Radical Islamic Militant Somali Pirates!

Walter Hinteler
Reply Mon 24 Nov, 2008 01:02 pm
georgeob1 wrote:

While air transport is indeed orders of magnitude more costly than transport by sea as Robert Gentel says, Setanta does have a point. The real cost of a Naval campaign sufficient to effectivelt suppress Somali piracy and subject to the political constraints currently imposed, would likely be very high indeed.

For those who believe Somali piracy is truly a transcendent evil that must be eliminated, I propose we simply announce our discontinuation of the international shipments of free food (which are at great expense, escorted by the CTF 150 ships that Walter cited) to Somalia until the Somali people themselves suppress the pirates.

I think that the only solution - at least for the moment and nearer future - will be to aked shipping companies that their ships form convois and use own defensive measures (such as barbed wire, electric fences, sonic canons) additionally.

(It's not only bureaucracy, George: some German politicians got the "idea" that policemen have to be an board of our frigates because soldiers couldn't - according to our laws/constitution - arrest people ... .)
Reply Mon 24 Nov, 2008 01:21 pm
@Walter Hinteler,
One assumes Walt that they were politicians with links to the Police force.
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Robert Gentel
Reply Mon 24 Nov, 2008 01:22 pm
spendius wrote:
That's a moot point. How many armed men per watch? How many watches? How many ships? How much rotation of tours?

Given that the pirates have only been armed with small arms (automatic rifles typically, and grenade launchers and a "mini canon") it doesn't take much to repel them.

There are different approaches by security companies. Blackwater favors an escort ship with a helicopter, other firms prefer non-lethal measures to avoid escalation.

There are also other alternatives like a safe room for the crew, if the crew can safely wait out a rescue in a safe room there are a lot more options. Right now the pirates aren't confronted on the ships because the respective navies have decided that with the possible exception of the weapons ship the cargo doesn't merit a risk to the crew's lives.

There are a lot of things they can do, and almost all of them are better than hoping that navies can eradicate the pirates or successfully patrol the waters and some insurance companies are offering significant discounts to ships that employ private security.

But the U.S. Navy, part of the coalition already patrolling off the coast of Somalia, says the coalition cannot effectively patrol the 2.5 million square miles of dangerous waters and welcomes the companies.

"This is a great trend," said Lt. Nate Christensen, a spokesman for the Bahrain-based U.S. 5th Fleet. "We would encourage shipping companies to take proactive measures to help ensure their own safety."

Somali officials also approve of the private contractors.

From this article, that explores the pros and cons of the private security option:

0 Replies
Reply Mon 24 Nov, 2008 03:09 pm
spendius wrote:

You would starve the Somali nation because of the Darwinian behaviour patterns of a few young daredevils. No wonder the Republicans got stuffed if that's anything to go by.

I wouldn't "starve" the Somali "nation" at all. They are doing quite well at that on their own as things are - just as are other nations such as Zimbabwe and parts of Sudan. Moreover, the "help" provided by other nations is far more effective as a palliative to their troubled consciences than it is in alleviating the problems to which it is nominally addressed.

Besides, who is in a better position to modify "the Darwinian behavior patterns of a few young (Somali) daredevils" than the Somalis themselves?

Finally, what evidence can you offer that suggests that the intervention of international naval or security forces is at all effective in limiting 'the Darwinian behavior patterns of young daredevils " in any of the troubled areas of this world?
Reply Mon 24 Nov, 2008 03:12 pm
@Walter Hinteler,
Walter Hinteler wrote:

(It's not only bureaucracy, George: some German politicians got the "idea" that policemen have to be an board of our frigates because soldiers couldn't - according to our laws/constitution - arrest people ... .)

Which merely demonstrates that even right-thinking Germans can be very stupid -- and that such international efforts at peacekeeping are usually doomed by the impractical, abstract and self-serving prejudices of the participants.
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Reply Mon 24 Nov, 2008 05:54 pm
Finally, what evidence can you offer that suggests that the intervention of international naval or security forces is at all effective in limiting 'the Darwinian behavior patterns of young daredevils " in any of the troubled areas of this world?

I'm more inclined to think that international sport is more effective. And cultural exchanges such as making movies that they all prefer to watch rather than the shite their own governments put out.

