Most destructive battle in history in lives?

Stalingrad

Hey!

I'm not sure.

Was Verdun worse?

Historians state that STalingrad was the worst (most costly in lives) battle of the 20th century. between 1 and 2 million were killed there between late 1942 and late 1943 (the battle continues till the 60s because kids, excavating mines were blown up 10s a year). Most of the dead were Russian soldiers and civilians . The German 6th Army was effectively eliminated . Ive heard that about 200000 Germans were killed.
Stalingrad was one of the 3 decisive battles that led to the start of Germanys defeat. Zhukov just sacrificed his troops in great stalling counteroffenses . Many entire divisions were just wiped out, but since the Russian Army posted almost 4 million men at this battle , he felt confident that his troops and the climate would prevail. almost half the German deaths were the result of cardiopulmonary infections brought on by climate stress in the Russian winter.So, like Napoleon, Hitler also learned what Lord North said about the American Wilderness, that"you cannot conquer a map"

THE BATTLE OF KURSK

Maybe this battle didn't have the largest number of lives lost; that would need some research. I, for one, don't know the answer.

"Veterans of the Elite

"Battle of Kursk Veterans

"The Battle of Kursk was probably the most monumental battle of the Second World War involving numerous elite fighting formations on both the Soviet and German sides. Among the German forces who took part in the battle was a large contingent from the Waffen SS including 1st, 2nd and 3rd SS Panzer Divisions-the so-called classic divisions. They made up 1st SS Panzer Korps who took on the Soviet armoured divisions at Prokhorovka. Among the Waffen SS troops who took part in the offensive was Georg Berger who was First Ordinance Officer from the SS General Command with the 2nd SS Panzer Division "Das Reich". He took part in the re-capture of Kharkov which was the main factor in creating the salient that the Kursk Offensive set about to eliminate. . . . "

http://www.eliteforces.freewire.co.uk/German%20Veterans/Kursk/Kursk.htm

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farmerman, I think you are correct. That's what we were told by the local tour guide in St Petersburg when I visited. c.i.

Dov1953

If you must use political figures to illustrate a point (i.e. "Let's not pull a 'Clinton'."). at least be accurate. Bush would have served you much better as an example of lying about battles.

As I think about Stalingrad, the number three million comes to mind, and 1/3 was left after the war. c.i.

Billy Falcon, I was referring to the time about 3 or 4 years ago when President Clinton was discussing in a legal forum of some kind about the meaning of the word "is". As far as one day battles go, wasn't it one of the Civil War battles like Gettysburg that lost a third of a million in one day? I've probably got that all wrong.

dov, the US Civil War claimed just over 600 000 dead for the entire war.

This link provides the total casualties of US wars. http://www.teachervision.com/lesson-plans/lesson-1512.html
c.i.

All of this is relative to conditions at the time. Farmerman has pointed out how the Soviets could pit human flesh against German technology to hold on at Stalingrad. It is very likely that more Soviet citizens lost their lives in the Gulags from 1937 to 1953 than all civilian and military deaths in World War II--by which standard, Stalingrad was not such a big deal.

At Old Cold Harbor, east of Richmond, in 1864, Grant rode into the yard of a Justice of the Peace, who reports in his journal that Grant pulled out his watch, and said: "If I don't hear the Old Fox's guns in fifteen minutes, I've got him!" (He used that term to refer to Lee.) The JP reported that five minutes later, they could hear the cannonade begin. Grant (who glosses this over completely in his memoirs, this battle being one his worst distortions) had been trying to get between Lee and Richmond since the beginning of May, and it was now the 31st, and Lee kept beating him to the river crossings and the high ground--even though Phil Sheridan's cavalry had gotten there first, and beaten off a Confederate attack, Lee got his army into position on the high ground. (What Grant was attempting to do to Lee is what Winfield Scott had done to Antonio Lopez de Santa Anna in the march from Vera Cruz to Mexico City--and Lee had been Scott's chief engineer, and had scouted all of the Army's approach marches. Grant was trying to teach his grandmother to suck eggs.) Grant was very frustrated, and had Meade arrange for a general assault on Lee's army on the morning of June 3. The field grade officers syncronized their watches the night before, and at 7:00 a.m., lauched the assault. Seven thousand Federal troops were shot down in the next ten minutes--in the era of single-action, muzzle-loaded rifled muskets. Grant then refused to acknowledge defeat, and would not allow anyone to send out a flag of truce, so as to pick up the wounded; a good many of them laid out in the summer sun for days, many of them dead as a result. Lee finally sent out a flag, and stretcher parties to carry the surviving wounded into the Federal lines. Nevertheless, this horrible slaugher didn't do more than buy the Confederates a little time--they were already beaten in the war.

