0
   

US AND THEM: US, UN & Iraq, version 8.0

 
 
cicerone imposter
 
  1  
Reply Fri 12 Aug, 2005 09:00 pm
Don't you just love it when the top brass talk about reducing our forces in Iraq, and Bush keeps saying we're not going to talk about any time-lines? From the very beginning, this administration kept telling the world we will leave when the new Iraqi government asks us to leave. Many in the current government and many of the Iraqi people wants us to leave, but we are building the largest embassy and some 14 US bases in Iraq.

All this confusion about the US leaving Iraq is a smoke screen, and it's working pretty good. Most Americans believe what this administration says, but doesn't know how to add 2 plus 2 = 14 US bases.

It's the oil, stupid!
0 Replies
 
hamburger
 
  1  
Reply Sat 13 Aug, 2005 08:19 am
morn' set : while i'm not the kind of history buff you are, i do like to look back occasionally(to peek behind the curtain).
it's amazing what one can learn - if willing to - , isn't it ?
of course i agree with you; not many care what's going on in those dirt poor countries. just imagine what would happen if oil would be found in bangladesh ! even now it's interesting to see how those dictatorships in central asia are handled where oil deposits have been found. the CBC had a special program some weeks ago following along some of those oil and gas pipelines that snake their way through central asia, pretty revealing. no mention of protecting "human rights" is being made for countries that are far enough away not to be in the daily news - i guess they are not on the radar screen.
live and learn ! (what ? at my age ?)
take care ! hbg
0 Replies
 
Setanta
 
  1  
Reply Sat 13 Aug, 2005 08:33 am
You're absolutely right, Hamburger. The states of the former Soviet Central Asia have been saavy enough to play along with the "war on terror" charade, and that, coupled with either petroleum and/or natural gas reserves, or the right of way of pipelines, assures that they get at least token aid from the United States, and a blind-eye for their human rights behavior. When we went into Afghanistan, Uzbekistan immediately made available former Soviet air bases, and now they get a token foreign aid commitment, the air bases have been renovated and modernized, and no one pays particular attention to how they treat ethnic population who are not Uzbek.

There should be no surprises there, though, eh?
0 Replies
 
BumbleBeeBoogie
 
  1  
Reply Sat 13 Aug, 2005 09:42 am
BBB
deleted duplicate post
0 Replies
 
BumbleBeeBoogie
 
  1  
Reply Sat 13 Aug, 2005 09:43 am
BBB
I will repeat what I've said before (in a not very scholarly organized manner, I'm afraid.)

I've come to believe that the real reason Bush et al was determined to invade Iraq is not very complicated, but the real reason was politically incorrect, making it impossible to be truthful with the American people and the world.

When we invaded Iraq the first time to liberate Kuwait, Saudi Arabia's royal family allowed US troops to enter the Kingdom to pursue the war led by Bush senior. This inflamed Osama bin Laden and other Muslims in Saudi Arabia and throughout the Arab world. The war was won and Kuwait was liberated. Some US troops in Saudi Arabia were sent home, but many remained on "temporary" bases that the US built.

Later, as bin Laden began his campaign to overthrow the Saudi royal family with strong support from the non-royal population, the Saudi royals put pressure on George W. Bush to remove all US troops from the Kingdom, Bush had to find another place to relocate our troops and to build bases. Why? There was fear that the pro-west faction of the Saudi royal family might not prevail. Bush had to act to ease the pressure on them. Why? To prevent Saudi oil from falling into bin Laden's hands if he was successful in overthrowing the Saudi royals who did not support his ideology.

Other than Kuwait, which had allowed limited US presence in their land (it would have been hard to refuse the US after being liberated) there were few countries in the region that would tolerate a US troop presence. Iraq was a sitting duck when Bush was looking for a country in which to build bases to protect US and other Western oil interests. We were already controlling large areas of Iraq. Iraqi president Saddam Hussein et al was a very bad man and the world would cheer his elimination.

Bush et al had to mask his real purpose and created several versions of why we should invade Iraq: WMDs, terrorism, liberation of the Iraqi people, spreading democracy, etc. None of which had anything to do with Bush et al goals. To get US bases in the regions to protect access and control of oil. That was something the British could also support given their long history of such actions.

The US is now completing fourteen bases in Iraq with a little time and money left over to restore Iraq. Do you really believe the US will abandon these bases after the Iraqi government has taken pseudo control of their country? Don't hold your breath. The US has a pattern of remaining on their bases around the world for a long, long time.

Several goals were achieved by Bush plans. It got US troops out of Saudi Arabia and bought the pro-west branch of the royal family time to fight their internal terrorists to save their control, and to take baby steps toward reform that would benefit their citizens.

