Einsteins special relativity nonsense

The point is that Newton's laws work in any of these cases.

maxdancona wrote:

The point is that Newton's laws work in any of these cases.

I said I wouldn't repeat it again, but I'll haul off and do it anyway.

I agree with the claim, but it has no particular relevance to the issue under discussion. It is a non sequitur.

That is exactly what I am saying.

By defining a frame of reference, you are setting a point (or object) that you define to be motionless. Then you are comparing your change in displacement to this fixed point to determine your motion.

In your train example, the assumption is that the Earth doesn't move. You have defined a fixed point, and a frame of reference.

Looking out the window is comparing how your location has changed (i.e. movement) with respect to the Earth.

... that you define to be motionless.

You are confusing philosophical ideas of "truth" with science. Science is only concerned with theories that can be tested and confirmed by experiment or precise observation.

SR may have a "philosophical" weakness. Physicists don't care about that.

The fact is that Isaac Newton says that I can run experiments based in any inertial frame of reference. And any experiment you run will show that Newton's laws work the same. I have now demonstrated the mathematics work in several frames of reference.

Scientifically they are equivalent because they all can be confirmed experimentally. As to your notions of "correctness" that can't be shown experimentally... that isn't science.

Yeah, right, eh? Tell it to Galileo, and Newton, who claimed to prove that the earth is actually orbiting the sun, rather than vice versa.

Without comparing himself to the Earth (i.e. by looking out the window), All experiments will give the same results whether A, B or C is true from the Earth frame of reference. In all three of these possibilities you will measure the exact same acceleration in the same direction. They are scientifically equivalent.

In philosophy of science and in epistemology, instrumentalism is a methodological view that ideas are useful instruments, and that the worth of an idea is based on how effective it is in explaining and predicting phenomena....There are multiple versions of instrumentalism. Instrumentalism is a variety of scientific anti-realism.

For Berkeley, a scientific theory does not state causes or explanations, but simply identifies perceived types of objects and traces their typical regularities.[9] Berkeley thus anticipated the basis of what Auguste Comte in the 1830s called positivism,[....Berkeley thus predated the insight that logical positivists—who originated in the late 1920s, but who, by the 1950s, had softened into logical empiricists—would be compelled to accept: theoretical terms in science do not always translate into observational terms.

Since the mind has virtually no power to know anything beyond direct sensory experience, Ernst Mach's early version of logical positivism (empirio-criticism) verged on idealism. It was alleged to even be a surreptitious solipsism, whereby all that exists is one's own mind.

By the 1950s, the verificationists had established philosophy of science as subdiscipline within academia's philosophy departments. By 1962, verificationists had asked and endeavored to answer seemingly all the great questions about scientific theory. Their discoveries showed that the idealized scientific worldview was naively mistaken. By then the leader of the legendary venture, Hempel raised the white flag that signaled verificationism's demise.

Widely read, Kuhn's 1962 thesis seemed to shatter logical empiricism, whose paradigmatic science was physics and which championed instrumentalism. Yet scientific realists, who were far more tenacious, responded by attacking Kuhn's thesis, Kuhn later indicated that his thesis had been so widely misunderstood that he himself was not a Kuhnian.

By rejecting all variants of positivism via its focus on sensations rather than realism, Karl Popper asserted his commitment to scientific realism, merely via the necessary uncertainty of his own falsificationism. Popper alleged that instrumentalism reduces basic science to what is merely applied science.[12] In his book "The fabric of reality", the British physicist David Deutsch followed Popper's critique of instrumentalism and argued that a scientific theory stripped of its explanatory content would be of strictly limited utility.

My reply to instrumentalism consists in showing that there are profound differences between "pure" theories and technological computation rules, and that instrumentalism can give a perfect description of these rules but is quite unable to account for the difference between them and the theories".