The sooner you lot get into "soccer" and cricket the better. You are the beacon of hope in the world and you're ******* blowing it. You sit in front of your screens watching unwatchable sport (I know--goodness I've tried) presented in an unwatchable fashion and faking being enthusiasts because you bet on it once in the foolishness of your early years.

Why do the "troubled consciences" exist? Are they an affectation? If they are genuine inefficiency of logistics is not a reason to think them silly or unjustified. It is a reason to work on the logistics with patience.

And they can't do it themselves.
0 Replies
Reply Mon 24 Nov, 2008 09:22 pm
Jesuitical George wrote:
In the first place the targets of Somali pirates have NOT generally been ships headed for the Red Sea and Suez. Rather they have been headed generally from either Suez or the Persian Gulf towards the cape of Good Hope or the coast of east Africa. The approaches to the Red Sea are relatively narrow and easy to patrol - not advantageous pickings for the Somalis.

Until recently it had been relatively easy to avoid the Somali pirates simply by staying about 200NM off the coast. Now evidently with better navigation systems; better equipped mother ships and possibly better intelligence (and possibly control), they have greatly extended their reach.

I believe i addressed this in pointing out that until quite recently, the Somali pirates were "small potatoes," and were preying on small, coast-wise vessels originating in western Africa. I meant to point out, although i might not have made it clear, that the recent outrageous behavior of these pirates is probably the result of the intervention of organized crime, which can afford to provide the gun-boat type of "mother" ship, the high speed boats, the GPS navigation systems, etc.--and who will then want a bigger payday in return. I probably did not make clear my perception that it is only recently that they have branched out into the international shipping lanes, and looking for lucrative targets as measured by potential ransoms.

From a purely naval perspective the severe reduction (not elimination) of this piracy would be a relatively easy matter - simply locate and preemptorily sink the mother ships from which the pirates operate. Alternatively we could discontinue the substantial naval effort now going into escorting the ships transporting free food and provisions to the Somali people - telling them to either set their house in order or starve.

There is the matter of the Islamist militants in Somalia who are apparently incensed that the pirates attacked and seized a Saudi-flagged vessel, objecting to piracy only when and if it is practiced against the shipping of a Muslim nation.

By and large, though (there . . . another of those nautical expressions), that idea is meaningless, if, as it appears, the newer, bolder, better equipped Somali pirates are the cat's paws of organized crime. Those boys aren't going to give a rat's ass if the entire nation starved.

That we don't now do this - or have not long since done so, given the huge, long-term presence of U.SA., French, British and even Soviet naval forces in the region - is purely the result of the political considerations affecting the nations with the power to limit the piracy.

That, of course, was my original point.

That is not a point against which i have argued. My posts from which this discussion derived were a call for the nations with the professional naval resources to do so take action. I'm not so naive as not to be aware of the political pettiness which usually motivates decisions made by politicians in matters concerning military deployments. I am saying it is time, and past time, that such pettiness be set aside.

In fact, it should shame the political leaders of the world's large, modern navies, that an Indian frigate had the sand to go in there and shoot it out with these scum. Of course, shame is not a motivating factor for politicians, either. It's like the old dictum about wrestling with a pig, and in the application of that metaphor, the politicians would be the pig.
Reply Mon 24 Nov, 2008 10:17 pm
OK you believe it is "past time" for the nations of the Western World to combine forces and rid the world of this plague (Somali piracy).

Again, I question the application of this logic and the consistency of your views on such "plagues". In the first place which of the world's evil (or merely ineffective) governments merit such intervention, and what standard would you apply to determine those meriting intervention and those not? Saddam's government was clearly a worse evil than Somali piracy (though it could be argued that he posed a smaller threat to us).

Second, I believe you are ignoring the manifest ineffectiveness of such international efforts when they are launched. One need only look to the various UN missions in the Congo and other areas or even to the NATO operation in Afghanistan. Our European allies, who so often remind us that together they have more population and GDP than we , wring their hands when asked, complaining that they don't have the ability to deploy such forces. Moreover, when they finally do, they too often require that no one shoot at them - or merely bug out when things get tough. As Walter reported above, the political debate in Germany involves argument about whether policemen should man any frigates sent to the Indian ocean, because soldiers have no right under their constitution to do anything.

Evidently we then agree about the political calculations of the various governments in this matter -- to them the threat simply isn't worth the effort.

