THE FRIGATE

FRIGATES THEN

Before the Reformation, all of Europe north of Serbia and west of Russia was of a single religious conviction (more or less, excluding sectaries regarded as heretical). What has this to do with warships? One need inquire of the Dutch. In the centuries preceding their uprising against their Spanish masters in the 16th century, the Dutch had made a very good if difficult and dangerous living fishing in the North Sea and the north Atlantic, providing Europe with the salt cod and pickled herring which made meat-less Lent bearable and reasonably nutritious. On one of the two primary scales of storm and wind speed, the highest storm level is not "hurricane," it is "winter, north Atlantic." In those long ago winters, before each Lenten season, Dutch sailors would literally risk their lives to provide Europe with its Lenten fish, and incidentally, developed both the seamanship skills and ship design techniques which would one day make them, briefly, the masters of the world's oceans. A ship's master had to be truly a sailor, and his ship very well-built, to survive those waters in the best of times, and especially in the early winter, when it was the time for the herring fleets to make their hauls.

When, after the Reformation, the Dutch rebelled against their Spanish masters, in an eighty-four year revolution (1564 to 1648), the Spanish were then considered not only the masters of much of Europe, but of much of the world. Their ill-disciplined and savage infantry, the tercios, were everywhere dreaded, and their ships plied the waters of the world, especially of the New World, to bring to Seville the productions and spices of the east, and the gold and silver of America. Columbus' ships, Nina, Santa Clara (affectionately nicknamed Pinta by the little fleet) and Santa Maria were, respectively, two caravels (an Italian design) and a nao (the flagship, a Portugese design, this type of ship was also known as a carrack). The Spanish did not excell at ship design, and militarily, they were accustomed to use galleys, driven by oars and sails, and on (relative to the Atlantic) the placid waters of the Mediterranean. This affected their naval tactical doctrine, as well--which was to lay a heavy broadside of cannon fire into the opponent, and then ram and board her. For their trans-Atlantic voyages, they had developed an all-purpose ship style, the galleon. This ship was a pig--it wallowed heavily; with high freeboard (lots of wood above the waterline), she could afford to wallow, even in heavy seas. But it was a poor sailing ship, and the conversion of it to warship simply made matters worse, although the Spaniard seems not to have realized it for almost two centuries.

As the Dutch had waxed wealthy from the large-scale fish industry, they had begun to challenge the north German trading costers, Hansa, which was an alliance of north German and easter Baltic ports (with largely German populations) which had dominated the carrying trade. The carrying trade simply means that the productions of any region are carried, for profitable fees, to the intended destinations. Hansa had relied upon a small ship, a cog, which was little more than an elongated tub with sails. The Dutch improved upon the design: they lengthened the keel, added more freeboard, stepped high masts to carry more sail, and reinforced the hull. The result, the fluyt, can probably be reasonably described as the best merchant vessel in the world for most of three centuries. When trade necessitated going in harm's way, the Dutch had a modified version of this ship, which was reiforced for combat, and had a narrower hull to improve the sailing qualities. It could not carry the cargo of the standard fluyt, but it could ship guns, and put up a good fight against pirates--a problem in the world's seas for millenia. The English adopted this ship almost exclusively as a war ship--although they often used it as the Dutch did, as an armed merchantman--and called it a snow.

For all of their fine sailing qualities, snows were too small to take on a well-armed galleon, and late in the sixteenth century, the Dutch went to work on this design, and produced what was to be one of the finest ships in the history of the world's navies. This was the frigate. The early frigates had the high freeboard of the snow, although considerably less than the snow or the fluyt, and were narrower still than the snows. They shipped more guns, in the early days, 12 to 18 of them. (In the heyday of the frigate, 32 to 36 guns was common, and the giant American frigates shipped 32 to 44 guns, but more on that later.) This was sufficient fire power to challenge the galleons, and the Dutch easily made the transition to commerce raiding. It helped to finance their rebellion, and inflicted serious losses on their opponents.

The armada which became famous in English history was not originally intended for an invasion of England. Confusion at the highest levels meant that even after this motley fleet sailed, it was still undetermined how much force would be used against the English. Its original and continuing mission was to reiforce the Duke of Parma in the low countries, who was fighting the Dutch on land. As the frigate and the snow had made the Dutch so formidable at sea, the armada was comprised of several war galleons to reinforce the galleys which escorted the trade galleons transporting troops and supplies to the Duke of Parma. The artillery on board was dual-purpose, intended for Parma's use, but mounted on ship's gun carriages for the voyage. The gun tubes were extraordinarily long by naval standards, and proved to be so unweildy, that the Spanish only managed one broadside from most ships, and two from a few of them, in the one surface engagement they had with the English. The gun carriages were so long, it was necessary to pull them back, and then turn them parralell to the ship's center line to load them. By contrast, the English, in their frigates and snows, had the standard Dutch dedicated naval guns, with slightly shorter gun tubes, and drastically smaller, but taller, gun carriages, which could be allowed to run back from the recoil of firing the gun, and loaded in situ, to be run up to the gun port and fired again. The English darted in and out of the slower moving ships at the tail end of the armada, spraying round shot and chain. (The later is a charming adaptation: it was two small cannonballs joined by a welded iron chain, wrapped around a dowell inserted between two round wooden plugs. When fired, only at short range, the wood quickly splinters, injuring and killing enemy crew, and the two cannonballs, joined by the chain, gyrate wildly through the rigging and sails, badly damaging the enemy's ability to sail.) They would then run out of range before any of the cumbersome galleons could present and fire a broadside (before the invention of the gun turret, it was necessary to "aim the ship" to fire at the opponent).