At Inkerman on November 5, 1854, the English were defending the right flank of the Anglo-French army's seige lines before Sebastapol, and their own base at Balaclava, when the Russian field Army under Prince Menshikov attacked. The Russian assaulting force numbered about 40,000, with about 9,000 or 10,000 in the initial force, moving in heavy columns. The English were able to dispose of just 3,000 defenders for most of the morning until reinforcements could arrive, and it was past noon before French troops were engaged. The assault began at dawn, with the valley between the Inkerman heights and "Victoria" ridge filled with fog and man-high scrub. The English were using Minié rifled muskets, the Russians used old smooth-bore muskets, and attacked in heavy columns, depending on the weight of numbers. The English countered by attacking from their defensive postions, lead on by General Cathcart, the division commander, who was killed before 9:00 a.m. The Russians were thrown into confusion, and in one incident, an English regiment, down to fewer than 200 effectives, literally cut their way into a massive Russian column, and were obliged to cut their way out again to get to the other side. At one point, Lord Raglan turned to General Canrobert and said: "Nous sommes . . . nous sommes . . . il y a un mot qui exprime ce que je veux dire." To which Canrobert replied: "Ah, nous sommes foutus, mais j'espère que non." ("We are . . . we are . . . there's a word which expresses what i wish to say." "Ah, we are fucked . . . but i hope not.") The heavy fighting was not over until about 4:00 p.m., and the little English Army was battered and exhausted, but they held their final defensive line. No one can state with any certainty how many Russians died, but the English carried in more than 3,000 Russian wounded after the battle--more than their own entire losses. Estimates run from 10,000 to 15,000 Russians dead or disabled. The entire fate of the Anglo-French Army was in the balance--in what can be considered the first "limited war" of the modern age.

Cortez marched on Tenochtitlan with fewer than 500 hundred Spaniards. He later received about 1000 reinforcements, and was supported by about 5000 Tlascalan warriors, but the Toltec city states routinely fielded armies in the tens of thousands. It took Cortez 22 months to finally reduce the city and destroy the Aztecs. Pizaro took only slightly more than 200 Spaniards to Cajamarca, but when he made a prisoner of the Inca, Atahulapa, and then executed him, he "cut of the head" and paralyzed the empire. Atahulapa had just returned from the conquest of Quito, at the head of an army vast by European standards, but Pizarro made him prisoner through treachery, and then made himself master of Cuzco. After the execution of Atahualpa, it took some time for the Inca society to recover, and the Spaniards just barely hung on by the skin of their collective teeth when Manco Capac beseiged them behind the walls of Cuzco.

What matters is not how many lost their lives, rather, it is the results. Historical perspective consists in understanding the importance of events and processes, and not in sheer numbers. The South was doomed to defeat because of their military values before ever the armies clashed; the massive peasant armies of the "Autumn" period in the ancient Chinese rice wars were sacrificed on the altar of personal ambitions, none of which accomplished any lasting effect. On the other hand, the French lost almost all of the battles of the Hundred Years War, except for the crucial last battle--and the circumstances of more than a century of war, brigandage, political intrigue and assassination, betrayal and despair forged the national consciousness of the French. Jeanne d'arc, "La Pucelle," provided a symbol and a focus for the French people; she was just 16, with no military experience (although she later developed her skills) when the English were driven from their seige of Orleans. She was a natural leader, and she had the "star quality" of the fifteenth century necessary to give hope to the French peasants. That she was captured, convicted by a religious kangeroo court, and burned only made the resolve of the nation stronger--she was a force with which the English were not prepared to deal.

Interesting question, perhaps, but not an historically important one.

