Why do most of the liberals view Iraq as a failure?

georgeob1 wrote:

The intriguing question is how and for what reason this strategy so decisively changed after 9/11 and during the Bush II Administration - particularly considering that so many of the key figures in their strategic circles had also served in the Bush I and Reagan Administrations.

You see, this is why i continue to "harp" on this topic. The "strategy" obviously changed at some point before PNAC was established in 1997--because what you have described as "one of the pillars" of the Reagan foreign policy for the middle east is clearly abandoned by the members of PNAC, and years before September 11th. My "gripe" with your analysis is your seeming refusal to acknowledge that for whatever reason this policy was changed, it was changed long before the Shrub even ran for office, let alone before the September 11th attacks. I suggest to you that this group of men who had formerly been members of Reagan's administration, and some few in the administration of the elder Bush must have considered those policies to have been a failure, and that decisive military action against Hussein, to place American forces in a position to permanently challenge the Persians, was the motivation for their decision to formulate a new policy at odds with the Reagan policy.

For whatever the reason for the policy change, it is clear that it was changed among this group, and that they subsequently would entertain no dissent from their new policy position. If you look at the PNAC policy documents at their web site, for the period before the 2000 election of the younger Bush, it is clear that their focus was on Iran, rather than Iraq. Their push to take down Hussein was, i suspect, motivated by the unsatisfactory outcome of having made this rather stupid and vainglorious tribal leader their middle eastern proxy. So, rather than rely upon the Ba'athist regime to act as a counterbalance to Iran, they conceived of using the excuse of the 1990 invasion of Kuwait, and the subsequent unsatisfactory performance of Iraq in response to SC Resolutions 686, et sequitur, to justify an invasion of Iraq. But it appears to me that they were focused on Iran, and this would explain why these men--none of whom can be considered to have been expert in military matters--grossly underestimated the degree of difficulty in "pacifying" Iraq, and put so little effort in planning for the occupation.

As i see it, their thinking went, roughly: We need to deal effectively with Iran. Iraq proved untrustworthy (which is mistake number one, equating Iraq with Hussein), therefore in order to put a credible counterbalance to the Persians in place, we need to take down Hussein, and occupy Iraq (mistake number two, because while focused on Iran, they gave no reasonable consideration to the probable consequences of invading Iraq--they certainly must not have had in mind the reasoning the elder Bush applied in deciding not to attempt the overthrow of Hussein, given the very nearly prophetic character [coincidentaly prophetic, of course] of Pappy Bush's description of the likely consquences of a full-scale invasion). Thereafter, i suspect their intent was to deal, and if necessary, to deal harshly, with Iran. But because they were focused on Iran, they simply did not give any realistic thought to the probably consequences of invading Iraq, especially in view of their decision to go in "on a shoestring" because of our prior involvement in Afghanistan.

My point is that this policy was determined upon, and all the avenues available to the members of PNAC to forward it used, before the election of the younger Bush, and before the September 11th attacks. I do not subscribe to the loony September 11th conspiracy theories. There was a conspiracy, it was established and forwarded by al Qaeda, and carried out by 16 Saudis, two Lebanese and an Egyptian--there is absolutely no good reason to assume that any member of PNAC knew that such an event would occur.

Significantly, the testimony of Miss Rice to the September 11th Commission was that immediately, on September 12th, when the key members of the administration assembled at Camp David to discuss their response to the attacks, Paul Wolfowitz suggested that Iraq was involved and that the response be centered on Iraq, but that Rumsfeld contradicted him at once, and the topic was not discussed again during those meetings. I suspect that Wolfowitz saw the main chance to forward the PNAC agenda, but the Rummy, although a founding member of PNAC, was attempting, at the least, to faithfully execute his duties, and he shut down Wolfowitz because he was focused on the problem, and not an opportunity to foward the agenda of PNAC.