It allowed fourteen bases in Iraq as a barrier to aggression by Iran in support of the Iraqi Shiite population. It preserved western control of Iraq's oil in the face of increasing Irani militancy. Without Bush's action, both Saudi and Iraq oil access was threatened.

It allowed semi-independence by Iraqi Kurds, which eased the tension with Turkey. Turkey, a country trying to modernize, wanted to join the EU and Kurd conflict would have made their goal difficult if not impossible.

Unfortunately, Bush's short-term goals to protect US and western oil interests have sewn the seeds of long-term conflict with great risk to the US. The conflict has only begun. In the meantime, Bush et al has done nothing to reduce US dependence on foreign oil. That doesn't only mean Middle East oil, but oil-rich countries in other parts of the world. South America and Asia comes to mind.

Sorry this is so rambling, I hope it makes sense.

I just found a site that seems to have the same conclusion as mine. which I haven't read yet, but it is much better documented and written:
http://www.mydd.com/story/2005/6/21/11741/6199

Time-line of first Iraq war Desert Storm:
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/gulf/cron/

Time-line of US Afghan Taliban War
http://www.warchronicle.com/terrorwar/news/timeline.htm

Time-Line of second Iraq war Enduring Freedom:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2003_invasion_of_Iraq
0 Replies
 
ican711nm
 
  1  
Reply Sat 13 Aug, 2005 09:58 am
Distributed by American Committees on Foreign Relations, ACFR NewsGroup No. 591, Friday, August 12, 2005; the author wrote:

The Price of Compromise
by Michael Rubin
New York Sun
August 8, 2005

Insurgent violence has taken a heavy toll on the U.S. in Iraq. A series of attacks earlier this month pushed the total of American fatalities past 1,800. The mounting casualties have shaken American confidence. Terrorism has hit Iraqis even harder. On Capitol Hill, there are bipartisan calls for the White House to establish a timeline for withdrawal. Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld has been floating trial balloons. Senior military officials and diplomats, meanwhile, seek to deflate the insurgency. They urge Iraqis to embrace and engage former Baathists, Islamists, and Arab Sunni rejectionists. If the Sunnis can be brought into the fold, the conventional wisdom goes, peace and reconciliation will prevail.

But the conventional wisdom is wrong. The insurgency has gained momentum as a result of failed U.S. policy and well-meaning but wrong-headed assumptions.

The coalition's ouster of Saddam Hussein was popular among the vast majority of Iraqis. They greeted American troops warmly. There were flowers and candies. Iraqis danced as Saddam's statues fell. But the honeymoon faltered and collapsed amid looting and confusion about American intentions.

Throughout the 35-year Baathist dictatorship, survival depended upon maintaining a low profile and divining the leader's wishes. Iraqis would note with whom the leader met as a sign of favor. Officials would parse televised speeches to fine-tune their sycophancy.

Generations of Iraqis continued their Kremlinology when Jay Garner arrived as the director of the Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance. They watched as he repeatedly met with Saad al-Janabi, a former Baathist businessman and a close associate of Saddam's late son-in-law, Hussein Kamal. Iraqis interpreted Garner's outreach to an agent of influence of the former regime as a sign that the White House might restore the former regime to power. The fear had precedent. In 1991, President George H.W. Bush called upon Iraqis to rise up in rebellion against Saddam Hussein. They did. But the White House did not come to their aid. According to the Iraqi narrative, Washington shared responsibility for the subsequent massacres by releasing Republican Guard prisoners-of-war in time for their redeployment against the civilians. Garner's choice of dinner guests might have been innocuous to American diplomats and military officers eager to catalyze reconciliation, but it created a chill of distrust among ordinary Iraqis. More importantly, it convinced high-level Baathists that they need fear no justice.

A faulty belief in reconciliation is largely responsible for the disintegration of security in Mosul. Rather than confront Baathists and Islamists, General David Petraeus empowered them. Discussing his strategy at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy on April 7, 2004, Petraeus explained, "The coalition must reconcile with a number of the thousands of former Ba'ath officials ... giving them a direct stake in the success of the new Iraq." Good in theory, but the result was Potemkin calm.

Petraeus assigned former Baathist General Mahmud Muhammad al-Maris, for example, to lead Iraqi Border Police units guarding the Syrian border. Al-Maris handpicked allies and poked holes in an already porous border. Petraeus allowed another former Baathist, General Muhammad Kha'iri Barhawi, to be Mosul's police chief. Not only did such a choice demoralize Iraqis who suffered under the former regime, but it undercut security.