Failing to agree with the above, there are no such things as unimportant questions in historic inquiry.
Many scholars look at the assumption of the entire union Army by Grant in late winter of 1864 as the turning point of resolve to finally "get it done".
The resulting "bloodiest 15 minutes " of the Civil War resulted from Grant taking his orders extra seriously. He was sending a message that Lee ultimately picked up. From The Wilderness through Cold Harbor, to the final seiges , the rate of blood -letting was not an exact science but made the South recognize that it could no longer achieve its original goals, that was never ever to win , but to gain decisive victories to allow for an honorable settlement of terms between 2 sovereign nations.
All these battles could convince the "enemy" of the one sides resolve in the conduct of the war. The bloodiest day, Antietam, was only successful in Lincoln removing one incompetent general (Mclellan) and installing another(Burnside)
The South never thought it could win an outright victory in a grand slug-fest with the North.As Shelby Foote said, "Lincoln fought this war with one arm tied behind his back' and "Lincoln didnt suffer from a lack of good generals, he suffered more from an overabundance of bad Generals"Also, the southern generals were playing this war to the readers of the northern papers (and it was almost successful)
The Time-Life series on the US Civil WAr has a timeline and casualty count that demonstrates there were no real decisive battles , instead, there was a recognition by both sides that a war of bloody attrition would ultimately go the Unions way. Thats why Lee was so deflated after Gettysburg. He knew then that the ability to sue for peace was gone, slipped out of his hand with Picketts wasteful charge.
Jay Winiks half-hearted book about the happenings during the month of April 1865 after Appomatox made one important point. Two out of three of the Southern Armies still existed after Appomatox. Yet, they (with the exception of a few brigades) laid down their arms and accepted the original terms given by Grant to Lee. It was touch and go but Davis's wish to continue the war as a Guerilla Campaign was ultimately rebuffed by the generals, not the politicians.
I think that there is a very important lesson there for our own times.

Which still does not support any contention that knowing the sheer number of deaths in any given battle will be instructive about the lessons of history. I have no idea what you mean about "Two out of three of the Southern Armies still existed after Appomatox." At no time after George Thomas defeated Zollicoffer at Mill Springs in January 1862, and scattered the forces which had been gathered under Crittenden's command, were there more than two coherently organized armies in the Southern Confederacy. Unless, of course, one counts ad hoc forces such as the west Texas boys who invaded New Mexico, or the detatchments occasionly made, such as Jubal Early's force sent into the Valley of Virginia in 1864. Whereas it is true that Johnston surrendered at Durham on April 29th, and therefore he was still in the field with an "army" after Lee's surrender, his army had been shattered at Bentonville, North Carolina. Johnston had never been an aggressive officer, and he rose above himself in this last battle in which the Confederates attacked a Federal force. In the three days from 19 March to 21 March, 1865, the last of the veteran forces outside of Virginia bled to death. Johnston had gathered remnants of the Army of Tennessee, which had been smashed and scattered by George Thomas before Nashville in the previous December; they were then squandered well before Lee began his headlong retreat from Richmond.

Lincoln constantly said that he needed a man who understood the numbers. In Grant, he had found that man. In suggesting that Grant "sent a message" at Old Cold Harbor, my personal view is that he's given far more credit than he deserves. I won't go into detail about Grant's tactical incompetence--what matters is that his strategic view was adequate, and his operational credo to find and destroy the enemy wherever and whenever possible was what made him the man for the job. Politics ruined the Federal effort more than anything; George Thomas was the best all-round officer in Federal Service, and due to a flaw of the 19th century Virginia gentleman, he demurred taking command of the Army of the Cumberland, which he had created, when it was amalgamated with the Army of Ohio, and the insomniac disaster, Rosecrans was put in command. Thomas had no political friends, as did Sherman (his brother was a senator, and was later responsible for the "Sherman Anti-trust Act"), and Grant (for whom the support of the Illinois Governor, Richard Yates, was crucial in the comic opera of "politcal generals" who continually attempted to take away his command). Although there was not a more thorough, and throroughly modern officer in Mr. Lincoln's armies, his lack of political support meant he would be passed over, and in constant danger of losing his command. After holding together the army of Rosecrans at Chicamauga, when Rosecrans fled, he withstood the worst seige endured by Federal troops in the entire war. When Grant told him to screen Orchard Hill, before Chattanooga, he marched out Woods division (the division which had fled at Chicamauga, precipitating the near destruction of the army) in parade ground formation, and, with bands playing and flags flying, they swept the Confederates from their observation post, and cleared the valley between Lookout Mountain and Missionary Ridge. Grant did not appreciate that kind of bravura, and despised those more competent than he. He and his staff were also embarrassed in the presence of Thomas' militarily correct and supremely efficient staff. During the battle of Missionary Ridge, Hooker was able to take and hold Lookout Mountain because Thomas' artillery swept the approaches to the mountain by indirect fire--the gunners could not see their targets, but were directed by forward observers using telegraph lines laid for the purpose. When Sherman, who never used the two divisions Thomas has so characteristically detached to go to his support, was bogged down at the railroad tunnel, and Cleburn's division threatened to drive his troops into the Tennessee, Thomas' artillery turned their guns, the forward observers hot-footed it to the other side of Chattanooga, and used semaphor flag signals to direct the fire which stopped the Confederate counterattack in its tracks. Grant ordered yet another demonstration from Thomas' troops, on the theory that Hooker's boys on Lookout Mountain would reorganize and attack the Confederate left, while Sherman reorganized to again attack the right. But the Army of the Cumberland was not to be denied: with Arthur MacArthur (Douglas MacArthur's father) in the lead, Thomas' boys turned the demonstration into a foot race, through three lines of Confederate trenches, straight to the top of Missionary ridge.