The armada was eventually badly damaged only when the English loaded up hulks with wood and pitch, and sent fire-ships into them one night--thereafter, nature took care of the survivors with a storm which many have described as a hurricane, although i am dubious about that. But the sailing qualities of the frigates and snows was sharply pointed up early in the running gun battle in which the English and the Spanish engaged for almost a week. The English had been sheltering in the Solent, a deep water passage on the eastern shore of the Isle of Wight. The Spanish attempted to follow them in, but could not turn across the wind without throwing the entire fleet into confusion--when they attempted it, collisions abounded. For a frigate or a snow to cross the wind, she turns away from the wind briefly, filling her sails and speeding up. Then the helm is put over to windward, the sails are reefed (shortened by pulling about two thirds of them up and tying them temporarily to the spar from which they hang). The momentum of the ship will swing the nose across the wind, and the reefed sails, which have not spilled the air behind them, will by the actions of the laws of physics, turn away from the the wind, filling again, and giving the bow of the ship a "boost" in the turn. Sail can then be lowered and the ship is now sailing, with a decent amount of speed, on a heading ninety degrees from the original heading. The Spanish galleons could not master this manoevre, all of their sails were square sails, while the frigate and the snow had lanteen (trapezoidal) sails on the mizzen (rear) mast and jibs on the boom at the bow. Those sails remain filled with air for all but a few seconds of the turn. The square sails of the galleons, even when reefed, simply did not hold enough air pressure to complete the turn. Many galleons would come up to the wind, and fall off again (turn back in the direction from which the turn had originally been attempted).

Although pride, arrogance or simple stupidity seems to have blinded the Spaniard, the rest of Europe's naval experts took note. The frigate had arrived. Line of battle ships evolved from the frigate, sailing with much less grace and ease, but shipping from 50 to 120 guns. But the frigate remained the athlete of navies across Europe. With more fire power than any ship but a line of battle ship, and as good as or better sailing qualities than any potential opponent, the frigate became the all-purpose bruiser of European navies. The French, who excelled at perfecting the designs of others, became the acknowledged European master builders of frigates: English commanders liked nothing better than to be given a captured French frigate. In particular, La Victoire, a frigate built at the time of the American revolution, was a ship design masterpiece. French voluteers sailing for America were carried in her, and she attracted a good deal of attention when she called at Philadelphia.

After America achieved her independence, the Philadelphia shipyards began to build frigates on commission from the Congress, and the same designs were used in shipyards in Boston and New York. One design problem of all ships is a quality known as "hogging." A true ship has three or more masts. With the weight of the masts forward and aft, the keel tends to bow upward in the center ("hogging") which puts undue stress on all structural members and reduces sailing performance. In the Philadelphia shipyards, this problem was addressed. Hogging is not really a problem with merchant ships, which are relatively broad in the beam (proportionately wider) than warships--and do not therefore, "hog" as badly, and they usually carry less sail, which means far less weight: consider, if you will, the weight of a heavy canvas sail soaked in salt water spray. Line of battle ships were also broader in the beam than frigates, and didn't rely upon superior sailing qualities, they relied upon the ability to slug it out at close range. But the frigates were good sailers because of a strange mix of other ship design qualities. They carried the tall masts and crowded on the thousands of square feet of sail which was characteristic of the fluyt. They were slim, narrow in the beam like a sloop, and carrying a fore-and-aft sail (the lanteen) at the stern, and jibs at the bow, with stay sails (triangular sails like jibs) between the masts. This means that a frigate carried relatively more sail than any other ship type, with taller (and consequently heavier) masts. Hogging is exagerated in the frigate. In Philadelphia, the problem was solved by means acceptable in a warship, which is not designed to carry cargo. In the hold, heavy oak beams were run from beam to beam (perpendicular to the center line of the ship) from the gun deck to the keel where the main mast is stepped (inserted into the keel). From stem and stern, similar beams were run to the main mast foot. Then four beams were run, each at 45 degrees to the centerline, from the gun deck to the main mast foot. This helped to reduce, almost to nothing, the warping effect of all of the weight of mast and sail, and virtually eliminated hogging in the American frigates. By the days of the swan song of the sail-powered fighting vessel, in mid-nineteenth century, all war ships had this reinforcement, but it was a part of the American "secret weapon" in the naval war of 1812. In Constitution, which one can visit in Boston harbor, those beams are 26" oak. At a time when 36 or 38 guns in the main battery (most ships piled on extra guns) was standard, Constitution was rated at 44 guns. This approaches the fire power of a third-rater line of battle ship, weighing it at 50 guns. Additionally, Constitution's main battery was comprised of "long 24's," meaning guns with long gun tubes, designed for long range accuracy, using a solid shot weighing 24 pounds. They could, of course, be loaded with chain (for destroying the enemy's sails and rigging) or grape shot (for killing the enemy crew) as the commander saw fit. English frigates of the day mounted long 16's--on more than one occassion, the difference in the size of the ordnance determined the outcome of actions between American and English sloops of war and frigates, as a long 24 is accurate at about one half mile greater range than a long 16. The American frigates could not only "out-sail" their opponents, they could out-shoot them. Essex, out of Boston, which single-handedly destroyed the English whaling industry, was destoyed by two English frigates mounting long-16's, while Essex had been (foolishly, in my opinion) equipped with carronades--guns of larger calibre, but much shorter range than long guns. Admiral David Farragut of American civil war fame was one of the "ship's boys" on Essex, sailing with her at age 12. His memoirs provide a fascinating glimpse into the era of the wind-powered fighting ships. The English bitterly accused the Americans of using "razees," which is to say, cut-down line of battle ships. This was absurd, because the Americans could not afford, and had never built a line of battle ship, and the sailing qualities of the American frigates gave the lie to this tale. By the end of that war, English frigates were ordered not to engage Constitution unless in the company of at least two consorts. Constitution took Cyane (36 guns) after disabling one of the sloops of war in her consort and running the other off.

