Re snood's question about Bush going to the Azores:
March 17, 2003
In Iraq Drama, Cheney Emerges
As President's War Counselor
As Bush Pursued Diplomacy, Vice President
Made Certain Invasion Remained on Table
By JEANNE CUMMINGS and GREG HITT
Staff Reporters of THE WALL STREET JOURNAL
WASHINGTON -- Last September, President Bush set out on two tracks for dealing with Iraq that were never going to be easy to reconcile.
On Sept. 12, the president stood before the United Nations and asked for new Security Council resolutions calling on Iraq to peacefully disarm. But two days earlier, Mr. Bush had received a proposal to deal with Iraq in a manner more favored by his influential vice president, Dick Cheney: an updated plan for invasion.
The divergence of the two paths was fully apparent Sunday, when Mr. Bush joined his two closest allies on the Azores Islands and called on the United Nations to immediately fall in line behind the unconditional disarmament of Saddam Hussein, by force if necessary.
"Tomorrow [Monday] is a moment of truth for the world," declared Mr. Bush, flanked by British Prime Minister Tony Blair and Spanish Prime Minister Jose Maria Aznar. Their joint news conference made clear that without U.N. action in the next 24 hours, the military option would become the only one left on the table.
It's also clear in retrospect that Mr. Bush always harbored doubts about what the diplomatic route could produce -- and that Mr. Cheney has quietly reinforced those doubts. At crucial points in the last eight months, he has stepped up internally with qualms about relying on the U.N. to finish what he considered to be an American job -- and has sown doubts about the usefulness of the U.N. at all.
BUILDING THE WAR FRONT
March 6, 20031: Bush says U.S. will act without U.N. authorization.
Jan. 312: In a tense appearance with British Prime Minister Tony Blair, Bush reluctantly agrees to seek a second U.N. resolution paving the way to war.
Jan. 303: Cheney: "Our purpose is not simply to follow a process ... the course of this nation does not depend upon the decisions of others."
Dec. 19, 20024: Pentagon prepares a series of deployment orders that will wind up sending more than 250,000 troops to the Persian Gulf region.
Nov. 85: U.N. Resolution 1441 passes, threatens "serious consequences" if Iraq fails to disarm.
Sept. 126: Bush urges U.N. to confront "grave and gathering danger" of Iraq, says U.S. will act alone if necessary.
Sept. 107: General Tommy Franks delivers updated Iraq invasion plans.
Source: USAID documents and contracts
While much attention in the move toward war with Iraq has been focused on the roles played by Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, Secretary of State Colin Powell and national-security adviser Condoleezza Rice, the vice president has played the largest role of all. That dynamic was clear Sunday, as the Iraq drama reached its final act. The two most overpowering pictures were of Mr. Bush at a summit meeting and Mr. Cheney, after nearly a month out of public view, emerging to make the case for war with lengthy interviews on national television.
"There's no question but [that] we're close to the end, if you will, of the diplomatic efforts," Mr. Cheney told NBC's Meet the Press. In one stark comment, he also made clear his underlying views of the U.N. "I don't think we damaged the United Nations. I think the United Nations up until now has proven incapable of dealing with the threat that Saddam Hussein represents."
As the Iraq drama unfolds, Mr. Cheney has become the war counselor with the lowest profile but the highest credibility with Mr. Bush. Repeatedly, he has defined the bottom line for U.S. policy: Mr. Hussein's prompt removal from power, with or without a broad international coalition.
Messrs. Bush and Cheney have shared that goal since shortly after the Sept. 11, 2001, terrorist attacks made vivid the threat posed by anti-American terrorists who might obtain weapons of mass destruction. Before then, the administration had been content to contain Mr. Hussein. A debate over whether to join with Iraqi exiles in a renewed push for regime change languished inside the State Department. Mr. Bush never really addressed the question directly, for it never was pushed up to him.
Even after Sept. 11, the White House initially postponed its move toward regime change to keep focused on its war against al Qaeda and the Taliban in Afghanistan. "We've got Saddam Hussein bottled up for now," Mr. Cheney said at the time.
