completed. Inspections in the DPRK continued, although inspectors were increasingly hampered in what they were permitted to do by the DPRK's claim of a "special status". However, some 8,000 corroding fuel rods associated with the experimental reactor remained under close surveillance and any plans to separate plutonium from them were deferred, in the event, for eight years.

Following bilateral negotiations between DPRK and the USA, and the conclusion of the agreed framework in October 1994, the IAEA was given additional responsibilities. The agreement required a freeze on the operation and construction of the DPRK's plutonium production reactors and their related facilities, and the IAEA was responsible for monitoring the freeze until the facilities were eventually dismantled. The DPRK remained uncooperative with the IAEA verification work and did not comply with its safeguards agreement, though apparently no further work was done on the two larger reactors at Yongbyon and Taechon.

Iraq was defeated in a war, which gave the UN the opportunity to seek out and destroy its nuclear weapons program as part of the cease-fire conditions. The DPRK was not defeated, nor was it vulnerable to other measures, such as trade sanctions. It could scarcely afford to import anything, and sanctions on vital commodities, such as oil, would either have been ineffective, or risk provoking war.

Ultimately, the DPRK was persuaded to halt its nuclear weapons program in exchange, under the agreed framework, for about $US5 billion in energy-related assistance. This included two 1000 MWe light water nuclear power reactors. There was also the prospect of diplomatic and economic relations with the USA.

At the end of 1999 The long-awaited contract to build two 1000 MWe light-water reactors was signed, enabling construction to begin. The agreement was between the Korean peninsula Economic Development Organisation (KEDO) - the international organisation in charge of the project, and the South Korean utility KEPCO, bringing technology to build a nuclear power plant which is not amenable to misuse. KEDO was set up following the 1994 deal involving the USA to head off the production of weapons plutonium from the small gas-graphite reactor and to provide much needed energy - in the short term fuel oil, but eventually electricity.

The Korean Standard Nuclear Plant (KSNP) reactors were the same as those then being built in South Korea, and were expected to be completed in 2008. South Korea committed to provide US$ 3.22 billion for the US$ 4.6 billion project, with Japan contributing US$ 1 billion and the EU most of the balance.

In August 2002, with the project running several years behind schedule due to North Korea's continued lack of cooperation with the IAEA in verifying the history of its nuclear program, first concrete for the two-unit nuclear power plant was poured at Kumho, on the east coast. This formal start of construction was a milestone for KEDO, which planned to deliver the main components in 2005. The work would then stop unless North Korea was fully compliant with IAEA requirements regarding verification of past activities (specifically, that all nuclear material held by North Korea has been declared and placed under safeguards).

However, in October 2002 it emerged that DPRK had been working clandestinely to enrich uranium for weapons use, using centrifuge equipment. There appeared to be some linkage to Pakistan's centrifuge program and in 2005 Pakistan confirmed that it had supplied centrifuges to DPRK.

In December 2002 DPRK removed the IAEA seals on its facilities at Yongbyon and ordered the IAEA inspectors out of the country. It then restarted its small reactor and reprocessed the 8000 irradiated fuel rods to recover weapons-grade plutonium. In April 2003 it withdrew from the NPT - the first country to do so.

Since 2003 negotiations have been intermittently under way to secure some agreement on curtailing North Korea's nuclear weapons program. These have involved China, South Korea and the USA, which insisted upon "complete, verifiable, and irreversible dismantling of North Korea's weapons programs" through "diplomatic dialogue in a multilateral framework involving those states with the most direct stakes in the outcome."

Construction of the reactors under KEDO was suspended late in 2003, and this suspension was renewed in 2004 and 2005. The KEDO board formally terminated the project in May 2006. Most of the fabrication of steam generators, pressure vessels and other equipment for both reactors is complete. This equipment could be sold off to other nuclear projects, including South Korean export ones.

In October 2006 DPRK tested a nuclear weapon underground near Gilju in the north east of the country, and the whole matter was referred to the UN Security Council.