On July 26, 2004, Brigadier General Andrew MacKay, head of the Coalition Police Assistance Training Team, told Pentagon officials. "We are seeing an increasing confidence within the Iraqi Police Service as they realize they are more than a match for the terrorists - even more so when they are led by officers of Major General Barhawi's ability." Unfortunately, the confidence was misinterpreted. After the November 2004 uprising in Mosul, Coalition officials learned that Barhawi had organized insurgent cells and enabled Islamists and former Baathists to briefly seize the city. Barhawi is now in prison. And both Iraqis and Americans are dead because of misplaced confidence and baseless theories.

Under Saddam Hussein, Baathists survived by ingratiating themselves to power. Too often, U.S. officials would base judgments on their own conversations, unaware of what former regime officials said behind their backs. The loyalty former regime elements and Islamists show is illusionary. In January 2004, for example, a delegation from the Ninewah provincial council visited Makhmur, a town in the Erbil governorate but tied administratively to Mosul. When an accompanying diplomat excused herself briefly, a translator - a former student of mine - said that councilmen berated the mayor for collaborating with the Americans. In Mosul, Petraeus created not placidity, but rather a safe-haven for terror.

Engagement and reconciliation may be the bread-and-butter of diplomacy, but in Iraq they are a prescription for failure. There is a correlation between re-Baathification and violence. Baghdad's security situation deteriorated sharply after Coalition Provisional Administration head L. Paul Bremer on April 23, 2004 declared, "Many Iraqis have complained to me that de-Baathification policy has been applied unevenly and unjustly. I have looked into these complaints and they are legitimate."

While Bremer argued that only implementation - not policy - changed, Iraqis felt otherwise. Their perception was validated one week later when Coalition forces lifted the siege of Fallujah and empowered former Baathists and insurgents in the name of reconciliation. Within a month, car bombings across Iraqi had increased 600%.

A belief persists in Foggy Bottom, Langley, and the White House that extensive de-Baathification is unpopular and destabilizing. Facts suggest otherwise. The Embassy embraced politicians like Interim Prime Minister Iyad Allawi and former Governing Council member Adnan Pachachi because they favored Baathist reintegration. Given a choice at the ballot box, however, Iraqis rewarded candidates who promised tough implementation of de-Baathification. Pachachi, once the shining star of the State Department, failed to win a single seat. Incumbent Allawi mustered only 15% of the vote.

Engagement has a price. In June 2005, word leaked that U.S. officials had engaged Iraqi insurgents in order to encourage them to join the political process. A National Security Council senior director rationalized the approach by differentiating between "talking to" and "negotiating with" insurgents. The Arab world drew no such distinction. A June 28, 2005 ash-Sharq al-Awsat cartoon depicted Uncle Sam, surrounded by barbed wire, with an insurgent blocking his path to escape. The lesson drawn was that the U.S. was weak, not magnanimous. Violence spiked soon after.

Political compromises sometimes carry a high price. As a consequence of adding 15 Sunni Arab members to the Constitutional Commission, women may lose their rights across Iraqi society. Contrary to popular wisdom, Iraq's Sunni political leaders are more Islamist than many of their Shi'ite counterparts. Blatant sectarian pandering backfires.

American strategy in Iraq is fatally flawed. Not just policy implementation has gone awry, but rather the assumptions upon which policy is based. Iraq is neither an academic problem nor a template upon which to impose theories imported from Bosnia and Kosovo. It is a unique society with a very vocal population. Blinded by a false conventional wisdom, we refuse to listen. The cost has been bitterness among natural allies, emboldening of terrorists, and unnecessary American and Iraqi casualties.

Mr. Rubin is editor of the Middle East Quarterly.


ican711nm wrote this from excerpts that Wikipedia wrote:

At the beginning of the US March 20, 2003 invasion of Iraq, the al Qaeda aligned, Ansar al Islam, formed in northern Iraq in December 2001, controlled about a dozen villages and a range of peaks in northern Iraq on the Iranian border.
...
When the US invaded, it attacked the al Qaeda aligned, Ansar al Islam, training camps in northern Iraq, and the organization's leaders retreated to neighboring countries. When the war in the north settled down, the militants returned to Iraq to fight against the occupying American forces.


Exterminate malignancy. Do not negotiate with it. The price is too high. The price of negotiating with it, is its daily murder rate of about 30 Iraqi civilians.
0 Replies
 
ican711nm
 
  1  
Reply Sat 13 Aug, 2005 10:22 am
Re: BBB
BumbleBeeBoogie wrote:
I will repeat what I've said before (in a not very scholarly organized manner, I'm afraid.)
...
Other than Kuwait, which had allowed limited US presence in their land (it would have been hard to refuse the US after being liberated) there were few countries in the region that would tolerate a US troop presence. Iraq was a sitting duck when Bush was looking for a country in which to build bases to protect US and other Western oil interests. We were already controlling large areas of Iraq. Iraqi president Saddam Hussein et al was a very bad man and the world would cheer his elimination.
...


