Whether religion is or is not a superstition has nothing to do with the topic of this thread.
Whether religion is or is not a superstition has nothing to do with the topic of this thread.
neologist wrote:Au contraire, religion being shown as superstition amplifies the absurdity of claiming a human being is a fertilized egg because a ghost told you.Whether religion is or is not a superstition has nothing to do with the topic of this thread.
That's what separates what we believe. Religion has the greatest impact on what we believe to the question "what is life?"
neologist wrote:Whether religion is or is not a superstition has nothing to do with the topic of this thread.
Kinda seemed like an opportunity to bash anyone of faith to me. But, I could be way off base and will simply state that is how it's received sometimes. But yeah....I agree.
Poorly worded as it may be, the law does do one thing. It absolutely defines abortion to not be any of the 60 offences outlined. That includes murder RL.
Legally this law defines aboriton is not synonomous with murder.
This right of privacy, whether it be founded in the Fourteenth Amendment's concept of personal liberty and restrictions upon state action, as we feel it is, or, as the District Court determined, in the Ninth Amendment's reservation of rights to the people, is broad enough to encompass a woman's decision whether or not to terminate her pregnancy. The detriment that the State would impose upon the pregnant woman by denying this choice altogether is apparent. Specific and direct harm medically diagnosable even in early pregnancy may be involved. Maternity, or additional offspring, may force upon the woman a distressful life and future. Psychological harm may be imminent. Mental and physical health may be taxed by child care. There is also the distress, for all concerned, associated with the unwanted child, and there is the problem of bringing a child into a family already unable, psychologically and otherwise, to care for it. In other cases, as in this one, the additional difficulties and continuing stigma of unwed motherhood may be involved. All these are factors the woman and her responsible physician necessarily will consider in consultation.
On the basis of elements such as these, appellant and some amici argue that the woman's right is absolute and that she is entitled to terminate her pregnancy at whatever time, in whatever way, and for whatever reason she alone chooses. With this we do not agree. Appellant's arguments that Texas either has no valid interest at all in regulating the abortion decision, or no interest strong enough to support any limitation upon the woman's sole determination, are unpersuasive. The [410 U.S. 113, 154] Court's decisions recognizing a right of privacy also acknowledge that some state regulation in areas protected by that right is appropriate. As noted above, a State may properly assert important interests in safeguarding health, in maintaining medical standards, and in protecting potential life. At some point in pregnancy, these respective interests become sufficiently compelling to sustain regulation of the factors that govern the abortion decision. The privacy right involved, therefore, cannot be said to be absolute. In fact, it is not clear to us that the claim asserted by some amici that one has an unlimited right to do with one's body as one pleases bears a close relationship to the right of privacy previously articulated in the Court's decisions. The Court has refused to recognize an unlimited right of this kind in the past. Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905) (vaccination); Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200 (1927) (sterilization).
We, therefore, conclude that the right of personal privacy includes the abortion decision, but that this right is not unqualified and must be considered against important state interests in regulation.
neologist wrote:Au contraire, religion being shown as superstition amplifies the absurdity of claiming a human being is a fertilized egg because a ghost told you.Whether religion is or is not a superstition has nothing to do with the topic of this thread.
I attended a lecture yesterday that was titled, "Morality and the Law". It was co-moderated by a Religious Studies professor (a Christian) and a Law Professor (personal religion unknown). It was presented at an inter-faith ecumenical center and was attended by individuals with very diverse professional and religious backgrounds, interests, and moral positions. Numerous moral-legal issues were presented including abortion, capital punishment, euthanasia, affirmative action, and others. For the purposes of this thread, I will limit the discussion to abortion.
The Religious Studies professor gave an overview of morals and ethical systems and the Law professor gave an overview of how the Constitution and the courts try to balance conflicting moralities. The lecture was fascinating and will probably become a full series (perhaps one class on each topic). Anyway.... the discussion on abortion and the law attempting to balance conflicting moralities must be based on the premise of the Constitution. The law is required to look at due process and "property" issues. Property does not simply mean physical property, it also includes personal rights as defined by the Constitution.
The opinion of the USSC on Roe vs Wade includes extensive discussion of these competing moralities along with the Constitutional requirements to preserve the rights (property) of the people. The decision determined that the right to privacy Constitutionally supersedes the rights of the unborn, at least in the first trimester of pregnancy. In reading the decision there is no question that care was given to balance these rights.
Quote:This right of privacy, whether it be founded in the Fourteenth Amendment's concept of personal liberty and restrictions upon state action, as we feel it is, or, as the District Court determined, in the Ninth Amendment's reservation of rights to the people, is broad enough to encompass a woman's decision whether or not to terminate her pregnancy. The detriment that the State would impose upon the pregnant woman by denying this choice altogether is apparent. Specific and direct harm medically diagnosable even in early pregnancy may be involved. Maternity, or additional offspring, may force upon the woman a distressful life and future. Psychological harm may be imminent. Mental and physical health may be taxed by child care. There is also the distress, for all concerned, associated with the unwanted child, and there is the problem of bringing a child into a family already unable, psychologically and otherwise, to care for it. In other cases, as in this one, the additional difficulties and continuing stigma of unwed motherhood may be involved. All these are factors the woman and her responsible physician necessarily will consider in consultation.