After several attempts at negotiation, in February 2007 agreement with DPRK was reached in the six-party talks involving China, Japan, Russia, South Korea and the USA. This involved DPRK agreeing to shut down and seal the Yongbyon reactor and related facilities including reprocessing plant within 60 days (by 14 April) and accepting IAEA monitoring of this, in return for assistance with its energy needs. Further assistance would follow the irreversible disabling of the reactor and all other nuclear facilities. The April 14 deadline was missed. After further diplomatic efforts, the reactor was shut down in mid July and an IAEA team was able to verify this and in addition, that other nuclear facilities at the site were also closed, notably the reprocessing plant ("Radiochemical Laboratory") and fuel fabrication plant. These were sealed and will be subject to ongoing monitoring by IAEA. It is proposed to send the used fuel to Mayak in Russia or Sellafield in UK for reprocessing.
The second phase of measures under the February 2007 agreement involved establishing a full inventory of nuclear materials and actually disabling the offending plants - initially promised by end of December 2007 but dragged out to June 2008 and then marked by demolition of Yongbyon's cooling tower. Phase 3 is when North Korea hands over fissile materials and weapons gear. There remains a question about uranium enrichment capacity. North Korea has raised the question of reviving the KEDO project for building a light water reactor.
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Since you either can't or won't read, I will replicate some important sentences from above.

l. Ultimately,(North Korea) was persuaded to halt its nuclear program in exchange ..for about five billion in energy related assistance.( 1995)

2 In August 2002, with the project running several years behind schedule due to NORTH KOREA'S continued lack of cooperation with the IAEA(no, they are not the Republican Hawks in the Senate) in verifying the history of its nuclear program.

3. In Oct 2002, it emerged that North Korea had been working clandestinely to enrich uranium for weapons use.

Uranium wasn't covered in the agreement. They didn't produce more plutonium or convert it for weapons. which was what the agreement covered, until after Bush came in and abrogated the agreement. It was the plutonium produced prior to the agreement and converted after its abrogation that they they used for their bombs. Was uranium enrichment subverting the intent of the agreement?Yes. But again it wasn't actually covered. Did they exploit a loophole? Yes. But they did not use enriched uranium for their bombs.

The North Koreans are, and have always been paranoid assholes, very conscious of what they perceive as their and their country's honor. When they feel that isn't respected, they react. The US fielded a team of paranoid assholes toformulate policy about them, Dick Cheney, Don Rumsfeld, Paul Wolfowitz, Doug Feith, John Bolton. The paranoia of the two sides reinforced each other. That mutual paranoia led to the bombs. There were a lot of sticks and delivery of the carrots didn't happen.

And another take on the question:
http://mediamatters.org/items/200610120002

Indeed, under the Agreed Framework -- which the Bush administration abandoned in 2002 -- North Korea did not produce any plutonium for eight years, as noted in a separate statement released on October 10 by Ben Yarrow, a spokesman for President Clinton:

For eight years during the Clinton Administration, there was no new plutonium production, no nuclear weapons tests and therefore no additional nuclear weapons developed on President Clinton's watch. President Clinton's policy toward the North was strong and effective, pairing clear red lines with tough, smart engagement. Secretary of State Colin Powell endorsed President Clinton's policy toward the North in 2001. The Clinton Administration's approach has been turned on its head and North Korea now has demonstrated its nuclear weapons capability to the world. It is unfortunate that anyone would attempt to rewrite history to score political points at a time when we need to address this serious threat.

Indeed, signed on October 21, 1994, the agreement stipulated that North Korea would halt its plutonium production and lock up its stockpile of spent fuel rods (used to make weapons-grade plutonium). In return, the United States, along with the European Union, Japan, and South Korea, would assist with the country's energy needs. During the next eight years, North Korea abided by the agreement and its plutonium-based facilities and materials remained under constant United Nations surveillance, as an October 10 Los Angeles Times article described:

Little more than four years ago, the North Korean nuclear weapons program was largely under lock and key, the threat seen as a fleeting crisis of a previous decade.

North Korea's main nuclear center at Yongbyon, 60 miles north of Pyongyang, was monitored 24 hours a day by U.N. surveillance cameras. International inspectors lived near the site. Seals were in place over key nuclear installations and a nuclear reactor at Yongbyon was gathering dust.