It appears to me that the PNAC agenda was brought in later, and members in the administration were then active to use the opportunity presented by the "war on terror" to get authority to go after Iraq. As matters stood after September 11th, the invasion of Afghanistan did not put the United States into a position to threaten Iran militarily while at the same time protecting Iraq (which needed protection because of its significant petroleum reserves, despite the Ba'athist regime) and Saudi Arabia. Invading Iraq, however, would provide that opportunity.

I outlined what I believe to be the most likely line of thought that precipitated this change. I don't know that it is actually what motivated them, but it is my considered opinion that what I outlined is the most likely and rational scenario.

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There was indeed disagreement and debate over the issues involving some senior military leaders, including a couple of former CENTCOMs. At the military level much of the energy was consumed over the so called transformation program instituted by Cheney and Rumsfield. It was focused on speed, agility, situational awareness and precision weapons. It permitted significant economies of force, and that was successfully proven in the opening campaign. It is possible that, among some, a fixation on this issue clouded the more fundamental strategic issues. My impression is that some people were right & wrong on the strategy for the wrong reasons. Gen Shinseki is a good example.

The problem with the new doctrine as regards the invasion of Iraq, was not so much that the strategic issues were clouded. If my assessment that the prime motivation came from PNAC policy decided upon at the latest in 1997, and perhaps earlier, then a course of action had been decided upon without sufficient thought having been given the the operational issues which were occasioned by the invasion's aftermath, and that the strategic consideration was limited entirely to the policy of containing Iran by invading Iraq. The new doctrine does not concern itself with the problems of occupation and "nation building," and (referring again to the topic of this thread) that explains why this administration has failed in Iraq. The initial invasion worked out well enough, but they missed that the locals were not strewing flowers at the feet of the GIs, and it seems to me at least, painfully apparent that they gave no consideration to the realites of occupation and the creation of a viable government. These are significantly complex and difficult problems to deal with in the simplest of circumstances, and Iraq, with a Shi'ite majority which has never held power, a Sunni minority which has always held power, and a Kurd minority which has fought literally for centuries for their own survival against Iraqi, Persian and Turk, is far from the simplest of circumstances.

No, nothing wrong with the operational doctrine of the invasion--all the problems arise from not having planned for the occupation.

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Many of the points you argue are perhaps valid as well. However, I don't think they relate very much to the point I was making.

I've carefully addressed in this post and the previous one the issue of the members of PNAC deciding upon a policy at variance with the policies followed by Reagan and the elder Bush--i really don't see what your quibble is. My quibble with you is that you continue to behave as though PNAC and its agenda--the agenda of men out of power who came to power with the election of the younger Bush--was not a significant factor in this invasion. In fact, it seems that you are determined to make it appear unimportant.

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from mctag's thread :

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The uncomfortable paradox facing London and Washington as they try to put the Iranian genie back in its bottle is that they have done more than anyone to uncork that bottle in the first place and set Iran on the way to regional hegemony.

it might be well to remember that president bush had difficulty understanding that there were BOTH shiites and sunnis in iraq .
from what i have read , even within the shiites and sunnis there are a number of factions/tribes that do not look particularly kindly on each other .
i believe there is a saying somewhat like this to describe the rivalry between the various factions/tribes :
"you are my enemy , but when we are fighting a common enemy -such as western invaders - you are my brother " .

western invaders might well remember that !
hbg

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georgeob1 wrote:

McTag wrote:

Many people here could see that coming, pre-invasion. Why couldn't Bushco?

Odd then that at the time they focused and spoke only about the WMD matter. Clarity is easy in retrospect: difficult in prospect - and many more claim it now than demonstrated it then.

On April 3, 2002, almost a full year before the invasion, Craven de Kere authored the
thread linked here, and which includes the following statement by the author, Tony Karon, of the op/ed piece which is the subject of Mr. de Kere's thread:

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The argument from the GOP foreign policy old guard is based on the premise that if the U.S. invades Iraq with no Arab allies in support, the consequence could be a long-term violent backlash against American interests throughout the Middle East, including the overthrow of pro-U.S. governments by extremist elements. Also, they argue, Arab support may be even more critical in the task of stabilizing a post-Saddam Iraq, which could require a long-term occupation of the country by U.S. forces. But the Arab allies that supported the U.S. in the Gulf War have rejected a new attack on Iraq, and a recurring theme in their complaints is the danger of a violent backlash sparked by a U.S. attack on an Arab country while the Israeli-Palestinian conflict remains hot.

