Fitzgerald Investigation of Leak of Identity of CIA Agent

It seems Fitzgerald has claimed that her identity was confidential. He may not have been able to produce evidence that she was outed according to the very strict IIPA, but he most definately asserted her covert status.

In addition - Tico too - I would like you to explain how the FBI wouldn't have known whether she was covert or not when they were investigating her outing. All it would have taken is a single phone call to determine that her status was not confidential. There is every evidence that the FBI knew her status was in fact confidential, which is exactly why they proceeded with the investigation. It is the height of mendacity to imagine otherwise.

It has never really been in doubt that her status was covert, outside the mind of right-wing partisans. The only question was whether or not whoever outed her did so in a criminal fashion under the IIPA, and whether or not investigations into this question were blocked by those who lied to investigators in order to protect themselves or others.

Cycloptichorn wrote:

It seems Fitzgerald has claimed that her identity was confidential. He may not have been able to produce evidence that she was outed according to the very strict IIPA, but he most definately asserted her covert status.

He definitely did not. Show me where he asserted her "covert" status. And we are talking about the word "covert" as it is defined in the IIPA. Because, Cyclops, you don't have the right to make words mean whatever the hell you want them to.

Quote:

In addition - Tico too - I would like you to explain how the FBI wouldn't have known whether she was covert or not when they were investigating her outing. All it would have taken is a single phone call to determine that her status was not confidential. There is every evidence that the FBI knew her status was in fact confidential, which is exactly why they proceeded with the investigation. It is the height of mendacity to imagine otherwise.

Do not even try to pretend that you don't know what "covert" means as opposed to "confidential."

Quote:

It has never really been in doubt that her status was covert, outside the mind of right-wing partisans. The only question was whether or not whoever outed her did so in a criminal fashion under the IIPA, and whether or not investigations into this question were blocked by those who lied to investigators in order to protect themselves or others.

It has never been in doubt with you leftist Bush-haters because you are given to substantiating your wild fantasies with logical leaps of faith. You have no basis to support your belief that she was "covert" (as that term is defined in the IIPA) at the time of the disclosure, other than the fact that the FBI investigated the matter.

It has never really been in doubt that her status was covert, outside the mind of right-wing partisans. The only question was whether or not whoever outed her did so in a criminal fashion under the IIPA, and whether or not investigations into this question were blocked by those who lied to investigators in order to protect themselves or others.

employee of the CIA that probably was not covert by the way

I haven't seen any big defense of Berger by the left. I haven't seen where Leahy has leaked. Any specifics?

I didn't claim she was 'covert as defined by the IIPA' - lately. I still believe there is plenty of evidence that she is (fits the criteria) but that isn't the point I'm trying to make here at all ...

Testimony in the Libby trial has shown that she was in fact covert, and her identity was confidential information. Just so ya know

But bottom line, this whole thing revolves around the breaking of the original law. He continues to investigate a crime that he has never established as being a crime.....after 3+ years. The clock continues to tick. Now he is prosecuting a person accused of covering up a crime that has never been established to have occurred.

In addition, even if they never are: if the coppers are investigating a robbery, and they find evidence of other crimes while investigating said robbery, you think they shouldn't pursue those other crimes unless they can make the robbery charges stick? Interesting viewpoint, because I think most people would agree that crimes uncovered during the course of an investigation deserve as much attention as those which spawned the investigation.

Quote:

In addition, even if they never are: if the coppers are investigating a robbery, and they find evidence of other crimes while investigating said robbery, you think they shouldn't pursue those other crimes unless they can make the robbery charges stick? Interesting viewpoint, because I think most people would agree that crimes uncovered during the course of an investigation deserve as much attention as those which spawned the investigation.

You didnt say this when the Whitewater investigation spawned investigations into several other potenrially criminal matters.
You werew then saying the whole thing was a waste of time and resources,designed only to attack the Clintons.

So,why the change of heart?

You forgot the word 'yet.' Remember that a large part of the IIPA is intent; whether or not you intentionally out someone. Libby's lies have kept Fitzgerald from proving this is the case; ergo, the Obstruction of Justice charge.

What would happen in an organized crime investigation, if you guys applied the same standards? If you don't charge the Don right off of the bat, you might as well give up? You're taking a ridiculous viewpoint here, Okie; just because things haven't been charged yet, doesn't mean they never will be.

In addition, even if they never are: if the coppers are investigating a robbery, and they find evidence of other crimes while investigating said robbery, you think they shouldn't pursue those other crimes unless they can make the robbery charges stick? Interesting viewpoint, because I think most people would agree that crimes uncovered during the course of an investigation deserve as much attention as those which spawned the investigation.

At this point there have been 5 or 6 gov't witnesses who have testified that Libby knew about things he said he didn't, that he had conversations which he said he didn't have, that he was intimately involved in matters to which he ascribed casual involvement. Even if the jury doesn't believe one or two witnesses, there is still a large amount of evidence that Libby was simply lying to protect himself or Cheney during FBI and GJ testimony.

Cycloptichorn

Why do we need to consider "yet." When a District Attorney investigates a crime, but the police report has no evidence of a crime, how far do you think a DA should carry something like that? I suppose 3 years? I have never heard Fitz even assert that Plame was covert, let alone prove intent, cyclops. The covert status should be the very first question to answer in this investigation and after 3 years, still no answer. As to intent, I agree, investigation is necessary. But still no answer on the first point, which I find incredibly incompetent.