Grant then complained that Thomas "had a case of the slows" again because of the lack of a pursuit. Most of Thomas' horses had died during the seige of Chattanooga, when they had been lead day and night over torturous mountain paths north of the Tennessee to bring in the trickle of supplies which kept his army alive. Despite this lack, Thomas did his best to comply, and began a pursuit with his army on foot, and relays of the surviving teams to bring forward supplies. Grant promptly took the rest of his horses, and gave them to Sherman. Then he put Sherman in command of the combined armies of the Tennessee and the Cumberland. Eventually, the remainder of Thomas' troops were taken from him, to join Sherman's pointless "March to the Sea." Thomas was left with a single division, and ordered to hold Tennessee. When Sherman went off on his wild goose chase, he left behind Hood and the Army of Tennessee, even though his express mission was its destruction. Hood turned west, and then north, and marched on Nashville. Thomas, with his typical efficiency, scraped together ever force he could. Finally, before Christmas in 1864, he launched the attack which destroyed Hood's army. The scattered remnant's either joined N. B. Forrest, to gadfly about in Federal occupied territory, raising hell and accomplishing nothing, or they drifted towar the sea, and the incompetent command of Pierre Toutant, known as Beauregard. These finally were gathered together by Johnston for that last futile battle at Bentonville.

The Confederacy was as plaugued by military incompetence and political generals as were the Federals, if not more so. Several salient points can be made about their military doctrine, and most were made by a former Federal staff officer in the 1870's (don't have his name with me here at work). Their decision to provide an area defense (i.e., attempting to defend very foot of ground in the Confederacy) mirrored the political nightmare of state's rights in their Congress--thousands of Floridians, for example, sat out the war doing nothing, after a young naval officer secured and held Pensacola, the only useful real estate in Florida, the Governor of Georgia sat on tens of thousands of uniforms and muskets throughout the war, while the state militia ran away from every Federal force they faced. Taking the strategic defensive, while practicing and operational and tactical offensive, assured that southern territory would be constantly devasted, depriving them of supplies, while their infantry were squandered in savage and mostly useless attacks against Federal forces. In the Seven Days, Lee was attempting to trap Fitz-John Porters "grand division" and smash them against the Chickahominy. Lee's staff work was non-existent, Jackson was sent to the wrong place, and given no orders to attack--finally, Powell Hill launched a bloody attack on Mechanicsville without orders, and got badly beaten up by Porter's rear guard. Porter was already pulling out to cross the Chicahominy and rejoin the other two thirds of McClellan's army. Every battle in the campaign was a pointless waste of limited Confederate resources and manpower. The one pitched battle in which Lee's troops were able to get at the main body of Porter's corps was Glendale, and Jackson, following again to the letter the geographically bizarre orders of his commander, did not arrive until near sunset. The slaughter which ensued punished Porter's troops, but it cost the Confederates far more. When that action is combined with the horrible casualties at Beaver Dam, Boatswain's Creek, Savage Station and Malvern Hill, you get a roll call of useless southern casualties suffered to make McClellan leave his position in front of Richmond, and Little Mac was already running away as fast as his little legs would carry him. The list of pointless slaughter of southern infantry in questionable attacks is almost endless: Bragg sending brigades one at a time, unsupported, into the maelstrom of the "Hornet's Nest" at Shiloh; Jackson's assault on Banks at Cedar Mountain; Sterling Price's order to the Missouri State Guard to attack with the bayonet at Pea Ridge, when their