In October 2002, however, North Korea admitted to having operated a clandestine uranium enrichment program. While the Agreed Framework covered only the North Korean plutonium-based nuclear facilities, the Bush administration considered its newly disclosed uranium program a violation of the "spirit" of the agreement. In response, the Bush administration announced (subscription required) in November 2002 that it would eliminate funding for, and ultimately end, fuel oil shipments to North Korea, an act that went contrary to the terms of the Agreed Framework. North Korea subsequently began producing plutonium (subscription required) in early 2003. The country has since accumulated 20-43 kilograms of the fissile material, enough for two to 12 nuclear weapons. But the fact remains that during years the Agreed Framework was in force, North Korea produced no plutonium, as Yarrow's statement asserted. Nonetheless, Babington left out this fact in his article.

Moreover, Babington uncritically reported McCain's misleading claims that, under the Agreed Framework, North Korea "kick[ed] out the IAEA inspectors" and "remove[d] the fuel rods from their reactor." In fact, during the eight years the Agreed Framework was in place, IAEA inspectors remained in the country. They were expelled in December 2002 after the Bush administration abandoned the agreement. Further, while the 8,000 fuel rods in North Korea's possession in 1994 were indeed moved from the nuclear facility at Yongbyon, this action was taken by the IAEA in order to store them under the terms of the Agreed Framework and was not in violation of the agreement, as McCain appeared to suggest. The IAEA began transporting the rods in 1996 and announced that it had completed the storage process in 2000.

By contrast to the Post, Associated Press staff writer Sarah Karush noted Yarrow's response in her October 10 AP article on McCain's remarks:

A spokesman for President Clinton, Ben Yarrow, said in a statement that it was "unfortunate that anyone would attempt to rewrite history to score political points at a time when we need to address this serious threat."

"For eight years during the Clinton administration, there was no new plutonium production, no nuclear weapons tests and therefore no additional nuclear weapons developed on President Clinton's watch," said Yarrow, who added that Colin Powell, Bush's secretary of State, endorsed Clinton's policy toward North Korea in 2001.

Karush further noted Sen. John Kerry's (D-MA) statement that, while the Agreed Framework was not "a perfect agreement ... [a]t least we had inspectors going in and we knew where the (nuclear fuel) rods were":

"He must be trying to burnish his credentials for the nomination process," said Kerry, who labeled McCain's comments "flat politics and incorrect."

"The truth is the Clinton administration knew full well they didn't have a perfect agreement. But at least they were talking. At least we had inspectors going in and we knew where the (nuclear fuel) rods were. This way, we don't know where the rods are, the rods are gone. There are no inspectors. Ask any American which way is better," Kerry said.

On the October 11 editions of Today and ABC's Good Morning America, McCain repeated his criticism of the Clinton administration's North Korea policy. On Today, he stated that North Korea violated the Agreed Framework "time after time, and we never did anything about it," describing this account as "a matter of history." But during the interview, co-host Meredith Vieira did not press McCain on the basis for this claim, nor did she note the overarching point that the agreement successfully halted North Korea's plutonium production for eight years.

Similarly, McCain argued on Good Morning America that the Agreed Framework allowed North Korea to "keep plutonium rods" and stated that they were "enriching uranium in violation" of the "spirit" of the treaty. But in this case, co-host Diane Sawyer responded by paraphrasing Kerry's statement, saying, "[H]owever they may have cheated, at least we were talking; at least we knew where the fuel rods were. There were inspections. There were 8,000 fuel rods, and they knew where they were; and that even if they were cheating on the margins that it deterred perhaps as many as 80 bombs." After McCain dismissed Kerry's defense, Sawyer went on to note that Powell endorsed the Agreed Framework, as Yarrow noted in his statement. Indeed, Powell said in 2003, "The previous administration I give great credit to for freezing that plutonium site. ... Lots of nuclear weapons were not made because of the Agreed Framework and the work of President Clinton and his team."