Almost all, if not all, our troops based in Saudi Arabia, were moved to Kuwait according to General Tommy Franks in "American Soldier." A substantial part of those troops continue to be based in Quwait.

October 20, 2001: US invades Afghanistan.

October 25, 2001:
9/11 Commission, 9/20/2004, wrote:
The pre-9/11 draft presidential directive on al Qaeda evolved into a new directive, National Security Presidential Directive 9, now titled "Defeating the Terrorist Threat to the United States." The directive was extended to a global war on terrorism, not just on al Qaeda. It also incorporated the President's determination not to distinguish between terrorists and those who harbor them. It included a determination to use military force if necessary to end al Qaeda's sanctuary in Afghanistan. The new directive—formally signed on October 25, 2001, after the fighting in Afghanistan had already begun -- included new material followed by annexes discussing each targeted terrorist group. The United States would strive to eliminate all terrorist networks, dry up their financial support, and prevent them from acquiring weapons of mass destruction. The goal was the "elimination of terrorism as a threat to our way of life."


December 20, 2001: Al Qaeda group flees Afghanistan and establishes al Qaeda training bases in northeastern Iraq.

March 20, 2003: US invades Iraq at the time al Qaeda controls about a dozen villages and a range of peaks in northeastern Iraq on the Iranian border.
0 Replies
 
hamburger
 
  1  
Reply Sat 13 Aug, 2005 10:46 am
us and them
after about 15 months in office the mayor of baghdad has thrown in towel and left iraq. he had been appointed by the u.s. authorities and had been trying to bring life back to some kind of state where iraqis might at least survive. seems he was not given much support/protection by anyone ... and he thinks it might be safer to return to canada.
weep for the iraqis ! hbg



...SOURCE...
0 Replies
 
ican711nm
 
  1  
Reply Sat 13 Aug, 2005 11:15 am
Re: us and them
hamburger wrote:
after about 15 months in office the mayor of baghdad has thrown in towel and left iraq. he had been appointed by the u.s. authorities and had been trying to bring life back to some kind of state where iraqis might at least survive. seems he was not given much support/protection by anyone ... and he thinks it might be safer to return to canada.
weep for the iraqis ! hbg

...SOURCE...


Here's the rest of the story [boldface added by ican]! Rolling Eyes

Quote:
OTTAWA -- The Canadian mayor of Baghdad is calling it quits and coming home after 15 frustrating months on the job, a wild ride that included everything from incessant complaints about trash collection and looters stealing key parts at the sewage plant to attempts on his life and an armed coup.

"I don't think I will return to office. I'm finished," Alaa al-Tamimi said yesterday.

It's not that Dr. al-Tamimi, who holds dual Iraqi-Canadian citizenship, has a lot of choice in the matter.

Under cover of a sandstorm, heavily armed Shia militia marched into Baghdad City Hall on Monday and announced a change in civic administration.


Dr. al-Tamimi, 53, was forced into hiding. He fled to safety across the border to Jordan on Thursday, where he was reunited with his wife and his son, a university student. They expect to be back in Canada this month.

Dr. al-Tamimi, a structural engineer with no particular political allegiance, was installed as mayor of Baghdad -- a city of seven million -- by Paul Bremer, the former U.S. occupation administrator, after the defeat of the Saddam Hussein regime to try to fix things such as bomb craters in the highways and water mains blown apart by saboteurs.

His appointment was confirmed by the interim central Iraqi government last year. He got a hint that things were starting to go sour for him a few weeks ago when he returned to Baghdad after a brief vacation outside the country. He was arrested at the airport and detained for a full day.

But Monday's coup was a surprise, occurring as it did in the middle of a fierce sandstorm. He hadn't made it in to the office yet when he got a call warning him away.

He was ousted by Shia militia forces with close ties to the radical Islamic regime in neighbouring Iran.

The weak central Iraqi government doesn't have enough clout to counter this challenge to its authority, Dr. al-Tamimi said in a telephone interview. "And I don't have a militia of my own."

Dr. al-Tamimi comes from a Shia background, so he doesn't want to blame all Shiites for his unceremonious removal from office. He says he's secular and his identity "is not Shiite or Kurdish or Sunni but national Iraqi."

That's one of the big problems in the country, he believes. People identify too much with a group or a clan. "Even Iraqi police don't believe they are Iraqi -- but they are part of an ethnic group or belong to a religion."