Given the facts that most shipping in the world is under flags of convenience and most of the crews are recruited from third world countries where wages are low, there are really no questions of national pride or soverignty involved here, and certainly no practical possibility of getting the crews to resist their takeover by a handful of thugs operating from small boats (remarkable in itself). In this context the proposals to employ commercial security operations do appear to make sense.

I find it merely ironic that so many Europeans reach this same conclusion after their shrill criticisms of comparable U.S. actions in Iraq.

Finally, I don't think it is in our interest to spend any more of our money and servicemen's lives in dealing with such international disorder when others are doing so little. China, japan, Korea, Germany, Canada and other nations benefit relatively more from international trade than do we. let them do it.
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Reply Tue 25 Nov, 2008 12:27 am
First of all, you are using the word plague, not i, so you needn't put in quotes as if you disparage my terms, since i didn't use the term.

It has always been a concept of international law that pirates are, by definition, outlaws, without question. Comparing an operation to interfere with or to remove a regime which can otherwise claim to be sovereign within its own territory to the eradication or suppression of piracy is a case of apples to oranges. I also think the nations of the world need to do the same thing in the Strait of Malacca. It costs the world a great deal, and it profits organized crime, which is become every bit as multi-national as is capitalism.

I don't intend to answers your objections, or your partisan polemic because you fail to recognize that pirates are the ultimate outlaws, with every man's hand against them, as sanctioned by law throughout the ages, and as sanctioned by contemporary international law. It is completely unreasonable to compare operations against piracy to operations of "regime change."

You will note that i have called for the professional navies, plural. I did not advocate the United States operating alone.

On the side issue of thugs operating from small boats, there is nothing remarkable about that, not historically at least. One of the most common pirate vessels in the Caribbean was the sloop, and even smaller vessels such as pinnaces, because of their small draft and relative speed. It is only necessary to accommodate a group of hard cases, well-armed, who will stick at nothing, to overawe or simply to slaughter the crew of a merchant vessel. In fact, when pirates got "too big for their britches," as in the case of Blackbeard, or Bartholomew "Black Bart" Robers, both of whom ended by operating frigates, they attracted the kind of attention and relentless pursuit which cost both of those boys their lives. It is a time-honored practice for pirates to operate from small, swift vessels. That is why the United States Navy built a squadron of sloops of war in the 1820s, to deal with the pirates operating from the coasts of Cuba, Hispaniola and Puerto Rico--to use a vessel with the same shallow draft, and capable of the same speed. The modern frigate should be able to handle these jokers in Somali waters, and in the Straits of Malacca.

Even if everyone else craps out, i'll bet you could get the Royal Navy and the Royal Canadian Navy to go along, if they thought the USN and the President were serious about it.
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Reply Tue 25 Nov, 2008 12:51 am
From the 1958 Geneva Convention on the High Seas:

Article 14

All States shall co-operate to the fullest possible extent in the
repression of piracy on the high seas or in any other place outside the
jurisdiction of any State.

Article 15

Piracy consists of any of the following acts:

(1) Any illegal acts of violence, detention or any act of depredation,
committed for private ends by the crew or the passengers of a private ship
or a private aircraft, and directed:

(a) On the high seas, against another ship or aircraft, or against
persons or property on board such ship or aircraft;
(b) Against a ship, aircraft, persons or property in a place outside the
jurisdiction of any State;

(2) Any act of voluntary participation in the operation of a ship or of an
aircraft with knowledge of facts making it a pirate ship or aircraft;

(3) Any act of inciting or of intentionally facilitating an act described
in sub-paragraph 1 or sub-paragraph 2 of this article.

Article 16

The acts of piracy, as defined in article 15, committed by a warship,
government ship or government aircraft whose crew has mutinied and taken
control of the ship or aircraft are assimilated to acts committed by a
private ship.

Article 17

A ship or aircraft is considered a pirate ship or aircraft if it is
intended by the persons in dominant control to be used for the purpose of
committing one of the acts referred to in article 15. The same applies if
the ship or aircraft has been used to commit any such act, so long as it
remains under the control of the persons guilty of that act.

Article 18

A ship or aircraft may retain its nationality although it has become a
pirate ship or aircraft. The retention or loss of nationality is determined
by the law of the State from which such nationality was derived.