On the basis of elements such as these, appellant and some amici argue that the woman's right is absolute and that she is entitled to terminate her pregnancy at whatever time, in whatever way, and for whatever reason she alone chooses. With this we do not agree. Appellant's arguments that Texas either has no valid interest at all in regulating the abortion decision, or no interest strong enough to support any limitation upon the woman's sole determination, are unpersuasive. The [410 U.S. 113, 154] Court's decisions recognizing a right of privacy also acknowledge that some state regulation in areas protected by that right is appropriate. As noted above, a State may properly assert important interests in safeguarding health, in maintaining medical standards, and in protecting potential life. At some point in pregnancy, these respective interests become sufficiently compelling to sustain regulation of the factors that govern the abortion decision. The privacy right involved, therefore, cannot be said to be absolute. In fact, it is not clear to us that the claim asserted by some amici that one has an unlimited right to do with one's body as one pleases bears a close relationship to the right of privacy previously articulated in the Court's decisions. The Court has refused to recognize an unlimited right of this kind in the past. Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905) (vaccination); Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200 (1927) (sterilization).
We, therefore, conclude that the right of personal privacy includes the abortion decision, but that this right is not unqualified and must be considered against important state interests in regulation.
After reviewing the decision our discussion turned to the moral implications of overturning R v W. I was somewhat surprised to hear the Religious Studies professor state his opinion that although he finds abortion to be immoral it would be more immoral to make abortion illegal. He went on to explain that his belief is that abortion existed in large numbers before R v W, that they would continue in equally large numbers if R v W were overturned, and that it would be immoral for society to force poor women who could not afford to fly somewhere for a safe legal abortion to search out procedures that would put their own lives at risk (I agree).
It is certainly a matter of conflicting moralities as well as a matter of balancing the rights of the mother as guaranteed by the Constitution. To me it is more an issue of enacting laws that accomplish nothing beyond criminalizing an action that will occur regardless. What benefit do we achieve by making an action illegal other than make ourselves feel better?
What nonsense this 'professor' is entangled in.
Why would abortion be immoral if the unborn is NOT a person? It would be of no more moral consequence than popping a zit, or surgically removing a mole.
Why should abortion NOT be illegal, if the unborn IS a person?
The appellee and certain amici argue that the fetus is a "person" within the language and meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment. In support of this, they outline at length and in detail the well-known facts of fetal development. If this suggestion of personhood is established, the appellant's case, of course, collapses, [410 U.S. 113, 157] for the fetus' right to life would then be guaranteed specifically by the Amendment. The appellant conceded as much on reargument. 51 On the other hand, the appellee conceded on reargument 52 that no case could be cited that holds that a fetus is a person within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment.
There are two satisfactory answers to the worry that supporting anti-feticide laws undermines Roe.
First, laws treating feticide as murder do not need to define fetuses as persons. California's law is illustrative. It defines murder as the killing of a human being or a fetus.
Second, there is nothing especially troubling about permitting the law to define the word "person" differently for different purposes. Statutes routinely define various words, including "person," so that they will mean exactly what the legislature intends in a particular context, and even general constitutional language can be interpreted differently depending upon the context. Corporations, for example, are "persons" under the Fourteenth Amendment in the sense that their property cannot be taken without fair processes, but not in the sense that they are entitled to vote on equal terms with natural persons.
Roe v. Wade said that states are not obligated to treat fetuses as persons. It also said that in a conflict with the constitutional liberty of a pregnant woman seeking an abortion before the fetus is capable of survival outside the womb, the fetus may not be given the same rights as the woman. However, that certainly does not mean that there are no circumstances in which fetuses can be given legal protection. Again, it all depends on the context.
Consider another analogy. Cats and dogs are not "persons" under the Fourteenth Amendment. Yet surely there is nothing constitutionally suspect about laws forbidding cruelty to animals, even though they limit the liberty of those who would perpetrate such acts of cruelty. Indeed, there would be no inherent constitutional problem with terming a malicious cat or dog killing "murder"-- though imposing too severe a sentence for that act might run afoul of the Eighth Amendment's ban on cruel and unusual punishment.
In sum, so long as respecting the rights and interests of fetuses does not conflict with the right of a woman to decide whether to terminate her pregnancy, there is no necessary contradiction between the abortion right established in Roe and feticide laws.
The rights of a mother?
What mother? What is she a mother of if not a human, if not a child, if not a person?
Can any woman be regarded as a mother if she carries within her something other than these?
Does a woman become a mother and that which is in her a person when and only when she decides?
Did black people become persons under the Constitution when government decided it was so? Or were they persons............all along?
Bartikus wrote:Does a woman become a mother and that which is in her a person when and only when she decides?
Did black people become persons under the Constitution when government decided it was so? Or were they persons............all along?
Legally or morally?
JPB wrote:Bartikus wrote:Does a woman become a mother and that which is in her a person when and only when she decides?
Did black people become persons under the Constitution when government decided it was so? Or were they persons............all along?
Legally or morally?
