Thomas wrote:Did you notice that I pointed to an article by Paul Krugman, who is a well-known liberal economist? When he writes In Praise of Cheap Labor his partisan preferences contradict his economic competence. To his credit, his economic competence won.
I haven't read the Krugman piece, so I'll take your word for it. But just because Krugman is on the left doesn't make him right.
Thomas wrote:Concerning your comment on "human nature", I don't see how it applies here. As it happens, I'm a pessimist on human nature as well. All I'm saying is that some bad-natured humans are in a better position than others to make good decisions for third world workers. And that those aren't the members of the US congress, whom they have no vote on, and who doesn't have any direct stake in those people's welfare. Who, in your opinion, is better-suited than third-world workers to make decisions for third-world workers?
Well, there's me, for instance.
Seriously, I think it's rather odd to maintain that individuals are always best suited to make decisions on their own behalf. As a lawyer, I am familiar with the "reasonable person" standard of responsibility in American courts. That standard is designed to determine what a hypothetically reasonable person would do in a particular situation, not what any actual person would do. The legal standard for one's behavior, then, is not a subjective one,
even in cases where persons are acting in their own best interests. And that's because we can't depend upon people making the right choices even in their own behalf.
There are many reasons why people act akratically (i.e. in ways that are inimical to their own interests). One of those reasons is that they often don't have very good information. In a
"prisoner's dilemma," the participants can be expected to make sub-optimal decisions precisely because they are acting in their own best interests under conditions of limited information. In many real life situations that resemble a prisoner's dilemma, it is the state that intervenes to redress the imbalance in information and makes the conditions of bargaining more equitable.
For instance, suppose an employer needs to hire a worker. He'd prefer to hire the job applicant to work for the most hours at the lowest wages, whereas the applicant would prefer to work for the fewest hours at the highest wage. The employer tells the applicant that, if he refuses to work 14 hours a day at $1 an hour, the employer will hire someone else who will. The applicant, unable to discern what some other applicant would decide if given the same offer, accepts, even though he would undoubtedly get a better deal if he cooperated with other job applicants in demanding fewer hours and higher wages. In a situation like this, the state ultimately steps in to redress the imbalance in information, either by mandating minimum wage and hour laws, or by protecting unions, or both.
Now, does that mean that the state would make a better decision on those workers' behalf than those workers could themselves. I think the answer is "yes." Considering that the state can transcend the prisoner's dilemma through legislating information sharing, it is not trapped like the individual workers into making unavoidably bad decisions. Admittedly, by taking away the option of making what are regarded as objectively bad decisions, the state is limiting the workers' choices to those that are regarded as objectively "reasonable," but that's a limitation on their freedom that many workers would consider to be a fair trade-off for other goods (both economic and non-economic) that they value more highly.
That does not mean that the state always makes better decisions than individuals, or that it is only the state that can transcend the prisoner's dilemma (or other games where players can be expected to make sub-optimal choices). I merely observe that individuals cannot be counted on to make the best decisions just because they are making those decisions in their own best interests.
Thomas wrote:Fair enough. Now, when you observe these people leave their old jobs to sew sneakers for Nike or weave t-shirts for WalMart, does this support or contradict the hypothesis that those sweatshops gave them better opportunities than they had before? Does it support or contradict the hypothesis that those new opportunities are good rather than bad for them?
Without knowing more about these people, I cannot confidently say that they are receiving either better or worse opportunties. At most, I can say that they are receiving
different opportunities.