In an interview with Scott Ritter, a former intelligence officer and United Nations weapons inspector, on the October 10 edition of The Situation Room, Blitzer strongly echoed McCain's misleading remarks in response to Ritter's criticism of the Bush administration's North Korea policy. Blitzer stated that "the Clinton administration gave the North Koreans basically everything: a lot of assistance, promises of light-water reactors for peaceful purposes, but they were lying and cheating throughout those entire years, developing, on a separate track, a nuclear bomb." But Blitzer did not mention the fact that the Clinton administration's policy had apparently halted the North Korea's plutonium production for eight years. And Blitzer overlooked this fact despite having conducted an interview with Gov. Bill Richardson (D-NM) a day earlier, during which Richardson made clear that, under the Agreed Framework, North Korea "did not develop any nuclear weapons."

Oh, please, Monterey Jack- I would never believe anything issued by Media Matters. Do you think that David Brock,Media Matters's founder,can be considered anything but a far left winger?

Of course, massagato, you only believe the usually unsourced wild-eyed extreme right wing stuff you post.

North Korea TESTED in the 00's

There is no evidence of them testing any nuclear device in the 90's. Let me REPEAT that NO EVIDENCE. Your claim is false.

You might want to read the articles you post genoves. Now.. when did North Korea test it's nuclear device? Who was President for the 5+ years prior to that?

You are consistent about your stupidity genoves but not much else.

I don't read the possum posts, but it appears that the asshole is taking my name in vain . . . i'm not surprised . . .

EDIT: I swallowed my disgust, and read the possum post . . . no where in the quoted material do i say that North Korea had a missile development program "going quite early." I merely observed that North Korea and China sell missiles on the international market--and the Korean missiles being sold are intermediate-range, "SCUD-like" missiles.

So Genoves/Possum is a goddamned liar--no surprise there.

Why don't you tell the truth Setanta and admit that you urinate in your pants in fear when you have to debate with someone like me. You do remember that I cleaned your clock on the FAscism debate and someone like you, an ALLEGED MASSIVE INTELLECT, is afraid to try to destroy my arguments.

Why don't you admit you are getting senile. That's whatOmSig alluded to in another post.

You and the left wing are just like the Nazis under Hitler. Joseph Goebbels gathered the editors of the major dailies together early in the morning and told them what to write, what not to write and how to slant it.

When some comes along with ideas and evidence which you can't handle, you hide in your hole. Typical Liberal tactic.

Here is what you wrote:

check it out.

. But North Korea and China both have missile development programs, and routinely sell their wares on the international market without much discrimination.

This, according to you was in 2002. Do you think I believe that those missle development programs WHICH WERE SOLD ON THE INTERNATIONAL MARKET, according to you, sprung up in TWO SHORT YEARS?

If you do, you don't know very much about missle development.

Unless you think that the missle developement was going to be used by the fanatic North Koreans for weather prediction purposes.

LOL

I may be a liar but you are a coward. I would rather be classed as a liar than someone who is afraid to express his ideas for fear that he will be shown up.

What's the fear? Do you really think that those who read these threads do not see that I pull your nose from time to time and you don't have the intellectual integrity to respond?

Perhaps you think I will go away.

As long as there is one person who will read my posts, I will post. I do not fear Nazilike censorship but you, Setanta, fear that I will rub your nose in it again and your fragile ego can't take it!!!

No, it is you who beleives the unsoucred wild-eye extreme left wing stuff.

How would you like to read a report to Congress--of course, this is nothing but wild eyed extreme left wing stuff. If you can't rebut it with proof, don't waste your time with the childish ad hominems.


