I've finally read the entire 136-page opinion in this case (well, I skimmed the dull parts). Some of my doubts have been resolved, others have not.
I still think that Judge Walker, in taking extensive testimony and incorporating lengthy and detailed findings of fact in his opinion, was, in effect, attempting to create a legislative history for Proposition 8. Compare his
opinion with the recent opinion of Judge Tauro in the Massachusetts case of
Gill v. Office of Personnel Mgmt., which invalidated DOMA. In contrast to Walker, Tauro issued his ruling on the basis of a motion for summary judgment and didn't hear any testimony at all. But then he was dealing with a congressional statute that had a full legislative history (which he cited), unlike Walker, who was dealing with a citizen initiative that had no such history. Tauro's opinion, as a result, is 39 pages long, about one-quarter of the length of Walker's opinion.
I am, again, left wondering why Walker didn't follow the same path and decide this case on summary judgment. I suppose that, without the kind of legislative history that Tauro had in connection with DOMA, he needed to determine if the government could establish any kind of rational basis for restricting marriage to heterosexual couples. The intervenors in his case, of course, did a terrible job of providing a rationale, although I'm not entirely impressed with the job that the plaintiffs did. Some of their factual findings were, I would say, tenuous or debatable or just plain irrelevant. It is less a testament to the plaintiffs that they did such a good job at presenting their case, I think, than a testament to the truly horrible job the intervenors did in trying to rebut it.
The intervenors, however, didn't really have to provide a rationale for Prop 8 so much as the plaintiffs had to show that there was no possible rationale for it. As the supreme court stated in
Heller v. Doe (citations omitted):
Quote:We many times have said, and but weeks ago repeated, that rational-basis review in equal protection analysis "is not a license for courts to judge the wisdom, fairness, or logic of legislative choices." Nor does it authorize "the judiciary [to] sit as a superlegislature to judge the wisdom or desirability of legislative policy determinations made in areas that neither affect fundamental rights nor proceed along suspect lines." For these reasons, a classification neither involving fundamental rights nor proceeding along suspect lines is accorded a strong presumption of validity. Such a classification cannot run afoul of the Equal Protection Clause if there is a rational relationship between the disparity of treatment and some legitimate governmental purpose. Further, a legislature that creates these categories need not "actually articulate at any time the purpose or rationale supporting its classification." Instead, a classification "must be upheld against equal protection challenge if there is any reasonably conceivable state of facts that could provide a rational basis for the classification."
It should be noted that Walker ultimately decided that the classification made by Prop 8
did involve a fundamental right, but he based much of his reasoning on the lower threshold of the rational basis test. Under that test, the legislature doesn't have to articulate "the purpose or rationale supporting its classification." Indeed, as
Heller goes on to say, a "legislative choice is not subject to courtroom factfinding and may be based on rational speculation unsupported by evidence or empirical data." In sum, as long as some
conceivable rational basis exists, the law stands.
That is, in part, why I don't think an appellate court would be required to defer to Walker's findings of fact. Although Walker attempted to create a legislative history for Prop 8, there's no constitutional requirement, under a rational basis analysis, for a legislative history
even for regular legislation. Furthermore, the fact that it was the intervenors, rather than the state, making the case (and doing a very bad job of it) provides additional reason for paying little deference to the trial court testimony or to Walker's findings of fact.
In short, I think many who thought that the appellate courts would be hamstrung by Walker's extensively detailed findings of fact and by the requirement to pay "due deference" to those findings are unduly optimistic. If this case reaches the supreme court, I doubt that the justices will feel bound to follow those findings, and I don't think they should be.