Article 19

On the high seas, or in any other place outside the jurisdiction of any
State, every State may seize a pirate ship or aircraft, or a ship taken by
piracy and under the control of pirates, and arrest the persons and seize
the property on board. The courts of the State which carried out the
seizure may decide upon the penalties to be imposed, and may also determine
the action to be taken with regard to the ships, aircraft or property,
subject to the rights of third parties acting in good faith.

Article 20

Where the seizure of a ship or aircraft on suspicion of piracy has been
effected without adequate grounds, the State making the seizure shall be
liable to the State the nationality of which is possessed by the ship or
aircraft, for any loss or damage caused by the seizure.

Article 21

A seizure on account of piracy may only be carried out by warships or
military aircraft, or other ships or aircraft on government service
authorized to that effect.

The language of the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention is identical, or nearly identical, and was probably taken verbatim from the Geneva Convention.
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Walter Hinteler
Reply Tue 25 Nov, 2008 06:35 am
Papers and magazines (and media generally) are full of reports about piracy the last couple of days. (A Yemeni ship is latest victim of Somali piracy, btw.)

Most point at how the problem was "solved" in the Strait of Malacca: coordinated patrols by Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore, along with increased security on vessels have sparked a dramatic downturn in piracy there.

One problem - besides those already mentioned by various posters above - are, of course, the legal problems. (Yes, I know: who cares. But they are there.)
When you look at the relevant UN Security Council resolutions, you see the first problems:
• Number 1838, passed in October, authorizes the use of ''necessary means,'' meaning force if need be, to stop piracy in international waters,
• Number 1816, allows operations against pirates within Somali territorial waters, but only with the consent and agreement of the Somali transitional government.

To top this, any action has to be within the provisions of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).
The USA, Iran, Libya, Syria, North Korea and some other countries didn't sign it, thus they could do what they want.
All the others (that's all anti-piracy-navies besides the USA in action today), however, had to regard the convention.
And it places limitations on military actions: under Article 100, a warship has to first send an officer-led party to board a suspected pirate ship to verify any suspicions. Furthermore, a warship cannot simply open fire on any suspected ship. An inspection to verify suspicions has to be carried out "with all possible considerations".

And if you captured a pirate, whom to hand him over, where should he be prosecuted? (The British Royal Navy have handed them over not to Somali but to Kenyan authorities. The French Navy hadn't handed them over at all but taken to Paris for prosecution.)

Beside those procedural problems there is also the problem of defining "piracy" and "pirates".
Easy, you say?
What about that piracy can take place only "on the high seas" or "outside the jurisdiction of any state"?

Neither the fictional Captain Flint and his Walrus nor the real Störtebecker and his Victual Brothers were easy to handle with as well Wink
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Reply Tue 25 Nov, 2008 06:55 am
Blackstone, in his Commentaries on the Laws of England, has this to say about pirates (ending with a general statement about how they may be treated):

Lastly, the crime of piracy, or robbery and depredation upon the high seas, is an offence against the universal law of society; a pirate being, according to Sir Edward Coke, hostis humani generis [i.e., "enemy to all mankind"]. As therefore he has renounced all the benefits of society and government, and has reduced himself afresh to the savage state of nature, by declaring war against all mankind, all mankind must declare war against him: so that every community hath a right, by the rule of self-defence, to inflict that punishment upon him, which every individual would in a state of nature have been otherwise entitled to do, any invasion of his person or personal property.

In the most extreme interpretation of that final clause, pirates may be subject to "lynch law."

Source at the Yale University Law Schools "Avalon Project" (N.B.: that transcript does not make a distinction between an "f" and an "s," a confusion which arises from the character once used in printing for an "s" appearing at the beginning of a word or within a word; additionally, in some cases, for the same reason, it does not distinguish between an "h" and a "b," the anciently used printers' character for an "h" appearing at the beginning of a word being indistinguishable from a "b"--at least by an OCR program. As an example, the Avalon text reads: ". . . a pirate being, according to fir Edward Coke, boftis humani generis . . .", which ought to read as rendered above.)
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Reply Tue 25 Nov, 2008 11:49 am
Setanta makes a good argument with respect to the historical legalities of the matter. Moreover his point about the legal distinction between enforced regime change and piracy is valid: my argument to the contrary was based on moral considerations - Saddam created far more human misery than the Somali pirates.