**********************************************************

Russian and U.S. intelligence agencies also reportedly have learned of significant
technological advances by North Korea towards nuclear weapons production. On March 10,
1992, the Russian newspaper Argumenty I Fakty (Arguments and Facts) published the text
of a 1990 Soviet KGB report to the Soviet Central Committee on North Korea’s nuclear
program. It was published again by Izvestiya of June 24, 1994. The KGB report asserted
that “According to available data, development of the first nuclear device has been completed
at the DPRK nuclear research center in Yongbyon.” The North Korean Government, the
report stated, had decided not to test the device in order to avoid international detection.
Additionally, there are a number of reports and evidence that point to at least a middle
range likelihood that North Korea may have smuggled plutonium from Russia. In June 1994,
the head of Russia’s Counterintelligence Service (successor to the KGB) said at a press
conference that North Korea’s attempts to smuggle “components of nuclear arms production”
from Russia caused his agency “special anxiety.” In August 1994, members of Germany’s
parliament and Chancellor Kohl’s intelligence coordinator stated that they had been briefed
that a German citizen arrested in May 1994 with a small amount of plutonium, smuggled
from Russia, had connections with North Korea. U.S. executive branch officials have
expressed concern in background briefings over the possibility that North Korea has
smuggled plutonium from Russia. One U.S. official, quoted in the Washington Times, July
5, 1994, asserted that “There is the possibility that things having gotten over the
[Russia-North Korea] border without anybody being aware of it.” The most specific claim
came in the German news magazine Stern in March 1993, which cited Russian
Counterintelligence Service reports that North Korea had smuggled 56 kilograms of
plutonium (enough for 7-9 atomic bombs) from Russia.

*************************************************************

Of course, these reports from Russian sources and German sources are just from "wild-eyed extreme right wingers"

Notice the date of the KGB report, massagato? 1990. Who was president in 1990, massagato?

Thank you for showing that scumbags Reagan and Bush I were the presidents responsible for not figuring out a way to deal with N. Korea's nuclear program in time. Not Bill Clinton.

That is, of course, if you think Russian intelligence was any more accurate than American intelligence.

Russian and U.S. intelligence agencies also reportedly have learned of significant
technological advances by North Korea towards nuclear weapons production. On March 10,
1992, the Russian newspaper Argumenty I Fakty (Arguments and Facts) published the text
of a 1990 Soviet KGB report to the Soviet Central Committee on North Korea’s nuclear
program. It was published again by Izvestiya of June 24, 1994. The KGB report asserted
that “According to available data, development of the first nuclear device has been completed
at the DPRK nuclear research center in Yongbyon.” The North Korean Government, the
report stated, had decided not to test the device in order to avoid international detection.
Additionally, there are a number of reports and evidence that point to at least a middle
range likelihood that North Korea may have smuggled plutonium from Russia. In June 1994,
the head of Russia’s Counterintelligence Service (successor to the KGB) said at a press
conference that North Korea’s attempts to smuggle “components of nuclear arms production”
from Russia caused his agency “special anxiety.” In August 1994, members of Germany’s
parliament and Chancellor Kohl’s intelligence coordinator stated that they had been briefed
that a German citizen arrested in May 1994 with a small amount of plutonium, smuggled
from Russia, had connections with North Korea. U.S. executive branch officials have
expressed concern in background briefings over the possibility that North Korea has
smuggled plutonium from Russia. One U.S. official, quoted in the Washington Times, July
5, 1994, asserted that “There is the possibility that things having gotten over the
[Russia-North Korea] border without anybody being aware of it.” The most specific claim
came in the German news magazine Stern in March 1993, which cited Russian
Counterintelligence Service reports that North Korea had smuggled 56 kilograms of
plutonium (enough for 7-9 atomic bombs) from Russia.


****************************************************************

Please cut the nonsense. Read the whole report.

Notice the German Citizen who was arrested in May 1994? Who was president then.
Notice the German News magazine which cited Russian Counterintelligence reports in Marh 1993. Who was President then?

North Korea was getting ready for Nuclear Weapons all through the nineties. Slick Willie entered into an agreement with them in 1995 which they violated.

Russian Intelligence more accurate than American Intelligence? Not necessarily. When you learn that almost all of the Intelligence Agencies of Europe added to by the Intelligence Agencies of China and Russia reported that Iraq and SaddamHussein were piling up biochemical and nuclear weapons, you have to wonder. But then that would make all intelligence reports suspect, would it not? Even the intelligence reports during the Clinton era.

Who knows, he may really have not used a cigar on Monica.