This was published in Time magazine.

The long running discussion of this topic is the series of threads known as "The US, the UN and Iraq"--there are now eleven of them, but the first thread, started by Walter Hinteler was actually entitled "Anti War Movement." The member Hazlitt posted on the first page of that thread, on November 8, 2002, in the post linked here, and significantly, wrote:

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I am not deeply informed on all aspects of the likely war, but as I see it, we are going to face one of two evils. On the one hand, we can try to contain Iraq, as we did the USSR for so many years, while doing what is necessary to repair the damage we've done over the years in the middle east; and thereby reduce the appeal of terrorism among the Arab peoples. On the other hand, we can enjoy the pleasure of giving Saddam what he has been asking for, the almost certain result of which will be a long, treacherous fruitless occupation of Iraq. At the same time we will have aggrieved Arab peoples everywhere and given impetus to terrorism among many Arabs who had perviously entertained no such ideas.

I found these two very quickly, by simply doing a search for "Iraq." I got more than 55,000 results. There is plenty of evidence that both public pundits and private member here "could see that coming."

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setanta wrote:

My quibble with you is that you continue to behave as though PNAC and its agenda--the agenda of men out of power who came to power with the election of the younger Bush--was not a significant factor in this invasion. In fact, it seems that you are determined to make it appear unimportant.

This may be the heart of the matter. I have no opinion and voiced none about exactly who was the agent of strategy change or exactly when it occurred. I neither excluded nor specifically included PNAC in the argument.

The people involved have had varied careers, but nearly all played significant direct or supporting roles in national strategy for a decade or more prior to the Bush II election. They had all, in effect, been part of a continuing, evolving dialogue on the matter. The degrees of influence or power they exercised varied, but I believe your phrase "came into power" exaggerates the reality of what actually occurred.

For example, Paul Wolfowitz started out as a Carter Administration appointee to the Arms Control Agency and later as an Assistant (or deputy) Secretary in DOD. He was more or less continuously in government in the years afterwards in a series of appointments in DOD, the State Department and again back to DOD. I came to know him while he was Ambassador to Indonesia during the mid 1980s.

He, Ken Adleman, John Lehman, Scowcroft, Libby and most of those you cited had a near continuous association with the development of our security policy over many years and several administrations. Historians will attempt to unravel - and of course will speculate - on who influenced what, when. However, from my perspective the truth on that aspect of the matter is unknowable. I am more interested in the basic ideas that motivated them and how they evolved over time. That was the subject of the post to which you objected.

I don't think we have any substantive disagreement on the points I actually raised.

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saturday's "globe and mail" (toronto) published an article under the heading : " AN IRANIAN SAGE ADVISES "

if you don't feel like reading the whole article , the last two paragraphs sum it up :

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The U.S. has made things a lot easier for Mr. Ahmadinejad by getting rid of two of Iran's greatest enemies, Saddam Hussein and the Taliban. Now Mr. Ahmadinejad is left with only the old bête noir of revolutionary Iran, America and its allies.

His challenge is to keep his people focused on that threat, so they put aside their growing disinterest in the absurd blend of Islam and politics. Our challenge is to block his nuclear ambitions without standing in the way of this unfolding metamorphosis

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by playing the "tough guys" both the united states and britain give the iranian president exactly what he is looking for : an opportunity to show the irianian people that they must stick together during these tough times to face the commom enemy .
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TEHRAN -- It was everything you would want from a visit with a Persian philosopher -- a large, deeply carpeted room overlooking a lavish garden, broad couches around the perimeter, oriental art on the walls, tables heaving with bowls of fruit and piles of books on art, philosophy, politics. And, beneath a shock of white hair and a grey beard, a mind that spans the libraries of eastern and western thought.