The way Canadians have been able to accommodate each other -- people from so many different races, religions and political beliefs -- is something most Iraqis wouldn't understand, he said.

He tries not to sound bitter about his recent experience and the chaos and frustration that were the daily routine for the past 15 months. It is hard to blame people who have had no experience of democracy, he explains.

"They lived in darkness all their lives under Saddam. Then they were liberated and it is like bright light. They are blinded. What does democracy mean? They don't know."

Echoing the complaint of big-city mayors everywhere, Dr. al-Tamimi said his municipal administration was starved for cash by senior levels of government. He got only a small fraction of what was needed from the central government's oil revenues to fix basic infrastructure, yet he had to take the heat when the trash wasn't collected or the sewers backed up. And he complained about the Americans cancelling a plan to build Baghdad's first sanitary landfill.

As much as he likes the Americans, he says, they made some mistakes after toppling the Hussein regime. A big one was totally dismantling the Iraqi army, one of the few institutions with national cohesion. The military leadership could have been purged without demobilizing thousands of rank-and-file soldiers who suddenly had no job and no paycheque but families to feed.

Talk of any U.S. military reduction in Iraq any time soon is not realistic, he believes. He said a major U.S. military presence will be needed for at least three to five years.

Dr. al-Tamimi says he isn't one of those Canadians who are always criticizing Americans. "I like them."

But as to the way Washington has handled the rebuilding of postwar Iraq, he paraphrases Winston Churchill: The Americans always do the right thing -- after they do everything else.

When Dr. al-Tamimi fled Iraq with his wife and son in 1995, he was not sure he would ever return. He had been a professor of structural engineering at Baghdad University and then was forced to work for the Iraqi nuclear agency. But he wants it understood that he helped make buildings, not bombs.
0 Replies
 
ican711nm
 
  1  
Reply Sat 13 Aug, 2005 12:38 pm
FANTASY TIME;
-MAKE BELIEVE TIME;
--BUNKUM SLOP TIME;
---PARANOIA TIME

I'll tell you what! I'll join the rest of you and pretend too!

=============================================

The Bush administration and in particular President George Bush really didn't mean a word of this:
October 25, 2001:
9/11 Commission, 9/20/2004, wrote:
The pre-9/11 draft presidential directive on al Qaeda evolved into a new directive, National Security Presidential Directive 9, now titled "Defeating the Terrorist Threat to the United States." The directive was extended to a global war on terrorism, not just on al Qaeda. It also incorporated the President's determination not to distinguish between terrorists and those who harbor them. It included a determination to use military force if necessary to end al Qaeda's sanctuary in Afghanistan. The new directive—formally signed on October 25, 2001, after the fighting in Afghanistan had already begun -- included new material followed by annexes discussing each targeted terrorist group. The United States would strive to eliminate all terrorist networks, dry up their financial support, and prevent them from acquiring weapons of mass destruction. The goal was the "elimination of terrorism as a threat to our way of life."


My extraordinarily superior, retro-active mind reading capability tells me that they didn't mean a word of it. This directive was updated under the guidance of Haliburton solely for propaganda purposes to fool the American public. Haliburton wanted to first invest heavily in mideastern oil. Afterward, they intended to make a financial killing by causing the US to invade Afghanistan and Iraq in order to drive up the price of oil to way more than double what it then was. Also, by extending the time to restore order and public safety in both Afghanistan and Iraq, and permit sabotage to Iraq's oil delivery system they could drive up the price of oil even further by causing demand to far exceed supply.

Haliburton's masterful plan even took into consideration the huge income tax bill they would face if they failed to lower tax rates on the enormously rich. They sought to make these tax cuts permanent and eliminate the death tax so as to permit Haliburton investors to pass along their anticipated huge new wealth to their heirs free of any tax burdon.

Of course, since President Bush is dumber than a post, he was merely serving as Haliburton's pawn, and this whole plan was crafted and managed exclusively by Haliburton to enable them to control all businesses throughout the world. They believed they could accomplish this by controlling the price of oil, since oil is desperately needed to fuel the world's economies.

To gain control of the price of oil Haliburton knew that they must first control the production of both oil and fuel. So they created an activist environmentalist group to prevent the US from developing oil wells in a desolate part of ANWAR and off shore of the US. Also these environmentalists were successful in getting different states to have different fuel additive requirements so as to decrease production efficiency and limit the fuel production capacity of US refineries.