cartridge boxes were empty; Jackson's attack on King's first corps at Centerville just before the second battle of Manassas; Lee's orders to Anderson to attack Hooker's lines at Chancellorsville, followed by Jackson's decision to continue his successful attack the following day, with a night attack (his reconnaissance in the dark was to result in his fatal wounding); Stuart's continued bloody attacks with the Second Corps on the final day of that battle after Jackson and Powell Hill were wounded; Bragg's attack on Rosecrans' army at Murphreesboro (where Thomas once again saved the day with his calm efficiency); of course, the much celebrated "Pickett's charge" (actually, carried out by Pickett's division, Heth's division of the Second Corps under the command of J. J. Pettigrew, and the remnants of Pender's Second Corps division under Isaac Trimble); the totally pointless attack at Bristoe Station; Hood's useless week of bloody assaults against Sherman's army around Atlanta (repulsed with great loss to the southerners, mostly by Thomas' highly disciplined troops); Longstreet's useless assaults on the seige works of the Federals beseiged in Knoxville; the repeated attacks on Meade's army in the wilderness, after Grant had begun his drive on Richmond--and that is not even a comprehensive list.

The South was doomed by political disunity, by military incompetence, by the imperious and wrong-headed military dictates of Jefferson Davis, by the insistence of each state on the defense of "their territory"--surely attrition won that war, but the South got busy and lost it long before the pack of mostly stumble-bum officers running Federal armies could learn their trade well enough to accomplish it.

Once again, understanding history, and military history in particular, involves a good deal more than simply knowing the numbers.

Set, This forum is titled, "Most destructive battle in history in lives," not political masacre. However, you should be complimented for your knowledge of history, and nobody is criticizing that point. c.i.

Set, I love to read your history posts! You make me want to pick up a book and learn more.

I think the Battle of the Sexes is probably the most destructive. Began 100,000 years ago and will continue until the end of mankind. But, it sure is fun - bring on another

(Just kidding, the one I have now is a beaut, and I'm oh so happy; will stick together for eternity plus 1 )

set-some of your "facts" need some updating. You dismiss the Army of Joseph Johnston,(ARMY NUMBER 2) yet you fail to recognize that Sherman had to conclude a separate peace with Joe in late April 1865. (The date you post was the second peace that concluded after Congress repudiated the original terms presented by Sherman who, acting on what he and Grant thought was fair,was nothing more than the terms afforded Lee at Appomat).
As far as the Trans Mississippi West (ARMY NUMBER 3), you must of course remember the Kansas Missouri conflict that was under the command of the "Trans Mississippi Confederacy" This involved GensPap Price, EK Smith, and the Army of about 15000 and included , separately the Indian Confederacy forces of GenStand Watie,Daniel Macintosh,John Jumper, and John Ross. These forces concluded a separate surrender with the Union on May 25 1865, under the command of Gen E K Smith and (the next day) at Doaksville where GENERAL Stand Watie surrendered.

My comment to you is that , as the author of this thread merely asked a question that seems perfectly reasonable, I dont believe we need to have an imprimatur from anyone who confers official "merit" of these questions. Im sure you didnt mean it but you sounded really snotty in your comment to the person who started this post. AND
Of course just knowing numbers of casualties is not an understanding of history,however, it often is a place to start our inquiries of some of the shortcomings of our species. Do we agree on that?

I did not dismiss Johnston's army, and, in fact, i consider it to have been "Army Number 2." You apparently did not read carefully what i had written, or you would have noted that i wrote that Johnston surrendered on April 29th.