But with little public notice, Mr. Cheney began working on the Iraq issue with a new dedication. He quietly sought out experts on the politics and culture of the country. He reached out to Iraqi exiles such as Iraqi National Congress leader Ahmed Chalabi, an Iraqi exile whose family led the country decades ago and who seeks to lead a post-Hussein Iraq. And he began hosting a series of small dinner parties -- some at his elegant official residence in Washington and others at the "undisclosed locations" where he'd been secluded for security reasons -- to share ideas with anti-Hussein intellectuals such as Princeton University scholar Bernard Lewis, Johns Hopkins University professor Fouad Ajami and conservative author Victor David Hanson.
Intellectual Support
The hard line struck at these gatherings provided intellectual support for Mr. Bush's own instincts. As the defense secretary in the first Bush administration, which closed the first Persian Gulf War without removing Mr. Hussein from power, Mr. Cheney had been called on for years to account for that decision. In the months after the Sept. 11 attacks, Mr. Rumsfeld adopted a wicked grin once when he prodded the vice president to admit to a crowded room of Pentagon employees that "not going to Baghdad" was one decision he regretted from his stint as Pentagon chief. "Yeah, I guess you're right," the vice president responded.
The policy debate over Iraq came to a full boil once war with Afghanistan subsided in the middle of last year. By late summer, it was becoming clear to insiders that the administration and the Republican Party were split on the question of how to proceed. Privately, Secretary of State Powell urged Mr. Bush to seek the assent of the United Nations before moving against Mr. Hussein.
By mid-August, Mr. Bush realized that he had to deal with the split. In a teleconference of leading administration figures that he conducted from his Crawford, Texas, ranch, Mr. Bush heard out the debate between Mr. Cheney and Mr. Powell. Initially, Mr. Powell seemed to gain the upper hand as the president agreed to seek U.N. approval in a scheduled speech at the U.N.
Mr. Cheney promptly moved to make sure nobody thought the U.N. solution and inspections would supplant Mr. Bush's ultimate goal of disarmament and regime change. In a speech to a veterans' convention in Nashville in late August, he said: "A person would be right to question any suggestion that we should just get inspectors back into Iraq, and then our worries will be over," Mr. Cheney said. "On the contrary, there is a great danger that it would provide false comfort that Saddam was somehow 'back in the box,' " the vice president said.
Mr. Bush was annoyed at the appearance of public discord, if not at Mr. Cheney's reasoning. And within three weeks, it appeared that Mr. Cheney had lost the debate to Mr. Powell. On Sept. 12, President Bush asked the U.N. for the "necessary resolutions" to authorize new action against Iraq.
Parallel Path
In fact, Mr. Bush was proceeding on a parallel path to military preparations that Mr. Cheney favored. Two days before the U.S. submitted Security Council Resolution 1441 calling on Iraq to disarm, an updated plan for military action from Defense Secretary Rumsfeld and General Tommy Franks landed on Mr. Bush's desk.
Mr. Powell's drive for diplomacy helped the administration win authorization to use force from Congress on Oct. 8. In private meetings with lawmakers through the fall, Mr. Bush acknowledged the appeal of acting through a coalition rather than simply imposing a U.S.-British military solution. Mr. Cheney argued that broad support wasn't necessary.
Throughout, Mr. Cheney was often absent from the public stage, fueling perceptions that security concerns had once again forced him to the "undisclosed locations" to which he repaired after the Sept. 11 attacks. In fact, his low profile stemmed from his belief that he can best serve Mr. Bush by offering advice privately.
The Security Council's unanimous endorsement of Resolution 1441 fostered an initial impression that the debate -- both within the administration, and between the U.S. and its allies -- had been settled. But it flared anew in early December when Mr. Hussein sent a 12,000-page report to the Security Council claiming he possessed no weapons of mass destruction. The next month, Mr. Powell himself began siding publicly with administration hawks after receiving a hostile lecture at the U.N. from the French foreign minister, the first unmistakable sign that France would prove an intransigent opponent of the war.