Walter has illustrated the foolishness introduced into international law by the largely European contemporary obsessions about process and legality. This is the sort of nonsense that allows some German politicians to argue that the suppression of piracy is a police matter - not one for navies. They, of course, don't address the practical issue of just how this might be accomplished. It is easy to understand why the United States has refrained from endorsing this foolishness. There is a sound basis for international law with respect to the sea and piract and the recent efforts of the UN to further codify it (and thereby advance its own bureaucratic interests) are both unnecessary and counterproductive.

With respect to Setanta's assertions that the suppression of Somali piracy could easily be done by (say) the British and the Canadians alone -- one need only ask why they haven't already done so. France alone has for the past 25 years more or less continuously maintained a naval force in the Indian Ocean that is as capable as the entire (sic) Canadian Navy. That none of these nations - or the United States - have done so is indicative of the fact that the effort required (particularly in view of the nonsensical new provisions introduced into Sea law by the signatory nations of the foolish UN treaty) to do so and the relative unimportance of the problem.

I do agree that, if Setanta's views of the legalities were to prevail, the job could be done at relatively low cost. However, the very allies whom Setanta asserts could - if "unleashed" - suppress this piracy have voluntarily tied their own hands - perhaps preferring that outlaw nations such as the United States do their dirty work for them.

I say, let the piracy continue.
Reply Tue 25 Nov, 2008 11:51 am
Privateer time!

0 Replies
Reply Tue 25 Nov, 2008 01:08 pm


In the summer of 2007, a 28-year-old father of three from Houston, Texas, shocked his country when he became the first American ever to be convicted of receiving military training at a terrorist camp in Somalia.

Daniel Maldonado, an offbeat, outspoken young man who sported tattoos and dreadlocks, committed himself to wage jihad outside the United States and went to Somalia to receive training. It was there that he mastered the violent “arts” of homicide bombing, building IEDs and engaging in hand-to-hand combat.

Maldonado’s training in jihad came from Shabaab al Mujahideen, a group the State Department on Feb. 29, 2008, designated as a highly dangerous foreign terrorist organization.

Shabaab al Mujahideen, which espouses radical Islamic rule and has close ties to Al Qaeda, is best known for operating training camps for people seeking a more extreme form of Jihad. It also has been forging relations with Somali pirates who have recently been intercepting and holding for ransom several international shipping vessels.

Shabaab's ultimate goal, as articulated in an April statement, is to throw the West "into hell.”

The terror organization's main focus, according to the non-profit research group Nine Eleven Finding Answers (NEFA) Foundation, which granted FOX News exclusive access to its detailed reports on the activities of terrorists, is its elaborate network of terror camps that is attracting fundamentalists from around the world. This trend, NEFA warns, could explode in the near future. The fear is that Shabaab's training will give anyone with the desire to attack Wstern targets the knowledge to act alone.

“We are now seeing a disturbing pattern of lone-wolf style individuals " such as Maldonado " who have been inspired to join Shabaab in order to do their part in confronting the newest ‘crusader battlefront,’” NEFA said.

Maldonado left his wife and three young children behind to pursue a life of jihad, beginning with his training at a Shabaab camp. Early in 2007, he fled the camp when it was invaded by the Ethiopian military. He was later arrested by Kenyan authorities and transferred to U.S. custody. After a lengthy interrogation by the FBI and a subsequent trial in Houston, he was convicted of receiving training from a terrorist organization. He was sentenced in July, 2007, to 10 years in federal prison.

After the trial, FBI Director Robert Mueller praised the cooperation among international authorities that led to Maldonado's conviction. But the disturbing implications of his case lingered. During his interrogation, Maldonado said Shabaab is not only intent upon creating an army of extremists for a crusade against the West, but it also seeks to establish an extremist Islamic network of unrivaled strength.

As the armed wing of the Islamic Courts Union (ICU), Shabaab was initially packaged and promoted to the people of Somalia as a “law and order” organization. Indeed, the collapse of the Somali government in the 1990s " when clan warlords overthrew dictator Mohamed Siad Barre -- resulted in years of violence and instability.

But what began with a promise to bring order to a broken, war-torn African nation rapidly developed into a new " and increasingly deadly " frontier in the war on terror.

According to Dr. J. Peter Pham, professor of justice studies and political science at James Madison University in Virginia, Somalia's conflict with Ethiopia destroyed much of Shabaab’s original leadership. What has replaced it is a group of cavalier fundamentalists with a desire to create a “Taliban-like” government in the country, similar to what existed in Afghanistan before the September 11 attacks.