I came to visit Daryush Shayegan because there are few figures who are better equipped to explain the precarious state of Iran today, and to help us answer the question that is occupying the world: How should we respond to the serious nuclear-weapons threat posed by its president, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad? With sanctions, with talks and diplomatic "constructive engagement," with missiles?

As this weekend opens with an armed confrontation between British sailors and Iranian soldiers and with the launch of a new, tougher round of sanctions, it's worth looking at what Mr. Shayegan told me during my recent visit to Tehran.

"In the long term, I'm optimistic about Iran," he said, in lightly accented English. It seemed a most unlikely statement from a man who is a victim of Mr. Ahmadinejad's increasingly nasty regime.

Mr. Shayegan is probably Iran's most famous secular philosopher; when he was in Paris in the 1970s and 1980s, he developed ties to the nouveaux philosophes, the liberal thinkers who rediscovered the values of the Englightenment (and who still play a prominent role in France today). His 1989 book Cultural Schizophrenia was the first serious work to examine the psychology of radical Islam, and it makes amazing reading today, foreshadowing almost everything that has been written on the topic in more recent years.

Now 71 years old, in retirement from academia, he is still involved in publishing, in a country where philosophy books sometimes outsell novels. But Mr. Ahmadinejad's aggressive crackdowns on intellectual, artistic and political work have made publishing almost impossible.

"Many old professors have been banished," Mr. Shayegan said. "There's huge censorship going on; thousands of books are piling up without being published. It's definitely a hardening of the situation."

So how, as the world closes in on Iran, could he be optimistic? Like a great many thinkers in Iran, he said he saw his country as being in the midst of a metamorphosis that is soon to reach its end -- if the West doesn't halt it with ham-fisted provocations. In his view, Iran is at the tail end of a process that other Muslim countries are only beginning.

"Iran has got un jour d'avance [a day ahead], as we say -- because we have already had that experience of Islamic radicalism. Now, of course, I could tell you that we shouldn't have undergone it at all, that we should have had reform instead of revolution. But since it has happened, and what has been done cannot be undone, I am now more worried about the other Muslim countries. I am sure that if we had free elections in Egypt today, the Muslim Brotherhood would come into power. We've seen the same with Hamas and so on."

If there were free elections in Iran today, on the other hand -- elections in which a circle of ayatollahs didn't prevent most candidates from running -- there is a strong feeling that someone quite different from Mr. Ahmadinejad would prevail, someone who would begin to undo the Islamic revolution.

In Iran, Mr. Shayegan said, the young generation no longer believes in the revolution. How to turn these beliefs into reality -- how to get the ayatollahs out of the way -- is a tricky question, one that is usually greeted with despair. But his message, and that of his contemporaries, is that it's worth waiting: The self-immolation of Iran's revolution will have a profound effect on the rest of the world.

"Don't forget that, symbolically, Iran is the Mecca of Islamic radicals," he said with a chuckle, "in the way that Russia was the Mecca of communism, in a way. And I think the fate of the Iranian experience will be very important for the future of Islamic radicalism. Because we started the whole thing, 28 years ago. There were marginal movements elsewhere. But suddenly these marginal Islamic radicals took over power in a huge country like Iran. It was the first experience."

At the time, it had been centuries since Islam had been associated with national politics -- it was a private religion, like most others. The idea of an Islamic state was born here.

But Mr. Shayegan has been arguing for three decades that the politicization of Islam is a self-defeating mission, because the very sacredness of its core beliefs is destroyed by lowering them into the secular and political world.

"The current trend towards the proliferation of fundamentalisms of every stripe is not just failing to renew the spirit of Islam; it is turning it into a funeral procession of petrified dreams, wandering off to lose itself in the sands of the desert," he wrote 18 years ago.

Now, he said, we are witnessing the decrepitude of Islamism in President Ahmadinejad, who is being set upon not only by a reformist opposition but also, it seems, by the very ayatollahs who supported him. Only one thing is stopping this self-immolation -- the sabre-rattling of the Americans.