Additionally, Haliburton in anticipation of their pawn George Bush being elected President, conspired to distract Bill Clinton with an extra sex partner, and get Jamie Gorelick, former Haliburton associate, to set up and administer administrative barriers or "walls" between the various US intelligence gathering services. This was done to cripple US intelligence effectiveness. Because of this crippling, Haliburton was able to convince Osama bin Laden to perpetrate the 9/11 demolition.

Had these "walls" not been established by Gorelick acting for Haliburton, al Qaeda preparations for the 9/11 demolition might have been detected and stopped before 9/11 could have ever happened. The 9/11 demolition was an essential part of their plan to convince the American public to invade the middle east and thereby drive up the price of oil worldwide.

You know the rest of the story!

=============================================

Special note: Anyone discovered to be dumb enough or crazy enough to believe this entire story, or even any part of this story, should for their own good, and everyone else's, be placed in an asylum and counseled for the rest of their natural lives. Razz
0 Replies
 
hamburger
 
  1  
Reply Sat 13 Aug, 2005 05:40 pm
"Under cover of a sandstorm, heavily armed Shia militia marched into Baghdad City Hall on Monday and announced a change in civic administration".

i wonder where the u.s. liberators were when the mayor was ousted ? hbg
0 Replies
 
ican711nm
 
  1  
Reply Sat 13 Aug, 2005 06:13 pm
hamburger wrote:
"Under cover of a sandstorm, heavily armed Shia militia marched into Baghdad City Hall on Monday and announced a change in civic administration".

i wonder where the u.s. liberators were when the mayor was ousted ? hbg

Pounding sand on the Syrian and Iranian borders of Iraq!

The provisional government of Iraq was ........
0 Replies
 
hamburger
 
  1  
Reply Sat 13 Aug, 2005 06:16 pm
"The provisional government of Iraq was ........"
... ... soundly asleep ?
0 Replies
 
cicerone imposter
 
  1  
Reply Sat 13 Aug, 2005 09:42 pm
US fights fresh Abu Ghraib images

The first Abu Ghraib pictures brought worldwide condemnation (AP Photo/Courtesy of The New Yorker)
The US government is trying to stop fresh images of prisoner abuse in Iraq being made public, claiming they will aid the insurgency, court papers show.
US civil liberties groups have launched a lawsuit to force the release of 87 pictures and four videos showing abuse at Abu Ghraib jail in Baghdad.

Earlier images sparked worldwide condemnation and resulted in charges against a number of soldiers.

The US argues the rest should stay hidden to avoid helping the insurgents.

It is "probable that al-Qaeda and other groups will seize upon these images and videos as grist for their propaganda mill," the chairman of the joint chiefs of staff, Gen Richard Myers, argues in court papers.

Releasing the images could also incite violence against US troops, he says.

The first step to abandoning practices that are repugnant to our laws and national ideals is to bring them into the sunshine

Ex-Col Michael Pheneger
Arguing for publication

And he says the images would be detrimental to the governments of Iraq and Afghanistan.

Gen Myers' arguments were contained in court documents filed on 21 July but only recently unsealed.

The Pentagon stepped up its campaign with a later request, submitted on Friday, for certain material to be kept from the public domain.
0 Replies
 
revel
 
  1  
Reply Sun 14 Aug, 2005 06:44 am
CI, how can the truth be part of a propaganda mill?

The US has finally come to admit what everyone has known for a long time.

http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/08/13/AR2005081300853.html

U.S. Lowers Sights On What Can Be Achieved in Iraq
Administration Is Shedding 'Unreality' That Dominated Invasion, Official Says

By Robin Wright and Ellen Knickmeyer
Washington Post Staff Writers
Sunday, August 14, 2005; A01



The Bush administration is significantly lowering expectations of what can be achieved in Iraq, recognizing that the United States will have to settle for far less progress than originally envisioned during the transition due to end in four months, according to U.S. officials in Washington and Baghdad.

The United States no longer expects to see a model new democracy, a self-supporting oil industry or a society in which the majority of people are free from serious security or economic challenges, U.S. officials say.

"What we expected to achieve was never realistic given the timetable or what unfolded on the ground," said a senior official involved in policy since the 2003 invasion. "We are in a process of absorbing the factors of the situation we're in and shedding the unreality that dominated at the beginning."

Administration officials still emphasize how much they have achieved despite the chaos that followed the invasion and the escalating insurgency. "Iraqis are taking control of their country, building a free nation that can govern itself, sustain itself and defend itself. And we're helping Iraqis succeed," President Bush said yesterday in his radio address.

Iraqi officials yesterday struggled to agree on a draft constitution by a deadline of tomorrow so the document can be submitted to a vote in October. The political transition would be completed in December by elections for a permanent government.