But the arrival of steam power numbered the useful days left to the frigate. Ironclads, torpedo boats, torpedo boat destoyers and behemoths like Dreadnought drove the memory of the frigate from naval minds for a century.

FRIGATES NOW

Then came the Second World War. In Canada, the Prime Minister, Mackenzie-King, was determined that his nation would not pay the price they had paid in the First World War--when 60,000 were killed, and an equal number maimed for life. Although Canadian soldiers certainly participated in large numbers, and made a significant contribution, the PM's thoughts were concentrated on the Royal Canadian Navy. In that war, Canada escorted more merchanmen on the Atlantic crossing than the United States and Royal Navies combined. The men of that navy called themselves the "sheepdog" navy, and the English made a point of looking down their naval nose at them. The Canadians could build minesweepers and corvettes (the latter is an armed ship about the size of a large, privately-owned cabin cruiser) in Great Lakes shipyards, and get them to sea in the days before the the St. Laurent Seaway. But they could not build a ship as large as a destroyer in those lakes and put to sea with it. Their ship yard facilities on the St. Laurent below La Chine and at Halifax were scant, but they were expanded after the war began. But the RCN still thought of itself as an auxilliary to the Royal Navy, and they bought destroyers from the English. When the Canadadian crews showed exceptional efficiency and spirit, the English took those ships and crews and included them in the RN's "hunter-killer groups," which hunted German U-boats. The Canadians' initial material contribution was the "tribal class" destroyers (so called because they were named after first nations tribes), but these were largely poor copies of English designs. In comparison to American and Japanese destoyers of that war, the English were about ten years behind the times. Later, the Canadians built the "river class" destoyers, meaning that that class of destoyers were all named for Canadian rivers. The English liked them, but complained that they were too small, not much larger than an American destoyer escort. Nevertheless, the Royal Navy expropriated those destroyers and their crews.

The Canadian answer was to "re-invent" the frigate. Although the development came too late to make a big impact on the war (the Royal Navy would steal any good ships and crews the Canadians came up with--eventually, Canadian destoyers and frigates were at the heart of the three groups which patrolled the English Channel), the Canadians have developed the design in the post-war years, and have made ASW (anti-submarine warfare) frigates the major contribution they have made to NATO's naval forces. The design has been so successful that both the USN and the RN have copied it, although i doubt they would admit to copying from a "poor relation." The American destoyer escort of the Second World War was a long, slim, but shorter and much less well-armed version of its larger cousin, and was conceived as an all-purpose vessel like the destoryer. But the Canadian frigate was a purpose-built ship from the outset, designed to hunt submarines. Canadian coastal waters are some of the most varied and difficult waters in the world. Temperature variants and cross currents are like no others in the world, and gave the Canadians fits when trying to hunt U-boats off Halifax and St. John's in that war. The frigate is shorter than the destoryer escort, and although the hull is more hydro-dynamically efficient than the destroyers, it is more of a tear-drop shape, broader at the beam and afore the beam than the destroyer escort. This accomodates the electronics which the English and Americans have developed for ASW, and which the Canadians have adapted for the frigates and perfected. Additionally, the Canadian frigates all have highly-sophisticated communications equipment packages, on the principal that any one of them can serve as the combat control center of any group into which it is put. The RCN's frigates last saw combat in the first Gulf War, when Canada's Navy was given the task of logistical coordination at sea. When an American cruiser grounded near Basra in that war, it was a Canadian frigate which was sent to protect her until she could be pulled off, being the only heavily armed ship available which could operate in those shallow waters and still provide surface and anti-aircraft fire power. The Canadians have resurrected the frigate.