Last month, the opposition parties declared that they were going to put aside their attacks on Mr. Ahmadinejad in order to present a united front against the U.S. menace. If that were to subside, the Iranian leadership could be convulsed, destroyed by its own highly visible contradictions (the sanctions, which are being deeply felt on the streets of Tehran, are making these contradictions extremely visible).

"We have had this revolution for 28 years," Mr. Shayegan said. "It has been an explosion of the collective unconscious. All the fantasies we have had, we just went through them. It has been, as the French would say, a défoulement -- you have vomited everything you had."

He described it as an inevitable cycle -- the transformation of Islamic fervour into politics, and then the secularism of politics destroying the sacred nature of Islam, its own religious base. This second metamorphosis, he says, is under way, and Mr. Ahmadinejad is using his only remaining weapon -- anti-Americanism -- to keep it at bay.

"I wouldn't say that the Iranians are becoming anti-religious," the old philosopher said. "I wouldn't say that. But probably they want more of a private religion than a public religion.

"I think the Iranians have understood something -- that the theocratic system doesn't work. The new generation has not got the same religious enthusiasm. They have realized that religion [has become] just a vehicle for power, that's all."

The U.S. has made things a lot easier for Mr. Ahmadinejad by getting rid of two of Iran's greatest enemies, Saddam Hussein and the Taliban. Now Mr. Ahmadinejad is left with only the old bête noir of revolutionary Iran, America and its allies.

His challenge is to keep his people focused on that threat, so they put aside their growing disinterest in the absurd blend of Islam and politics. Our challenge is to block his nuclear ambitions without standing in the way of this unfolding metamorphosis.

link :
...AN IRANIAN SAGE ADVISES...

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It's exactly the device by which governments can most easily and quickly get all their people behind them- convince them of an external threat.

Bushco easily did it after 9/11; look at the Congress vote, almost unanimous.

However it works in reverse too, and Mr Ahmadinejad did not even have to convince his people of an imaginary threat; Mr Bush did that job for him, and provided them with a real threat.

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georgeob1 wrote:

The people involved have had varied careers, but nearly all played significant direct or supporting roles in national strategy for a decade or more prior to the Bush II election. They had all, in effect, been part of a continuing, evolving dialogue on the matter. The degrees of influence or power they exercised varied, but I believe your phrase "came into power" exaggerates the reality of what actually occurred.

The point i was making was that at the time in which these people apparently came to the conclusion that the invasion of Iraq was necessary to American interests, they were all of them politically "sidelined" in the eight years of the Clinton administration. That is why i used the term "came into power." They had been cooling their heels since 1993.

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I don't think we have any substantive disagreement on the points I actually raised.

Other than your attempt to suggest that the PNAC shift in policy came after September 11th, when it clearly dated from 1997 at the latest, no, we don't disagree substantively.

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I have no knowledge if the PNAC as such ever had a strategy or if it ever changed, before or after 9/11. That aspect of the question has little interest for me, and, I believe, little significance overall. The change in the situation, as they (or whoever) saw it, and what motivated the change in policy, interests me a great deal.

Clearly there was no discernable activity during the Clinton administration to take out Saddam's regme. I agree the group to which you refer were on the sidelines during the Clinton Administration. The change in U.S. policy came after Bush took office: when I don't claim to know.

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I've given plenty of information on the PNAC policy, O'George, and have linked their web site. It is patently obvious by reading the documents which the organization itself supplies that they advocated the invasion of and occupation of Iraq from at least 1997. That, combined with the large number of founding members of the PNAC who subsequently took offices of high responsibility in the Bush administration, is compelling evidence of the likely origin of the plan to invade Iraq.

I understand, though, that you seem to want to bury your head on that issue. If you have no knowledge of it, that is because you haven't taken the ample opportunities which i have provided for you to look at the documents prepared by PNAC itself.