But Mr. Bush by then had already cast his lot with Messrs. Cheney and Rumsfeld by quietly directing the deployment of a critical mass of U.S. troops. By the end of February, they would number 250,000.
In new public remarks -- before a group of conservatives in a Virginia hotel ballroom -- Mr. Cheney once again warned the international community that the diplomatic effort wouldn't distract the U.S. from its ultimate aims. "Our purpose is not simply to follow a process, it is to end the terrible threats to the civilized world," he said.
That hard line didn't help Mr. Bush's staunchest ally, Mr. Blair, when they appeared in a joint news conference at the White House. Mr. Blair wanted Mr. Bush to take several steps to mollify opponents in Britain and across Europe. In the last two weeks, Mr. Bush, Mr. Powell and Mr. Blair have worked frantically to build support for a resolution that would set stiff requirements for Mr. Hussein to demonstrate, in short order, that he's ready to disarm.
Largely Aloof
Mr. Cheney has remained largely aloof from the process. He made a pitch for the second resolution in a call to Angola's president and a private meeting with Russian President Vladimir Putin's chief of staff. But Mr. Cheney has spent much more time smoothing the way for military action and occupation. He placed a call to Turkish leader Racep Tayyip Edogan aimed at winning, at a minimum, the use of Turkish airspace in an attack on Iraq and, at best, gaining permission to move U.S. ground troops onto Turkish soil; that attempt has so far been fruitless.
Those close to him say the vice president is spending more time monitoring homeland-security efforts on the eve of war, and working closely with Mr. Rumsfeld to iron out last-minute adjustments to the war plans. The vice president has also taken a significant role in planning for the postwar rebuilding of Iraq.
In the last week of February, Mr. Cheney met here with the president of Azerbaijan to see if troops from that secular Muslim nation could serve in a peacekeeping role in postwar Iraq. And he has participated in a new internal debate with Mr. Powell on the role of Iraqi exiles in any new government.
State Department and CIA officials mistrust the wealthy, American-educated Mr. Chalabi, who was convicted in a Jordanian banking scandal more than a decade ago. But Mr. Cheney and his senior staff have remained stubborn advocates of Mr. Chalabi, a man they first got to know in the mid-1990s at the barbecues and golf games held at private seminars hosted by groups such as the Aspen Institute.
In the tug-of-war, the State Department has managed to quash any hopes Mr. Chalabi or other exile leaders may have held out for an appointed presidency similar to that of Afghan President Hamid Karzai. But the exiles remain undaunted, as are the vice president's senior aides. Mr. Cheney's senior aides are also regrouping -- lobbying the Pentagon to team U.S. administrators with some of the Iraqi exiles, including Mr. Chalabi.
Last month, Mr. Cheney joined Mr. Bush at an Oval Office meeting with three representatives from the Iraq exile community. Mr. Bush peppered them with questions about how the U.S. "could do this right." The visitors differed, with some arguing for elevation of the Iraqi exiles while Mr. Mukhlis said Iraqis still in the country should take on more-important roles than the exiles. As is typical, Mr. Cheney said very little during the meeting.
The last act of the diplomatic endgame has remained a subject for debate into its final hours. Administration officials say Mr. Powell doesn't want to force a Security Council vote that faces certain defeat, fearing long-term damage to the U.N. and American alliances. Mr. Cheney and his allies would be happy to force Security Council members to "show their cards," as Mr. Bush put it in a recent news conference.
He is also content to endure the barbs of world opinion to achieve the goal he shares with the president. Noting his own Western heritage, Mr. Cheney said on NBC Sunday that "the notion that the president is a cowboy ... is not necessarily a bad idea. He cuts to the chase ... . The leaders who will set the world, if you will, on a new course, deal effectively with these kinds of threats we've never faced before, will be somebody exactly like President Bush."
Write to Jeanne Cummings at
[email protected] and Greg Hitt at
[email protected]
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