But the realities of daily life are a constant reminder of how the initial U.S. ambitions have not been fulfilled in ways that Americans and Iraqis once anticipated. Many of Baghdad's 6 million people go without electricity for days in 120-degree heat. Parents fearful of kidnapping are keeping children indoors.

Barbers post signs saying they do not shave men, after months of barbers being killed by religious extremists. Ethnic or religious-based militias police the northern and southern portions of Iraq. Analysts estimate that in the whole of Iraq, unemployment is 50 percent to 65 percent.

U.S. officials say no turning point forced a reassessment. "It happened rather gradually," said the senior official, triggered by everything from the insurgency to shifting budgets to U.S. personnel changes in Baghdad.

The ferocious debate over a new constitution has particularly driven home the gap between the original U.S. goals and the realities after almost 28 months. The U.S. decision to invade Iraq was justified in part by the goal of establishing a secular and modern Iraq that honors human rights and unites disparate ethnic and religious communities.

But whatever the outcome on specific disputes, the document on which Iraq's future is to be built will require laws to be compliant with Islam. Kurds and Shiites are expecting de facto long-term political privileges. And women's rights will not be as firmly entrenched as Washington has tried to insist, U.S. officials and Iraq analysts say.

"We set out to establish a democracy, but we're slowly realizing we will have some form of Islamic republic," said another U.S. official familiar with policymaking from the beginning, who like some others interviewed would speak candidly only on the condition of anonymity. "That process is being repeated all over."

U.S. officials now acknowledge that they misread the strength of the sentiment among Kurds and Shiites to create a special status. The Shiites' request this month for autonomy to be guaranteed in the constitution stunned the Bush administration, even after more than two years of intense intervention in Iraq's political process, they said.

"We didn't calculate the depths of feeling in both the Kurdish and Shiite communities for a winner-take-all attitude," said Judith S. Yaphe, a former CIA Iraq analyst at the National Defense University.

In the race to meet a sequence of fall deadlines, the process of forging national unity behind the constitution is largely being scrapped, current and former officials involved in the transition said.

"We are definitely cutting corners and lowering our ambitions in democracy building," said Larry Diamond, a Stanford University democracy expert who worked with the U.S. occupation government and wrote the book "Squandered Victory: The American Occupation and the Bungled Effort to Bring Democracy to Iraq."

"Under pressure to get a constitution done, they've lowered their own ambitions in terms of getting a document that is going to be very far-reaching and democratic. We also don't have the time to go through the process we envisioned when we wrote the interim constitution -- to build a democratic culture and consensus through debate over a permanent constitution," he said.

The goal now is to ensure a constitution that can be easily amended later so Iraq can grow into a democracy, U.S. officials say.

On security, the administration originally expected the U.S.-led coalition to be welcomed with rice and rosewater, traditional Arab greetings, with only a limited reaction from loyalists of ousted Iraqi president Saddam Hussein. The surprising scope of the insurgency and influx of foreign fighters has forced Washington to repeatedly lower expectations -- about the time-frame for quelling the insurgency and creating an effective and cohesive Iraqi force capable of stepping in, U.S. officials said.

Killings of members of the Iraqi security force have tripled since January. Iraq's ministry of health estimates that bombings and other attacks have killed 4,000 civilians in Baghdad since Prime Minister Ibrahim Jafari's interim government took office April 28.

Last week was the fourth-worst week of the whole war for U.S. military deaths in combat, and August already is the worst month for deaths of members of the National Guard and Reserve.

Attacks on U.S. convoys by insurgents using roadside bombs have doubled over the past year, Army Brig. Gen. Yves Fontaine said Friday. Convoys ferrying food, fuel, water, arms and equipment from Kuwait, Jordan and Turkey are attacked about 30 times a week, Fontaine said.

"There has been a realistic reassessment of what it is possible to achieve in the short term and fashion a partial exit strategy," Yaphe said. "This change is dictated not just by events on the ground but by unrealistic expectations at the start."

Washington now does not expect to fully defeat the insurgency before departing, but instead to diminish it, officials and analysts said. There is also growing talk of turning over security responsibilities to the Iraqi forces even if they are not fully up to original U.S. expectations, in part because they have local legitimacy that U.S. troops often do not.

"We've said we won't leave a day before it's necessary. But necessary is the key word -- necessary for them or for us? When we finally depart, it will probably be for us," a U.S. official said.

Pressed by the cost of fighting an escalating insurgency, U.S. expectations for rebuilding Iraq -- and its $20 billion investment -- have fallen the farthest, current and former officials say.