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I've little doubt that the PNAC folks used 9-11 to bolster their case for action... and would agree that it hasn't changed as well. In a lot of ways; 9-11 exemplified the need for a change of strategy, and the PNAC was already pushing one that made a lot of sense to a lot of people. Cross reference that to 8 years of a passive foreign policy in which Saddam repeatedly ignored his obligations and laughed off the possibility of consequences, while defying the UN inspectors, taking potshots at our planes in the no-fly zone, paying $10,000 to $25,000 a hit for terrorist activity and using Oil for Food to essentially render sanctions meaningless. Even today; virtually no other real proposal beyond a lot of finger pointing and blame-laying exists beside that of the PNAC. Pointing out the PNAC strategy was implemented doesn't really change anything. It is well known that the majority of both the Congress of the United States and the citizens of the United States were pretty much in harmony with the President when this thing got started.

Anyone who believes the Aluminum Tubes and Yellow Cake stories were the driving force behind the American People's alliance against "the Towelheads" is using selective memory. Any standard propaganda against Iraq would have been every bit as effective, as the general public was still angry about 9-11 and wanted to hit back... and as statistics still show (embarrassingly); Americans in general still don't know the difference between Saddam and Bin Laden, let alone a Sunni and a Shia. The Patriot button was as simple to push as the bigot button, and the demonization was a walk in the park, so why would anyone think a plan to bring the ME into the 21st Century would be a tough sell?

I realize I'm in the minority now; but I still think the ME needs to be brought into the 21st Century and honestly believe the consequences of letting the hatred fester would be even greater than those resulting from opposing it directly. Thoroughly oppressed people will rebel, rightfully so, and the rebellion has begun. Pretending this isn't so is no solution at all. Perhaps the PNAC is completely wrong in strategy. But, can anyone point out an alternative plan, laid out in such detail? I sure haven't seen one.

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Setanta wrote:

I've given plenty of information on the PNAC policy, .

You have indeed, and I will follow up on it later. I'll confess to little knowledge of PNAC - or interest in it for that matter. I'm mostly interested in the strategic issues themselves.

OCCOM BILL wrote:

I've little doubt that the PNAC folks used 9-11 to bolster their case for action... and would agree that it hasn't changed as well. In a lot of ways; 9-11 exemplified the need for a change of strategy, and the PNAC was already pushing one that made a lot of sense to a lot of people. Cross reference that to 8 years of a passive foreign policy in which Saddam repeatedly ignored his obligations and laughed off the possibility of consequences, while defying the UN inspectors, taking potshots at our planes in the no-fly zone, paying $10,000 to $25,000 a hit for terrorist activity and using Oil for Food to essentially render sanctions meaningless. Even today; virtually no other real proposal beyond a lot of finger pointing and blame-laying exists beside that of the PNAC. Pointing out the PNAC strategy was implemented doesn't really change anything. It is well known that the majority of both the Congress of the United States and the citizens of the United States were pretty much in harmony with the President when this thing got started.
...

I realize I'm in the minority now; but I still think the ME needs to be brought into the 21st Century and honestly believe the consequences of letting the hatred fester would be even greater than those resulting from opposing it directly. Thoroughly oppressed people will rebel, rightfully so, and the rebellion has begun. Pretending this isn't so is no solution at all. Perhaps the PNAC is completely wrong in strategy. But, can anyone point out an alternative plan, laid out in such detail? I sure haven't seen one.

I agree. There was no alternative plan - not from Europe or anywhere else.

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I'll tell you one thing George- there were two million people (an unprecedented demonstration) on the streets of London united behind the idea "DON'T ATTACK IRAQ".

I am proud to have been one of them. And in all my long life I have never before been on a political demonstration of any kind.

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georgeob1 wrote:

McTag wrote:

Many people here could see that coming, pre-invasion. Why couldn't Bushco?

Odd then that at the time they focused and spoke only about the WMD matter. Clarity is easy in retrospect: difficult in prospect - and many more claim it now than demonstrated it then.

This is not "being wise after the event", please. The facts were all there before.

The military assumption which went wrong was, the USA has not been able to balance the absence of Saddam's forces. And so the balance of power has shifted badly against us.

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Quote:

It is well known that the majority of both the Congress of the United States and the citizens of the United States were pretty much in harmony with the President when this thing got started.