Legally one thing morally another?
real life wrote:What nonsense this 'professor' is entangled in.
Why would abortion be immoral if the unborn is NOT a person? It would be of no more moral consequence than popping a zit, or surgically removing a mole.
Why should abortion NOT be illegal, if the unborn IS a person?
I don't think he or I would say that the unborn is not a least a potential person but that abortion should NOT be illegal for the very reasons stated in the decision (quoted previously). The decision does not use the term mother but pregnant woman. I do feel that the woman is the mother of a potential person. I also feel that abortion is a moral decision best left to the woman and her conscience. And, I agree that the rights of the woman/mother to determine whether to continue the pregnancy beyond the first trimester supersedes the rights of the State to intervene on behalf of the unborn. I honestly believe that the number of abortions will only be reduced (isn't that the goal?) by reducing the number of unplanned pregnancies. Making abortion a criminal act does not prevent abortions.
I read the entire decision for the first time the other night. I try, in most issues, to look at both sides of the discussion and look for balance between those views. In reading the R v W decision in full, I see a tremendous attempt to balance the rights of the individual, the rights of the unborn, and the allowable interest of the State. I don't see anything that I can argue with that would make me think overturning R v W is the best solution.
I think the debate of whether the unborn is a 'person' is different than the debate whether it is protected under the 14th Amendment.
Quote:The appellee and certain amici argue that the fetus is a "person" within the language and meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment. In support of this, they outline at length and in detail the well-known facts of fetal development. If this suggestion of personhood is established, the appellant's case, of course, collapses, [410 U.S. 113, 157] for the fetus' right to life would then be guaranteed specifically by the Amendment. The appellant conceded as much on reargument. 51 On the other hand, the appellee conceded on reargument 52 that no case could be cited that holds that a fetus is a person within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment.
The National Right to Life website includes discussion on feticide laws and their impact on Roe such as
Quote:There are two satisfactory answers to the worry that supporting anti-feticide laws undermines Roe.
First, laws treating feticide as murder do not need to define fetuses as persons. California's law is illustrative. It defines murder as the killing of a human being or a fetus.
Second, there is nothing especially troubling about permitting the law to define the word "person" differently for different purposes. Statutes routinely define various words, including "person," so that they will mean exactly what the legislature intends in a particular context, and even general constitutional language can be interpreted differently depending upon the context. Corporations, for example, are "persons" under the Fourteenth Amendment in the sense that their property cannot be taken without fair processes, but not in the sense that they are entitled to vote on equal terms with natural persons.
Roe v. Wade said that states are not obligated to treat fetuses as persons. It also said that in a conflict with the constitutional liberty of a pregnant woman seeking an abortion before the fetus is capable of survival outside the womb, the fetus may not be given the same rights as the woman. However, that certainly does not mean that there are no circumstances in which fetuses can be given legal protection. Again, it all depends on the context.
Consider another analogy. Cats and dogs are not "persons" under the Fourteenth Amendment. Yet surely there is nothing constitutionally suspect about laws forbidding cruelty to animals, even though they limit the liberty of those who would perpetrate such acts of cruelty. Indeed, there would be no inherent constitutional problem with terming a malicious cat or dog killing "murder"-- though imposing too severe a sentence for that act might run afoul of the Eighth Amendment's ban on cruel and unusual punishment.
In sum, so long as respecting the rights and interests of fetuses does not conflict with the right of a woman to decide whether to terminate her pregnancy, there is no necessary contradiction between the abortion right established in Roe and feticide laws.
From RL's previous link...
"The Unborn Victims of Violence Act of 2004 (Public Law 108-212) is a The Unborn Victims of Violence Act of 2004 (Public Law 108-212) is a United States law which recognizes a "child in utero" as a legal victim, if he or she is injured or killed during the commission of any of over 60 listed federal crimes of violence. The law defines "child in utero" as "a member of the species homo sapiens, at any stage of development, who is carried in the womb."[2] law which recognizes a "child in utero" as a legal victim, if he or she is injured or killed during the commission of any of over 60 listed federal crimes of violence. The law defines "child in utero" as "a member of the species homo sapiens, at any stage of development, who is carried in the womb."[2]"
The question then becomes, does the Unborn Victimes of Violence Act of 2004 meet the definition of "person" within the language and meaning of the 14th Amendment as outlined in Roe? Not when it specifically excludes abortion under the Act.
...Herein is the conflict. Should we protect someone who can help themselves and has the ability to make decisions based on laws and common sense? Or should we protect the potential person that hasn't the ability to do so?
Seems to me a woman who is desperate enough to go to someone to have a fetus removed illegally has enough common sense to know she is taking a risk and it is on her to deal with that risk, especially this day and age. Whereas this fetus - and potential person has not that ability to claim our protection. Why do we seek to protect a woman other than to free her to continue to live the way she did before with no thought to consequences of her actions? Life is being devalued and I think that that will lead to other potential problems.
Sorry - I know this is not the point of this thread. And I know I am supposed to be working on why abortion should be illegal according to the guidelines TKO gave me and without relying on my own conscience and emotions...but so far it has been quite difficult.
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