Once again, i would suggest you did not carefully read what i've written. Read it again, above, and you'll find the following sentence: " At no time after George Thomas defeated Zollicoffer at Mill Springs in January 1862, and scattered the forces which had been gathered under Crittenden's command, were there more than two coherently organized armies in the Southern Confederacy." (emphasis added). The opening battle of the Trans-Mississippi came when Nathaniel Lyons marched south from Springfield, Missouri to confront the "army" of the Transmississippi at Wilson's Creek in 1861. I've put quotes around the word army, because there was no single commander--Sterling Price with his Missouri State Guard could not get along with anyone, and he cordially despised Ben McCullogh, who commanded Texas Rangers and the Arkansas Mounted Rifles. They would not even encamp their forces together. Lyons might have made short work of them, but he had just the same problem. The majority of his force were largely German-American volunteers under the command of Franz Sigel, who was about as bad as Price, and would not make the approach march in conjunction with Lyons. Lyons drove into the camp of the Missouri State Guard, and was making good progress when he was killed, and his force collapsed. McCullough, encamped on a nearby hill, watched with supreme indifference. Sigel got word of Lyons' death, and having held back in the first place, got the hell out of Dodge before he became involved in the debacle.

Kirby Smith was sent west to command that "army," but he fared no better. He had no Adjutant General, no Quartermaster, no Commisary, and almost no transport, and he got no respect and was paid scant attention by Price and McCullogh, who continued to feud. The Cherokee, Choctaw and Creek "soldiers" from the Indian Territories, under the overall command of Albert Pike, joined McCullogh. The battle of Pea Ridge, also known as Elkhorn Tavern, was based upon a sound plan by Smith to interpose his army between the Federals and their base, by moving north around them. (Sigel was now obliged to fight in earnest, since he couldn't run.) Smith was seriously ill, and was transported to the battle in an ambulance, on of the few this "army" possessed. Price had some transport, but managed to lose it, so his Guard marched to the south with ten cartridges each in their cartridge boxes--60 or 80 was pretty much the standard in that war, and those could be fired off pretty damned quickly. McCullogh and Pike marched south through deep forest to the west of Pea Ridge, which was impassible for wheeled vehicles, although with the very little artillery of this army, and the almost total lack of transport, it would not have much mattered. But McCullogh's troops were almost all mounted, and they could not have easily joined with the Guard, which was something McCullogh was not inclined to do at any event. McCullogh was killed in the opening skirmish, and the command devolved upon Pike, who was generally despised by the Texas Rangers and the Arkansas Mounted Rifles, who had a pronounced racist attitude toward their Indian "allies."

To the east of the Ridge, Price marched south with the Guard, and Kirby Smith flat on his back in the ambulance. He came upon the Federals around Elkhorn Tavern, and his boys fired off their few rounds in the opening skirmish. He sent them across the wood lot, about the only large open area in these dense woods, with the bayonet. They looted the cartridge boxes of dead and wounded Yankees, but their efforts were doomed, despite their courage and devotion. They could not break out into the open country south of the Tavern, where their numbers would have tolled, and they were obliged to retreat at nightfall. To the west, the Indians scattered as soon as the "fire wagons," the Federal artillery, opened up--they were always good fighters until that stage in a battle. The Texas Rangers and the Arkansas boys were disinclined to leave the satety of the woods, and with McCullogh dead, there was no one to make them do so--with them mounted and armed with muskets and rifles, they were effectively fast dragoons, and could have made minced-meat of the handful of U.S. Regular Cavalry and Iowa and Kansas volunteers they faced. Smith was obliged to retreat, after suffering great losses while inflicting very little damage on Sigel, Curtis and Dodge.

Stirling Price crossed the Mississippi after Pea Ridge, and although he represented a serious threat to Halleck's new base at Corinth, Mississippi, Grant was able to deal effectively with his force at the battles of Corinth and Iuka, despite having unreliable subordinates. Grant was never much of a battlefield commander, but he had drive, and he cracked the whip over his generals, who largely served him well, even crazy old Rosecrans. Back across the river, Price was placed under the command of Holmes, who was hoping to recoup the disaster of the Prairie Grove campaign, and intended to use Price and the remnants of the Guard, especially as Price was now the "darling" of the Transmississippi. Just as Kirby Smith had been and one day would again be placed, Holmes commanded a force without the least bit of coherent organization--no commissary service, no quartermaster service, little transport, little artillery, no ordonance department, no supply or operational bases. Holmes decided upon an attack on Helena on the Mississippi River. But he later thought better of the plan, unwilling to risk what passed for an army in Arkansas. He thought that 4- or 5000 Federals in the town would destroy his army if he attempted an assualt--in fact, there were nearly 20,000 troops there. Even with the detachments to support Grants army moving on Vicksburg, it was an insane plan. By now, however, Price was fired up, and declared that it would be an easy victory. Holmes contacted Kirby Smith, now the department commander, and was told: "Most certainly do it."