Just as disturbing is Shabaab's association with the Somali pirates. While Shabaab's original leaders discouraged a connection to the pirates, the new generation appears to be developing a burgeoning relationship with the outlaws.

“Right now, the relationship between Shabaab and the pirates is one built out of convenience,” Pham said. “In return for allowing pirates to operate out of ports south of the city of Mogadishu, which are all controlled by Shabaab, it is receiving from the ransom the pirates demand for hijacked ships.”

Now analysts are concerned that Shabaab will develop a more significant relationship with the pirates, one that could result in an organization with the power to terrorize a struggling global economy.

“There is a real danger that they might see an opportunity for real economic impact,” Pham said, In a worst-case scenario, he said, “Shabaab might say, ‘Individual [homicide] bombers are effective, why not [homicide] tankers?’”

As it is now, the ransom money the pirates share helps fund Shabaab's jihadi cause, most likely in the form of weapons for its terror camps.

Its efforts in that regard have not gone unnoticed " Shabaab has garnered the praise of Usama bin Laden on multiple occasions.

According to NEFA, as early as 2006, bin Laden accused the West of interfering in Somalia’s politics as part of its "crusade" against Islam.

“We promise the almighty Allah that we will fight soldiers on the land of Somalia with his help and power,” bin Laden said. “We also reserve the right to punish them on their own land and in any available place at any time or in any way which is convenient for us.”

As Al Qaeda camps in areas like Pakistan and Afghanistan have come under increasing international scrutiny, NEFA said, Shabaab camps have “developed into a cheaper and more readily available alternative for jihadi recruits living in the West and seeking an appropriate venue to obtain expert instruction in the arts of terrorism.”

Video footage obtained by NEFA shows young men enduring a grueling preparation for war. Shabaab camps not only provide their fighters with weapons and ammunition, but also offer courses on bomb construction that are taught by Al Qaeda extremists.

At night, according to Maldonado, members of Shabaab gather together to share tales of bin Laden and his exploits.

Indeed, NEFA said, “Shabaab has proudly draped itself in the flag of Al Qaeda and the philosophy of global jihad against the U.S.” The terrorists welcome their placement with "other honorable men" on the State Department’s list of Foreign Terrorist Organizations.

Both NEFA and Pham caution that the U.S. must take immediate steps to deal with the threat of Shabaab beyond giving it a mere designation on a list.

“We have fought so hard since 9/11 against terrorism,” Pham said. “We can’t afford to slip into the tendency of underestimating organizations like Shabaab.”

0 Replies
Walter Hinteler
Reply Tue 25 Nov, 2008 01:16 pm
Yet the choice of going after the pirates or after the Islamists " some of whom are ready to tackle the pirates themselves, even while others are getting paid off by them " is in some ways a false one, since both problems have the same root: the inability of Somalia’s transitional federal government, established by the United Nations and the international community in 2004, to achieve even a modicum of stability.

It has never been functional, its authority is limited to a few square miles, and it has survived only because of the presence of soldiers from Ethiopia.

Analysts have myriad explanations for the TFG’s failure. It has been plagued by corruption and incompetence and riven by in-fighting between Abdullahi Yusuf, president, and two successive prime ministers.

None of the TFG’s leaders, the Islamists or Somalia’s numerous militarised clans have shown a commitment to reconciliation. “Spoilers” " such as the warlords in control of airports " perpetuate the chaos.

Mr Yusuf admitted this month that the enfeebled TFG had lost control of most of the country to Islamist rebels. The irony is that they have a better chance of stamping out piracy than has the government.

Source: FT Africa
0 Replies
Reply Tue 25 Nov, 2008 01:22 pm
The Islamists are going to stamp out the pirates like Castro is going to stamp out Chavez.

Cheezits Walt, do you really believe the crap you post?
Walter Hinteler
Reply Tue 25 Nov, 2008 01:45 pm
Get knowledge about the subject - your topic, cjhsa.
That would do a lot help and perhaps, later, you can take part in this discussion.
Reply Tue 25 Nov, 2008 02:07 pm
@Walter Hinteler,
You didn't read what I posted that completely supports my thread title.

Try reading something that makes you uncomfortable, instead of your little left wing rag rants.
Reply Tue 25 Nov, 2008 04:23 pm
While I suppose it is "your" thread, you do have a way of discouraging - even chasing away - any rational discourse on the subject.

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