Because of lies, not because the true situation compelled people to be on the same page. Please remember to make this distinction.

Cycloptichorn

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Cycloptichorn wrote:

Quote:
It is well known that the majority of both the Congress of the United States and the citizens of the United States were pretty much in harmony with the President when this thing got started.

Because of lies, not because the true situation compelled people to be on the same page. Please remember to make this distinction.

Cycloptichorn

You're right. We went to war based on the lies Saddam told about his WMD program. He was good at it. Fooled every major intelligence agency in the world.

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georgeob1 wrote:

I agree. There was no alternative plan - not from Europe or anywhere else.

In the first place, this assumes that the Anglo-American "No Fly Zones" operations were not a part of a plan. Although certainly not authorized by the United Nations, it still constituted a plan to contain the military operations of Hussein's regime. In the second place, it assumes that the inspections regime was not a part of a plan, and that was authorized by the United Nations. The PNAC came up with their plan before Hussein threw the inspectors out of Iraq, so the PNAC plan was a plan to replace the Anglo-American "No Fly" plan, and the United Nations inspections regime. Third, it assumes that the "oil for food" program was no part of a plan. That it was shamelessly exploited, and by Americans more than anyone else, does not alter that it was part of a plan. Finally, it assumes that any plan is better than no plan, even though it is not correct to say that there were no plans in operation. There is never any good reason to say that any plan is better than no plan, and the invasion of Iraq is a bloody and painful object lesson about plans and their relative value.

Had there been no plan, no restriction on the sale of Iraq oil, no aerial patrol of southern and northern Iraq by the RAF and USAF, had there been no inspections regime--you might have a point, but you'd still have the problem that one cannot automatically assume that any plan is better than no plan.

All that is going on here is that you like the plan which was put into execution, and so now you attempt to claim that there were no other plans to contain Hussein.

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Setanta,
My reference was to a plan for dealing with the lack of political development in the Islamic world and the discontent and hostility to the modern world that appear to accompany it.

I don't regard the "no fly" zones, sanctions and all the rest as any more than a means to (slightly) restrain Saddam's actions and rearmament. As it was both were headed for extinction by 1999 due to lack of international support.

It is not quite true to say that "I liked the plan put into execution". I liked it better than the inaction and criticisms of it put forward at the time. However, that isn't saying much. In my own thinking, the Gulf war itself may have been the major error. Better a strong tyranny in Iraq, locked in conflict and rivalries with its major neighbors to the East, West and North, than a political void full of chaos and conflict.

Better yet would be a modern secular state that could influence the future evolution of Iran and Saudi Arabia (that certainly appears to be happening, albeit on a smaller scale, in the smaller Gulf states and emirates.) . Unfortunately, so far our attempt to do that appears to have been a failure -- perhaps due to flaws in both strategy and execution.

My interest here is in the strategic aspects of the question. I agree the best answerr is unknown (to me, at least). You are correct in that I cannot exclude the possibility that no plan could have been the best option (indeed I believe that with respect to the first Gulf War.)

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McGentrix wrote:

You're right. We went to war based on the lies Saddam told about his WMD program. He was good at it. Fooled every major intelligence agency in the world.

Not so. We "believed" or peddled the lies which suited our purpose.

At least one Iraq expert in Britain committed suicide when he learnt what the Government was about to do with his information. An honourable man, in a situation where these were painfully few.

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How ironic, O'George. Prior to 2003, Iraq was a modern secular state--sufficiently modern to have deployed and used weapons of mass destruction, provided by your boy Ray-gun.

So tell me, O'George, which is it that you want to do--bring democracy to the middle east, with all that is implied in such an effort, or force them to adopt "modern secular states," without regard to the wishes of the governed?

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Quote:

Setanta,
My reference was to a plan for dealing with the lack of political development in the Islamic world and the discontent and hostility to the modern world that appear to accompany it.

An honest question - you believe that the appropriate response to this development has anything at all to do with forcible regime change in the region?

Cycloptichorn

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Why do most of the liberals view Iraq as a failure?

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