By the time Holmes' arrived with not quite 8000 men, the defender, Bejamin Prentiss, indeed had only a force of 4000 men left. But he had mounted the terrific defense of the sunken road at Shiloh, the "Hornet's Nest," and he had posted his forces at Helena very well indeed, having learned to use terrain effectively. Only Price's men reached their objective, taking Graveyard Hill, where they were the focus of every gun the Federals commanded, and of the Navy in the river. The guns Price had captured on the hill had been spiked and were useless to him. Prentiss' casualties did not reach 250 men, Holmes lost more than 1600. The battle took place on July 4, 1863, the day after "Pickett's Charge," and the day after John Pemberton had surrendered Vicksburg to Grant. The "Army of the Transmississippi" had only ever been an army in name--after Helena, it ceased to be a force of any consequence. The Missouri State Guard was reduced to fewer than 2000 men, and desertion and disease assured that it ceased to exist as an effective fighting force long before the war ended. That Smith held out until May of 1865 only means that Federal resources were diverted elsewhere, because he posed no threat. In fact, the forces used by Thomas in the defense of Nashville, and the counter offensive which shattered Hood's Army of the Tennessee came from the Transmississippi. A. J. Smith was happy to join Thomas, because his boys weren't doing anything west of the river.

So, to repeat myself, after Mill Springs in January of 1862, there were never more than two coherently organized armies in the Confederacy.



Talk about sounding snotty--just because you continue to nurse a grudge against me for what happened in another thread doesn't justify those comments. I offer no imprimatur, and haven't passed judgment on the thread's author. What i had hoped to offer was some insight. The majority of people i have met in my life who expressed an interest in history have been men who read military history, many claiming it is the only significant history, and whose interest is largely in matters of "glory," battlefield slaughter, and the minutiae of uniforms, weapons and tables of organization. If you look at the history section of most book stores, half or more of the books will be military history. It is indeed a thankless task to find good history to read in most bookstores. Even if one's interest is solely in military history, most of what is on offer is not worth the price. If you found my "tone" offensive, i will offer two replies: the first being that the tone of what someone writes is largely, personally interpretive; the second is that if you are offended, i could not care less, given the nastiness i've had from you in other threads, with little justification.

To the author of this thread: if you were offended by what i've written, i sincerely regret it, because it was never my intent to offend you. I would hope that you will see that i'm attempting to offer some historigraphic advice. The context and the effects of events is far more important than the numbers of players on stage. In terms of the number of troops involved, the bloodiest war in which the United States has ever engaged was the Mexican War. In that war, more than two thirds of those who died succumbed to disease without ever hearing a shot fired in anger. From that war, with a very small military investment, we managed to steal New Mexico, Arizona, California, Nevada, and parts of what are now Utah and Colorado--for which we "paid" a paltry few millions of dollars. Greater events loomed on our nation's historical horizon, and Lee, Grant, Jackson, McClellan, Price, Pillow--a host of officers who fought in the War Between the States learned their trade there. In the reading of history, perspective is everything.

so then you agree with me, good. Im glad were getting somewhere. you must learn to breathe deeply and demand serenity now.

When a post gets more than , say 50 lines, then maybe we are just a bit overwrought.

------------------added about 20 minutes later----------------------------
Oh Im sorry , I just now read your prolixificated post ,please , you dont have to recite to me,Ive probably done my own independent study. However you still want to deny the significance of the transmiss confederacy. Hmmmm, then we must have you read some of Leroy Fischers accounts or Ray Coltons, Civil War in the Western Territories. You spent much time reciting but I didnt see any analysis. Do you have something against that part of the Civil War? It is a less written about but , as anyone in Minnesota or Oklahoma and the Indian Territories would say, it happened.