Pentagon officials originally envisioned Iraq's oil revenue paying many post-invasion expenses. But Iraq, ranked among world leaders behind Saudi Arabia in proven oil reserves, is incapable of producing enough refined fuel amid a car-buying boom that has put an estimated 1 million more vehicles on the road after the invasion. Lines for subsidized cheap gas stretch for miles every day in Baghdad.

Oil production is estimated at 2.22 million barrels a day, short of the goal of 2.5 million. Iraq's pre-war high was 2.67 million barrels a day.

The United States had high hopes of quick, big-budget fixes for the electrical power system that would show Iraqis tangible benefits from the ouster of Hussein. But inadequate training for Iraqi staff, regional rivalries restricting the power flow to Baghdad, inadequate fuel for electrical generators and attacks on the infrastructure have contributed to the worst summer of electrical shortages in the capital.

Water is also a "tough, tough" situation in a desert country, said a U.S. official in Baghdad familiar with reconstruction issues. Pumping stations depend on electricity, and engineers now say the system has hundreds of thousands of leaks.

"The most thoroughly dashed expectation was the ability to build a robust self-sustaining economy. We're nowhere near that. State industries, electricity are all below what they were before we got there," said Wayne White, former head of the State Department's Iraq intelligence team who is now at the Middle East Institute. "The administration says Saddam ran down the country. But most damage was from looting [after the invasion], which took down state industries, large private manufacturing, the national electric" system.

Ironically, White said, the initial ambitions may have complicated the U.S. mission: "In order to get out earlier, expectations are going to have to be lower, even much lower. The higher your expectation, the longer you have to stay. Getting out is going to be a more important consideration than the original goals were. They were unrealistic."
0 Replies
 
cicerone imposter
 
  1  
Reply Sun 14 Aug, 2005 09:32 am
The unnamed officials speaking in anonymity continue to clash with Bush's rhetoric. As native Americans used to say, speaks with forked toungue.
0 Replies
 
ican711nm
 
  1  
Reply Sun 14 Aug, 2005 11:52 am
Let's see if I have this straight.

Quote:
The United States no longer expects to see a model new democracy, a self-supporting oil industry or a society in which the majority of people are free from serious security or economic challenges, U.S. officials say.


The villifiers of the Bush administration allege we invaded Iraq for control of Iraqi oil. But the Bush administration is actually planning to down grade its original expectations and pull out of Iraq before it accomplishes its original objectives.

The villifiers of the Bush administration allege we invaded Iraq to make it an American colony. But the Bush administration is actually planning to down grade its original expectations and pull out of Iraq before it accomplishes its original objectives.

The villifiers of the Bush administration allege we invaded Iraq to establish a permanent military presence in the Middle East. But the Bush administration is actually planning to down grade its expectations and pull out of Iraq before it accomplishes its original objectives.

What will probably happen after our pullout from Iraq?

To the Iraqi civilian death rate? This /\ not this \/?

To the American civilian death rate? This /\ not this \/?

To the growth of totalitarian rule? This /\ not this \/?

To Iraqi oil production? This /\ not this \/?


Well, what the hell: win one lose three. After all, it ain't my boat -- I'm just a passenger-- Laughing .............................. Crying or Very sad let it sink. Mad
0 Replies
 
McTag
 
  1  
Reply Sun 14 Aug, 2005 01:38 pm
hamburger wrote:
"Under cover of a sandstorm, heavily armed Shia militia marched into Baghdad City Hall on Monday and announced a change in civic administration".

i wonder where the u.s. liberators were when the mayor was ousted ? hbg


Troops stay in their own fortified areas mostly, only coming out for special operations. They do not mount patrols, it's too costly in terms of men killed.
0 Replies
 
Cycloptichorn
 
  1  
Reply Sun 14 Aug, 2005 01:56 pm
Our boat has been leaking for a long time; better to admit it.

Cycloptichorn
0 Replies
 
cicerone imposter
 
  1  
Reply Sun 14 Aug, 2005 01:58 pm
Several ships full havelready sunk, and more are expected to drown. Unfortunately, there are still many Americans who think "it's worth it."
0 Replies
 
 

Related Topics

Obama '08? - Discussion by sozobe
Let's get rid of the Electoral College - Discussion by Robert Gentel
McCain's VP: - Discussion by Cycloptichorn
The 2008 Democrat Convention - Discussion by Lash
McCain is blowing his election chances. - Discussion by McGentrix
Snowdon is a dummy - Discussion by cicerone imposter
Food Stamp Turkeys - Discussion by H2O MAN
TEA PARTY TO AMERICA: NOW WHAT?! - Discussion by farmerman
 
Copyright © 2025 MadLab, LLC :: Terms of Service :: Privacy Policy :: Page generated in 0.04 seconds on 07/21/2025 at 09:01:27