Is it a crime to cover up a non-crime? Does a DA have right to prosecute you for lying about stealing a car that was never stolen? ....Does the lying charge carry any weight?

Potentially fatal flaws plague perjury charge against Libby

Darrell Salomon, The Examiner
Read more by Darrell Salomon
Feb 2, 2007 6:00 AM

SAN FRANCISCO - The interesting development in Special Counsel Patrick Fitzgerald's investigation of "Plamegate" is not the perjury charge he brought against senior White House adviser Lewis "Scooter" Libby, now on trial in Washington, but the charges he did not bring against Libby.

Fitzgerald did not charge Libby for outing Valerie Plame to columnist Robert Novak for two reasons. First, because he knew that the person who really outed Plame to Novak was not Libby or anyone else in the White House, but rather was Richard Armitage, Colin Powell's incessantly gossipy deputy. Second, because Plame was not a "covert agent" within the meaning of The Intelligence Identities Protection Act of 1982, one of the two statutes available to Fitzgerald in his investigation.

The 1982 act makes disclosure of the "covert" status of a CIA agent criminal only when the agent has worked outside the United States during the prior five years. Since 1997, Valerie Plame has not worked outside the U.S. She has worked at CIA headquarters at Langley, Va.

Fitzgerald recognized his problems with the Identities Act early on. So the special counsel shifted his investigative focus to another criminal statute, the 1917 Espionage Act. But here again difficulties ramified. The Espionage Act does not make criminal the mere disclosure of classified information, such as Plame's employment duties at Langley. It only criminalized disclosures of classified information where a defendant specifically intended to aid a foreign enemy or harm the nation's security.

There is no evidence that Libby or Armitage ever harbored such intent, so Fitzgerald charged Libby with perjury. But perjury is a difficult charge to sustain. It will be particularly difficult, at least on review by an appellate court, in Mr. Libby's case.

The indictment charges that Libby committed perjury when he told the grand jury that, at the time he spoke to a reporter about whether Plame was employed by the CIA, he "did not know that as a fact." Now we have heard testimony from former White House press secretary Ari Fleisher and New York Times reporter Judith Miller that Libby appeared to "know" of Plame's status when he spoke to them prior to his grand jury testimony.

At some point the defense can be expected to argue that Libby's testimony before the grand jury was literally true, that in fact he did not and could not "know" Plame was a CIA employee, covert or otherwise, in the sense of knowing it of his own knowledge, but had merely been told from hearsay sources that she was.

Such testimony, Fitzgerald might argue, though literally true, was misleading. But the perjury statute, as Chief Justice Warren Burger wrote for a unanimous Supreme Court in the landmark case Bronston v. United States (1973), is not violated "so long as the witness speaks the literal truth."

There is an even more fundamental defense, one that may emerge in final argument at the end of the trial. Perjurious testimony must be material to the subject matter of a grand jury's investigation.

If the entire Fitzgerald investigation was off track, if Libby's revelation of Plame's employment status, and therefore the source of his knowledge about that status, was simply not criminal under any U.S. statute, then Fitzgerald's perjury charge against Libby must also fall. The false statements Libby allegedly made would be entirely immaterial to any possible violation of the laws referred to the grand jury for investigation.

A perjury indictment, one would have hoped, would have involved charges based upon facts more definitive than those being tried in Libby's case, especially when brought, as here, against a man of long, unblemished public service. But Washington is a rough town, as the public beyond the Beltway, to its increasing revulsion, is coming more and more to understand.

Darrell Salomon is a San Francisco trial attorney.

The Examiner wrote:

...

Such testimony, Fitzgerald might argue, though literally true, was misleading. But the perjury statute, as Chief Justice Warren Burger wrote for a unanimous Supreme Court in the landmark case Bronston v. United States (1973), is not violated "so long as the witness speaks the literal truth."

...

that in fact he did not and could not "know" Plame was a CIA employee, covert or otherwise, in the sense of knowing it of his own knowledge, but had merely been told from hearsay sources that she was.

At some point the defense can be expected to argue that Libby's testimony before the grand jury was literally true, that in fact he did not and could not "know" Plame was a CIA employee, covert or otherwise, in the sense of knowing it of his own knowledge, but had merely been told from hearsay sources that she was.

Such testimony, Fitzgerald might argue, though literally true, was misleading. But the perjury statute, as Chief Justice Warren Burger wrote for a unanimous Supreme Court in the landmark case Bronston v. United States (1973), is not violated "so long as the witness speaks the literal truth."

A. I was very clear to say reporters are telling us that because in my mind I still didn't know it as a fact. I thought I was - all I had was this information that was coming in from the reporters.

Q. And you're, you're certain as you sit here today that every reporter you told that Wilson's wife worked at the CIA, you sourced it back to other reporters?
A. Yes, sir, because it was important for what I was saying and because it was - that's what - that's how I did it.

In truth and fact, as LIBBY well knew when he gave this testimony, it was false in
that LIBBY did not advise Matthew Cooper or other reporters that LIBBY had heard other reporters
were saying that Wilson's wife worked for the CIA, nor did LIBBY advise Cooper or other reporters
that LIBBY did not know whether this assertion was true;
In violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section 1623.